

CHAPTER VIII

Marking Time (April-June 1953)

The Peace Talks Resume—Operation LITTLE SWITCH—Interval Before the Marines Go Off the Line—The May Relief—Training While in Reserve and Division Change of Command—Heavy May-June Fighting—Developments in Marine Air—Other Marine Defense Activities—The Division Is Ordered Back to the Front

*The Peace Talks Resume*¹

IT WAS APRIL 1953, but it wasn't an April Fool's mirage. On 6 April, representatives of the United Nations Command and the Communist delegation sat down at the Panmunjom truce tents to resume the peace talks that had been stalemated six months—since October 1952. If there was a word that could be said to reflect the attitude of American officials and private citizens alike—for that matter, the atmosphere at Panmunjom itself—it was one of caution—not real optimism, not an unbridled hopefulness, but a wearied caution born of the mountains of words, gulfs of free-flowing dialogue and diatribe, and then ultimate plateaus of intransigence that had marked negotiations with Communist leaders since the original truce discussions had begun in July 1951.

Diplomatic maneuverings had been underway since the end of 1952 for the exchange of sick and wounded prisoners of both sides. This was considered a first step towards ending the prisoner of war

¹ Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 6, Chap. 9; 1stMarDiv, 1st EngrBn ComdDs, Apr 53; Berger, *Korea Knot*; Clark, *Danube to Yalu*; Hermes, *Truce Tent*; Leckie, *Conflict*; M/Sgt Robert T. Fugate, "Freedom Village," *Leatherneck*, v. 36, no. 7 (Jul 53), hereafter Fugate, "Freedom Village."

dispute and achieving an ultimate truce. A resolution introduced in mid-November by India at the United Nations session dealing with settlement of nonrepatriate prisoners had been adopted in early December. Later that month the Red Cross international conference had officially gone on record favoring the exchange of sick and wounded prisoners in advance of a truce. A letter written on 22 February by the UNC commander, General Clark, calling for the immediate exchange of ailing prisoners had been delivered to the NKPA and CCF leaders.

Initially, the Communist answer was an oppressive silence that lasted for more than a month. During this time the Communist hierarchy had been stunned by the death, on 5 March, of Premier Stalin. Then, on 28 March, in a letter that reached General Clark at Tokyo in the middle of the night, came an unexpected response from the two Communist spokesmen. They not only agreed unconditionally to an exchange of the sick and injured prisoners but further proposed that "the delegates for armistice negotiations of both sides immediately resume the negotiations at Panmunjom."²

This favorable development astonished not only the United Nations Commander but the rest of the Free World as well. Several steps were quickly put in motion. The UN Commander's reply to the Kim-Peng offer was expressed in such a way that resumption of full negotiations was not tied in as a condition for the preliminary exchange of ailing POWs. President Eisenhower, commenting on the new Communist proposals at his 2 April press conference, stated he thought the country should "now take at face value every offer made to us until it is proved unworthy of our confidence."³ He also further enjoined major military commanders and subordinates to avoid anything that might be contrary to this view when they made public remarks or issued press releases.

In Korea, the Munsan-ni Provisional Command was established on 5 April under the Commanding General, Eighth Army, in the vicinity of the 1st Marine Division railhead at Munsan-ni. The command was to prepare for the many housekeeping details involved in the receiving and orderly processing of all UNC prisoners. The anticipated exchange itself was dubbed Operation LITTLE SWITCH.

² Leckie, *Conflict*, p. 373.

³ CG, Eighth Army msg to CG, 1stMarDiv and others, dtd 4 Apr 53, in 1stMarDiv ComdD, Apr 53, App. I, p. 1.

Two Army officers, one Marine Corps, and one ROKA representative were designed to direct the administrative machinery of the provisional command. Heading the organization was Colonel Raymond W. Beggs, USA.

The Marine representative, Colonel Wallace M. Nelson, was named commanding officer of the United Nations Personnel and Medical Processing Unit. His responsibility was not limited to the obvious medical aspects of the exchange, but extended to other details involving clothing issue, personnel, security, chaplains, food, communication, motor transport, engineering, and the operation of unit headquarters. Among those matters to which the Munsan-ni command directed its immediate attention was the setting up of a temporary facility for Communist prisoners currently held in UNC camps at Koje, Cheju, and Yongcho Islands and a hospital near Pusan. Arrangements were also made for an interpreter pool, debriefing teams, and press center facilities.

As the new week began on Monday, 6 April, and the world looked to Panmunjom for the next set of signals in the war, a new stage developed in the truce negotiations. Within five days after the talks had begun, both sides agreed to return the disabled prisoners in their custody. Final papers for the preliminary exchange were signed at noon on 11 April by Rear Admiral John C. Daniel, USN, for the United Nations Command, and Major General Lee Sang Cho, of the Communist delegation. The week-long transfer of sick and wounded POWs was scheduled to begin 20 April, at Panmunjom.

The Communists announced they intended to release 600 sick and wounded UNC prisoners (450 Korean, 150 non-Korean), a figure which Admiral Daniel called "incredibly small."⁴ For its part, the UNC indicated that it planned to free nearly ten times that number of North Korean and Chinese POWs. Communist and Allied representatives also agreed that truce talks would be resumed at Panmunjom, once the prisoner exchange was completed.

Security precautions went into effect at both Panmunjom⁵ and the

⁴ Hermes, *Truce Tent*, p. 415.

⁵ With resumption of truce negotiations, the 1st Marines, whose left battalion sector was immediately adjacent to the Panmunjom neutral zone between the two battle lines, took certain precautionary measures. The regiment set up radio communication with the UN base camp at Munsan and reactivated its rescue task force. This unit was on alert to evacuate the UN truce team from Panmunjom in the event of Communist hostile action or any threat to security. While the talks were in session, a forward covering

entire Munsan-ni area, 10 miles southeast, on the first day of the prisoner talks. All facilities at both Panmunjom and Munsan-ni were placed off limits to Eighth Army personnel not directly involved in the operations. Regulations were strictly enforced. Even before the negotiations opened at Panmunjom, actual construction work for LITTLE SWITCH was well under way by Marine engineers. "Operation RAINBOW," as the building of the facilities for the POW exchange was called, began 5 April.

In a little over a day—actually 31 working hours—a task force of less than 100 Marine construction personnel had erected the entire Freedom Village POW recovery station at Munsan-ni. The special work detachment was composed of men from Company A, 1st Shore Party Battalion, under Major Charles E. Gocke, and attached to the engineer battalion; utility personnel from Headquarters and Service Companies; and a Company D platoon, 1st Engineer Battalion.⁶

Early Sunday morning the Marines moved their giant bulldozers, earth movers, pans, and other heavy duty equipment into Munsan-ni. Ground leveling started at 0800 and work continued around the clock until 0100 Monday. After a five-hour break the men dug in again at 0600 and worked uninterruptedly until 2000 that night. Furniture, tentage, and strongbacking stored at the 1st Engineer Battalion command post, meanwhile, had been transported and emplaced. When it was all done the Freedom Village complex, like ancient Gaul, had been divided into three parts. The command area comprised receiving lines, processing and press tents, and related facilities for United Nations troops. Adjacent to this was the 45th Mobile Army Surgical Hospital tent, completely wood-decked, equipped for mass examinations and emergency treatment. Across the road from the UN site proper was the area reserved for returning South Korean prisoners, who would form the bulk of the repatriates.

Altogether the three camp areas represented some 35,100 square feet of hospital tentage, 84 squad tents, and 5 wall tents. Gravel to

group, composed of a reinforced rifle company and 1st Tank Battalion platoon, occupied the high ground east of Panmunjom at COP 2. Here the Marine rescue force maintained close surveillance of the enemy in the Panmunjom peace corridor as well as the safe arrival and departure of the UN truce team shuttled in by helicopter or motor convoy. 1stMar ComdD, Apr 53, pp. 5, 14 and App. II, pp. 1-4.

⁶ The battalion's new commanding officer was Lieutenant Colonel Francis "X" Witt, Jr., who a week earlier had succeeded Lieutenant Colonel Francis W. Augustine.

surface three miles of standard combat road, plus two miles of electrical wiring, was hauled and installed. More than 100 signs, painted in Korean and English, were erected, as well as the large one that stretched clear across the road at the Freedom Village entrance. Six welcome signs were raised above the UN and ROK processing tents, while another mammoth Korean-English sign was installed at the Panmunjom exchange site.

Special areas for ambulance parking; helicopter landing strips; five 50-foot flagpoles; graded access roads and foot paths; sanitation facilities; and storage areas for food, blankets, and medical supplies were also constructed. And timing was important. It had been anticipated that the prisoner exchange might take place on short notice. For this reason 1st Marine Division work and processing teams had conducted their rehearsals so that they could complete all duties within 36 hours after first receiving the "go ahead" signal for the switch.

Operation LITTLE SWITCH⁷

Nine days after the truce talks were temporarily suspended, 11 April, Operation LITTLE SWITCH (code-named Little Swap) began the morning of Monday, 20 April. By the time it ended on 26 April, a total of 6,670 North Korean and Chinese Communist prisoners had been returned by the UNC. The enemy released 684 captives,⁸ of whom 149 were Americans. Among them were 15 Marines, 3 Navy corpsmen who had been attached to the 1st Marine Division, and a Navy aviator. The first day Allied prisoners—walking, some hobbling along on crutches, and others carried on litters—were delivered in two groups. The initial 50 men reached Panmunjom at 0825, and the second group, two hours later. The first Marine freed

⁷ Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 6, Chap 9; Commander Naval Forces, Far East (ComNavFE), "Operation Little Switch-Apr 53"; ComNavFE Rpt of Intelligence Processing; ComNavFE Rpt, 24 Jul 53; FMFPac ComdD, Apr 53 (#1); FMFPac ComdD, May 53 (Pt. 2), rpt LtCol Fisher to CG, FMFPac, subj, "Debriefing of Returned POWs"; 1stMarDiv ComdD, Apr 53; MacDonald, *POW*; Clark, *Danube to Yalu*; Hermes, *Truce Tent*; Leckie, *Conflict*; Fugate, "Freedom Village"; *New York Times*, 19-21 Apr 53; *Washington Post*, 19-21 Apr 53.

⁸ The 684 UNC prisoners returned in LITTLE SWITCH represented 471 South Koreans, 149 Americans, 32 British, 15 Turks, 6 Colombians, 5 Australians, 2 Canadians, 1 Greek, 1 South African, 1 Filipino, and 1 Netherlander.

was Private Alberto Pizarro-Baez, H/3/7, a Puerto Rican, who had been captured at Frisco in the early October 1952 outpost clashes. Later that day, another POW taken in the same action, Private Louis A. Pumphrey, was also released.

Early moments of the exchange were tense as UNC sick and wounded captives were shipped in a long line of CCF ambulances from Kaesong, five miles northwest of Panmunjom, down the neutral corridor past enemy lines to the exchange point. Despite the fact that all official papers and agreements had been concluded more than a week earlier, no one was absolutely sure until the last moment that the prisoner exchange would actually take place. The mechanics of the transfer operation itself, as it turned out, went off practically without hitch. One minor unsavory incident had occurred when 50 North Korean prisoners in UNC custody en route from Pusan to Panmunjom, had dumped their mess kits into garbage cans, noisily complaining about breakfast.

There was also a long taut moment of uneasy silence when the first Communist ambulance pulled up in front of the Panmunjom receiving center. An American MP, who in the excitement had gotten his orders confused, forgot to tell the enemy driver where to turn. The ambulance almost went past the center. A UN officer raced out to the road and motioned to the driver, who backed around and pulled into the parking lot.

One of the first things the liberated POWs saw was the big sign "Welcome Gate to Freedom" raised the preceding night over the Panmunjom receiving tents. Here they could get a cup of coffee and momentarily relax before starting the long one-and-a-half hour ambulance trip south to Freedom Village. The returnees were outfitted in blue Communist greatcoats, utilities, caps, and tennis shoes. Some of the men were bearded; some wore thin smiles; some had half-hidden tears in their eyes. Primarily, there was a subdued and businesslike air to the day's proceedings, however, with a marked absence of levity. Admiral Daniel, whose UNC liaison group had negotiated the exchange, in commenting on the smoothness of the first day's operation observed: "It's been a tremendous emotional experience for us all. Not much was said between us here, but we are all very happy."⁹

⁹ *New York Times*, dtd 20 Apr 53, p. 1.

From Panmunjom all Allied prisoners were taken to Freedom Village at Munsan where they received a medical check, and the more seriously wounded were flown to a field hospital near Seoul. The first American prisoner to reach Freedom Village was an Army litter patient, Private First Class Robert C. Stell, a Negro. Helicoptered in from Panmunjom at 1007, he was treated "like a 5-star general by all hands, including General Clark, UN commander."¹⁰ By noon the routine, agreed upon in the earlier exchange talks, was moving along evenly and would be in effect throughout the week-long exchange. The Communist quota was 100 prisoners freed daily, in two groups of 50 each, while the Allies returned 500. Thirty Americans were among the 100 UNC men released that first day.

Upon their arrival at Freedom Village the Marine POWs, all of whom had been wounded prior to being captured, were greeted by representatives of the 1st Marine Division. In addition to General Clark, other ranking officials on hand included Lieutenant General Maxwell D. Taylor, new EUSAK commander, Major General Pollock, 1st Marine Division CG, Brigadier General Joseph C. Burger, in one of his first public duties since assuming the post of assistant division commander on 1 April, and Dr. Otto Lehner, head of the International Red Cross inspection teams.

Each Marine prisoner was met by a 1st Division escort who gave him physical assistance, if necessary, as well as a much-prized possession—a new utility cap with its Marine Corps emblem. Recovered personnel received a medical examination. Waiting helicopters stood by to transport seriously sick or wounded Marines to the hospital ships *Haven* and *Consolation* riding at anchor in the Inchon harbor. Chaplains chatted as informally or seriously as a returnee desired. Newspapers and magazines gave the ex-prisoners their first opportunity in months to read unslanted news. And a full set of utility uniforms, tailored on the spot for proper fit, were quickly donned by Marines happy to discard their prison blues.

Although returnees received their initial medical processing at Freedom Village, no intelligence processing was attempted in Korea. Within 24 hours after their exchange, returned personnel were flown to K-16 (Seoul) and from there to Haneda Air Force Base at

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 3.

Tokyo. Upon arrival at the Tokyo Army Hospital Annex, a more detailed medical exam was conducted, including a psychiatric interview by officials from the newly formed Special Liaison Group of Commander, Naval Forces, Far East. Lieutenant Colonel Regan Fuller, USMC, was designated by ComNavFE as OIC of the detailed briefing of all returned personnel at Tokyo. Other Marine officers participating in the debriefings included Lieutenant Colonel Thell H. Fisher and Major James D. Swinson, of FMFPac headquarters; Major Jack M. Daly, representing the 1st Marine Division; and Captain Richard V. Rich, of the 1st Marine Air Wing.

Each Marine returnee was interviewed by a two-man debriefing team that consisted of a Marine and a Navy officer, the latter usually a counterintelligence expert. The three-phase interrogation averaged 9-12 hours and covered personal data, counterintelligence, and a detailed military questionnaire. The latter, particularly, sought information about UN personnel still held captive by the enemy. Since all of the 15 Marine POWs had been captured relatively recently (either in the October outpost contests or the Vegas battle the previous month), the information they had about the enemy was of limited intelligence value. From debriefing reports of Marine returnees, many of whom brought address books with them, it was learned that at least 115 more USMC and Navy prisoners were alive and still held in POW camps.

Upon completion of counterintelligence processing, returned personnel were available for press interviews. Long-distance telephone calls to parents or other family members were arranged by the Red Cross. Summer service uniforms and campaign ribbons were issued, pay provided, and administrative records updated by representatives dispatched by Colonel John F. Dunlap, Commanding Officer, Marine Barracks, Yokosuka.

All of the 19 Marine and Navy POWs had been released by 25 April. After final processing and clearance for return to the U.S. the men were flown home, via Hawaii, in three groups that departed 28 April, 30 April, and 4 May. Each was accompanied by a Marine Corps officer. Members of the first contingent of POWs arrived at Travis Air Force Base, California, on 29 April, thereby completing their 7,000-mile journey from Communist prison camps. Another small group of POWs considered possible security risks were airlifted directly from Japan to Valley Forge Hospital, near

Philadelphia, for further interviewing. No Marines were among them. With the initial prisoner exchange completed, staffs of the major Far East commands began to prepare for the final return of all POWs. Operation BIG SWITCH would take place after the ceasefire that, hopefully, was not too far away.

On the day that Operation LITTLE SWITCH ended, 26 April, plenary truce talks resumed at Panmunjom. The stormy issue of repatriation of prisoners, which had already prolonged the war by more than a year, was still the one major problem preventing final agreement. There was indication, however, that the Communists appeared to be softening on their rigid insistence of forced repatriation. And, on 7 May, the Communists accepted the UN proposal that nonrepatriate prisoners be kept in neutral custody within Korea (rather than being removed to a foreign neutral nation) and offered an eight-point armistice plan. With modifications, this ultimately became the basis for the armistice. While discussions and disagreements continued on this proposal, another real problem developed from a totally different source.

Since early in April rumblings had been heard, through the polite ambassadorial circuits, that Syngman Rhee, the aging South Korean president, was dissatisfied with major truce issues. In particular, he was disturbed over the possibility that Korea would not become reunited politically. Further, Rhee gave indication that he might take some kind of action on his own. The Korean leader had advised President Eisenhower that if any armistice was signed that permitted Chinese Communist troops to remain south of the Yalu, with his country divided, he would withdraw ROK military forces from the UN command. Since South Korean troops, backed by American specialized units, presently manned the bulk of the UNC front line, Rhee's threat to remove them from General Clark's command presented harrowing possibilities.

Meanwhile, on 13 May, General Harrison, senior UN representative at Panmunjom, made a counterproposal to the Communist plan. This incorporated three measures aimed at reconciling differences in the long-controversial repatriation issue.¹¹ Arguments flew back and

¹¹ In brief, these were: (1) that the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission (NNRC) take custody of Chinese nonrepatriates but give Korean POWs the option of settling either in North or South Korea, as they wished; (2) that troops from just one

forth at Panmunjom, with a temporary recess called in the talks; but on 4 June the Communists accepted this UN final offer. The dispute of 18 months' duration had ended and the Allied principle of voluntary repatriation had won out in the end. About the only homework left for the negotiating teams was to map out final details of the Demilitarized Zone.

President Rhee now even more violently denounced the projected armistice plan. He declared that he and the Koreans would fight on alone, if necessary. South Korean delegates boycotted the Panmunjom truce meetings, and Rhee began a campaign to block the cease-fire. Final agreement on the POW issue was reached 8 June. It provided that the NNRC offer a "civilian status" to former POWs who did not exercise their right of repatriation within four months after being taken into custody by the commission. Those POWs who desired asylum would be set free. The South Korean National Assembly unanimously rejected the truce terms the following day.

Revision of the truce line, to correspond to current battle positions, and other concluding details of the truce were being settled by 17 June. On 18 June, chaos suddenly replaced progress. Acting on orders from Rhee, during early morning hours ROK guards at the South Korean prisons released approximately 27,000 North Korean anti-Communist POW inmates (the majority of the large group of NKPA who did not wish to be repatriated). They quickly escaped and became absorbed into the civilian populace of South Korea. Immediately the Communists charged the Americans with complicity and demanded to know whether the United Nations Command was able to control its South Korean ally or not.

For the next two weeks the American ambassadorial and military team tried to restore some measure of international good grace and hope to the crisis. Daily talks (and pressure) took place with Rhee, as well as with the Communist negotiators, to set the course back on track again in the direction of a final truce agreement. At the end of June, UNC Commander Clark was authorized by Washington to work out a way in which it would be possible to sign the tenuous armistice—without the Koreans, if necessary.

country (India) be used to guard nonrepatriates, rather than the unwieldy five-nation force earlier proposed by the Communists; and (3), that specific procedures, which were clearly spelled out, be followed for granting political asylum to returning prisoners who refused repatriation.

*Interval Before the Marines Go Off the Line*¹²

Shortly after the heavy Vegas fighting in late March, Colonel Funk's 7th Marines, which had been in reserve, exchanged positions with the 5th Marines. The new line regiment assumed responsibility for the critical, action-prone right sector of the MLR on 4-5 April. In the center part of JAMESTOWN, the 1st Marines of Colonel Adams continued to man the MLR and its 12 outposts, including the strategic COP-2 tucked down by the Panmunjom peace corridor. With the resumption of truce talks on 6 April, this position had again taken on renewed importance with its tank-infantry covering force of 5 armored vehicles and 245 Marines on call at all times.

After its relief from the MLR in early April the 5th Marines, as the new division reserve unit, assumed the regular missions of serving as a counterforce for Marines in the I Corps sector, if required; maintenance of the secondary KANSAS line; and a rigorous training program. On 10 April, the 3d Battalion moved out to the KANSAS position for a two-day field exercise. By midmonth, spring thaws and heavy rains had so weakened the trench and bunker fortifications of KANSAS that an all-out effort was temporarily diverted from refresher training to reconstruction. The 2d Battalion, meanwhile, under Operation Plan 24-53, pursued an intensive five-day shore-based training program, 7-11 April, in preparation for its coming amphibious exercise, MARLEX XX. On the 13th, BLT 2/5 under Lieutenant Colonel Finch, with armored amphibian, tank, amtrac, and 1/11 detachments, proceeded to the landing area, Tokchok-to, one of the WCIDE command offshore islands southwest of Inchon. Battalion assault companies hit the southern Tokchok-to beaches on D-Day, 15 April, according to schedule, although high winds and rough seas subsequently modified the exercise.¹³

Not long afterward a training exercise involving UNC personnel got underway when the 5th¹⁴ and 1st Marines, together with the

¹² Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 6, Chap. 9; 1stMarDiv ComdD, Apr 53; 1stMarDiv PIRs 896-900, dtd 8-12 Apr 53; 1stMar, 5thMar, 7thMar, 11thMar, 2/5, 1/7, 2/11, 1st TkBn ComdDs, Apr 53; VMAs-121, -212, -323, VMFs-115, -311, VMF(N)-513 ComdDs, Apr 53.

¹³ Official records are at variance on this point. The 2/5 command diary indicates that the battalion continued the exercise on 16-17 April, returning the latter date. The 5th Marines report categorically indicates that MARLEX XX was cancelled on 15 April, because of the weather.

¹⁴ Now under a new regimental commander, Colonel Tschirgi, who had joined the 5th Marines on 14 April, succeeding Colonel Walt, newly assigned division G-3.

artillerymen, combined with the Army, ROK, and Commonwealth Division on 20 April for a four-day I Corps command post exercise (CPX) EVEREADY GEORGE, not far from Seoul.

Along the division front the war was still a daily survival contest, despite the promising outlook at Panmunjom. The most ambitious attempt by the Chinese during the month took place over a three-day period in the right regimental sector, not long after the 7th Marines had moved to the MLR. On 9 April, following a heavy two-hour ballistic downpour of 2,000 rounds of enemy mortar and artillery, a reinforced company of about 300 Chinese soldiers launched a strong probe against Carson at 0345. Attacking in two echelons, the enemy approached from the direction of Arrowhead on the north and the Reno ridgeline. In an hour's time, the enemy had reached the Marine trenches and protective wire, at some places, and was being unceremoniously repulsed by the 1/7 detachment at Carson. For an hour and a half a heavy fire fight raged at the outpost while intruders and defenders battled at pointblank range to settle the dispute.

A reinforcement platoon, from 4/2/7, dispatched from the MLR at 0530, made it as far as the newly established Marine outpost at Elko, about 400 yards southeast of Carson, before being held up by a heavy shower of mortar rounds, and small arms fire. Tankers from the Company A direct element¹⁵ plus a section (two tanks) from the regiment's armored platoon leveled their lethal 90mm fires to discourage the enemy, as did the defender's barrage of 60mm, 81mm, and 4.2-inch mortars.

Two rocket ripples and 22 defensive fire concentrations unleashed by 2/11, also in direct support of Lieutenant Colonel Henry C. Lawrence Jr.'s 1st Battalion, plus additional reinforcing fires by batteries of 1/11 and 4/11 drove off the enemy at 0700. As a security measure, a company from the regimental reserve (E/2/7) was assigned to Carson to buttress the position and assist in reorganizing the outpost defense. The enemy's activity had cost him 60 known dead. Additional casualties were estimated to be 90 killed and 70 wounded. Marine losses numbered 14 killed, 4 missing, 44 wounded/

¹⁵ Throughout the three-day action, gun tanks from Companies A and B (the forward reserve unit) and the regimental antitank company fired a total of more than 1,469 90mm shells to neutralize enemy positions and weapons.

evacuated, and 22 non-seriously wounded. Meanwhile, beginning at 0715, Marine prop-driven attack AUs from VMAs-212 and -323 and ADs from VMA-121 were aloft over prime Chinese targets to perform CAS missions and MPQ drops.

Between the morning's first strike and midafternoon the three MAG-12 squadrons completed 43 sorties and blasted enemy hills and weapons positions north of Carson with a total of 67½ tons of bombs. Later that night three Chinese platoons, operating in small units, reappeared in the Carson-Elko-Vegas vicinity to recover casualties. Although they reached an unoccupied caved-in bunker 50 feet from Carson, the enemy's nocturnal activity only cost him more casualties from the COP's defense fires: 15 known dead, 15 estimated killed, 7 known wounded, and 27 estimated wounded.

The following day, Panther jets from Marine Fighter Squadrons 311 and 115 contributed to the further destruction of hostile emplacements, but the enemy himself was nowhere to be seen. Again that night, ground-controlled radar bombing runs were made by VMA-121 and VMF(N)-513 to help keep the enemy off balance. In the early-morning hours of the 11th, however, a band of 30 grenade-slinging Chinese renewed the assault on 7th Marines positions by attacking the reverse slope of Elko. This ambition was deterred by outpost organic weapons and box-me-in fires. After a brief fire fight the CCF withdrew, and the two MAG-33 squadrons later that morning returned to station for CAS strikes against CCF trouble spots. Another raid on Carson began at 2115 that night when 70 Chinese moved out from Ungok to the west ridge of the Marine position. Ten minutes later, Marine 81mm and 4.2-inch mortars, artillery, machine guns, and tanks forced them back with approximately 20 CCF killed and wounded to show for their efforts.

A brief repeat action occurred the following night when two squads of Chinese reappeared at Elko, but they were dispatched by Marine infantry, artillery, and armor direct fires following a 15-minute spirited exchange. During the night of the 12th¹⁶ Chinese probes and harassing efforts diminished. Other than a few spotty, abortive skirmishes in the KMC sector, this pattern of reduced enemy effort would continue for the next several weeks, until after the change of the Marine line in early May. As the peace talks at Panmunjom were

¹⁶ This same date was significant because it marked the first time a searchlight-guided night close air support mission was flown by 1st MAW in the division sector.

beginning to show some progress, enemy psychological warfare efforts in the KMC, 1st, and 7th regimental sectors became more zealous, an indication of the Chinese attempt to increase their propaganda offensive. This included not only loudspeaker broadcasts and propaganda leaflet fired in mortar shells but a more unusual tactic, on 6 April, of enemy messages dropped over the COP Vegas area by airplane.

Little ground action took place in the division sector throughout the rest of the month. During the last three days of April, as the operational period for the Marines drew to an end, both infantry and artillery units noticed an unusual lull across the front. Marine patrols made few contacts, and there was a sharp decrease in the heavy enemy sightings of midmonth. Chinese incoming, in fact, during the latter part of the month decreased markedly, with a total of 873 rounds compared to the 4,149 tallied during the 1-15 April period. An average of 58.2 rounds daily made it, in fact, the quietest period in the Marine division sector since the holiday calm of late December when only 84.2 rounds had fallen the last 10 days of the month.

*The May Relief*¹⁷

By late April, plans had moved into high gear for relief of the 1st Marine Division by the 25th U.S. Infantry Division and transfer of the Marines to U.S. I Corps reserve at Camp Casey. Although the Marine division had been in active defense positions for 20 months (first in the eastern X Corps and, for the past year, on the western front), some observers noted that there was a reluctance to turn over their presently occupied positions and that the Marines were coming out "under protest from commanders who wanted the Division to remain on the line."¹⁸

For its part, the 25th Division, commanded by Major General Samuel T. Williams, was to shift over to the I Corps far west coastal area from its own neighboring IX Corps sector on the right. Marine association with the Army division went back to the early days of

¹⁷ Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 6, Chap. 9; 1stMarDiv ComdDs, Apr-May 53; 1stMarDiv G-3 Jnls, 22 Apr-13 May 53; 1stMar ComdDs, Apr-May 53; 5thMar, 7thMar, 11thMar ComdDs, May 53; 1st EngrBn ComdDs, Apr-May 53; Hermes, *Truce Tent*.

¹⁸ News story (AP), Robert D. Tuckman, Seoul, dtd 12 May 53, 1stMarDiv ComdD, May 53, App. IX, p. 1.

the war.¹⁹ In August 1950, when the Korean Conflict was then only a few weeks old, the 25th Division, with the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade and the Army's RCT-5, had spearheaded the first UN counteroffensive on the far southern front, in the Sachon-Chinju area. Now fresh from its own recent period in reserve²⁰ the 25th Division, including its attached Turkish Brigade, was to take over the 33-mile 1st Marine Division line, effective 5 May. Marine armor and artillery, however, would remain in support of the 25th Division and transfer to I Corps control.

Another change at this time affected the designation of the United Nations MLR. Called Line JAMESTOWN in the I Corps sector (and variously in other parts of the EUSAK front as MISSOURI, DULUTH, MINNESOTA, and CAT), the Allied front was redesignated simply as "main line of resistance," beginning 28 April, and was to be so known in all future orders and communications throughout the entire Eighth Army. A further modification dropped the reference "in Korea" from the acronym EUSAK, the title becoming "Eighth U.S. Army."

In the Marine sector, the last few days of April were a study in contrasts. While Marine frontline infantrymen and cannoneers were having a comparatively peaceful interlude during this period of minimal CCF activity, division engineers were the proverbial colony of beavers. Following up their rigorous schedule in early April of building Freedom Village from scratch within 36 hours, engineer personnel moved out from the division sector late that month to begin construction of the rear area camps that would shortly be occupied by the Marines while in I Corps reserve.

Located approximately 15 miles east of the Marine MLR, the Camp Casey reserve complex consisted of three major areas. They were: the central one, Casey, which gave its name to the entire installation and would house the new division CP and 5th Marines; Indianhead, to the north, where the 7th Marines, 1st KMC Regiment, Division Reconnaissance Company, machine gun and NCO schools

¹⁹ The two divisions had also seen combat together early in WW II, at Guadalcanal. Col R. D. Heintz, Jr. ltr to Dir, MCHist, HQMC, dtd 27 Sep 70, hereafter *Heintz ltr*.

²⁰ Soon after assuming command of the Eighth Army, in mid-February, General Taylor had begun to stress the need for a complete eight-week training program for reserve divisions before reentering the line, detailed rehearsal of patrols, and more frequent rotation of artillery battalions to maintain their basic mobility. *Hermes, Truce Tent*, p. 391.

were to be established; and Britannia, to the south, assigned to the 1st Marines. Motor transport, engineer, and medical units in support of the respective regiments were to locate nearby.

On 27 April, the day after resumption of truce talks at Panmunjom, Company A engineers began the work of clearing the camp site, erecting prefabricated buildings, and pioneering roads in the 7th Marines northern area. Two days later the 1st KMC Engineer Company was also detailed to Indianhead for work on the 1st KMC Regimental camp. Company C engineers and Company A, 1st Shore Party Battalion, attached to the Engineer Battalion, meanwhile moved into the Casey sector to ready the relocated Division CP and the 5th Marines camp.

Tactical relief of the 1st Marine Division officially began 1 May. By the time it was over, four days later, more than 2,370 truckloads of Marine personnel and equipment had been used in the transfer to Camp Casey. Described another way: if placed bumper to bumper in a continuous convoy, this would have extended more than six miles, the length of the MLR held by a Marine regiment in any major defense sector. As a preliminary step in the relief, on 29 April the division assumed operational control of several incoming Army artillery units (the 8th, 64th, 69th, and 90th Field Artillery Battalions, and the 21st Antiaircraft Automatic Weapons Battalion) plus elements of the Turkish command, including the TAFC Field Artillery Battalion. By midafternoon, the first of the Army infantry relief personnel had also arrived in the division sector, when elements of the three battalions of the 35th Infantry Regiment had reported in to respective 1st Marines²¹ host units, preparatory to assuming responsibility for the center sector of the Marine line.

On 1 May the 5th Marines, then in reserve at Camp Rose, took over responsibility for the 14th Infantry Regiment, designated as the Army maneuver unit. Later that day, when Colonel Tschirgi's regiment closed its headquarters and moved out by motor march to Casey, control of the Army unit transferred to the division. The same day, the 1st KMC/RCT artillery battalion—which, like the 11th Marines units, was to remain on line although KMC infantry personnel were to move to I Corps reserve—came under control of

²¹ The regiment was newly-commanded by Colonel Nelson, the former UN Personnel and Medical Processing Unit officer, who succeeded Colonel Adams as CO, 1st Marines on 1 May.

I Corps; two days later an Army armored unit, the 89th Tank Battalion, rolled into position in the KMC rear support area and came under division command.

The 7th Marines right regimental sector, with its critical Nevada Cities and two Berlin positions, became the new home for the Turkish battalions of Brigadier General Sirri Acar in a four-day phased operation, beginning 0115 on 3 May. Actual bulk displacement of the first Marine MLR units and their respective outposts got underway on this date, when responsibility for the 7th Marines left battalion sector transferred from 2/7²² to the 1st Battalion, TAFC, and the 7th Marines battalion began displacing to Indianhead. On the same day the division opened its advance command post at Camp Casey.

The first Marine sector to complete the relief was the 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion, to the south of the Munsan-ni railhead; at midnight on 4 May, with the assumption of sector responsibility by the Army Task Force Track, it moved to the logistical complex at Ascom City where it opened its new CP. Throughout the BMNT hours of 4 and 5 May, Marine positions were transferred to the incoming organic and/or attached units of the U.S. Army 25th Division. Relief of three of the major sectors in the Marine division line was thus well under way by the early hours of the 5th. Final relief and its elaborate phasing operations were completed that morning. On the left flank, the 1st KMC was relieved at 1030 by the incoming U.S. Army 27th Infantry;²³ 30 minutes later, the 1st Marines was replaced in the line by the Army 35th Infantry; and on the right, the 7th Marines sector was taken over by the TAFC. (See Map 28.)

Sharply at 1120 on 5 May,²⁴ the U.S. Army 25th Division assumed responsibility for defense of the MLR in what had been the 1st Marine Division sector for more than 13 months. At the same time all 25th Infantry Division units under operational direction of the division also reverted to parent control. In addition to the Kimpo Regiment, several small Korean Service Corps and medical units retained in the sector also came under Army command.

²² On 23 April, 2/7 had relieved 1/7 in the left battalion sector and 1/7 became the regimental reserve. There was no change in 3/7's location in the right sector. These were the positions for transfer with the Turkish troops in early May.

²³ *ROKMC Comments.*

²⁴ Final relief was largely complete at this time. Exceptions were the 7th Marines reserve battalion, 1/7, relieved by TAFC forces at 0350 the following day and a few remaining Marine rear echelon elements that closed out the sector on 7 May.

I Corps Operation Orders No. 31 and 32 had directed that the 11th Marines remain on line in the sector attached to I Corps Artillery, with a general support mission of reinforcing the fires of the 25th Division artillery, and a secondary task of coordinating counter-battery support. The medium battalion, 4/11, and the 1st 4.5-inch Rocket Battery, furnished general support for I Corps. Regimental and battalion CPs, as well as the rocket battery, continued to occupy their same locations. A change affected the KMC artillery battalion, however; when transferred to I Corps artillery control it displaced from the Marine sector, with a new general support role of reinforcing the I Corps line.

Also on 5 May, at 1130, the 1st Tank Battalion²⁵ passed to 25th Division control. Two companies, C and B, were assigned to the TAFC (which had no armored units) in the left and right battalion areas, respectively. Company D vehicles came under command of the 35th Infantry Regiment, in the center sector; while A, the remaining company, was designated as the single reserve unit. This was a modification of the Marine system of maintaining two tank companies in reserve, one a short distance behind the MLR and the other, at the armored battalion CP near Munsan-ni. A change in tactics also took place when the Marine tanks came under Army operational control. It had been the Marine practice to retain the tanks at the company CP from where they moved to prepared firing slots at the request of the supported infantry unit.

When the 1st Tank Battalion was attached to the 25th Division, the armored vehicles were shifted to firing slots near the MLR where they occupied semifixed positions.²⁶ Armored personnel carriers (APCs) were assigned by the Army to Company B and used by both B and C as resupply vehicles to haul food, water, fuel, and ammunition to the tanks on line. Also as part of the relief, control of the KMC tank company was transferred from the Marine 1st Tank Battalion to I Corps, although the company still continued in its same location in the old KMC sector.

²⁵ The 1st Tank Battalion was now commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Charles W. McCoy, who had relieved Lieutenant Colonel Williamson on 16 April 1953.

²⁶ The tanks were not kept in exposed firing positions at all times. They were parked in protected, defilade revetments and were periodically driven into the firing slots to zero in on targets of opportunity. One tank might thus use any of several slots, and in cases of major attacks reserve tanks could reinforce. LtCol Robert J. Post ltr to Dir, MCHist, HQMC, dtd 28 May 70, hereafter *Post ltr*.

Also remaining in their same positions were MASRT-1 (Marine Air Support Radar Team One), in support of the 25th Infantry Division, MTACS-2 (Marine Tactical Air Control Squadron Two), and VMO-6. The mobile air support section of the observation squadron, however, had moved with the 1st Marine Division to the new Casey area for participation in the coming MARLEX operations scheduled during the reserve training period.

Thus with the relief completed, components of the old Marine division front, from left to right, were: the Kimpo Provisional Regiment; Task Force Track; the 27th Infantry Regiment; 35th Infantry Regiment in the center sector, including its armor and heavy mortar company and 2d and 3d Battalions forward, replacing the 1st Marines 3d and 1st Battalions; and in the right sector, the Turkish Brigade 4.2-inch mortar company and its 1st and 3d Battalions initially located²⁷ in the MLR positions vacated by the 2d and 3d Battalions, 7th Marines.

In addition to the 1st Marine Division railhead and truckhead at Munsan-ni and Ascom City, a subsidiary railhead/truckhead was opened at Tongduchon-ni, two miles southwest of the new division CP at Casey. No change was made in the airhead at K-16. Effective with the 5 May change, remaining elements of the division CP staff at Yongji-ri joined the advance elements at Casey. As the Marines moved off the front lines they received "well-done" messages from the Commandant, General Shepherd, and the U.S. Pacific Fleet Commander in Chief, Admiral Arthur W. Radford, as well as the new I Corps Commander, Lieutenant General Bruce C. Clarke²⁸ who cited the "excellence of the planning, coordination and cooperation which enabled the operation of the past few days to be successfully accomplished."²⁹

²⁷ Later, the Turkish forces were to place three battalions forward [adding the 2d], with a fourth in reserve.

²⁸ General Clarke had succeeded General Kendall on 10 April 1953.

²⁹ CG, I Corps msg to CGs, 1stMarDiv, 25th InfDiv, dtd 6 May 53, in 1stMarDiv ComdD, May 53, App. I, p. 2.

*Training While in Reserve and Division Change of Command*³⁰

While the division was in reserve, its tactical mission consisted of preparation for commitment on I Corps order as a counterattack force in any of the four division sectors of I Corps. Division Operation Plan 7-53 implemented this I Corps Plan "RESTORE" and set forth the designated blocking positions in the 25th Army, Commonwealth, 1st ROK, and 7th Army Division sectors in event of threatened or actual enemy penetration of the MLR.

The 1st Marine Division's Training Order 8-53, issued on 6 May, the day after the relief was officially effected, outlined the training to be accomplished during the eight-week reserve period, 10 May-5 July. Following a few days' interval devoted to camp construction and improvement of facilities, an active training program commenced. Its objective was the continued improvement of amphibious and ground offensive combat potential of all personnel. Three major regimental combat team MARLEXES were scheduled.³¹ The training syllabus called for a four-phased progressive schooling from individual to battalion and regimental level conducted in all phases of offensive, defensive, and amphibious warfare. Weaponry familiarization, small unit tactics, and combined unit training, with tank-infantry deployment and integration of helicopters at company-level exercises, were emphasized, culminating in a week-long field maneuver.

Lectures were to be kept to a minimum, with at least 50 percent of the tactical training conducted at night. Specialty training in intelligence, signal communications, antitank and mortar, machine gun, mine warfare, and staff NCO schools was also prescribed. Numerous command post exercises were programmed to obtain a high standard of efficiency in both battalion and regimental-level

³⁰ Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: *PacFlt Eval Rpts* No. 5, Chap 6, No. 6, Chaps. 7, 9; 1stMarDiv ComdDs, May-June 53; 1stMarDiv G-3 Jnls, 22 Apr-30 Jun 53; 1stMar, 5thMar, 7thMar, 11thMar, 1st EngrBn, HMR-161, VMO-6 ComdDs, May-June 53; Field, *NavOps, Korea*.

³¹ Relief from the Eighth Army defense line provided the first opportunity for expansion of the 1st Marine Division amphibious training to regimental level. Amphibious training in battalion-sized MARLEXES had been under way since June 1952, upon transfer of the Marines to the western coastal sector. This had, in fact, "produced an extra dividend as [their] amphibious retraining program, conducted throughout the summer in the Tokchok Islands, was apprehensively observed by the enemy." Field, *NavOps, Korea*, p. 430.

staff functioning. It was the first time the division had been in reserve since a brief two-week period in late July–August of 1951. A brisk 40-44 hour week, plus organized athletics, insured that the training period was to be fully utilized.

No time was lost getting under way. At a staff conference with battalion commanders on 11 May, General Pollock, division CG, stressed the importance of using the time they were in reserve for enhancing division combat-readiness. Even as he spoke, his 5th Marines had the day before boarded ships at Inchon and were en route to the Yongjong-ni landing area for MARLEX I. Since the 5th Marines, in division reserve, had been the first of the regiments to displace and on 1 May had turned its sector over to the incoming 14th Infantry Regiment, it got the jump on training during the reserve period. Regimental Operation Plan 12-53, of 28 April, had outlined requirements for the 5th Marines RCT LEX 1; from 2-9 May the regiment had participated in a week of intensive amphibious training, including reduced and normal distance CPX dry runs for the coming MARLEX.

With ships from CTE 90.85,³² and air defense by VMFs-311 and -115, Colonel Tschirgi's RCT-5 made the D-Day landing on 13 May with its two assault BLTs securing the objective. An unexpectedly shallow beach gradient and difficulties encountered in unloading vehicles from the causeway resulted in less than a 100 percent performance rating. These were deficiencies that might have been prevented had not the customary rehearsal been cancelled the previous day when a heavy fog obscured the landing beaches. Besides regimental antitank and 4.2-inch mortar units, participating support elements included Company D, 1st Tank Battalion; Company A, 1st Armored Amphibian Battalion; Company C, 1st Engineer Battalion; 1/11; and helicopters from HMR-161 and VMO-6.

Meanwhile, on 15 May, command post and subordinate units from the 1st, 5th (less RCT-5 currently deployed in MARLEX I), and 7th Marines and support elements took part in a one-day division CPX at Camp Casey stressing mobility, security and operational procedures. Another CPX on 22-23 May by 11th Marines and engineer personnel emphasized dispersion, camouflage, and message handling

³² CTE 90.85 constituted the MARLEX training element of TF-90, Amphibious Force Far East, redesignated Amphibious Group Western Pacific earlier that month.

under simulated combat conditions. Units of the three infantry regiments plus the KMCs training with the 7th Marines at Indian-head combined in a CPX-FEX (command post-firing exercise) on 26-27 May. Realism bowed to current ordnance supply economics in that ammunition was carried for individual weapons, but it would "not be loaded except on specific orders from an officer."³³

The CPX-FEX was held as a trial exercise for an Eighth Army CPX scheduled later in the month, which was postponed indefinitely on 29 May because of the critical battlefront situation and continuing enemy attacks across the EUSAK front. Extensive preparations were also underway for MARLEX II, with RCT-7, from 2-10 June; and concluding MARLEX III, scheduled 14-23 June, with RCT-1.

Armor and advance regimental elements had left for the Ascom City-Inchon staging area by 1 June, preparatory for departure to the Yongjong-ni beaches on the Korean west coast in the vicinity of Kunsan. The troop list included approximately 250 officers and 4,450 enlisted from Colonel Funk's 7th Marines and support units, including USN and KMC. Infantry personnel from the regiment's three battalions formed the three assault teams plus a reserve battalion composed of 475 Korean Marines designated as BLT 5/KMC. Regimental support units included Company C, 1st Engineer Battalion; Company D, 1st Medical Battalion; Company C, 1st Shore Party Battalion; Company B, 1st Armored Amphibian Battalion, and various motor transport, amphibian truck, military police, and helicopter detachments.

R-Day on 5 June went off per schedule. Despite intelligence estimates which cheerily predicted that only "nine days of rain can be expected during the month of June",³⁴ RCT-7 drew one out of the barrel with its D-Day landing, 6 June. This took place during heavy rains and decreased visibility which threw the boat waves off phase by minutes and required more than the allotted time for HMR-161 troop and cargo lifts.

Use of a 144-foot-long M-2 steel treadway pontoon bridge loaned by the Army, emplaced from the end of the causeway to the beach high water mark, was considered highly successful. It solved unloading problems encountered in the earlier MARLEX, in that all heavy equip-

³³ 1stMarDiv msg to addrees in 1stMarDiv G-3 Jn1, dtd 22 May 53.

³⁴ MAR RCT LEX II, Opn Plan I, App. 1 to Annex B, dtd 9 May 53, p. 1, in 7thMar ComdD, May 53.

nment and vehicles were landed on the designated beaches. Further experimentation with this novel employment of the M-2 was recommended to test the coupling system of bridge and causeway during periods of heavy surf. On the minus side, shore party officers noted that night transfer operations had been hindered because of the lack of running lights on the amtracs.

On 9 June, as RCT-7 was on the way back from its amphibious exercise, a directive from ComNavFE (Vice Admiral Robert P. Briscoe) notified the division of cancellation of the forthcoming RCT MARLEX III. All available shipping was being held on 24-hour readiness for the expected final repatriation of POWs (Operation BIG SWITCH). All afloat training exercises by Marine, Army, and Navy units between 6 June and 15 October were to be cancelled.

The division was host to ranking I Corps, Eighth Army, Korean, and 1st Commonwealth officials when a special helicopter assault demonstration was staged 11-12 June at Camp Casey. Two rocket launcher sections, 14 HMR-161 copters, and 2/5 infantrymen were deployed to show the diverse combat capabilities of the aerial workhorse. While in I Corps reserve, the division was also host—and winner—of the I Corps Pistol Matches. And 3/11, which the previous month had taken the Army Training Test 6-2 (a) Modified, was notified the battalion had scored 92.91 percent and received congratulations from the CGs, I Corps Artillery and Eighth Army.

A change of command within the 1st Marine Division took place on 15 June with the arrival of Major General Randolph McC. Pate. The retiring CG, General Pollock, was presented the Distinguished Service Medal by the I Corps commander, General Clarke, for his "outstanding success in the defense of Carson, Vegas, and Elko." The previous month, General Pollock had received the Korean Order of Military Merit, Taiguk for his active part in the formation, development, and training of the Korean Marine Corps. Attending the change of command ceremonies were General Megee, CG 1st MAW, General Schilt, CG AirFMFPac, and other Marine, I Corps, Commonwealth, and Korean senior officers.

The new 1st Marine Division CG was coming to his Korean post from Camp Lejeune, N. C. where (like General Pollock before him) he had most recently commanded the 2d Marine Division. Commissioned originally in the Marine Corps Reserve in 1921, General Pate was to later rise to four-star rank. Prior to World War II,

he had seen expeditionary service in Santo Domingo, in 1923-1924, and in China from 1927-1929, and also served in Hawaii. For his outstanding service and skill in complicated staff duties, first at Guadalcanal, and later during amphibious operations at Peleliu, Iwo Jima, and Okinawa, General Pate had been awarded the Legion of Merit and a Gold Star in lieu of a second Legion of Merit.

After the war, he had served two tours as head of the Division Reserve, in 1946 and 1951. Other assignments included Director of the Marine Corps Educational Center at Quantico and Deputy Director of Logistic Plans in the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.³⁵

*Heavy May-June Fighting*³⁶

After the early May change of lines, the Chinese lost little time in testing the new UNC defenses. Shortly after 0200 on 15 May, the CCF directed a two-battalion probe on the Carson-Elko-Vegas trio and the Berlin-East Berlin outposts newly held by the Turkish brigade. Supported by heavy concentrations of mortar and artillery, one battalion of enemy soldiers moved against each of the two major defense complexes. Marine Company C tanks, occupying the firing slots that night, accounted for heavy enemy losses in the action, estimated at 200 CCF killed and 100 wounded. Assisting the TAFC Field Artillery Battalion in throwing back the attack were 1/11, 2/11, and 4/11 which sent 3,640 rounds into the sharp four-hour engagement.

The TAFC defense was further reinforced later that day with 21 air strikes against hostile personnel and weapons positions north of the Turkish sector. Adding their weight to the clash, 3/11 and the rocket battery also brought their guns into action, for a combined 5,526 Marine rounds³⁷ dispatched against the enemy.

³⁵ DivInfo, HQMC, Biography of Gen Randolph McC. Pate, Jan 56, rev.

³⁶ Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 6, Chap. 9; 1stMarDiv ComdDs, May-Jun 53; 1stMarDiv G-3 Jnls, 15 May, 28-30 May 53; 11thMar, 2/11, 1st TkBn ComdDs, May-Jun 53; 1st MAW ComdD, May 53; 1st MAW PIR 136-53, dtd 14-15 May 53 and PIR 150-53, dtd 28-29 May 53; VMAs-121, -212, -323, VMFs-115, -311 ComdDs, May 53; *Hermes, Truce Tent*; Miller, Carroll, and Tackley, *Korea, 1951-1953*.

³⁷ Total ammunition expenditure by the 11th Marines and the 25th Division artillery batteries was 11,527 rounds, to the Chinese output of approximately 10,000 rounds. 11thMarDiv ComdD, May 53, p. 13.

It was not until 25 May, after the UNC had made its final offer at the truce talks, however, that CCF artillery really began to open up on the Nevada complex. The increased activity by hostile pieces, during the 25–27 May period, was duly noted by the artillery Marines who laconically reported, "Operations followed the recent pattern: enemy shelling of the Turkish Brigade increased during the afternoon; no contacts were reported."³⁸

This latter situation changed abruptly on 28 May. Beginning at 1800, major elements of the Chinese 120th Division launched simultaneous attacks over 17,500 yards of I Corps front that stretched from COP-2 eastward to that consistent trouble-spot, the Nevada Cities, on to the Berlins, and finally the Hook area in the adjacent Commonwealth Division sector. Supported by heavy artillery fires, one CCF battalion moved in towards Carson and Elko. Another battalion,³⁹ under cover of smoke, attacked central COP Vegas, while a third struck Berlin and East Berlin on the right flank. Three hours after the initial attack, defenders at Carson and Elko were engaged in hand-to-hand combat with the Chinese.

By midnight the men of the 35th Infantry had beaten back the attack at COP-2. The Turks, likewise, were still in possession of the two Berlin (platoon-strength) outposts, but Commonwealth forces were involved in a pitched battle at Ronson and Warsaw. The situation was even grimmer at this time in the Nevada Cities area outposted by the TAFC. Although the Turkish troops continued to hold Vegas, where 140 men were dug in, Carson (two-platoon size) had fallen and Elko (platoon-strength) was heavily besieged. Shortly thereafter, the 25th Division ordered that the TAFC withdraw from the latter position to its own MLR. The diversionary attack against Berlin-East Berlin had been broken off and the twin positions were secured.

During the first six hours of the attack, the night of 28–29 May, Colonel Mills' 11th Marines, now under I Corps command, had sent 9,500 rounds crashing into Chinese strongpoints, while Marine air observers directed eight missions against active enemy artillery positions. Ripples from the 1st 4.5-inch Rocket Battery, transferred to the

³⁸ 11thMar ComdD, May 53, dtd 27 May, p. 19.

³⁹ Some historians indicate that the 120th Division initially sent four battalions forward in the action, with two against the main objective, Vegas. *Hermes, Truce Tent*, p. 463.

Commonwealth sector to support the Hook defense, were fired on CCF troop activity there. Another curtain of flame engulfed the Carson intruders. When the fighting started, 15 Marine tanks were positioned in the Turkish sector. Company B and C vehicles, under Captains James M. Sherwood and Robert J. Post, relentlessly pounded the approaching CCF columns, while Company D was put on a 30-minute standby. As the action developed, additional tanks were committed until 33 were on line at one time or another.⁴⁰

When savage Chinese pummeling of the 25th Division outposts continued the following day, Colonel Nelson's 1st Marines was transferred at 1315 to operational control of I Corps. The regiment's three infantry battalions, antitank, and heavy mortar companies promptly moved out from their Britannia headquarters and within two hours had relocated at 25th Division bivouac areas south of the KANSAS line in readiness for counterattack orders. The 1st Marine Division Reconnaissance Company was similarly ordered to 25th Division control to relieve a 14th Infantry Regiment reserve company in position along the east bank Imjin River defenses.

Overhead, close air support runs were being conducted by pilots of Marine Attack Squadrons 212, 121, and 323. A series of seven 4-plane strikes hit repeatedly from noon on those Chinese troops, hardware, and resupply areas north of the 25th Division line. The aerial assault continued late into the night with MPQ missions executed by VMA-121 and WMF-311.

During the 29th, control of the Vegas outposts—where 1st Division Marines had fought and died exactly two months earlier—changed hands several times between the indomitable Turkish defenders and the persistent Chinese. By dark, the CCF had wrested the northern crest from the TAFC which still held the southeastern face of the position. In the 24-hour period from 1800 on the 28th through the 29th, the 11th Marines had expended 41,523 rounds in 531 missions. At one point in the action Chinese counterbattery fire scored a direct hit on Turkish gun emplacements, knocking six howitzers

⁴⁰ Discussing the Army employment of tanks in fixed MLR positions, Lieutenant Colonel Post recalled that although many Marine tankers were originally opposed to this procedure, "I am forced to confess that it worked well in that static defensive situation." A major advantage resulting from this change was that tanks effectively linked the MLR with rear area CPs through land line and radio. While initial preparatory fire often tore out the phone lines, the radios worked well and this was "generally the only reliable means of communications with the scene of action." *Post ltr.*

made to retake them and that a "reevaluation of the terrain in view of the destruction of the defensive work indicates these hills are not presently essential to defense of the sector."⁴⁴

If things were now relatively quiet along the battlefield of the I Corps coastal sector, the situation had begun to heat up in the central part of the UNC defense line. On 10 June, following a CCF realignment of troops and supply buildup that had not gone unnoticed by Eighth Army intelligence officials, elements of the CCF 60th and 68th Armies struck the ROK II Corps area, on the east-central front. (See Map 29.) Advancing south along both sides of the Pukhan River with two divisions, the Chinese struck at the ROK II defense line which originally had bulged out to form a salient in the Kumsong vicinity. Within six days the ROK line had been forced back 4,000 yards. In subsequent assaults the enemy made new penetrations further west in the ROK II MLR. Although the main Communist thrust was directed against the ROK II Corps, secondary attacks were also made in the X Corps sector east of ROK II, in the Punchbowl area manned by the ROK 20th Division. It was the heaviest, all-out drive since the CCF spring offensive of April-May 1951, when the UNC had been pushed south approximately 30 miles across the entire Korean front.

By 18 June, the CCF assaults started to settle down. During the nine days of flaming action, ROK units had suffered some 7,300 casualties to enemy losses of 6,600. Boundaries had been redrawn and three ROK divisions had been redeployed in counterattacks to plug holes in the line that the Chinese had punched open. Nearly 15,000 yards of ROK front had been pushed 4,000 yards south and several hill positions east of the Pukhan had been lost.

The brief respite ended 24 June when the CCF again directed heavy blows against the ROK troops, ignoring other UN forces in the Eighth Army line. It was generally considered a retaliatory move for the 18 June mass release of anti-Communist prisoners by South Korean President Rhee. This time the major target of the renewed Chinese offensive was the ROK 9th Division, in the IX Corps sector immediately west of the ROK II Corps. On 25 June the 1st ROK Division on the eastern flank of I Corps, to the right of the 1st

⁴⁴ CG, I Corps msg to CG, 7thInfDiv, CG, 25thInfDiv, CG, 1stMarDiv, GOC, 1stComWelDiv, CG I Corps Arty, dtd 9 Jun 53 in 1stMarDiv ComdD, Jun 53, App. I, p. 1.

Commonwealth Division, was pounded by another Chinese division. Significantly, the date was the third anniversary of the invasion of South Korea.⁴⁵ The 7th Marines, training in I Corps reserve, was put on standby status. The regiment was removed the following day when the 1st KMC/RCT (minus its 3d Battalion) was instead placed in readiness,⁴⁶ and subsequently moved out from its Indianhead area to be committed as a relief force in the left sector of the 1st ROK line.

By the 26th, the persistent Chinese probes of the 1st ROK sector had resulted in several forward outposts being overrun. To help stem the action the Marine 1st 4.5-inch Rocket Battery was displaced on I Corps Artillery order from its regular position (in the right regimental sector) 20 miles east to support the hard-pressed ROK division. On at least two occasions the battery placed ripples between ROK positions only 600 yards apart and it was felt that these "continued requests for fire close to friendly troops attested to the gunnery of the unit."⁴⁷ Between that date and the 30th, the rocket battery remained in the ROK sector, firing a total of 25 ripples. For the 25th Infantry Division sector, however, the front continued undisturbed throughout the entire month of June.

*Developments in Marine Air*⁴⁸

While the division was in I Corps reserve during the greater part of the April-June period, the 6,800-man 1st Marine Aircraft Wing

⁴⁵ The strong likelihood of such attacks at this time had been noted by Eighth Army in a warning issued the previous day that reminded all commanders to be "particularly alert" at this time. CG, 8th Army msg to CG, 1stMarDiv and addressees, G-3 Jnl, dtd 24 Jun 53.

⁴⁶ This change was due to the existing policy of not having a United States unit serving under operational control of a Korean commander. Had the 7th Marines or other U.S. unit been so committed, it is expected that a provisional task force would have been created for the assignment, under a non-Korean commander. *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 6, Chap. 9, p. 9-20. Actually, the 7th Marines alert on the 25th was of such short duration that no mention of it appears in the regimental command diary, although the fact is so noted in division records. The 1st KMC/RCT was ordered to move out from the Indianhead area at 1630 on 26 June and came under operational control of 1st ROK Division at 1540, 27 June. By 0100 the following day, it had relieved 11th ROK Regiment. *ROKMC Comments*.

⁴⁷ 11thMar ComdD, Jun 53, p. 15.

⁴⁸ Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: *PacFlt EvalRpts* No. 4, Chap 10, No. 5, Chap 9, No. 6, Chaps. 9, 10; 1stMarDiv ComdD, Apr 53; 1/7 ComdD, Apr 53, App. IV, Rpt of Night Air Strikes; 1st MAW, MAGs-12, -33, VMAs-121, -212, -323, VMFs-115, -311, VMF(N)-513, VMJ-1 ComdDs, Apr-Jun 53; VMA-312 ComdDs, Apr-May 53; VMA-251 ComdD, June 53; VMO-6 ComdD, Apr 53; Futrell, *USAF, Korea; Hermes, Truce Tent*.

continued its missions as an operational component of Fifth Air Force. For the Marine air arm it was a time of a major tactical innovation, a number of new air records set, and rapid personnel changes in the squadrons.

Shortly before the Marine division went off the line, a new method of close air support at night was introduced. This employed the use of two or more ground controlled 24-inch searchlights located on prominent terrain features along the MLR in the 7th Marines left battalion sector where the missions were to be flown. Enemy-held reverse slopes—in some cases less than 500 yards from Marine positions—were thereby pinpointed by the powerful intersecting searchlight beams. These long pencil-shaped beams created an excellent artificial horizon and enabled pilots to make bombing or strafing runs with a high degree of accuracy even on the blackest of nights. Manned by ANGLICO personnel, the lights were employed either for target location or illumination (both shadow and direct). A tactical airborne observer in an OE light liaison plane of VMO-6 directed the searchlight teams and controlled the missions.

A week of experimentation and trial runs to perfect the night close air support (NCAS) was conducted by several VMF(N)-513 pilots under direction of Colonel Jack R. Cram. Formerly CO of Marine Air Control Group Two at K-3, he had extended his tour in Korea to complete work on the new program. On 12 April, the first night of operations, Major Charles L. Schroeder and Second Lieutenant Thomas F. St. Denis flew two night support missions in F7F Tigercats. Although employed only a few weeks prior to the division going into reserve on 5 May, the new system rated an enthusiastic response from both pilots and ground commanders, all the way up to the division CG. As the latter reported to the Commandant following the first week of night close support missions, "results . . . exceeded all expectations."⁴⁹

Between 12 April and 5 May, the night fighter squadron conducted 58 NCAS sorties in the division right sector employing this

⁴⁹ CG, 1stMarDiv msg to CMC, dtd 18 Apr 53; in 1stMarDiv ComdD, Apr 53, App. II, p. 2.

⁵⁰ Confirmed damage assessment in this period: 75 enemy KIA, 5 WIA; 25 bunkers, 12 personnel shelters, 20 mortar positions, 32 automatic weapons positions, 1 ammunition bunker, and 1 37mm AA position destroyed; 1 supply area, 3 weapons damaged; 1,545 yards trenchline destroyed; and 190 secondary explosions or fires. Due to operating conditions, these figures represented only 80 percent of the total flights made on which TAOs confirmed results. VMF(N)-513 ComdDs, Apr-May 53.

new control system with excellent results.⁵⁰ The procedure was a marked success and made it possible to provide continuous 24-hour-a-day close support to Marine infantry units. It was considered a supplement to, not a replacement for the MPQ. (radar controlled bombing) missions of MASRT-1. Plans called for F9F aircraft to be integrated into the program, since the F7F Tigercats were being replaced by jets. Allied psychological warfare teams on 17 April introduced a different theme in their broadcasts to the enemy: that of the dangers to the CCF from the new searchlight marking of targets. As a Marine training bulletin noted: "It is believed that this method of attack by aircraft is particularly demoralizing to the enemy because he is unable to anticipate where the strike will hit, and therefore has no means of defending himself against it."⁵¹

Another tactical improvement about this same time dealt with artillery flak suppression in support of close support aircraft. Two refinements made in the procedure in the late spring of 1953 involved firing of HE rounds during the actual run of planes over the target. Basically, the plan consisted of releasing a TOT or VT concentration on the most lucrative enemy antiaircraft positions within a 2,500-yard circle around the strike area. A continuous rain of HE-fuzed projectiles was placed on these targets for a three-minute period, during which Marine planes made their runs.

Favorable results were achieved in that new system tended to keep enemy antiaircraft gunners off-balance for a longer period of time and thus decreased the danger to friendly attacking aircraft. On the other hand, pilots quickly noted that this became an "unimaginative employment of an unvarying flak suppression schedule which Communist AA gunners soon caught onto and turned to their own advantage."⁵²

With respect to squadron hardware, Marine combat potential increased substantially during the spring months with the phasing out of F7Fs in Night Fighter Squadron 513 and introduction of the new F3D-2 twin-jet Skyknight intruder. By late May the Allocation of 24 of these jet night fighters had been augmented by 4 more jets from the carrier USS *Lake Champlain* and the squadron "assumed its primary night-fighter mission for the first time in the

⁵¹ *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 6, Chap. 9, p. 9-106, quoting 1stMarDiv Training Bulletin No. 5-53, dtd 10 Jun 53.

⁵² *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 6, Chap. 10, p. 10-70.

Korean War.”⁵³ While the sturdy, dependable Tigercats⁵⁴ made their final contribution to the United Nations air effort early in May with the experimental NCAS program, the new Skyknights continued the squadron’s unique assignment inaugurated in late 1952 as night escort to Air Force B-29 bombers on their strike missions. Not a single B-29 was lost to enemy interceptors after 29 January 1953. The capabilities of the skilled Marine night-fighters were noted in a “well done” message received by the CO, VMF(N)-513 in April from the Air Force.⁵⁵

Organizational changes within the wing included the arrival, on 29 May, of a new MAG-12 unit to replace the “Checkerboard” squadron. VMA-332 (Lieutenant Colonel John B. Berteling) was slated to operate on board the USS *Bairoko* (CVE-115) for the F4U carrier-based squadron VMA-312⁵⁶ due for return to CONUS. Veteran of 33 months of combat while attached to the wing as West Coast (CTE 95.1.1) aerial reconnaissance and blockade squadron, VMA-312 (Lieutenant Colonel Winston E. Jewson) was officially relieved 10 June. The change, moreover, was the first phase of a new personnel policy, carrier unit rotation, that was expected to implement a unit rotation program for land-based squadrons. It was anticipated that the new unit rotation program would eliminate inherent weakness of the individual pilot rotation system and thus increase the combat effectiveness of the wing.⁵⁷

During the period other organizational changes included transfer of administrative control of VMF(N)-513 on 15 May from MAG-

⁵³ *Ibid.*, p. 10–99.

⁵⁴ Also characterized by squadron members as the “tired old Tigercats” in reference to the war-weary, 1945-vintage aircraft. VMF(N)-513 ComdD, May 53, p. 6.

⁵⁵ CO, 19th Bomber Group (Col Harvey C. Dorney, USAF) msg to CO, VMF(N)-513 (LtCol Robert F. Conley), n.d., reading: “19th Bomber Group Airborne Commander and crews participating in attack on Sinanju Bridge Complex, 11 April, have high praise for night fighter protection. All feel that without their protection severe damage or loss of B-29’s would have resulted.” VMF(N)-513 ComdD, Apr 53, p. 6.

⁵⁶ Prior to early May, VMA-312 had been based aboard the USS *Bataan* (CVL-29). The carrier itself was scheduled for relief from the Korean Theater shortly before the new afloat MAG-12 squadron reported in, and a transfer was made by 312 to the new, larger escort carrier on 8 May.

⁵⁷ Comments *PctFlt EvalRpt* No. 6, Chap. 10, p. 10–33: “Severe tactical operations weakness developed throughout the war in Korea which can be traced directly to the individual pilot rotation system. These weaknesses are inherent in any system which precludes pre-combat unit training of pilots in the tactical squadron with which they later go into combat. The situation is aggravated further when pilots, many of them inadequately pre-combat trained, are rotated through combat engaged units so rapidly that squadron esprit cannot develop to a degree which will insure a high standard of tactical efficiency.”

33 to MAG-12.⁵⁸ The squadron, with its new twin-engined jet fighters, moved from K-8 (Kunsan) further up the coast to the MAG-12 complex at K-6 (Pyongtaek), upon completion of the new 8,000-foot concrete runway there. This phased redeployment of nightfighter personnel and equipment began in late May and was concluded on 6 June without any interim reduction of combat commitments. Replacement of the squadron F7F-3Ns with F3D-2s was also completed in early June.

Late that month, plans were underway for two additional changes: the Marine photographic squadron, VMJ-1, was due to be separated administratively and operationally from MAG-33 on 1 July and revert to 1st MAW; and Marine Wing Service Squadron One (MWSS-1) was to be deactivated, effective 1 July.

The change of command relationships between CG, FAF and CG, 1st MAW earlier in the year⁵⁹ which had restored operational control of certain designated Marine air units to the wing commander, increased the efficiency of 1st MAW operations. Despite the fact that VMJ-1 at times contributed nearly 40 percent to the total FAF input of all daylight combat photographs,⁶⁰ aerial intelligence (both pre- and post-strike photos) supplied to wing and group headquarters was considered inadequate. As a MAG-33 intelligence officer commented with some exasperation as late in the war as May 1953:

The Section continued to experience difficulty in obtaining 1:50,000 scale overlays of friendly MLR and OP positions. These overlays are important for making up target maps for close support missions, but they are continually held up for long periods by higher echelons, and, if received here at all, are then often too old to be considered reliable.⁶¹

Similarly, at the individual squadron level, the carrier unit VMA-312 shortly before its relief, reported: "The one limitation on squadron activities continued to be photo coverage of the strikes. With limited facilities available, the squadron has no clear cut pictures of strike results."⁶² Return of VMJ-1 to operational control of General

⁵⁸ MAG-12, since 1 April, had been under Colonel Edward B. Carney, who assumed command upon reassignment of Colonel Bowman to the States.

⁵⁹ See Chapter VI.

⁶⁰ The magnitude of the VMJ-1 work load "can be gauged by one day's peak effort of 5,000 exposures, which, if laid end to end, would cover a strip of ground one and one half miles long." *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 4, Chap. 10, p. 10-67.

⁶¹ MAG-33 ComdD, May 53, p. H-2.

⁶² VMA-312 ComdD, May 53, p. G-2.

Megee ultimately "gave the Wing adequate photo-intelligence for the first time since commencement of combat operations in Korea."⁶⁸

Indoctrination of new replacement personnel within the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing took a swift upturn during the spring period. Pilots who had completed 100 combat missions were transferred to staff duty elsewhere in the wing in Korea or rotated Stateside. The average squadron personnel strength ran to 88 percent of T/O for enlisted; and officer strength, considerably less, frequently dipped as low as 61 percent. Under the 100-missions policy, it was a time of rapid turnover of unit commanders, too, as witnessed from the following squadron diary entries:

VMA-212—Lieutenant Colonel James R. Wallace assumed command from Major Edward C. Kicklighter, effective 19 June; the latter had been squadron ExO and acting CO in interim period following 30 April departure of former CO, Lieutenant Colonel Smunk;

VMA-323—Lieutenant Colonel Clarence H. Moore vice Lieutenant Colonel Frash, on 11 April; and Major Robert C. Woten succeeding Lieutenant Colonel Moore on 27 June;

VMA-121—Major Richard L. Braun vice Lieutenant Colonel Hughes, on 21 April;

VMF(N)-513—Lieutenant Colonel Ross S. Mickey vice Lieutenant Colonel Conley, on 6 May; in June, Lieutenant Colonel Robert L. Conrad, acting CO, named CO for Lieutenant Colonel Mickey, hospitalized for injuries received in a May aircraft accident;

VMJ-1—Lieutenant Colonel Leslie T. Bryan, Jr. vice Lieutenant Colonel William M. Ritchey, on 15 May;

VMF-311—Lieutenant Colonel Arthur M. Moran vice Lieutenant Colonel Coss, on 21 April; Lieutenant Colonel Bernard McShane vice Lieutenant Colonel Moran, on 1 June;

VMF-115—Lieutenant Colonel Lynn H. Stewart vice Lieutenant Colonel Warren, 5 June.

With respect to CAS activities, excellent weather in April—only a single day of restricted flying—brought the 1st MAW air tally that month for its land-based squadrons to 3,850 effective combat sorties (440 more by *VMA-312*) and 7,052.8 combat hours. This was a substantial increase over the preceding months. Not surprisingly, the average daily sortie rate for the month was correspondingly high: 128.3. Of 1,319 CAS sorties the largest proportion, 579 and 424 (43.9 percent, 32.1 percent), were for Marine and ROK operations, respectively.

⁶⁸ *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 6, Chap. 10, p. 10-65.

The outstanding day of the month was 17 April. During the 24-hour reporting period, 262 sorties were completed by MAGs-33 and -12 pilots,⁶⁴ who expended a combined total of 228.3 tons of bombs and 28,385 rounds of 20mm ammunition. For the two MAG-33 fighter bomber squadrons, it represented maximum effort day. Preparation had been made a week earlier to devise the targeting and best all-round flight schedules for ordnance and line sections. Objective areas for the mass attack were picked by the wing G-3 target selection branch and approved by the EUSAK-Fifth Air Force JOC. It was decided that "flights of eight aircraft staggered throughout the day would offer the best efficiency in expediting reloading and refueling with not more than sixteen aircraft inactive on the flight line at one time."⁶⁵ Throughout the day, from 0410 to 2030, VMFs-311 and -115 continuously pounded designated targets in support of the U.S. 7th and 3d Infantry Divisions.⁶⁶ Commented MAG-33:

Hitting an all-time high in the annals of memorable days, this, the seventeenth of April not only further proved MAG-33's ability to cripple the enemy's already diminishing strength but it also allowed VMF-115 to set records in total airborne sorties launched in a single day plus a record total ordnance carried and expended in one day by jet type aircraft.⁶⁷

VMF-115 alone, with 30 pilots and 23 aircraft, had flown 114 sorties and delivered 120 tons of bombs on North Korean targets.

A sample of the intensity of this maximum day was a series of three early-morning interdiction strikes led by three VMF-115 pilots that launched the effort. Led by Lieutenant Colonel Joe L. Warren, Major Samuel J. Mantel, Jr., and Major John F. Bolt, the 23 attacking Panther jets lashed the objective with 22.35 tons of ordnance and 4,630 rounds of 20mm ammunition. The three missions destroyed half of

⁶⁴ Between 15-18 April the west coast carrier squadron was under a FEAF order restricting normal interdiction missions. This was to protect UNC sick and wounded POWs in transit from China to Kaesong for final exchange at Panmunjom. VMA-312 air operations were held to CAS along the bomblines. "Marine fliers of the 'Checker-board' squadron proved adept at this unusual role [CAS support missions along the front lines], and received a 'well done' from JOC Korea as the Corsairs flew more than 100 close air support sorties from 16-18 April." *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 6, Chap. 10, p. 10-110.

⁶⁵ MAG-33 ComdD, Apr 53, p. 51.

⁶⁶ Their respective locations were: 7th Division, at the extreme right of I Corps sector; and further east, the 3d Division occupied the corresponding right flank of IX Corps sector. VMF-311 concentrated on the 7th Division targets while VMF-115 efforts were devoted primarily to the 3d Division.

⁶⁷ MAG-33 ComdD, Apr 53, p. 51.

the buildings and inflamed 95 percent of the target area in the enemy supply concentration point T'ongch'on on the Korean east coast.

By contrast, wing operations in May were considerably hampered by the bad weather peculiar to this time of the year in Korea. Restricted flying conditions were recorded for 18 days of the month. A total of 153 CAS sorties were flown for the Marine division before its 5 May relief from the front lines. Of the wing's 3,359 sorties⁶⁸ during the month, 1,405 were for close support to forward units beating back Communist encroachment efforts. The allocation of CAS sorties was 412 for U.S. infantry divisions (including 211 for the 25th Division occupying the customary Marine sector); 153 for the 1st Commonwealth Division at the Hook which the Communists assaulted on 27-28 May as part of their overall thrust against western I Corps defenses; 412 sorties for ROK units; and 63, miscellaneous. Heaviest action for Marine aviators took place towards the end of the month to thwart enemy blows in the I Corps sector where Army and Turkish units were attempting to repulse the Chinese.

The renewed effort of the Chinese Communists against UNC ground forces in late May continued sporadically the following month. A number of new records were set by Marines flying CAS assignments under the Fifth Air Force. During the intense mid-June attacks on the ROK II Corps area and adjacent X Corps sector, MAGs-12 and -33 pilots chalked up some busy days. Between 10-17 June, Marine, Navy, and Air Force aircraft had flown 8,359 effective sorties, the bulk of this massive FAF effort to buttress the crumbling ROK defense. Of this number, Marine sorties totaled 1,156, or nearly 14 percent. (Combat sorties for the 1st MAW throughout June came to 3,276 despite 23 days of marginal to nonoperational weather.) Marine pilots scored as high as 48 percent of a single day's interdiction strikes made by FAF. This occurred 15 June when the 1st MAW flew a record-breaking 283 sorties, followed by another peak 227 sorties the next day.

Actually, when the ground situation in the ROK II Corps front began to deteriorate on 12 June, the new Fifth Air Force commander, Lieutenant General Samuel E. Anderson, "waived the [3,000 foot] minimum-altitude restrictions on his fighter-bombers and ordered his wings to give all-out support to the Eighth Army."⁶⁹ The Seventh

⁶⁸ This figure does not include sorties by VMA-312 (carrier-based), VMO-6, or HMR-161, the latter two under operational control of the 1st Marine Division.

⁶⁹ Futrell, *USAF, Korea*, p. 631.

Fleet commander, Admiral Clark, likewise kept his carriers on line for seven days and ordered its naval pilots to "team with Marine and Fifth Air Force airmen for a close-support effort exceeding anything up to that time."⁷⁰ When the ROK II Corps defenses cracked open on 15 June, temporary clearing weather "allowed General Anderson and Admiral Clark to hit the Reds with everything they had. FEAF planes flew a total of 2,143 sorties of all kinds for the largest single day's effort of the war."⁷¹

Commenting on this heavy action period, 14-17 June, a dispatch to General Megee from the new FAF commander, who had succeeded General Barcus the previous month, noted:

The figures are now in. From 2000, 14 Jun 53, to 0001, 17 Jun 53, Fifth Air Force units flew a total of 3,941 combat sorties. The cost was 9 pilots lost, 11 aircraft lost, 11 aircraft major damage, 42 aircraft minor damage. The results: 1 enemy offensive stopped cold. I very deeply appreciate the splendid efforts of all members of the 5th AF at all levels. Only a concerted team effort made the foregoing possible.⁷²

This came, incidently, only five days after receipt by the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing of the Korean Presidential Unit Citation.⁷³ The award cited the wing's "outstanding and superior performance of duty" between 27 February 1951 and 11 June 1953. During this period Marine fliers executed more than 80,000 combat sorties for UNC divisions.

The fighter-bombers of MAG-33 and the MAG-12 attack planes saw heavy action during 24-30 June when the Chinese again concentrated their attention on ROK divisions in the UNC line. Peak operational day was 30 June. Marine squadrons alone executed 301 sorties, including 28 percent of the CAS and 24 percent of total FAF interdiction missions. It was also an outstanding day for MAG-12 which "outdid itself by flying 217 combat sorties against enemy forces. The 30th of this month saw MAG-12 establish a new ordnance record when an all-time high of 340 tons of bombs and napalm were drop-

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*

⁷¹ *Ibid.*

⁷² CG, FAF msg to CG, 1st MAW, dtd 17 Jun 53, in 1st MAW ComdD Jun 53 (Vol I), p. 3 and App., IV (Vol III).

⁷³ Presentation of this second Korean PUC to the 1st MAW was made by South Korean President Rhee in impressive ceremonies 12 June at MAG-33 headquarters, K-3. Among the many ranking military officials attending the ceremony was Admiral Radford, former CinCPacFlt, and newly-appointed Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.

ped on North Korea.”⁷⁴ Contributing heavily to this accomplishment was Marine Attack Squadron 121. It unleashed 156 tons of ordnance, a squadron record. It was believed this also established an all-time record for tonnage expended on the enemy by a Marine single-engine propeller squadron.

*Other Marine Defense Activities*⁷⁵

Like their counterparts on the Korean mainland, the Marines, naval gunfire teams, and ROK security troops comprising the West Coast and East Coast Island Defense Commands felt the alternating pressure build-up and slow-down that typified the closing months of the war. At both installations the defense had been recently strengthened, more or less by way of response to a CINCPacFleet intelligence evaluation in December 1952. This alerted the isolated island forces to the possibility of a renewed Communist attempt to recapture their positions. The Allied east coast defense structure at Wonsan, right at the enemy's own front door just above the 39th Parallel, was considered particularly vulnerable.

As in the preceding months, the mission of the west coast island group remained unchanged—namely, the occupation, defense, and control of its six island components. These, it will be remembered, were: Sok-to, Cho-do, Paengyong-do (command headquarters), Yongpyong-do, and the two lesser islands at Taechong-do and Tokchok-to.⁷⁶ Formal designation of the island commands was modified on 1 January 1953. At this time the West Coast and East Coast Island Defense Elements (TE 95.15 and TE 95.23) were redesignated as Task Units (TU 95.1.3 and TU 95.2.3) respectively. Korean Marines, who represented the bulk of these task units, were provided from the 2d KMC Regiment, the island security force. This unit constituted the main defense for the important U.S. Marine-controlled islands off the Korean west and east coasts.

⁷⁴ MAG-12 ComdD, Jun 53, p. C-1.

⁷⁵ Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: *PacFlt Eval Rpts* No. 5, Chaps. 2, 8, No. 6, Chaps. 2, 9; WCIDE(U) ComdDs, Oct 52-Jun 53; ECIDE(U) ComdDs, Oct 52-Jun 53; Cagle and Manson, *Sea War, Korea*; Field, *NavOps, Korea*.

⁷⁶ Locations given on WCIDE map, Chapter II.

Approximately 17 Marine officers and 100 enlisted men were assigned to the western coastal complex, with two battalions of Korean Marines fleshing out the garrison defense. The primary mission of this island group was to serve as offshore bases for UNC intelligence activities, including encouragement of friendly guerrilla operations conducted by anti-Communist North Korean personnel. Artillery based on the Marine-controlled islands provided both defensive fires and counterbattery missions against enemy guns sited on the nearby mainland.

The secondary mission of WCIDU, that of training Korean troops in infantry and weapons firing exercises, continued to be hampered somewhat by faulty communication. As one officer observed, the training program to qualify selected KMCs for naval gunfire duties "met with only modest success, due primarily to the language barrier and lack of communications equipment in the Korean Marine Corps. Personnel who had received this training did prove to be extremely helpful in accompanying raiding parties on the mainland in that they were able to call for and adjust fires."⁷⁷

Enemy pressure against the West Coast Islands, both from Communist shore guns and bombing, had increased during the fall and winter of 1952. Cho-do, shaped roughly like a giant downward-plunging fish, as previously noted had been bombed in October for the first time in the history of the command. This new trend was repeated for the next two months. By way of response, two 90mm guns were transferred to Cho-do from Kanghwa-do (a more peaceful guerrilla-controlled island northwest of Inchon) for use there as counterbattery fire against aggressive mainland batteries. The islands of Sok-to and Paengyong-do had likewise been bombed during this period, although no damage or serious casualties resulted. In December, enemy shore guns fired 752 rounds against Task Force 95 (United Nations Blockading and Escort Force) ships charged with responsibility for the island defense, in contrast to the 156 rounds of the preceding month.

Intelligence in December from "Leopard," the friendly Korean guerrilla unit at Paengyong-do, also reported the presence of junks, rubber boats, and a nearby enemy artillery battalion off Chinnampo, believed to be in readiness to attack the island. A captured POW,

⁷⁷ *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 6, Chap. 9, p. 9-128. See also Chapter II.

moreover, on 22 December reported that elements of the 23d NKPA Brigade located on the mainland across from Sok-to would attempt to seize the island group before the end of the year. The next day, shortly after dusk, when a concentration of 200 rounds⁷⁸ of 76mm suddenly fell on Sok-to, and another 125 rounds struck neighboring Cho-do, it looked as if it might be the beginning of trouble. Naval gunfire (NGF) spotters on the islands directed the fire from UNC patrol boats cruising the Yellow Sea. This counterbattery fire quickly silenced the enemy guns. Again, at the end of the month, West Coast islands were alerted for an invasion, but it never materialized.

A matter of continuing concern to the command during the fall and winter months was the North Korean refugee problem. So serious was the situation, in fact, that it had warranted a directive from the TF 95 commander (Rear Admiral John E. Gingrich). In the early fall, a large number of refugees had filtered into the West Coast Islands, raising serious doubts as to their feeding and ultimate survival during the Korean winter. Through the United Nations Civil Assistance Command, a tentative date of September had been set for evacuating these North Korean refugees to South Korea. By November the question of their relocation was still not settled, although the feeding problem had been eased somewhat by two LST-resupply loads of emergency rations and grain by CTF 90.

Activities followed a fairly consistent pattern during early 1953, with harassing fire striking the islands from the North Korean shore batteries and sporadic bomb and propaganda drops. Periodically USAF pilots who had strayed off course, planes from the nearby British carriers HMS *Glory* or *Ocean*, or Marine fliers from USS *Badoeng Strait* or *Bataan* made emergency landings on the beach airstrips at Paengyong-do for engine repairs or refueling. Logistical support continued to be a problem, due to the peculiarities of the joint ordering system through the Army. In January the western islands had unfilled requisitions dated from as early as February 1952. Official unit reports also noted the difficulty of obtaining medical supplies either promptly or in full.

In April, with the hot-cold cease-fire talks again taking one of their spasmodic upswings, WCIDU commander, Colonel Harry N. Shea,

⁷⁸ An average day's enemy harassment consisted of 4, 7, 10, or at the most approximately 28 rounds of fire. WCIDE ComdDs, *passim*.

conferred with American and British naval officials regarding CTG 95.1's (Royal Navy Commander, West Coast Blockading and Patrol Group) Operation PANDORA. This called for the evacuation of Sok-to and Cho-do, the two WCIDU islands north of the 38th Parallel, at the time of the armistice.

Increased naval gunfire and artillery missions against active enemy mainland targets, caves, and observation posts gave the two new 90mm guns delivered to the Sok-to garrison the month before and the pair already at Cho-do, as well as their gun crews, some unscheduled practice. Marine garrison personnel at the two islands and nearby patrol ships were busy 25 days of the month knocking out or neutralizing Communist mainside batteries. Late that month, the battleship USS *New Jersey* stationed off the east coast, sailed around the Korean peninsula to add its 16-inch guns to the bombardment. Enemy shelling of the two western islands increased in June, with 1,815 rounds expended in response by the two Marine gun sections.

During June, as it appeared the end of the war was in sight, the first phase of PANDORA got underway with the evacuation by CTF 95 of approximately 19,425 partisans, their families, and refugees from Sok-to and Cho-do to islands south of the 38th Parallel. A new WCIDU commander, Colonel Alexander B. Swenceski, had also arrived by this time, since the average tour of duty was but a brief four months at both island commands.

Across the Korean peninsula, the east coast Allied off-shore island defense centered on a cluster of islands in Wonsan Harbor. Situated more than 100 miles north of the battleline, these strategically-placed islands comprised the northernmost UN-held territory in Korea. The East Coast Island Defense Command numbered approximately 35 Marines, 1,270 Korean Marines, and 15 Naval personnel. Headquarters for TU 95.2.3 was Yo-do, the largest installation, which was garrisoned by approximately 300 Korean Marines and a limited detachment of USMC and USN personnel. Smaller defense forces were located on the other islands under ECIDU command.⁷⁰ In addition, an improvised NGF spotting team was also stationed at the three forward islands (Mo-do, Tae-do, and Hwangto-do). Mission of the ECIDU was a defensive one: to hold the islands as a

⁷⁰ See Chapter II and ECIDE map.

base for covert intelligence activities. The island defense system existed for the purpose of "containing and destroying any enemy forces who escape detection or who press home an attack in the face of Navy attempts at their destruction."⁸⁰

Individual island commanders were responsible for the defense of their small parcels of seaborne real estate, control of both defensive and offensive NGF missions in the area, and evaluation of intelligence regarding enemy troop locations, the movement of supplies north, or new emplacements of hostile guns. Fire support for the ECIDU islands, exposed to the enemy shore batteries above the 39th Parallel, was available from Task Force 95, which maintained a task group of ships off both the east and west coasts. Aircraft and ships of Task Force 77 (Seventh Fleet Striking Force), operating off the East Korean coastline, were also on call. In December, for instance, the Corsairs of TF 77 had resumed their rail-bridge interdiction. All-out attacks on railroad and highway bridges, as well as bombing runs on the 90-mile stretch of east coast railroad from Hungnam to Songjin, were undertaken to cut off supplies being moved north for Communist industrial use.

February marked the second anniversary of the siege of Wonsan by the UNC, the longest blockade of a port in recent U.S. history. Some naval authorities by this time argued that the venture had become one of doubtful merit which "should never have been undertaken, but its long history made it difficult to abandon without apparent admission of defeat."⁸¹ In any event, the month also signaled increasing attention paid by hostile shore batteries to the little island enclave. For seven consecutive days, 9-15 February, the harbor islands were targets for enemy mixed artillery and mortar shells. Minor materiel damage and casualties were sustained at Yo-do during a Valentine's Day bombardment, 14 February.

Altogether, the enemy harassed the harbor islands for 16 days during the month, expending 316 rounds, compared with 11 days in January. Hostile fire, not limited to the Wonsan Harbor islands, was also directed against friendly ships USS *DeHaven* and USS *Moore*. These provided counterbattery fire and were, in turn, fired upon, the nearest shells landing only 400 yards from the two vessels.

⁸⁰ ECIDE ComdD, Oct 2, p. 1.

⁸¹ Field, *NavOps, Korea*, p. 434.

This attack, also on 14 February, was described as an "unusually determined and precise"⁸² effort. The enemy, moreover, did not appear to take his usual precautions with respect to disclosing his positions. The fact that a Communist shore battery would cease fire when subjected to friendly counterbattery, with other positions then immediately taking up the delivery, "indicated some sort of central control for the first time."⁸³ The I Corps, NKPA artillery units across from the Wonsan Island command revealed the "heavy, effective artillery capability of enemy batteries which encircle Wonsan Harbor."⁸⁴

Unseasonably good weather the latter part of February improved the transportation and supply situation. With the bitter cold and wind subsiding, maintenance crews could repair the ravages of the past several months. Craft, up to LCVP size, were hoisted in on a large pontoon for repair. For most of December and January, "this small, physically remote Marine Corps command,"⁸⁵ as the ECIDU commander, Lieutenant Colonel Robert D. Heintz, Jr. himself described it, had been snowbound. Winds howled in excess of 40 knots, and temperatures dropped to 10° below at night. Personnel at the command island, Yo-do, subsisted on C rations for eight days. With boating operations suspended because of the high winds, it was not possible to send supplies or water to Hwangto-do which for several days relied solely on melted snow.

The prolonged foul weather, moreover, interrupted all classified radio communications between the ECIDU and the outside world. Crypto guard for the Wonsan islands was maintained by elements of the East Coast TG 95. Coded and decoded security radio messages had to be picked up by patrol boat which could not reach the islands during extreme conditions of icy seas and heavy snows.

As with the men on the front line, the Communists stepped up their pressure and gunfire against the island command Marines during March. The record⁸⁶ 524 rounds which fell on the ECIDU islands

⁸² *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 6, Chap. 2, p. 2-5.

⁸³ *Ibid.*

⁸⁴ ECIDE(U) ComdD, Feb 53, p. 1. Seventh Fleet intelligence estimated that there were no less than "21 active batteries emplaced on Wonsan Bay and within range of our islands." *Heintz ltr.*

⁸⁵ ECIDE(U) ComdD, Jan 53, p. 3.

⁸⁶ Another record at this time was the spate of senior visiting officers. Seven times during the month no less than 15 flag and general officers had taken their turn inspecting the ECIDU command headquarters at Yo-do. Services represented were the Marine

in March doubled the following month when the command received 1,050 rounds from active mainland batteries. In April the persistent NKPA artillerymen kept up a continuing bombardment of the eastern coastal UNC islands, missing only three days of the entire month, that caused nine casualties when a direct hit was made on the Tae-do CP bunker. It was the highest rate of incoming since UN occupation of the islands. Another April record was enemy mine laying, which increased sharply in both the WCIDU and ECIDU command areas. A total of 37 mines were sighted, the highest number since August 1952. Communist shore gunners, in addition to harassment of the island themselves, fired 2,091 rounds against TF 95 ships, another all-time high.

With respect to personnel, the situation had improved markedly. An increase in ECIDU command strength authorized by CG, FMFPac in March provided for an additional 9 Marine officers, 38 enlisted Marines, and 6 Navy personnel. These were exclusive of the current detachments of 1st ANGLICO shore party and naval maintenance personnel, and represented nearly a 40 percent strength increase.⁸⁷ Not long afterward the new ECIDU commander, Lieutenant Colonel Hoyt U. Bookhart, Jr., arrived to succeed Lieutenant Colonel Heintz, who had held the position since the preceding November.

As with the WCIDU force, by late spring it appeared that the days of UNC control and occupation of the east coast islands were numbered. In view of the imminent armistice, a CinCFE directive of 11 June called for the evacuation of all civilians, supplies, and equipment "in excess of immediate needs."⁸⁸ This was a preliminary step towards full evacuation of the islands once the armistice agreement was reached. Accordingly, on 11 June, as evacuation of the friendly west coast partisans got under way, villagers from Yo-do, the largest and ECIDU headquarters site, and the far northern island of Yang-do were similarly moved south. The evacuation was completed by mid-June.

Corps, U.S. Army, Korean Marine Corps, ROK Navy, and ROK Army. "One local statistician computed the total number of stars for the month (one side of the collar only) as 38," the monthly report brightly noted. This was believed possibly an all-time high for any headquarters in the Korean theater, short of the Eighth Army. ECIDE(U) ComdD, Mar 53, p. 1.

⁸⁷ The previous T/O for the ECIDU was 5 officers and 30 enlisted USMC, 15 USN attached primarily to the Navy maintenance unit, and 55 officers and 1,217 enlisted KMCs.

⁸⁸ ECIDE(U) ComdD, Jun 53, p. 1.

*The Division is Ordered Back to the Front*⁸⁹

A rash of political activity in June markedly affected the tenor of military operations in Korea. Intensified Communist aggression broke out north of ROK sectors in the Eighth Army line, largely as a reaction to President Rhee's unprecedented action on 18 June of freeing, with the help of ROK guards, approximately 25,000 North Korean anti-Communist prisoners at POW camps in the south. Other anti-Communist POWs at Camp No. 10, near Ascom City, staged violent break-out attempts at that same time and Company A, 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion passed to operational control of the camp commanding officer there to help prevent a repetition of any such incidents in the future. Following a recess of truce talks, pending a clarification of the status of the current military-diplomatic agreements, key delegates held crisis meetings at Panmunjom and Tokyo to get the beleaguered talks back on track.

Despite the furor, signing of the armistice agreement was expected shortly. As a result, the Munsan-ni Provisional Command was re-organized with the 1st Marine Division assigned the responsibility of reactivating the United Nations Personnel and Medical Processing Unit for the anticipated post-truce exchange of prisoners of war. This was to be conducted along lines similar to that for Operation LITTLE SWITCH, the initial limited exchange. The Division Inspector was named processing unit commander and functional sections (S-1, S-2, S-3, S-4, interpreters, messing, medical, engineer) were also activated. As the division training tour in I Corps reserve drew to a close, a number of regimental CPXs were held during June. And the 5th Marines drew a new assignment: training in riot control. Following civilian demonstrations that had erupted in various populated areas of Eighth Army, including the I Corps sector, the regiment was ordered "to be prepared to move in battalion size increments, to be employed as army service area reserve in suppression of civil disturbances anywhere in army service area."⁹⁰

While the Marine infantry regiments concluded their training period, the 1st Tank Battalion, Kimpo Provisional Regiment, and Division Reconnaissance Company remained under operational con-

⁸⁹ Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 6, Chap. 9; 1stMarDiv, 1stMar, 5thMar, 7thMar ComdDs, Jun 53.

⁹⁰ 5thMar ComdD, Jun 53, p. 1.

trol of the frontline U.S. 25th Infantry Division. Marine artillerymen likewise continued under orders of CG, I Corps Artillery, in the forward area, reinforcing division artillery fires. Tentative plans were underway for movement of the 1st Marine Division back to its former position on the MLR in early July. After the signing of the cease-fire, the division would comply with provisions of the truce agreement by closing out its former MLR and withdrawing to designated positions two kilometers south of the former defensive positions.

CHAPTER IX

Heavy Fighting Before the Armistice

Relief of the 25th Division—Initial Attacks on Outposts Berlin and East Berlin—Enemy Probes, 11–18 July—Marine Air Operations—Fall of the Berlins—Renewal of Heavy Fighting, 24–26 July—Last Day of the War

Relief of the 25th Division¹

FOR THE FIRST WEEK OF JULY the 1st Marine Division continued its mission as I Corps Reserve and its two-month period of intensive combat training that had begun on 5 May. Planning got under way on 1 July, however, for return of the division to its former sector of the MLR, as the western anchor of I Corps, in relief of the 25th Infantry Division.

Marine infantry components were directed by I Corps to effect the transfer of operational control during the night of 7–8 July. Tank and artillery units—already in the division sector throughout the reserve period—were to make whatever minor relocations were necessary at suitable times thereafter. Division Operation Plan 10–53 ordered the 7th Marines to reassume its responsibility for the right regimental sector of the MLR, eastward to the 1st Commonwealth boundary. The 5th Marines, which had been in reserve at the time of the May relief of lines, was assigned to the center sector of the MLR, while the 1st Marines was designated as divisional reserve.

Relief of the 25th Infantry Division by Marine units got underway on 6 July when the first incoming elements of Colonel Funk's 7th Marines moved up to the right regimental sector manned jointly by

¹ Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: *Pac Flt EvalRpt* No. 6, Chap. 9; 1stMarDiv ltr to CMC 3/cpc, A16–13, n.d., Subj: Berlin and East Berlin Action, Rpt of, in 1stMarDiv Summary of Activities, Jul 53 (G–3) file (Records Group 127, 61A–2265, Box 74, FRC, Alex., Va.), hereafter *CG, 1stMarDiv, Berlin Rpt*; 1stMarDiv ComdD, Jul 53; 1stMarDiv G–3 Jnls, 1–9 Jul 53; 1stMar, 5thMar, 7thMar, 11th Mar, 1st TkBn, 1/7, 2/7, 3/7, 2/11 ComdDs, Jul 53.

the U.S. 14th Infantry Regiment and the Turkish Armed Forces Command. Advance personnel reported into the left sector, to be taken over by the Marine 1st Battalion, and at 1400 the 3d Battalion relieved the TAFC reserve battalion in the rear area.

Two platoons from the Marine regiment's 4.2-inch Mortar Company, meanwhile, also began their phased relief of the Turkish Heavy Mortar Company. The incoming mortar crews had some unexpected early target practice. As the men took up their active MLR firing positions in the right battalion sector, they were promptly forced to put their tubes into action to silence a troublesome machine gun, enemy mortars, and hostile troops behind the Jersey Ridge to the north and Reno and Elko on the west. That evening the 2d Battalion opened its new command post in the eastern sector, occupied by two TAFC battalions.

Sharply at 0455 on 7 July, the 7th Marines assumed responsibility for the right regimental sector and came under operational control of the 25th Division. Shortly after noon that day, forward units of 1/7 reached the 25th Division sector after a three hour motor march from Camp Indianhead, through driving rains in their second day without letup. At the battalion sector, 1/7 joined the advance echelon of 40 men who had arrived the previous day and took over its MLR positions from the 14th Infantry. Additional 7th Marines units reporting in throughout the day and assuming new locations were the weapons, mortar, and antitank companies.

The first of Colonel Tschirgi's 5th Marines returned to their center regimental sector before dawn that same day to begin their relief of the Army 35th Infantry Regiment. At 0300 the 3d Battalion assumed responsibility for the eastern half of the MLR. By late afternoon, antitank personnel and the 2d Battalion were in line, the latter taking over the western battalion sector at 1716. In the rear regimental area, early elements of Colonel Nelson's 1st Marines, locating just south of the Imjin River, had begun to arrive by 1300. The regiment would assume ground security for the Spoonbill and Libby (formerly X-Ray) bridges in the sector as well as MASRT #1.

No one needed to remind the 1st Marine Division that the territory it was moving back into was not the same—with respect to defense posts in the right regimental sector—that it had left two months earlier. Three of its six outposts there (Carson, Elko, Vegas) had fallen to the enemy in the late-May battle, despite the formid-

able resistance of the defending Turks. Outpost Ava remained at the far western end of the line, with the Berlin-East Berlin complex in the right battalion area. Some 6,750 yards of intervening MLR—more than four miles—lay in between, bereft of any protective outposts to screen and alert the defending line companies to sudden enemy assaults. The Marines were thus returning to a main line of resistance considerably weakened in its right regimental sector.

As the 1st Division CG, General Pate, observed:

Vegas [had] dominated the enemy approaches to Berlin from the north and northwest and therefore made Berlin relatively secure. Berlin, in turn, dominated the enemy approaches from the north and northwest to East Berlin and made East Berlin relatively secure. The loss of Outpost Vegas to the CCF placed Berlin and East Berlin in very precarious positions and negated their being supported by ground fire except from the MLR.²

Ground support fire from the MLR, moreover, tended to be only moderately successful in supporting the outposts because of the nature of the terrain. A major Communist stronghold, Hill 190, lay northeast of the Carson-Elko-Vegas complex. Since Berlin (COP 19) and East Berlin (COP 19-A) were sited on extensions of this same hill mass, the enemy could make sudden "ridgeline" attacks against the Berlins. With buffer outpost Vegas now lost, the likelihood of CCF success in such attacks was "immeasurably increased."³

Initial Attacks on Outposts Berlin and East Berlin⁴

It did not take the Chinese long to exploit this situation. At about 2100 on 7 July, while the relief of lines was in progress, the two Berlin outposts and newly-located MLR companies of Lieutenant Colonel Cereghino's 2d Battalion (from the left: D, F, and E), were greeted by a heavy volume of Chinese mortar and artillery fire. The barrage continued unrelentingly, followed by waves of a reinforced Chinese battalion that swept over the two platoon-sized outposts,

² CG, 1stMarDiv, *Berlin Rpt.*, p. 1.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 2.

⁴ Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 6, Chaps. 9, 10; CG, 1stMarDiv, *Berlin Rpt.*; 1stMarDiv ComdD, July 53; 1stMar Div G-3 Jnls, 1-10 Jul 53; 1stMarDiv PIR 992, dtd 8-9 Jul 53; 5thMar, 7thMar, 11thMar, 1st TkBn, 1/7, 2/7, 3/7, 2/11, 4/11 ComdDs, Jul 53; 1st MAW, VMF-311, VMO-6, HMR-161 ComdDs, Jul 53; Hicks, *Outpost Warfare*; MacDonald, *POW*.

from the direction of Vegas. By 2345 defending Marines at both outposts were engaged in hand-to-hand combat with the enemy, identified as elements of the 407th Regiment, 136th Division, 46th CCF Army.

Berlin, manned at the time by TAFC⁵ and Marine personnel, was unexpectedly strengthened by a Company F reinforced squad that had been dispatched on an earlier ambush patrol in the vicinity of the outpost. At East Berlin, however, the overwhelming hordes of Chinese soldiers advanced to the trenchline of the steep forward slope and quickly locked with the Marines at point-blank range. Despite the coordination of MLR machine gun, 60mm, 81mm, and 4.2-inch mortar, and artillery fires from 2/11⁶ and 4/11, the enemy overran the outpost at 2355 after heavy, close fighting. Chinese mortar and artillery barrages, by midnight, had continuously disrupted the Marine communications net at East Berlin, and by 0130 radio relay was also out at Berlin proper.

A provisional platoon from Headquarters and Service Company of 2/7 was quickly ordered to reinforce the main line against any attempted breakthrough by the Chinese. This was a distinct possibility since the Berlins were only 325 yards from the MLR, nearer than most outposts. Men from Companies H and I of the rear reserve 3d Battalion (since 26 May commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Paul M. Jones) were also placed under operational control of 2/7 and ordered to forward assembly areas in readiness for a thrust against the enemy at East Berlin.

At 0355 a Company F squad jumped off for the initial counter-attack. This was made at 0415, without artillery preparation, in an attempt to gain surprise for the assault. It was thrown back. A second Company F. unit, by 0440, was on its way to reinforce the first but got caught by 25 rounds of incoming, with 15 men wounded. It continued on, however, but an hour later the Marines were ordered to disengage so that the artillerymen could place TOT fire on the area preparatory to a fresh attempt to dislodge the enemy soldiers.

⁵ Discussing this phase of operations, the 2/7 commander stated: "As it turned out we were in great shape with both Marines and Turks fighting side by side in some instances. We had a great rapport with the Turks in that they had previously relieved 2/7. In fact, they made us honorary members of their battalions, giving each 2/7 Marine one of the unit patches." Col Alexander D. Cereghino ltr to Dir MCHist, HQMC, dtd 19 Jun 70.

⁶ On 7 July, 2/11 had become the direct support battalion for the 7th Marines.

During the early morning hours of 8 July, large numbers of Chinese were seen at their new Vegas and Reno strongholds. Marines of the 1st 4.5-inch Rocket Battery blanketed hostile troops there and at the Berlin outposts with four ripples. On another occasion, a time-on-target mission launched by the 2/11 direct support battalion, landed in the midst of an enemy company assembled on Vegas. Friendly firepower by this time consisted of all four battalions of the 11th Marines, as well as seven Army and Turkish artillery battalions still emplaced in the area during the relief period and thus under tactical control of 25th Division Artillery.

Throughout 7–8 July, 11 Marine tanks from Company B placed 800 shells on enemy installations and troops. In the characteristic pattern, use of Marine armor heightened unfriendly response. The tanks drew in return 2,000 rounds of Chinese mortar and artillery on their own positions, but without any serious damage. Elements of the Army 14th Infantry Regiment Tank Company, still in the area, also opened up with some additional shells and bullets.

Despite the Chinese attack, the relief of lines continued during the night. In the center MLR sector, the 5th Marines had taken over regimental responsibility at 2130, with 3/11 becoming its direct supporting unit. And in the western half of the 7th Marines line—about the only undisturbed part of the regimental sector—1/7 had routinely completed its battalion relief at 0335 on 8 July.

At 0630 it was confirmed that East Berlin, an extension of the ridge on which Berlin was located, was under enemy control. Better news at first light was that Berlin,⁷ 500 yards west, had repulsed the enemy, a fact not definitely known earlier due to communication failure. At this time, G-3 reported that 18 effectives were holding Berlin, and 2/7 assigned an 18-man reinforced squad to buttress the defense. It was not considered feasible to send a larger reinforcement "since the Berlin area [could] accommodate only a small garrison."⁸

Meanwhile, another 7th Marines counterforce was being organized for a massed assault to retake East Berlin. At 1000, under cover of a thundering 1,600-round mortar and artillery preparation by Marine and TAFC gunners, a reinforced two-platoon unit from Companies

⁷ The ridge on which COP Berlin was located was split by two valleys. Both of these and the ridge itself served as approaches to the Marine MLR. *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 6, Chap. 9, p. 9–169.

⁸ *CG, 1stMarDiv, Berlin Rpt*, p. 2.

George and How, launched the attack. The unlucky H/3/7 platoon, in the lead, got caught between well-aimed Chinese shells and the Marines' own protective wire. In less than 15 minutes the platoon had been reduced to 20 effectives, with Company G passing through its ranks to continue the attack. By 1123 the Marines were in a violent fire fight and grenade duel in the main trenchline at East Berlin.

Tank guns, meanwhile, blasted away at Chinese troops, bunkers, active weapons, and trenches. On call they placed their fire "only a few yards in front of the friendly attacking infantry and moved this fire forward as the foot troops advanced."⁹ Heavy countermortar and artillery rounds were also hitting their mark on forward, top, and reverse slopes of East Berlin to soften the Chinese defenses. A few minutes later the 3d Battalion men had formed for the assault. During the heavy hand-to-hand fighting of the next hour the Marines "literally threw some of the Chinese down the reverse slope."¹⁰ Gaining the crest of the hill, the Marines by force and fire dispatched the enemy intruders. At 1233 they were again in possession of East Berlin. With just 20 men left in fighting condition at the outpost, a reinforcing platoon from I/3/7 was dispatched to buttress the assault force.

North of the 7th Marines sector four F9F Panthers, led by the commanding officer of VMF-311, Lieutenant Colonel Bernard McShane, found their way through the rainy skies that had restricted aerial support efforts nearly everywhere. In a noon MPQ mission, the quartet delivered five tons of ordnance on Chinese reinforcement troops and bunkers.

Promptly at 1300—a half hour after retaking the outpost—the 7th Marines effected the relief of the last Turkish elements at Berlin and occupied the twin defense positions. And by 1500 on 8 July, the 1st Marine Division assumed operational control of the entire division sector from the Army 25th Infantry Division. Relief of individual units would continue, however, through several more days. At the same time, the mission of the 11th Marines, since 5 July under a new regimental commander, Colonel Manly L. Curry, changed from general support of U.S. I Corps, reinforcing the fires of the 25th Division Artillery, to direct support of the Marine Division.

⁹ 1st TkBn ComdD, Jul 53, p. 2.

¹⁰ Hicks, *Outpost Warfare*, p. 136.

The 1st Tank Battalion similarly took over its regular direct support role. Other units under temporary Army jurisdiction, such as the Kimpo Provisional Regiment and Division Reconnaissance Company, reverted to Marine control.

During the rest of the day, gunners of the 11th Marines continued their fire missions despite reduced visibility that hindered surveillance by the OY spotting planes and forward observers. Only 42 Chinese were sighted during the daytime, although shortly before dusk a CCF group reportedly heading toward the Berlins area southwest from Frisco was taken under fire. Estimates of enemy incoming throughout the 7-8 July action from 17-odd battalions of Chinese artillery dug in across the division sector was placed at 19,000 rounds of all types. Marine and Army-controlled battalions, for their part, pounded Chinese strongholds with a total of 20,178 rounds.

That night Colonel Funk authorized a 3d Battalion platoon to bolster the MLR. Five tanks were also ordered to locate in the Hill 126 area, the Marine high-ground terrain feature to the rear of the frontlines. This foresight was well rewarded. During the late evening hours strange motor noises "sounding like a convoy pulling in and then back out again"¹¹ floated over the Korean hills and the tanks immediately swept suspected hostile installations with their 90mm guns. Later that night of 8-9 July, the Chinese suddenly renewed their probing efforts at the battered Marine outposts. Moving in from Vegas, an estimated reinforced enemy company attacked Berlin at 0104, then brushed on to East Berlin. An intense fire fight ensued off and on for nearly two hours at the two posts. Marine 81mm and 4.2-inch mortars, plus artillery illumination, boxing fires, and tanks blunted the assaults. At 0315 the enemy broke contact and action quieted down at both locations.

Throughout the rest of the day, eight Company C¹² armored vehicles assisted the infantrymen in consolidation of positions. A total of 25 rounds of shells and 19,140 rounds of .30 and .50 caliber

¹¹ 1stMarDiv G-3 Jnl, dtd 9 Jul 53.

¹² On 9 July Company C relieved Company B on the MLR in support of the 7th Marines. Both tank companies had been in action with the TAFC during the entire 60-day period the division was in I Corps reserve. Due to the rotation system, however, Baker Company had been on line longer and transferred to the rear ranks for a "much needed rest and rehabilitation." 1st TkBn ComdD, Jul 53, p. 3.

machine gun bullets were expended on CCF strongpoints and troops during a 24-hour firing period that ended at 1700.

Because of the casualties at Berlin, an H/3/7 reinforcement squad was sent to augment the Marine force there. Losses suffered by the 7th Marines for the two successive nights were 9 killed, 12 missing,¹³ 126 wounded and evacuated, and 14 with minor wounds. The cost to the CCF was 30 known dead, and an estimated 200 killed and 400 wounded.

With the Marines back on line, VMO-6 and HMR-161 which were under division operational control again resumed normal combat routine. Returning on 8 July to their forward airstrip in the center regimental sector, VMO-6 helicopters made eight frontline helicopter evacuations. Observation planes that same day conducted four artillery spotting missions behind enemy lines. HMR-161, assuming normal operations on 10 July, resupplied Marine division outposts with 1,200 pounds of rations, water, and gear as part of its 25.3 hours flight time this first day back in full service.

Enemy and Marine Probes, 11-18 July¹⁴

After the flare-up on the Berlin front, there was relatively little action for the next 10 days. Marines continued the relief of the last of the outgoing 25th Division units. When this was completed on 13 July, 1st Marine Division units, including the 1st KMC/RCT¹⁵ and 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion, were all back in their accustomed sectors. They thus rejoined the 1st Tank Battalion, 11th Marines, Kimpo Regiment, and Division Reconnaissance Company which had remained on line throughout the period. The July relief was one that could hardly be characterized as routine. Interfering elements had included not only the Chinese but torrential summer rains. These

¹³ Later it was determined that only two were actually captured and they were subsequently repatriated. MacDonald, *POW*, p. 211.

¹⁴ Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 6, Chap. 9; 1stMarDiv ComdD, Jul 53; 1stMarDiv G-3 Jnls, 10-17 Jul 53; 1st MarDiv PIRs 923-930, dtd 10-17 Jul 53; 1stMar, 5thMar, 7thMar, 11thMar, 2/5, 1/7, 3/7, 2/11 ComdDs, Jul 53; Hermes, *Truce Tent*.

¹⁵ The 1st KMC/RCT turned over its sector of the 1st ROK Division front to the 1st ROK Regiment at 1800 on 8 July and relieved the U.S. 27th Infantry Regiment on 12 July. *ROKMC Comments*.

had continued virtually nonstop from 5-8 July causing bridge and road washouts, rerouting of supply trucks, and juggling of manifests at a time when the regiments were using an average of 90 transport vehicles daily.

Forward of the MLR the regular nightly patrols probed enemy territory, often with no contact. On at least three occasions division intelligence reported entire 24-hour periods during which the elusive Chinese could not be sighted anywhere in No-Man's-Land by friendly patrols operating north of the Marine division front.

More rain,¹⁶ continual haze, and ground fog for 6 of the 10 days between 9-18 July not only reduced the activity of air observers and Marine pilots, but apparently inspired the ground-digging Chinese to pursue—at least across from the division sector of I Corps—a more mole-like existence than ever. Enemy troop sightings during the daytime decreased from as many as 310 CCF to a new low of 14. Incoming, for one 24-hour period, totaled no more than 48 rounds of Chinese artillery and 228 of mortar fire that struck Marine positions, causing only slight damage.

The same could not be said for their mines. One 7th Marines reconnaissance patrol located a new minefield staked out with Soviet antipersonnel mines (POMZ-2) of an unfamiliar type with both pull and tension fuses. It appeared that mines which had lain dormant during the winter months had suddenly come to life with the warm weather, or else been recently re-laid. Nearly a dozen were uncovered by 5th and 7th Marines patrols, soon after their return to the front, and sometimes the discovery came too late. Probably the worst day was 12 July when four Marines were killed and eight wounded as a result of accidentally detonating mines.

At the same time, in the 5th Marines sector near the vicinity of truce corridor COP-2, the persistent voice of the Dragon Lady taunted Marines with such lackluster gambits as "Surrender now! What is

¹⁶ Spoonbill Bridge was submerged under 11 feet of water and destroyed by the pressure against it on 7 July. Flood conditions existed again on 14-15 July when the Imjin crested at 26 feet at Libby Bridge. Roads in the vicinity were impassable for three days. Resupply of forward companies was made via Freedom Bridge. One command diary writer, discussing the elaborate series of six moves made by 1/1 during July, added a touch of unconscious humor when he observed, "During the month, it seemed as if the Battalion was constantly on the move . . . Rain hampered these moves considerably. The weather between moves was generally clear and dry." 1/1 ComdD, July 53, p. 1; 1st TkBn ComdD, Jul 53, pp. 5, 11-12, 23; *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 6, Chap. 9, pp. 9-68, 9-136.

your girl doing back home?" in the stepped-up pace of its midnight propaganda broadcasts.

The regular nightly patrols checked in and out, performing their mission routinely. Even during this last month of the war, when word of the final truce agreement was expected daily, fire fights ensued. On 12 July, a 5th Marines 13-man reconnaissance patrol clashed briefly north of COP Esther, while a 7th Marines platoon-size combat patrol brushed with a Chinese squad west of Elko in an 18-minute fire fight. The same night the 11th Marines reported increased enemy sightings of 318 CCF soldiers—the most seen since the Berlin probe of 7–8 July. No follow-up was made. The Chinese were busy with major offensives elsewhere along the UNC front, devoting their primary efforts to ROK divisions on the central and eastern sectors of the Eighth Army line. Apparently they fully intended to "demonstrate to the South Koreans that continuation of the war would be a costly business."¹⁷

Along the Marine front, three patrol contacts took place on the night of 16–17 July. Two of them were grim reminders that despite the promising look (and sound) of the peace talks, for those men lost the toll of the war was as final and unrelenting as it had been at any time during the past three years of combat. The first was a routine maneuver for a 5th Marines 13-man combat patrol that, at 2252, engaged an enemy squad just north of outpost Hedy. After an eight-minute fire fight the enemy withdrew, with two Chinese soldiers counted dead and one wounded and no friendly casualties.

Not so lucky was a 2/5 reconnaissance patrol. At midnight, its 15 members encountered a band of 30 to 40 Chinese, deployed in a V-shaped ambush in the Hill 90 area, an enemy stronghold two miles east of Panmunjom. The Marines set up a base of fire, beating off the enemy with their rifles, BARs, mortars, and bare fists. Reinforcements and artillery fires were called in. The first relief unit was intercepted by vicious mortar shelling which wounded the entire detail. A second relief squad, also taken under mortar fire, continued the action in an intense fire contest that lasted nearly two hours. In the meantime, the direct support artillery battalion, 3/11, reinforced by 1/11, showered 280 rounds of countermortar on Chinese long-range machine guns and mortars barking from the surrounding hills.

¹⁷ *Hermes, Truce Tent*, p. 470.

During the engagement the Chinese made several attempts to capture prisoners. When the enemy finally began to withdraw, CCF casualties were 10 known dead, an estimated 9 more dead, and 3 wounded. Seven Marines were found to be missing after the Chinese broke contact. A 5th Marines platoon that extensively screened the battalian front during the hours of darkness on the 17th returned at 2210 with six bodies.

The third encounter took place not long after midnight in the 7th Marines territory. This brief skirmish was also to have an unpleasant aftermath and, inadvertently, fulfill the psywar broadcast of the previous day that had warned Marines "not to go on patrols or be killed." As it was leaving the Ava Gate (250 yards northwest of the outpost proper) at 0045, a 30-man combat patrol from Company A was challenged on three sides by 40-50 CCF employing small arms, automatic weapons, grenades, and mortars. After a 15-minute fire exchange, during which the patrol lost communications with its MLR company, the enemy withdrew. Six CCF had been counted dead, and 12 more estimated killed or wounded.

Upon returning to the outpost, a muster of the men engaged in the action showed four Marines were missing. A rescue squad recovered three bodies. When, several hours later, daylight hampered movements of the search party, 2/11 laid down a smoke screen to isolate the sector. Between 0050 and 0455, its gunners also directed 529 rounds of close support and countermortar fire on Chinese troops and active weapons in the area. The recovery unit continued to sweep the area for the last missing man until 0545 when it was decided that the search would have to be terminated with negative results. Marine casualties from the encounter were 3 killed, 1 missing, 19 wounded (evacuated), and 2 nonseriously wounded.

The following day patrol activity and enemy contacts quieted down. Action shifted to the 1st KMC/RCT sector. Here, during the late hours of the 18th, four Korean combat patrols brushed quickly and briefly with Chinese squad and platoon units in light skirmishes of but a few minutes duration. The Korean Marines killed 2 of the enemy and estimated they accounted for 16 more.¹⁸

The only activity in the Marine right regimental sector occurred when a 7th Marines 36-man combat patrol, on prowl the night of

¹⁸ ROKMC Comments.

17–18 July, advanced at 0112 as far as hand-grenade range of the Chinese trenchline at Ungok. Undetected by the enemy, a patrol member fired a white phosphorus rifle grenade squarely at the CCF machine gun that was harassing the friendly MLR. The Marines then engaged 15 Chinese defending the position in a brief 20-minute skirmish. Although two men were wounded,¹⁹ the Company C patrol members in a somewhat roguish gesture as they left also planted a Marine Corps recruiting sign at their FPOA (Farthest Point of Advance), facing the enemy.

*Marine Air Operations*²⁰

If the monsoon rains of July hung like a shroud over the infantryman, they were an even more serious impediment to air operations of MAGs-12 and -33. There were 24 days of restricted flying when the weather at home base or target area was recorded as marginal to non-operational. On 12 full days air operations were cancelled entirely. Precipitation for July rose to 7.38 inches, with 22 days of rain recorded throughout the month. The generally unfavorable weather conditions not only limited the normal support missions flown by 1st MAW but delayed the arrival of VMA-251²¹ en route from Japan to relieve VMA-323.

¹⁹ One, who died that morning, was squad leader Sergeant Stephen C. Walter, posthumously presented the Navy Cross. Also awarded the nation's second highest combat medal for extraordinary heroism in a patrol action on 16–17 July was Private First Class Roy L. Stewart, of the 5th Marines.

²⁰ Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: *PacFlt EvalRpts* No. 4, Chap. 10, No. 5, Chap. 9, No. 6, Chap. 10; 1stMarDiv ComdD, Jul 53; 1stMarDiv PIR 924, dtd 10–11 Jul 53; 1st MAW, MAGs-12, -33, VMAs-121, -212, -251, -323, VMF(N)-153, VMF-311 ComdDs, Jul 53; Field, *NavOps, Korea*; Futrell, *USAF, Korea*.

²¹ Marine Attack Squadron 251 (Lieutenant Colonel Harold A. Harwood) administratively joined MAG-12 on 6 July for 323, which had rotated back to MCAS, El Toro three days earlier. Movement of -251 aircraft to Korea could not take place, however, until 12 July. When VMA-323 (Major Woten) departed, the famous "Death Rattlers" had the distinction of being the Marine tactical (VMA/VMF) air squadron in longest service during the Korean War. The unit's final combat mission on 2 July brought its total Korean operations to 20,827 sorties and 48,677.2 hours. On 6 August 1950, roaring up from the flight deck of the USS *Badoeng Strait*, the VMA-323 Corsairs (then VMF-323) had launched their opening blow against North Korean installations, led by Major Arnold A. Lund, CO. The initial Marine air offensive action of the Korean War had been flown three days earlier by VMF-214. This unit was reassigned to CONUS in November 1951, giving the Death Rattlers the longest continuous service flight record. Jul 53 ComdD, 1st MAW, p. 2; *USMC Ops Korea-Pusan*, v. I, pp. 89–90, 98; VMF-214 Squadron History, HRB.

During July the wing's nearly 300 aircraft (250 operational, 43 assigned to pool status in Korea) flew 2,688 combat sorties²² and 5,183.1 combat hours. The bulk of the sorties, 1,497, were CAS operations flown for 19 different UNC divisions. Nearly 900 supported the 12 ROK divisions involved in the heavy fighting on the central UNC sector. Approximately 250 of the CAS sorties were for the 1st Marine Division, with more than 200 being day or night MPQ drops and the rest, daytime CAS runs. No night close support missions were conducted.

When nearly a week of inclement weather finally lifted, Colonel Arthur R. Stacy's²³ MAG-33 pilots based at Pohang welcomed a brisk change in the tempo of operations. In seven MPQ strikes on 11 July, they hurled 13 tons of ordnance on Chinese fortifications north of the 7th Marines sector. It was the wing's first active day in support missions for the 1st Marine Division, newly back on the line.

During the interim period of 9-18 July, between the two Berlin outpost attacks, F9F jet fighters from MAG-13 again carried out approximately 35 MPQ missions for the division. (MAG-12 attack planes, during this time, were assigned to the flaming central Allied line.) Nearly 20 of these were on a single day, 14 July, when VMF-311 and -115 Panther jets roared over enemy country from morning to sundown unleashing 25 tons north of the Marine troubled right regimental sector and 9 more tons on hostile emplacements near the western end of the division line.

In middle and late July, however, the majority of missions by Marine fliers bolstered UNC operations in the central part of the Allied front where a major enemy counterthrust erupted. The peak operational day for MAG-33 pilots during this period occurred 17 July when 40 interdiction and MPQ missions (136 combat sorties) were executed for Army and ROK divisions. The corresponding record day for Colonel Carney's MAG-12 aviators was 19 July when 162 combat sorties were flown on heavy destruction missions to support UNC action.

²² Individual reports by the two groups result in a slightly higher figure. MAG-12 recorded 2,001 combat sorties (including more than 400 flown by carrier-based VMA-332, not in the 1st MAW sortie rate). MAG-33 listed 945 sorties, or a combined group total of 2,946 for the month. ComdDs Jul 53 MAG-12, p. C-1 and MAG-33, p. 1.

²³ Colonel Stacy was group commander until 24 July, when he was detached for assignment to 1st MAW as Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2. He was succeeded at MAG-33 by Colonel John L. Smith.

Marine exchange pilot Major John F. Bolt, of VMF-115, chalked up a record of a different kind on 11 July. Attached to the Fifth Air Force 51st Fighter-Interceptor Group, he shot down his fifth and sixth MIG-15 (the previous four having been bagged since 16 May) to become the first Marine jet ace in history. Major Bolt was leading a four-plane F-86 flight in the attack on four MIGs east of Sinuiju and required only 1,200 rounds of ammunition and five minutes to destroy the two enemy jet fighters. Bolt thereby became the 37th jet ace of the Korean War.

Earlier in the month, Navy Lieutenant Guy P. Bordelon won a Silver Star medal and gold star in lieu of a second Silver Star. Attending the K-6 ceremonies were General Megee and Admiral Clark, 1st Wing and Seventh Fleet commanders. Bordelon, flying with the Marine Corsair night fighters, had downed four of the harassing "Bedcheck Charlie" planes. A member of VC-3 attached to MAG-12, Lieutenant Bordelon on 17 July made his fifth night kill and was subsequently awarded the Navy Cross.

On the minus side, the 1st Marine Air Wing this last month of the war suffered a higher rate of personnel losses on combat flights than in any month since June 1952.²⁴ Captain Lote Thistlethwaite and Staff Sergeant W. H. Westbrook, of VMF(N)-513, were killed in an air patrol flight on 4 July. (Two nights earlier, the same squadron had lost a Navy pilot and crewman on temporary duty with the night-fighters when their F3D-2 similarly failed to return to Pyongtaek.) Another MAG-12 casualty was Captain Carl F. Barlow, of VMA-212, killed 13 July on a prebriefed CAS mission when he crashed while flying instruments.

On 17 July, Captain Robert I. Nordell, VMF-311, flying his third mission that day, and wingman First Lieutenant Frank L. Keck, Jr. were hit by intense automatic weapons fire while on an interdiction flight. Their planes reportedly went down, at 2000, over the Sea of Japan. After a four-day air and surface search conducted by JOC, they were declared missing and subsequently reclassified killed in action. Another MAG-33 pilot listed KIA was Major Thomas M. Sellers, VMF-115, on exchange duty with the Air Force, shot down 20 July in a dogfight after he had scored two MIG-15s.

²⁴ Wing casualties for July 1953 were listed as three killed, seven missing, and two wounded in action. Names of enlisted crew members on flights are not always given in air diaries, which accounts for the discrepancies.

Two days earlier a VMO-6 pilot, First Lieutenant Charles Marino, and his artillery spotter, First Lieutenant William A. Frease, flying a flak suppression mission, were struck by enemy fire and crashed with their ship in the 5th Marines center regimental sector.

*Fall of the Berlins*²⁵

Despite their preoccupation with other corps sectors on the central front of the Eighth Army line, the Chinese had not forgotten about the Berlin complex held by the Marines. On the night of 19-20 July,²⁶ the enemy lunged against the two Marine outposts in reinforced battalion strength to renew his attack launched 12 days earlier. Beginning at 2200, heavy Chinese mortar and artillery fire struck the two COPs and supporting MLR positions of the 3d Battalion, which had advanced to the front on 13 July in relief of 2/7.²⁷ In the center regimental sector, 5th Marines outposts Ingrid and Dagmar, and the line companies were also engaged by small arms, mortar, and artillery fires. An attempted probe at Dagmar was repulsed, aided by 3/11.

Concentrating their main assault efforts on the Berlins, however, the Chinese forces swarmed up the slopes of the outposts at 2230, with more troops moving in from enemy positions on Jersey, Detroit, and Hill 139, some 700 yards north of Berlin. The Chinese struck first at East Berlin, where 37 Marines were on duty, and then at Berlin, held by 44 men. Both positions were manned by First Lieutenant Kenneth E. Turner's Company I personnel and employed the maximum-size defenses which could be effectively utilized on these terrain features.

²⁵ Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 6, Chap. 9; *CG, 1stMarDiv, Berlin Rpt*; 1stMarDiv ComdD, Jul 53; 1stMarDiv G-3 Jnls, 19-21 Jul 53; 1stMarDiv PIRs 933-934, dtd 19-21 Jul 53; 1stMar ComdD, Jul 53; 5thMar, 7thMar, 11thMar, 3/1, 3/5, 1/7, 2/7, 3/7, 1/11, 2/11 3/11, 4/11, 1stTkBn ComdDs, Jul 53; 1stMar Preliminary Special Action Report, period 8-27 Jul 53 in ComdD, Jul 53, hereafter 1stMar SAR "Berlins"; MAGs-12, -33, VMAs-121, -212 ComdDs, Jul 53.

²⁶ The 19th of July, ironically, was the date that truce negotiators working at Panmunjom had reached final agreement on all remaining disputed points. Staff officers were scheduled to begin drawing up details of the armistice agreement and boundaries of the demilitarized zone. USMA, *Korea*, p. 51.

²⁷ Company E and a detachment of the 81mm mortar platoon from the 2d Battalion remained on line. They were attached to the 3d Battalion when the sector command changed.

By 2300 hostile forces were halfway up Berlin. Continuous volumes of small arms and machine gun fire poured from the defending MLR companies. Defensive boxes were fired by 60mm, 81mm, and 4.2-inch mortars. Eight Company C tanks augmented the close-in fires, with their lethal direct-fire 90mm guns tearing into Chinese troops and weapons. Within two hours after the initial thrust, the 11th Marines had fired 20 counterbattery and 31 countermortar missions. Artillerymen from 2/11 and 1/11 had expended 1,750 rounds. In addition, 4/11 had unleashed 124 of its 155mm medium projectiles. More countermortar fire came from the TAFC Field Artillery Battalion. Despite the heavy fire support, by midnight the situation was in doubt and at 0146 the twin outposts were officially declared under enemy control. Nearly 3,000 rounds of incoming were estimated to have fallen on division positions by that time, most of it in the 7th Marines sector.

During the early morning hours of the 20th, Marine tank guns and continuous shelling by six²⁸ artillery battalions wreaked havoc on Chinese hardware, reinforcing personnel, supply points, and fortifications. Reserve units from 2/7 were placed on 30-minute standby, with Companies D, E, and F already under 3/7 operational control. Battalion Operation Order 20-53, issued at 0400 by Lieutenant Colonel Jones, called for Easy and Dog to launch a two-company counterattack at 0730 to restore Berlin and East Berlin respectively. Incoming, meanwhile, continued heavy on the MLR; at 0520, Company I, located to the rear of the contested outposts, reported receiving one round per second.

The Marine assault was cancelled by I Corps a half hour before it was scheduled to take place. A decision subsequently rendered from I Corps directed that the positions not be retaken.²⁹

²⁸ Three Marine, one TAFC, and two Army battalions.

²⁹ At a routine conference that same morning attended by CG Eighth Army (General Taylor), CG I Corps (General Clarke) and CG 1st Marine Division, the earlier decision about not regaining the outposts was affirmed. General Taylor maintained the positions "could never be held should the Chinese decide to exert sufficient pressure against them" and recommended instead that the sector be organized on a wide front defense concept. Actually, following the initial Berlins attack of 7-8 July, a discussion about possible readjustment of the Marine sector defense had been initiated by General Pate. A staff study recommending that just such a "strongpoint" concept (rather than the customary linear defense) be adopted had been completed by Marine Division officials on 15 July. I Corps staff members had concurred with the study and it was awaiting consideration by CG, I Corps when the Berlins were attacked for the second time on 19 July. *CG, 1stMarDiv, Berlin Rpt*, pp. 3-4.

Since the outposts were not to be recaptured,³⁰ efforts that day were devoted to making the two hills as untenable as possible for their new occupants. Heavy destruction missions by air, armor, and artillery blasted CCF defenses throughout the day. Air observers were on station from 0830 until after dark, with nine CAS missions conducted by MAG-12 pilots from VMA-121 and -122. The day's series of air strikes on the Berlin-East Berlin positions (and Vegas weapons emplacements) began at 1145 when a division of ADs from Lieutenant Colonel Harold B. Penne's³¹ -121 hurled nine and a half tons of ordnance on enemy bunkers and trenches at East Berlin.

The artillery was having an active day, too. Six firing battalions had sent more than 3,600 rounds crashing against the enemy by nightfall. The 1st 4.5-inch rocketeers also contributed four ripples to the melee. Heavy fire missions were requested and delivered by the Army 159th Field Artillery Battalion (240mm howitzers) and 17th Field Artillery Battalion (8-inch howitzers) using 11th Marines airborne spotters. The precision fire on enemy positions, which the air spotters reported to be "the most effective missions they had conducted in Korea"³² continued for several hours. By 1945 the big guns had demolished the bunkers and all but 15 yards of trenchline at East Berlin. For their part the Chinese had fired an estimated 4,900 rounds of mortar and artillery against the 3d Battalion right hand sector in the 24-hour period ending at 1800 on the 20th.


Armored vehicles, meanwhile, during 19-20 July had expended 200 rounds of HE and WP shells and 6,170 machine gun rounds.³³ Tank searchlights had also effectively illuminated enemy positions on the East Berlin hill. The tankers' performance record included: 20 Chinese bunkers and 2 57mm recoilless rifles destroyed; an estimated 30 enemy soldiers killed; a dozen more firing apertures, caves, and trenchworks substantially damaged.

³⁰ Commenting on this point, the I Corps commander noted: "The outposts in front of the MLR had gradually lost their value in my opinion because, between the MLR and the outposts, minefields, tactical wire, etc. had made their reinforcement and counter-attacks very costly." Resupply was thus restricted to narrow paths on which the CCF had zeroed in and "holding poor real estate for sentimental reasons is a poor excuse for undue casualties." Gen Bruce C. Clarke, USA, ltr to Dir, MCHist, HQMC, dtd 20 May 70.

³¹ The new squadron commander had taken over 16 July from Major Braun.

³² BGen Manly L. Curry ltr to Dir, MCHist, HQMC, dtd 28 May 70, hereafter *Curry ltr*.

³³ Tank and artillery ammunition allocations had been cut 50 percent the afternoon of the 19th, with a subsequent reduction of normal destruction missions and elimination of H&I fires. ComdDs Jul 53 1st TkBn, p. 3 and App. 2, p. 4 and 1/11, p. 5.



Between noon and the last flight of the day, when a trio of AUs from Lieutenant Colonel Wallace's VMA-212 attacked a northern enemy mortar and automatic weapons site, 35 aircraft had repeatedly streaked over the Berlin territory and adjacent Chinese strongpoints. Strikes by VMA-121 at 1145, 1320, 1525, 1625, 1700, 1750; and VMA-212 at 1413, 1849, and 1930 had released a combined total of 69½ tons of bombs and 6,500 rounds of 20mm ammunition on hostile locations.

The Chinese casualty toll during this renewed flareup in the fighting on 19-20 July was conservatively placed by 3/7 at 75 killed and 300 wounded. It was further believed that "the enemy battalion was so weakened and disorganized by the attacks that it was necessary for the CCF to commit another battalion to hold the area captured."³⁴ Regimental reports indicated that 6 Marines had been killed, 56 listed missing,³⁵ 86 wounded and evacuated, and 32 not seriously wounded.

As a result of the critical tactical situation and number of casualties suffered during the Berlins operation, the 7th Marines regimental commander requested that units of the division reserve be placed under his control to help check any further aggressive moves of the enemy. For it now appeared that the Chinese might continue their thrust and attempt to seize Hill 119 (directly south of Berlin and East Berlin) in order to be in position to deny part of the Imjin River to UNC forces after signing of the armistice.

While the lost outposts were being neutralized on the morning of the 20th, the CO of the incoming 1st Marines, Colonel Nelson, also ordered an immediate reorganization and strengthening of the MLR. This employed the defense in depth concept, used by the British Commonwealth Division in the sector adjacent to the Marines on the east. The wide front defense concept was fully developed with one company occupying a portion of the MLR to the rear of the Berlin complex, known as Hill 119 or more informally, Boulder City. Three



³⁴ 3/7 ComdD, 20 Jul 53, p. 5. With respect to the number of enemy casualties that night, battalion, regimental, artillery support, and division command diaries given differing accounts. Other figures cited are: 9 CCF killed, between 234-284 estimated killed, and 630 estimated wounded.

³⁵ Subsequently, it was learned that of 56 Marines unaccounted for at the time, 12 were actually captured. They were returned after hostilities ended. Several men from 1st Marines units under operational control of the 7th were also taken in this battle. MacDonald, *POW*, pp. 212, 268-269.

7TH MARINES MLR SECTOR

Defense - in-depth

20-21 July 1953



companies organized the high ground to the right rear of the MLR east to Hill 111, the limiting point on the boundary between the Marine and Commonwealth divisions. Three more companies fortified the Hill 126 area to the rear and left of Berlin to its juncture with the western battalion sector held by Lieutenant Colonel Harry A. Hadd's 1/7. (See Maps 30 and 31.)

The afternoon of the 20th, 2/1 (Lieutenant Colonel Frank A. Long) was transferred to 7th Marines control and positioned in the center of the regimental MLR, as the first step in the scheduled relief of the 7th, due off the line on 26 July. For the next three days the regiment continued to develop the sector defense to the rear of the MLR. Elements of the regimental reserve, 2/7, were employed to reinforce the 3/7 sector. Initially, on 20–21 July, F/2/7, under operational command of 3/7, was assigned the mission of reinforcing Hill 119. Later a 2/1 platoon was also ordered to strengthen the position.

Incoming 1st Marines platoons and companies from the 2d and 3d (Lieutenant Colonel Roy D. Miller) Battalions augmented the forces at the two critical Hill 119 and 111 locations. As it turned out, 1st Marines personnel returning to the front from division reserve were to see the last of the war's heavy fighting in the course of their relief of the 7th Marines. Ultimately, the regimental forward defense, instead of being divided into two battalion sectors as before, now consisted of three—a left, center, and right sector. By 23 July the depth reorganization had been completed and these sectors were manned by 1/7, 2/1, and 3/7. (See Map 32.)

*Renewal of Heavy Fighting, 24–26 July*³⁰

Sightings of enemy troops for the next few days were light. A large scale attack expected on the 21st by the 5th Marines at Hedy and Dagmar failed to materialize. Instead, a token force of a dozen Chinese dressed in burlap bags made a limited appearance at Hedy be-

³⁰ Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 6, Chap. 9; 1stMarDiv ComdD, Jul 53; 1stMarDiv G-3 Jnls, dtd 21–28 Jul 53; 1stMarDiv PIRs 935–941, dtd 21–27 Jul 53 and 942, dtd 7 Aug 53; 1stMar, 5thMar, 7thMar, 11th Mar, 3/1, 3/5, 2/7, 3/7, 1/11, 2/11, 3/11, 4/11, 1st TkBn ComdDs, Jul 53; 1stMar SAR "Berlins"; MAGs-12, -33, VMAs-121, -212, -251, VMFs-115, -311 ComdDs, Jul 53; Hicks, *Outpost Warfare*; Hermes, *Truce Tent*; Miller, Carroll, and Tackley, *Korea, 1951–1953*; Martin Russ, *The Last Parallel: A Marine's War Journal* (New York: Rinehart and Company, 1957); USMA, *Korea*.

Defense-in-depth

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fore departing, minus three of its party, due to Marine sharp-shooting skills. In the skies, MAG-33 fliers from VMF-115 and -311 had been transferred by Fifth Air Force from exclusive missions for the central and eastern UNC front (the IX, ROK II, and X Corps sectors) to join VMA-121 in MPQ flights supporting the 1st Marine Division. During the 21-23 July period, despite layers of thick stratus clouds and rain that turned off and on periodically like a water spigot, more than 15 radar missions were executed by the three squadrons.³⁷ They unleashed a gross 33-ton bomb load on CCF mortar and 76mm gun positions, supply areas, CPs, bunkers, and trenches.

The lull in ground fighting lasted until late on the 24th. Then, at 1930, a heavy preparation of 60mm, 82mm, and 120mm mortars combined with 76mm and 122mm artillery shells began to rain down on Boulder City. Men of G/3/1, under command of First Lieutenant Oral R. Swigart, Jr., were deployed at that time in a perimeter defense of the position having that morning completed the relief of G/3/7.

Enemy troops were reported massing for an assault. One regiment located by forward observers behind Hill 139, some 700 yards northwest of Berlin, was taken under fire at 1940 by artillery and rocket ripple. At 2030, following their usual pattern of laying down a heavy mortar and artillery barrage, the CCF began to probe the MLR at Hills 119 and 111 in the Marine right battalion sector. They hit first at Hill 111, the far right anchor of the division line, currently held by 7th Marines personnel. Then the CCF moved westward to Hill 119. Their choice of time for the attack once again coincided with the relief of 7th Marines units by the 1st Marines.³⁸ When the assault began, H/3/1 was moving up to relieve H/3/7 at the easternmost point of the line in the Hill 111 vicinity, and Company I was preparing to relieve I/3/7, to its left.

The Communist troops temporarily penetrated Hill 111 positions. At Boulder City, where the main force of the CCF two-battalion unit

³⁷ One additional flight expending three 1,000-lb. bombs was made 22 July by a single AD from replacement squadron VMA-251. This was the unit's first combat sortie in support of the 1st Marine Division after its indoctrination flights. VMA-251 also flew four MPQ flights for the 7th Marines in the early hours of 24 July, the day the outposts were attacked again. VMA-251 ComdD, Jul 53.

³⁸ A similar incident had occurred on 7 July when the 7th Marines was attacked while in the process of relieving a regiment of the 25th Infantry. *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 6, p. 9-58.

had struck, they occupied a portion of the trenchline. Attempting to exploit this gain, the Chinese repeatedly assaulted the Berlin Gate, on the left flank of Company G's position and the East Berlin Gate, to its right. Marine units of the two regiments posted at the two citadel hills were heavily supported by MLR mortar, artillery, and tank fires. No artillery spotter or CAS flights were flown through the night, once again due to weather conditions.

By 2120, the bulk of Chinese soldiers had begun to withdraw from Hill 111, this attack apparently being a diversionary effort. But the enemy's main thrust continued against the central Hill 119 position. Here the close, heavy fighting raged on through the morning hours, with enemy troops steadily reinforcing from the Jersey Ridge and East Berlin, by way of the Berlin Gate, the best avenue of approach to forward positions of Hill 119. At approximately 2100, the Chinese hurled a second attack against Hill 119 in the strength of two companies, supported by intense mortar and artillery fire. An hour later hand-to-hand combat had developed all along the 700 yards of the forward trenches. Company G men of the 1st Marines were down to half their original number, ammunition was running low, and evacuation of casualties was slowed by the fact that two of the eight corpsmen had been killed and most of the rest were themselves casualties.

By midnight, the front, left, and right flanks of the perimeter had been pushed back to the reverse slope of the hill and a 1st Marines participant commented "... only a never-say-die resistance was keeping the enemy from seizing the remainder of the position."³⁹ At 0015, the thinning ranks of G/3/1 Marines (now down to 25 percent effectives) were cheered by the news that Company I men were about to reinforce their position. This latter unit itself suffered 35 casualties while moving into the rear area, when the Chinese intercepted a coded message and shifted a substantial amount of their mortar and artillery fires to the rear approaches of Hill 119.

In response to the enemy bombardment, Marine artillery fires crashed against the Chinese continuously from 2100 to midnight. Four ripples were launched in support of the Hill 119 defenders. In one of the regiment's most intense counterbattery shoots on record, the 11th Marines in three hours had fired 157 missions. By 2400, an

³⁹ 1stMar SAR "Berlins," Aug 53, p. 4.

estimated 6,000 to 8,000 hostile rounds had fallen in the division sector.

Meanwhile, the Chinese were also attempting to punch holes in the 5th regimental sector. In a second-step operation, rather than striking simultaneously as was customary, the enemy at 2115 had jabbed at outposts Esther and Dagmar in the right battalion of the 5th Marines. The reinforced Chinese company from the 408th Regiment quickly began to concentrate its attention on Esther, outposted by Company H Marines. During the heavy fighting both Marines and Chinese reinforced. By early morning, the enemy had seized part of the front trenchline, but the Marines controlled the rear trenches and reorganized the defense under rifle platoon commander, Second Lieutenant William H. Bates. The Chinese unsuccessfully attempted to isolate the position by heavy shelling and patrolled vigorously between Esther and the MLR.

Marines replied with flamethrowers and heavy supporting fires from the MLR, including machine guns, 81mm and 4.2-inch mortar boxes. Three tanks—a section from the regimental antitank platoon and one from Company A—neutralized enemy targets with 153 rounds to assist the 3d and 2d Battalions. The 3/11 gunners supporting the 5th Marines also hurled 3,886 rounds against the Chinese in breaking up the attack. After several hours of strong resistance, the Chinese loosened their grip, and at 0640 on the 25th, Esther was reported secured.

By this time an enemy battalion had been committed piecemeal at the position. The action had developed into the heaviest encounter of the month in the 5th Marines sector. During that night of 24–25 July, more than 4,000 artillery and mortar rounds fell in the outpost vicinity; total incoming for the regimental sector throughout July was recorded at 8,413 rounds. Twelve Marines lost their lives in the battle, with 35 wounded and evacuated, and 63 suffering minor injuries. A total of 85 CCF were counted dead, 110 more estimated killed, and an estimated 250 wounded.

Back at the Berlin Complex area of the 7th Marines where the major action centered, intense shelling, fire fights, and close hand-to-hand combat continued through the early morning of the 25th. Chinese infiltrators had broken through a substantial part of the trenchwork on the forward slope of Boulder City. For a while they temporarily occupied the rocky, shrub-grown hill crest as well.

A swift-moving counterattack launched at 0130 by 1st Marines from Companies G and I, led by Captain Louis J. Sartor, of I/3/1, began to restore the proper balance to the situation. At 0330 the MLR had been reestablished and the Marines had the controlling hand. By 0530 the Hill 119 area was secured, with four new platoons from Companies E of the 7th and 1st Marines aiding the defense. Scattered groups of Chinese still clung to the forward slopes, and others vainly tried to reinforce by the Berlin-to-Hill 119 left flank trenchline.

Direct fire from the four M-46s on position at Boulder City⁴⁰ had helped disperse hostile troop concentrations. The tanks had also played a major communication role. Although surrounded by enemy forces during the peak of the fighting, two of the armored vehicles were still able to radio timely tactical information to higher echelons. This Company C quartet, plus another vehicle from the 7th Marines antitank unit, between the time of the enemy assault to 0600 when it stabilized, had pumped 109 HE, 8 marking shells, and 20,750 .30 caliber machine gun bullets into opposition forces.⁴¹ Five tanks from the 1st Marines AT company located to the west of the Berlin site meted out further punishment to enemy soldiers, gun pits, and trenches.

Sporadic fighting and heavy incoming (at the rate of 60-70 rounds per minute for 10 minutes duration) also rained down on eastern Hill 111 in the early hours of the 25th. Assault teams with flame-throwers and 3.5-inch rocket launchers completed the job of clearing the enemy out of Marine bunkers.

Altogether the Communists had committed 3,000 troops across the Marine division front during the night of 24-25 July. Between 2200 and 0400, a total of 23,725 rounds had been fired by the 11th Marines and 10 battalions under its operational control in the division sector. This included batteries from the 25th Division Artillery, I Corps Artillery, and 1st Commonwealth Division Artillery.⁴² The

⁴⁰ One participant remarked: "I think the Boulder City action . . . is the classic example of where the Army system worked well. The tanks were generally given credit for saving the position, and I seriously doubt our ability to have done the job under the previous system which would have required the tanks to move to the scene after the action had begun." *Post ltr.*

⁴¹ In retaliation, between 2200 and 0600, the four tanks at Hill 119 drew 2,200 rounds of enemy mortar and artillery.

⁴² The British were not hampered by any ammunition restrictions at this time. The excellent liaison between the 11th Marines and Commonwealth Division Artillery resulted in a humorous incident. After the battle of 24-25 July, a young British artillery

artillery outgoing represented 7,057 rounds to assist the 5th Marines at outpost Esther and 16,668 in defense of Boulder City.

On the morning of 25 July, the Chinese at 0820 again assaulted Hill 119 in company strength. Marine mortar and artillery fire repulsed the attack, with heavy enemy losses. See-saw action continued for most of the rest of the day on the position. No major infantry attempt was made at Hill 111. Intense hostile shelling was reported here at 1100, however, when the 3d Battalion, 7th Marines, still in operational control of the area, began receiving 125 to 150 rounds per minute. The last of the Chinese marauders were forced off the forward slope at Boulder City at 1335. For some welcomed hours both Marine positions remained quiet. A conservative estimate by 3/7 of the toll for the enemy's efforts were 75 CCF killed and 425 wounded.

Air support that morning was provided by 32 of the sleek, hard-hitting F9Fs from VMF-115 and -311. Working in tandem over Chinese terrain directly north of the right regimental sector, the two squadrons, between 0616 and 1036, flew nine MPQ missions. In the aerial assault, they bombarded the enemy with more than 32 tons of explosives.

Twelve Marine tanks had a workout, expending 480 HE and 33 WP shells and 21,300 rounds of machine gun ammunition in direct fire missions. The traditional inequity of battlefront luck was plainly demonstrated between a section (two) of armored vehicles near the Hill 111 company CP and a trio located at Boulder City. It was practically a standoff for the former. Together they were able to fire only 71 high explosive shells, drawing a return of 1,000 rounds of CCF 60mm mortar and 122mm cannon shells. Blazing guns of the three tanks in the Hill 119 area, meanwhile, during the 24-hour firing period had sent 158 HE, 10 WP, and 17,295 bullets to destroy hostile weapons and installations and received but 120 mortar and another 120 rounds of artillery fire.

The 11th Marines were also busy as heavy firing continued on

officer arrived at a Marine regimental CP. He identified himself as being from the unit that had provided artillery support to the Marines the previous night, for which he was profusely thanked. Before his astonished audience he then unrolled an impressive scroll. This proved to be a bill enumerating the various types and amounts of projectiles fired and specifying the cost in pounds sterling. When he felt the Marine staff was properly flabbergasted, he grinned and conceded waggishly: "But I am authorized to settle for two bottles of your best whiskey!" *Curry ltr.*

Chinese policing parties and those enemy batteries actively shelling MLR positions. By late afternoon, 13,500 rounds of Chinese mortar and artillery had crashed against the 7th Marines right sector—the highest rate of incoming for any 24-hour period during the entire Berlin action. For its part, the regiment and its medium and heavy support units completed 216 counterbattery missions and sent 36,794 rounds of outgoing into Chinese defenses between 2200 on 24 July and 1600 on the 25th.

Meanwhile, during 25 July, Colonel Nelson's men continued with their relief of the 7th Marines. At 1100 Major Robert D. Thurston, S-3 of 3/1, assumed command of Hill 119 and reorganized the embattled Company G and Company I personnel, 1st Marines. That night, at 1940, E/2/1 and F/2/7 effected the relief of the composite George-Item men. At the eastern Hill 111 Company H, 1st Marines had assisted Company H, 7th Marines during the day in clearing the trenchworks of the enemy; then at 1815, the 1st Marines unit completed its relief of H/3/7 and took over responsibility for the MLR right company sector. Not long after, beginning at 2130, 1st and 7th Marines at the critical Hill 119 complex were attacked by two enemy companies. MLR fire support plus artillery and tank guns lashed at the enemy and he withdrew. Between 0130 and 0300 the Chinese again probed Hills 111 and 119, gaining small parts of the trenchline before being driven out by superior Marine firepower. Marine casualties were 19 killed and 125 wounded. The CCF had suffered 30 known dead, an estimated 84 killed, and 310 estimated wounded.

With dawn on the 26th came the first real quiet the battlefield had known for two days. Small enemy groups tried to reinforce by way of the Berlin trenchline, only to be stopped by Marine riflemen and machine gunners. Hostile incoming continued spasmodically. At 1330 the 1st Marines assumed operational control of the right regimental sector, as scheduled, and of the remaining 7th Marines units still in the area.⁴³ By this time Marine casualties since 24 July numbered 43 killed and 316 wounded.

That night the Communists, knowing the armistice was near and that time was running out for seizing the Boulder City objective,

⁴³ Seventh Marines units were Companies D and E, and elements of the 4.2-inch Mortar Company.

made their final attempts at the strongpoint. Again they attacked at 2130. Defending 1st Marines were now under Captain Esmond E. Harper, CO of E/2/1, who had assumed command when Major Thurston was seriously wounded and evacuated. They fought off the Chinese platoon-size drive when the enemy advanced from Berlin to the wire at Hill 119. Shortly after midnight another Chinese platoon returned to Hill 119 in the last skirmish for the territory, but Marine small arms and artillery handily sent it home. At 0045, a CCF platoon nosed about the Hill 111 area for an hour and twenty minutes. Again the Marines discouraged these last faltering enemy efforts. Action at both hills ceased and what was to become the concluding ground action for the 1st Marine Division in Korea had ended.

Despite impressive tenacity and determination, the Chinese Communist attacks throughout most of July on the two Berlin outposts and Hills 119 and 111 achieved no real gain. Their repetitive assaults on strongly-defended Boulder City up until the last day of the war was an attempt to place the Marines (and the United Nations Command) in as unfavorable a position as possible when the armistice agreement was signed. While talking at Panmunjom, the Communists pressed hungrily on the battlefield for as much critical terrain as they could get under their control before the final cease-fire line was established.

Had the enemy succeeded in his assaults on the two hill defenses after his earlier seizure of the Berlins, under terms of the agreement UNC forces would have been forced to withdraw southward to a point where they no longer had free access to all of the Imjin River. If the Chinese had taken Boulder City this would have also provided the CCF a major high ground position (Hill 126) with direct observation into Marine rear areas and important supply routes.

From the standpoint of casualties, the last month of the Korean War was a costly one, with 181 infantry Marines killed in action and total losses of 1,611 men.⁴⁴ This was the highest rate for any month during 1953. It was second only to the October 1952 outpost battles⁴⁵ for any month during the year the 1st Marine Division defended the line in West Korea. The closing days of the war pro-

⁴⁴ Casualty breakdown: 181 killed, 86 missing, 862 wounded and evacuated, 474 wounded (not evacuated), and 10 non-battle deaths.

⁴⁵ During this period 186 Marines were killed and 1,798 listed as casualties.

duced the last action for which Marines were awarded the Navy Cross. These Marines were Second Lieutenant Bates, H/3/5; First Lieutenant Swigart, G/3/1; Second Lieutenant Theodore J. Lutz, Jr., H/3/1; and Sergeant Robert J. Raymond, F/2/7, who was mortally wounded.

The 7th and 1st Marines, as the two regiments involved during July in the Berlin sector defense, sustained high monthly losses: 804 and 594, respectively. Forty-eight men from the 7th Marines and 70 from the 1st Marines were killed in action. In contrast, the 5th Marines which witnessed little frontline action during the month (except for a sharp one-night clash at Outpost Esther), suffered total monthly casualties of 150 men, of whom 26 lost their lives. Chinese losses were also high: 405 counted killed, 761 estimated killed, 1,988 estimated wounded, 1 prisoner, or 3,155 for the month of July.

In their unsuccessful attempts to dislodge the Marines from their MLR positions the Chinese had pounded the right regimental flank with approximately 22,200 artillery and mortar shells during the last 24-27 July battle. In reply, 11th Marines gunners and supporting units had expended a total of 64,187 rounds against CCF strong-points. The enemy's increased counterbattery capabilities in July, noted by division intelligence, also received particular attention from the artillerymen. A record number of 345 counterbattery missions were conducted during the period by Marine and Army cannoners.

More than 46,000 rounds of outgoing had been fired by the Chinese in their repeated attempts of 7-9, 19-20, and 24-27 July to seize the Berlin posts and key MLR terrain. Operations during this final month, as the 2/11 commander was to point out later, on numerous occasions had verified the wisdom of leaving "direct support artillery battalions in place during frequent changes of frontline infantry units."⁴⁶

Armored support throughout the 24-27 July period consisted of more than 30 tanks (Company C, AT Company elements of the 1st and 7th Marines, a section of flames, and Company D platoon) on line or in reserve. Marine tankers used a record 1,287 shells and 54,845 bullets against the CCF, while drawing 4,845 rounds of enemy mixed mortar and artillery.

The enemy's attack on Marine MLR positions, beginning 24 July,

⁴⁶ Col Gordon H. West ltr to Dir, MCHist, HQMC, dtd 1 Jul 70, hereafter *West ltr*.

constituted the major action in the I Corps sector the final 10 days of the war. During this period the Chinese probed I Corps positions 25 times (8 in the Marine, 5 in the 1st Commonwealth, 6 in the 1st ROK, and 6 in the 7th Infantry Division sectors).

In other parts of the Eighth Army line, the last large-scale action had broken out east of the Marine sector beginning 13 July when major elements of six Chinese Communist divisions penetrated a ROK unit to the right of the IX Corps. As the division's right and center fell back, units withdrew into the zones of the IX and ROK II Corps on the east. General Taylor directed that a new MLR be established south of the Kumsong River, and a counterattack 17-20 July by three II Corps divisions attained this objective.

Since the armistice agreement was imminent, no attempt was made to restore the original line. The Chinese had achieved temporary success⁴⁷ but at heavy cost. Eighth Army officials estimated that CCF casualties in July reached 72,000 men, with more than 25,000 of these dead. The enemy had lost the equivalent of seven divisions of the five Chinese armies committed in attacks upon the II and IX Corps sectors.

*The Last Day of the War*⁴⁸

Representatives of the Communist Forces and the United Nations Command signed the armistice agreement that marked the end of the Korean War in Panmunjom at 1000 on Monday, 27 July 1953. The cease-fire, ending two years of often fruitless and hostile truce negotiations, became effective at 2200 that night. After three years, one month, and two days the so-called police action in Korea had come to a halt.

⁴⁷ Minor realignments of the military line of demarcation were made in the center sector to include a few miles of territory gained by the Communists in their massive July offensive there. Clark, *Danube to Yalu*, p. 292; Futrell, *USAF, Korea*, p. 640; Leckie, *Conflict*, p. 385.

⁴⁸ Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 6, Chap. 9; 1stMarDiv ComdD, Jul 53; 1stMarDiv G-3 Jnls, 26-28 Jul 53; 1stMarDiv PIR 941, dtd 27 Jul 53; 1stMAW ComdD, Jul 53; 1stMar, 5thMar, 7thMar, 11thMar, 3/1, 3/5, 2/7, 4/11 ComdDs, Jul 53; 1stMar SAR "Berlins"; HRS Log Sheet, dtd 21 Aug 67 (n.t., about Korean War Casualties, prepared on request for Policy Analysis Br., HQMC); Leckie, *Conflict*; Capt C. A. Robinson and Sgt D. L. Cellers, "Land of the Morning Calm," *Midwest Reporter* (Jul 68).

Actually, final agreement on the armistice had been expected since late June. By mid-July it was considered imminent, even though the CCF during these waning days of the war had launched several major counteroffensives against ROK troops defending the central part of the Eighth Army line as well as the Marines in the western I Corps sector.

With the final resolution of hostilities at 1000, a flash message went out immediately to the 26,000 Marines of General Pate's division directing that there be "no celebration firing related in any way to the advent of the armistice."⁴⁹ Fraternization or communication with the enemy was expressly forbidden. Personnel were reminded that firing of all weapons was to be "restricted to the minimum justified by the tactical situation."⁵⁰ No defensive firing was to take place after 2145 unless the Marines were actually attacked by enemy infantry. Each frontline company was authorized to fire one white star cluster at 2200, signalling the cease fire.

The signing of the armistice agreement on 27 July thus ended 36 months of war for the Marines in Korea. On that date, the 1st Marine Division initiated plans for its withdrawal to defensive positions south of the Imjin River. One regiment, the 5th Marines, was left north of the river to man the general outpost line across the entire division front. A transition was made at this time from the customary wide-front linear defense to a defense in depth, similar to that employed in the July Boulder City battle.

Briefly, the armistice agreement decreed that both UNC and Communist forces:


Cease fire 12 hours (at 2200, 27 July) after signing of agreement;

Withdraw all military forces, supplies, and equipment from the demilitarized zone (2,000 yards from line of contact) within 72 hours after effective time of ceasefire;

Locate and list all fortifications and minefields in the DMZ within 72 hours, to be dismantled during a subsequent salvage period;

⁴⁹ Msg 1stMarDiv G-3 Jnl, dtd 27 Jul 53, quoting Cease Fire and Armistice Agreement, IUS-OP-9-53.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*



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Replace combat personnel and supplies on a one-for-one basis, to prevent any build-up; and

Begin repatriation of all POWs, with exchange to be completed within two months.

The 1st Marine Division began that afternoon to close out its existing MLR⁵¹ and withdraw to its designated post-armistice main battle position located two kilometers to the south, in the vicinity of the KANSAS Line. This tactical withdrawal was to be completed no later than 2200 on 30 July.

By early afternoon the three infantry regiments had been ordered to furnish mine teams to mark, remove, and clear minefields. For units of the 1st and 7th Marines deployed at the Boulder Hill Outpost—quiet only since 0300 that morning—the cease-fire news understandably carried a “let’s see” reaction as the men “waited cautiously throughout the day in their fortifications for the White Star Cluster which would signify the end . . .”⁵² Convincing the men at shell-pocked Boulder City that a cease-fire was to take place within a few hours would have been a difficult task that day, however, even for the Commandant.

The Marine infantrymen who had been the target of the last heavy Communist attacks of the war might well have had a special sense of realism about the end of hostilities. Between the skirmish with Chinese attacking units in the early hours of the 27th and mine accidents, a total of 46 Marines had been wounded and removed from duty that last day of the war and 2 others declared missing in action.

For the more free-wheeling artillerymen of the 11th Marines, that final day was one of fairly normal operations. During the day, 40 counterbattery missions had been fired, the majority in reply to Communist batteries that came alive at dusk.⁵³ A total of 102 countermortar missions were also completed, bringing the total outgoing that last month to 75,910 rounds. Action of the regiment

⁵¹ See Map 33 for Eighth Army dispositions on the last day of the war.

⁵² 1stMar SAR “Berlins,” p. 5.

⁵³ The CO of the direct support artillery battalion in the defense of Boulder City, recalled that “on the evening of the 27th, with the Armistice only hours away, 2/11 received heavy Chinese artillery fire apparently directed at the batteries. Of the many rounds . . . 80% were duds and no damage was done. Numerous time fuzed shells detonated hundreds of meters above ground. We figured that they were using up old rounds to keep from hauling them back north.” *West Ltr.*

continued until 2135, just ten minutes before the preliminary cease-fire which preceded the official cease-fire at 2200.

For the 7,035 Marine officers and men on duty with General Megee's 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, the day was also an active one. That final day of the war Corsairs, Skyraiders, and Pantherjets from the wing mounted 222 sorties and blasted the enemy with 354 tons of high explosives along the front. Banshees from VMJ-1 flew 15 reconnaissance sorties during the day for priority photographs of enemy airfields and railroads. Last Marine jet pilot in action was Captain William I. Armagost of VMF-311. He smashed a Communist supply point with four 500-pounders, at 1835, declaring his flight felt "just like the last winning play of a football game."⁵⁴

The wing closed out its share of the Korean War 35 minutes before the cease-fire. A VMA-251 aviator, Captain William J. Foster, Jr., dropped three 2,000-pound bombs at 2125 in support of UN troops. The distinction of flying this final Marine mission over the bomblines had gone, fittingly, to the wing's newly-arrived "Black Patch" squadron. At sea, U.S. and British warships ended the 17-month naval siege by shelling Wonsan for the last time, and at 2200 the ships in the harbor turned on their lights. In compliance with the terms of the armistice, full evacuation of the WCIDU and ECIDU islands north of the 38th Parallel started at 2200. Island defense forces off both coasts at this time began a systematic destruction of their fortifications as they prepared to move south.

As early as 2100 Marine line units reported seeing Chinese soldiers forward of their own positions, policing their areas. An hour later large groups of enemy were observed along the division sector. Some "waved lighted candles, flashlights, and banners while others removed their dead and wounded, and apparently looked for souvenirs."⁵⁵ A few attempts were made by the Chinese to fraternize. One group approached a Marine listening post and asked for water and wanted to talk. Others hung up gift bags at the base of outpost Ava and shouted, "How are you? Come on over and let's have a

⁵⁴ 1st MAW ComdD, Jul 53 (Folder 3), CTF-91 msg to ComNavFE, dtd 27 Jul 53.

⁵⁵ 1stMarDiv, ComdD, Jul 53, p. 2. One Marine officer, Major General Louis Metzger, who at the time was Executive Officer, Kimpo Provisional Regiment, recalled how voices of the Chinese Communists' singing and cheering drifted across the Han River that night. "It was an eerie thing . . . and very depressing." MajGen Louis Metzger comments on draft MS, dtd 1 Jul 70, hereafter *Metzger comments*.

party," while the Marines stared at them in silence.⁵⁶ The last hostile incoming in the 1st Marine Division sector was reported at 2152 when five rounds of 82mm mortar landed on a Korean outpost, COP Camel.

Marines on line that night warily scanned the darkness in front of their trenches. Slowly at first, then with increasing rapidity the white star cluster shells began to burst over positions all along the line. Thousands of flares illuminated the sky and craggy hills along the 155-mile front, from the Yellow Sea to Sea of Japan. The war in Korea was over. Of the men from the one Marine Division and air wing committed in Korea during the three-year conflict, 4,262 had been killed in battle. An additional 26,038 Marines were wounded. No fewer than 42 Marines would receive the Nation's highest combat decoration, the Medal of Honor, for outstanding valor—26 of them posthumously.

⁵⁶ 1stMarDiv ComdD, *op. cit.*, and Rees, *Korea*, p. 434.

CHAPTER X

Return of the Prisoners of War

Operation BIG SWITCH—Circumstances of Capture—The Communist POW Camps—CCF "Lenient Policy" and Indoctrination Attempts—The Germ Warfare Issue—Problems and Performance of Marine POWs—Marine Escape Attempts—Evaluation and Aftermath

*Operation BIG SWITCH*¹

BETWEEN AUGUST 1950, the month that the first Marine was taken prisoner and July 1953, when 18 Marine infantrymen were captured in final rushes by the CCF, a total of 221 U.S. Marines became POWs.² The majority of them—nearly 90 percent—ultimately returned. After the conclusion of hostilities, Marine POWs were among the UNC fighting men returned in Operation BIG SWITCH.

The new mission of the 1st Marine Division, with the cease-fire, called for organization of the Post Armistice Battle Positions and establishment of a No-Pass Line approximately 200 yards south of the Demilitarized Zone boundary. In addition to maintaining a defensive readiness posture for full-scale operations if hostilities

¹ Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 6, Chaps. 9, 10; 1stMarDiv ComdDs, Jul-Sep 53; 1stMarDiv G-3 Jnls, Jul-Aug 53; 1st MAW ComdD, Jul 53; 11thMar, MAG-33 ComdDs, Jul 53; HRS Subject File VE23.2.S8 "CMC Statements on Korean POWs"; HRS Subject File #1 "Prisoners of War—Korea—General"; HRS Subject Files "Prisoners of War—Korea—News Clippings, folders #1, #2, #3"; Korea War casualty cards from Statistical Unit, Casualty Section, Personal Affairs Br, Code DNA, HQMC; MacDonald, *POW*; Berger, *Korea Knot*; Clark, *Danube to Yalu*; T. R. Fehrenbach, *This Kind of War—A Study in Unpreparedness* (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1963), hereafter Fehrenbach, *Kind of War*, quoted with permission of the publisher; Field, *NavOps, Korea*; Hermes, *Truce Tent*; Leckie, *Conflict*; Rees, *Korea*; USMA, *Korea*; MSgt Roy E. Heinecke, "Big Switch," *Leatherneck*, v. 36, no. 11 (Nov 53), hereafter Heinecke, "Big Switch"; *Life* Magazine, Jul-Aug 53 issues; *New York Times*, 5 Aug-6 Sep 53; *Washington Post*, 5 Aug-6 Sep 53.

² Marine Corps prisoners, including their unit designations and date of release (or death), are listed in MacDonald, *POW*, pp. 249-273.

resumed, the Marine division was charged with control of the Munsan-ni area and assisting in repatriation of prisoners of war. Obviously, since the Panmunjom release point for receiving the POWs was located in the Marine zone of action, the division—as in the earlier LITTLE SWITCH prisoner exchange—would play a major part in the final repatriation.

With the armistice and ending of the war expected almost daily, the Munsan-ni Provisional Command was activated and reorganized in June. Once again, the 1st Marine Division was responsible for the United Nations Personnel and Medical Processing Unit, organized along lines similar to those used during the preliminary exchange. The division inspector, Colonel Albert F. Metze, was designated Processing Unit Commander. Sections under his direction were staffed by Marine and naval personnel. The normal command structure was reinforced by special engineer, medical, interpreter, food service, chaplain, security, signal, supply, and motor transport teams. Planning for the project, like all military operations, was thorough and continuous.

As in April, the Munsan-ni Provisional Command assumed responsibility for handling the UN repatriation at Panmunjom as well as supervision of the receiving and processing of ROKA personnel. Brigadier General Ralph M. Osborne, USA, was placed in charge of the command, with headquarters at the United Nations Base Camp. The RCT landing exercise for the 1st Marines, scheduled in July, was cancelled because of shipping commitments for Operation BIG SWITCH, as the Navy Amphibious Force readied itself for the repatriation of prisoners. By the end of July, the 1st Marine Division was supporting "approximately 42,400 troops with Class I [rations] and 48,600 with Class III [petroleum products] due to the influx of units and personnel participating in Operation BIG SWITCH."³

Several days before the exchange, however, it became evident that the old site of the Gate to Freedom used in the April exchange would have to be abandoned. It was found inadequate to handle the larger number of returning prisoners—approximately 400 daily—to be processed in the new month-long operation. The new site, Freedom Village, near Munsan-ni contained an old Army warehouse which was renovated by the 1st Division engineers and transformed

³ *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 6, Chap. 9, p. 9-134.

into the 11th Evacuation Hospital where the UN Medical and Processing Unit was located. Members of the division Military Police Company provided security for the exchange area. Marines from practically every unit of the division were assigned duties at the United Nations Processing Center. As General Clark, UNC Commander later recalled:

Preparations for Big Switch were necessarily elaborate. At Munsan we had a huge warehouse stocked high with clothing, blankets, medical equipment and other supplies for the returning POWs. At Freedom Village nearby we had a complete hospital unit ready. It was one of the Mobile Army Surgical Hospitals (MASH) which had done such magnificent work close to the front through most of the war.⁴

On 5 August, the first day of BIG SWITCH, Colonel Metze took a final look around the processing center. Readiness of this camp was his responsibility. If anyone had real understanding of a prisoner's relieved and yet shaken reaction to new freedom it was this Marine Colonel. Chosen by the United Nations Command to build and direct the enlarged Freedom Village, Colonel Metze himself had been a prisoner of war in World War II. He knew from personal experience how men should be treated and what should be done for them early in their new freedom. For many, this was after nearly three long years in Communist prison camps. That morning, as described by an observer:

Members of his [Colonel Metze's] command stood by their cubicles, awaiting the first signal. The 129 enlisted Marines, corpsmen, doctors and other UN personnel had held a dress rehearsal only the day before. Everything was ready.⁵

Fifteen miles northwest another group of Marines assigned to the Provisional Command Receipt and Control section waited almost in the shadow of the famous "peace pagoda" at Panmunjom. UNC receiving teams, each headed by a Marine Corps major, "watched the road to the north for the first sign of a dust cloud which would herald the approach of the Communist convoy."⁶ The United Nations POWs had been assembled at Kaesong and held there in several groups, preparatory to the return. The exchange agreement had specified that the repatriation would begin at 0900. Precisely

⁴ Clarke, *Danube to Yalu*, pp. 298-299.

⁵ Heinecke, "Big Switch," p. 44.

⁶ *Ibid.*

at 0855 the Communist convoy, led by three Russian-made jeeps, each carrying one CCF and two NKPA officers, moved out from the Communist side of the peace corridor. Trucks and ambulances followed the jeeps.

As they approached the exchange site, "a Marine officer bellowed the familiar naval command, 'Marines, man your stations!'"⁷ Rosters of the UNC prisoners in the trucks and ambulances were then presented to the Marine team captains who checked the lists. As they called the names, "thin, wan, but smiling men shuffled from the trucks to the medical tents."⁸

Official receipt of the POWs at Panmunjom was by the Munsan-ni Provisional Command Receipt and Control Officer, assisted by 35 officers and enlisted men from the 1st Marine Division. After their screening by medical officers, UN returnees not in need of immediate medical aid were transferred by ambulance to Freedom Village at Munsan-ni for further processing. Helicopter priority went to litter patients too weak to travel by ambulance. POWs requiring prompt treatment were loaded aboard the HMR-161 carriers and flown to the 11th Evacuation Hospital at Freedom Village.

Seriously injured men were transferred directly to the Inchon hospital ships for embarkation to the United States, or were air-evacuated to Japan. South Korean repatriates were processed and went their way to freedom through nearby Liberty Village, the ROK counterpart of Freedom Village. A huge map was used to check progress of the POW convoys en route from Panmunjom to Freedom Village. The departure of ambulances and helicopters from Panmunjom was radioed ahead to Freedom Village, where medical personnel and vehicles lined the landing mat.

At Munsan-ni, the newly-freed men received a more thorough physical exam and the rest of their processing. Here they were again screened by medical officers to determine their physical condition. Able-bodied POWs were escorted to the personnel data section where necessary administrative details were recorded and their military records brought up to date. Those medically cleared were available for press interviews. New clothing issue, individually tailored, probably as much as anything emphasized to a prisoner that his particular Korean War was over. And nearly all of them found

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 45.

⁸ *Ibid.*

news⁹ awaiting them in letters from home. When all basic details were completed, returnees went into the recreation and refreshment section. Commonplace iced tea, coffee, ice cream (the favorite), milk, sandwiches, cigarettes, and the latest periodicals were luxuries. In their weakened condition, the POWs could be served only light fare; the big steaks would come later.

The first Marine and fifth man in the processing line on the initial day, 5 August, was Private First Class Alfred P. Graham, Jr., of H/3/5. Although too weak to enter the press room, the 21-year-old repatriate told newsmen later in Tokyo of being fed a diet of cracked corn during his prison camp stay and of being forced to carry firewood 11 miles each day. The second Marine returned that day, and the 34th man to enter Freedom Village, was Sergeant Robert J. Coffee, of the 1st Signal Battalion. Captured in November 1950, he had been wounded just before being taken prisoner and had received little medical treatment. Like other returnees, Coffee stated that the treatment had been very poor while he was in the hands of the North Koreans but that it had improved somewhat after he was turned over to the Chinese.

Third and last Marine to come through the line was Private First Class Pedron E. Aviles, previously with the Reconnaissance Company of Headquarters Battalion. Knocked unconscious with a rifle butt while battling the enemy on a patrol on 7 December 1952, he regained consciousness to find himself a prisoner of the CCF.

On the second day, three more USMC infantrymen traveled that final road to freedom. They were Private First Class Francis E. Kohus, Jr., of A/1/7; Corporal Gethern Kennedy, Jr., I/3/1; and Private First Class Bernard R. Hollinger, H/3/5. Like the preceding three, their stories bore a similar pattern: usually they had been captured only after having been wounded or clubbed unconscious. As with other UNC prisoners being released daily, they told of the physical cruelty of their North Korean captors and the mental strain under the Chinese. Observers noted that many of the men released this second day were in much poorer physical condition than the initial returnees. In fact, one ROK prisoner was found to have died

⁹ For at least two Marines their return home was news in itself. Captain Paul L. Martelli, VMF-323, had been reported KIA. First Lieutenant Robert J. O'Shea, of division headquarters, the son of Marine Brigadier General George J. O'Shea (Ret), had also been thought dead by his family. He had been reported missing in July 1951 and had not been carried on the official POW list released the following December.

in an ambulance while en route to Liberty Village.

Mostly the repatriates asked questions about their old outfits: "Do you know if any of the other guys on the outpost got back off the hill?" and "Did we finally take the damn thing?" "Where's the 24th Division now?"¹⁰

Technical Sergeant Richard E. Arnold was one of the two Marine combat correspondents at Freedom Village during BIG SWITCH. He described his impressions of the returning men—in some cases, coming home after 30 months' confinement in North Korean POW camps, and others, as little as 30 days:

All are relieved and some a little afraid . . . It's their first hour of freedom, and most tell you that they can still hardly believe it's true. Some are visibly shaken, some are confused—and all are overwhelmed at the thought of being free men once again.¹¹

As in prison life everywhere, the POWs told of the hated stool pigeons, the so-called "progressives." These were the captives who accepted (or appeared to accept) the Communist teachings and who, in turn, were treated better than the "reactionary" prisoners who resisted the enemy "forced feeding" indoctrination. Continued the Marine correspondent:

They don't talk much. When they do, it's . . . mainly of progressives and reactionaries—the two social groups of prisoner life under the rule of Communism, the poor chow and medical care, and of the desire to fight Communism again.

When you ask, they tell you of atrocities committed during the early years of the war with a bitterness of men who have helplessly watched their friends and buddies die. Of forced marches, the bitter cold, and the endless political lectures they were forced to attend.¹²

One of the last—possibly *the last*—Marine captured by the Chinese was Private First Class Richard D. Johnson, of G/3/1. The 20-year-old machine gunner had been in the final battle of the war, the Boulder City defense, and was taken 25 July, just two days before the signing of the truce. Private First Class Johnson was returned the 19th day of the exchange. Another Marine seized in

¹⁰ HRB Subject File: "#1, 'Prisoners Of War—Korea—General,' " HQMC Div Info release, n.d., n.t.

¹¹ *Ibid.*

¹² *Ibid.*

that same action was Private First Class Leonard E. Steege, H/3/7. As he entered the gate, he momentarily shook up Corporal James E. Maddell, a military policeman on duty at Freedom Village. Maddell said the last time he saw Steege was during the fighting for the outpost. "He was a dead Marine then," Maddell said, "but I guess it was just a case of mistaken identity."¹³

Captain Jesse V. Booker of Headquarters Squadron 1, the first Marine POW of the war, who had been captured on 7 August 1950, was also one of the earliest MAW personnel released. Booker and First Lieutenant Richard Bell, VMF-311, were returned to UNC jurisdiction on 27 August, the first Marine aviators to be sent back.

In addition to the regular issue of Marine utilities, gold naval aviator's wings, donated by 1st MAW fliers, were pinned on the chests of returning pilots by Wing General Megee and Division General Pate. Also welcoming Marine returnees at Freedom Village were Brigadier General Verne J. McCaul, the new Assistant Wing Commander; General Burger, ADC; and Colonel Metze, who also "found time during the busy days to greet and talk with every Marine and Navy Corpsman who passed through."¹⁴ Among those dignitaries¹⁵ present for the occasion were General Taylor, EUSAK CG; General Clarke, I Corps Commander; Secretary of the Army, Robert T. Stevens; and various U.S. senators.

During August enlisted POWs were recovered in large numbers. Officers, generally, did not arrive at Kaesong—the first step to Panmunjom—until about 21 August. After that date they were gradually returned to friendly control.

Even as late as 26 August there was considerable concern over the fate of hundreds of Allied officers not yet repatriated. Some early returning officers told of colonels, majors and captains who had been sentenced up to ten years for forming "reactionary groups" in camp. One field grade officer had been sentenced to a long prison term on

¹³ Heinecke, "Big Switch," p. 48.

¹⁴ 1stMarDiv ComdD, Aug 53, App. VI, p. 12.

¹⁵ As the exchange got underway, General Mark Clark was on a trip to the U.S. Unable to greet the returning prisoners, as he had at LITTLE SWITCH, the UNC Commander had a welcoming letter waiting for each repatriate. A booklet especially prepared for returning POWs which contained a quick fill-in on world news and sports events they may have missed as prisoners was also given each returnee. *Washington Post*, dtd 5 Aug 53, p. 3.

¹⁶ HRS Subject File: "#1. 'PRISONERS OF WAR—Korea—General,'" *Washington News* article, dtd 26 Aug 53 from Panmunjom, "Officers' Fate Worries Army," by Jim G. Lucas.

the eve of the armistice.¹⁶ A similar thing nearly happened to Captain John P. Flynn, VMF(N)-513, long a thorn in the side of his Communist captors. Like a number of UNC airmen falsely charged with waging germ warfare, he vigorously denounced these allegations. "Even as late as the end of August the Marine was threatened with nonrepatriation, and his experience formed the basis for an episode in the novel *A Ride to Panmunjom*."¹⁷

Between 5 August–6 September, 3,597 U.S. servicemen were returned during Operation BIG SWITCH, including 129 ground and 28 air Marines. This 157 figure represents a total of 42 officers and 115 enlisted repatriated during this second and final POW exchange. Of the 27 Naval personnel freed, at least 6 were hospital corpsmen serving with the 1st Marine Division when they were taken. Counting the 157 Marines released in Operation BIG SWITCH and the 15 wounded POWs sent back in April, a total of 172 division and wing Marines were returned in the two POW exchanges.

Although the switch took place over a five-week period, 38 Marines, or 24 percent, were not released until late in the proceedings, in September. As one author noted, "It was Communist policy to hold the 'reactionaries' . . . to the last."¹⁸

Two of the best-known Marine "reactionaries" who had openly defied their Communist jailers during their entire period of captivity, were then-Lieutenant Colonel William G. Thrash, a VMA-121 pilot, and then-Major John N. McLaughlin, taken POW in November 1950. McLaughlin was released on 1 September and Thrash on 5 September in a group of 275 Americans returned, the largest number for any single day's transfer since the exchange began. The most famous U.S. prisoner held by the Communists was Major General William F. Dean. Formerly commander of the U.S. Army 24th Division, he had been captured in August 1950 after the fall of Taejon.

Ever since Operation BIG SWITCH got under way, every returnee had been asked if he had seen or heard of General Dean. None had. Many UN officers felt—uneasily—that he would probably be the last officer to be sent back. In fact, he emerged from imprisonment on 4 September "to be greeted with cheers at Freedom Village."¹⁹ Major Walter R. Harris and the most senior Marine captured

¹⁷ MacDonald, *POW*, p. 225.

¹⁸ Fehrenbach, *Kind of War*, p. 651.

¹⁹ *Life Magazine*, v. 35, no. 11 (15 Sep 53), p. 42.

during the war, Colonel Frank H. Schwable, later to be the central figure in a Court of Inquiry, were among the last nine Marines returned on 6 September, the final day of the switch. And so, one by one, the last 160 American POWs passed through Panmunjom. All were men marked by the enemy as "war criminals."

One Army sergeant, who freely admitted he could "never adequately describe how he felt when he knew he was going home"²⁰ recalled those final moments as a newly-freed prisoner:

At 1100 his truck pulled up at Panmunjom, the last convoy of American POWs to be exchanged. A huge, moustached Marine master sergeant walked up beside the truck, called out: "I will call out your last name. You will answer with your first name, middle initial, and Army serial number . . ."

"Schlichter!"

Schlichter [Charles B., Sgt.], barked out his response, and stepped down.

"Sergeant," the big Marine said gravely, "glad to have you home."

"Fella, you don't know how glad I am," Schlichter said.²¹

In the preliminary prisoner exchange, the week-long "LITTLE SWITCH" in April 1953, all of the returned Marine personnel were men who had been wounded at the time of their capture. They were recently-captured POWs, deliberately segregated by the enemy from early captives. All of these home-coming Marines had been captured since May 1952. Generally speaking, they had all been fairly well-treated.

During Operation BIG SWITCH, by contrast, 41 Marines were repatriated who had spent nearly three years as Communist prisoners of war. The majority of USMC returnees in this second exchange, however—a total of 91—had been captured relatively recently, in 1952 and 1953, and 25 had been held since 1951.

Throughout Operation BIG SWITCH, the Allied Command transferred a total of 75,799 prisoners (70,159 NKPA and 5,640 CCF) seeking repatriation. The Communist returned 12,757 POWs. In addition to the 3,597 Americans, this total represented 1,312 other UNC troops (including 947 Britons, 228 Turks, and small numbers of Filipinos, Australians, and Canadians) and 7,848 South Koreans.

The BIG SWITCH exchange went relatively smoothly, marred for a while only by the unruly behavior of some Communist diehard POWs. In a manner reminiscent of their earlier camp riots, the

²⁰ Fehrenbach, *Kind of War*, p. 651.

²¹ *Ibid.*

Communist POWs put on a blatant propaganda show for the benefit of world newsreel cameras. As the train carrying CCF and North Korean prisoners moved into the Panmunjom exchange point, enemy POWs noisily shouted Communist slogans, defiantly waved Communist flags, and hurled insults at UN forces. Some POWs stripped off their [U.S. provided] uniforms, "tossing them contemptuously to the ground."²² Others spat in the faces of U.S. supervising officers, threw their shoes at jeep windshields, and sang in Korean and Chinese "We will return in the Fall."²³

Marine division and wing elements were designated responsible for the security of nonrepatriated enemy POWs. By terms of the armistice agreement, these were held by UNC custodial forces from India. In commenting on the airlift operations, performed largely by HMR-161, the UNC Commander noted:

We had to go to great lengths to live up to our pledge to Syngman Rhee that no Indian troops would set foot on South Korean soil. Therefore, we set up an airlift operation which carried more than six thousand Indians from the decks of our carriers off Inchon by helicopter to the Demilitarized Zone. It was a major undertaking which just about wore out our helicopter fleet in Korea.²⁴

One of the recommendations made by military officials after the April LITTLE SWITCH exchange was that all interrogation of returning POWs be done either in America or on board ship en route home, rather than in Tokyo. This system was followed and worked out well. The POWs boarded ships at Inchon, following their clearance at Freedom Village. Interrogation teams, in most cases, completed this major part of their repatriation processing before docking at San Francisco. Two weeks of recuperation, good food and rest aboard ship enabled many POWs to arrive home in far better shape for reunion with their families than they had been in when received initially at Panmunjom.

As in LITTLE SWITCH, Marine and Navy personnel were processed by members of the Intelligence Department of Commander, Naval Forces Far East, augmented by officers from other Marine staffs. Marine officers who conducted the shipboard interrogations again included Lieutenant Colonel Fisher, ComNavFE liaison officer, as

²² *Life Magazine*, v. 35, no. 7 (17 Aug 53), p. 22.

²³ Metzger comments.

²⁴ Clark, *Danube to Yalu*, p. 299.

well as Lieutenant Colonel William A. Wood, Major Stewart C. Barber, and First Lieutenant Robert A. Whalen. All returning POWs were queried in depth by counterintelligence personnel about enemy treatment and atrocities, questionable acts committed by that small proportion of our own men whose conduct was reprehensible, and routine military matters. A security dossier was prepared on each prisoner, and all data about him went into his file case. The LITTLE SWITCH reports had indicated earlier—and this was subsequently confirmed—that some U.S. servicemen were definitely marked for further detailed questioning and scrutiny.

*Circumstances of Capture*²⁵

As the Commandant, General Shepherd, was to testify later during an investigation, "the prisoner of war question had never been a major problem [in the Marine Corps] due to the extremely limited number of Marines taken prisoner."²⁶ As one returnee at BIG SWITCH bluntly put it: "You fought until they reached you with a bullet or a rifle butt—that was the end."²⁷

Of the 221 U.S. Marines captured during the Korean War, more than half—121—were seized after 20 September 1951. For the Marine Corps this date marked the time when "warfare of position replaced a warfare of movement throughout the remaining 22 months of the conflict in Korea."²⁸ Both in the X Corps sector in eastern Korea where the 1st Marine Division was located at that time, as well as later on the Korean western front, the Marine Corps was denied its traditional aggressive fighting role. The Marines (along with the rest of the UNC forces) ceased offensive operations, were reduced to making limited attacks, and were under order from higher echelons to "firm up the existing line and to patrol vigorously forward of it."²⁹

²⁵ Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: HRS Subject File: VE 23.2.S8 "CMC Statements on Korean POWs"; HRS Subject File: "Korea—Korean War—General"; MacDonald, *POW*; Montross, Kuokka, and Hicks, *USMC Ops Korea—East-Central Front*, v. IV; Matthew B. Ridgway, *The Korean War* (Garden City: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1967), hereafter Ridgway, *Korean War*; Heinecke, "Big Switch."

²⁶ HRS Subject File: "VE 23.2.S8—CMC Statements on Korean POWs," CMC Statement dtd 14 Apr 54, p. 2.

²⁷ Heinecke, "Big Switch," p. 58.

²⁸ Montross, Kuokka, and Hicks, *USMC Ops Korea*, v. IV, p. 201.

²⁹ *Ibid.*

The mission of the Marine division thereby evolved into "an aggressive defense of their sector of responsibility" as records duly phrased it. On a larger scale, the nature of the Korean War, from about November 1951 on, reverted to that of July and August,³⁰ characterized primarily by minor patrol clashes and small unit struggles for key outpost positions. This became the pattern for the remainder of the war. It changed only when the decreed mission of an "active defense of its sector" by a UNC unit became this in fact. Normal defense then escalated into sharp, vigorous fighting to retain friendly key ground positions being attacked by the enemy. One American writer, in a discussion of the British defense in depth concept (adopted by the Marine Corps late in the war), went so far as to blame heavy Marine casualties in Korea on EUSAK's outpost system.³¹

Approximately half of the 100 Marines taken prisoner by September 1951—43—had fallen into enemy hands during the last two days of November 1950. They had been part of the ill-fated Task Force Drysdale,³² a composite Royal Marine-USMC-Army convoy that was ambushed by the Chinese en route to the Chosin Reservoir. These facts are relevant to a better understanding of the Commandant's statement that, traditionally, few Marines become prisoners of war.

Overall, the survival rate for Marines taken captive during the Korean War was 87.8 percent. Even for the worst year, 1950, when NKPA treatment was more ruthless and brutal than the CCF (and in any event, for those men longest-held), the Marine survival rate was 75 percent. Marine Corps statistics show that of 221 Marines captured, 194 (43 officers, 151 enlisted) returned, and 27 or 12.2 percent died.³³ Only a few Marines were afflicted with "give-up-itis," the malady that struck countless POWs and took a heavy toll of

³⁰ In July 1951, fighting had quieted down all along the UNC front, as a result of truce talks initiated by the Communists. This conveniently provided the enemy, at that time hard-pressed, a much-needed breathing spell. The lull in ground fighting continued until late August when the truce negotiations were suspended.

³¹ HRS Subject file "Korea—Korean War—General," article *Washington Times-Herald*, dtd 20 Aug 53, by Walter Simmons, p. 27.

³² For further details of this action, see MacDonald, *POW*, pp. 33–43; Montross and Canzona, *USMC Ops Korea—Chosin*, v. III, pp. 140–141, 225–235; and Reese, *Korea*, p. 162.

³³ Records indicate that 3 officers and 18 enlisted died while in captivity. Three officers and 3 enlisted POWs were also presumed to have died. MacDonald, *POW*, pp. 257–259.

lives. Included among these 194 returnees were the 172 men from the two POW exchanges, as previously noted; plus a group of 18 Marines captured in 1950 who escaped and rejoined USMC units in May 1951; two enlisted men who escaped less than a week after being taken; and two others released by the enemy after less than a month's captivity.

In a pure statistical oddity, the survival percentage for both Marine officers and enlisted (as well as the overall return rate) turned out to be the same: 87 percent.

Without going into an analysis here of the possible relevant factors, it is interesting to note that 62 percent of all U.S. captured military personnel returned after the Korean War and that roughly 38 percent died while imprisoned.³⁴ During World War II, the death rate for U.S. prisoners held by the Axis powers was approximately 11 percent.

Circumstances accounting for the capture of Marines during the Korean War were, as in every war, an occupational hazard. In most cases, prisoners were taken in one of two situations. One occurred when overwhelming numbers of hostile forces suddenly surrounded and overran a small outpost, and either killed or captured a high proportion of its defenders. The second resulted from the well-known increasing accuracy of CCF antiaircraft fire. Halfway through the war it began to take its toll of 1st MAW pilots with similarly predictable results: either death or capture. Simple mischance and the human error of confused directions caused at least two ground Marines to blunder into enemy territory.³⁵

A brief review of the Korean War, chronologically, illustrates how some of the men of the 1st Marine Division wound up as prisoners. In the first week of August 1950, leading elements of the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade and the 1st MAW air squadrons arrived in Korea. Soon thereafter the Marine Corps was in the thick

³⁴ The number of American servicemen returned was approximately 4,428 of 7,190 captured during the war. *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, 1966 edition, "Prisoners of War—Korean War," p. 519B. Earlier DOD "Tentative Final Report of U.S. Battle Casualties in the Korean War," cited by MacDonald, *POW*, p. 230, indicated 7,140 Americans were captured, 4,418 recovered, and 2,701 died. Either way, the percentages remain the same.

³⁵ A similar mishap had dire consequences for Major General Dean of the Army. Cut off from his unit, he was attempting to return to the U.S. line. Lacking a compass he walked to the southwest—and thereby into NKPA hands—instead of the southeast where U.S. troops were then heavily engaged in the fierce battle of the Pusan Perimeter.

of these early-moving offensives: at the Pusan Perimeter; the September Inchon-Seoul amphibious landings; Fox Hill at Toktong Pass, Yudam-ni, the Task Force Drysdale operation, all in November; and the October-December Chosin Reservoir campaign, including the two-day movement from Hagaru to Koto-ri in early December. Marine infantry, military police, tankers, motor transport personnel, and artillerymen were listed MIA in these operations.

Altogether, 79 Marines were captured during the first year. November 1950, when 58 Marines were lost to the enemy, would rank as the most costly month of the entire war in terms of Marines seized in combat. The first air POW, Captain Booker, was shot down 7 August while flying a reconnaissance mission from the USS *Valley Forge*. (This was the same date that infantrymen of the Marine Provisional Brigade saw their initial heavy fighting in what was then considered only a "police action.") Captain Booker was to remain the only Marine pilot in enemy hands until April 1951.

One ground Marine captured during the hectic days of August 1950 escaped before ever becoming listed as a casualty. Although Private First Class Richard E. Barnett thus does not technically qualify as a POW statistic, he still holds the distinction of being both one of the first Marine captives and one of the few to escape.³⁶

Few Marines were taken during 1951. Of the 31 seized throughout the entire year, 13 were from the division and 18 from the wing. The Marines were engaged in antiguerrilla activities until late February when a general advance was ordered by U.S. IX and X Corps to deny positions to the enemy. The 1st Marine Division was committed near Wonju, as part of the IX Corps. A second offensive, Operation RIPPER, was launched in March, and for the next six weeks small inroads were made against CCF forces. Relieved in the Hongchon area the next month by elements of the U.S. 2d and 7th Divisions, the Marines continued to operate as part of the IX Corps. Their mission was to secure objectives north of the 38th Parallel.

³⁶ A radio-jeep driver, Private First Class Barnett, was returning to his unit when he made a wrong turn and, instead, came upon a group of North Koreans. The enemy fired and halted the vehicle, quickly taking Barnett prisoner. Beaten, searched, and interrogated, the Marine was placed in a heavily-guarded cellar. For several days he was given only a few crackers to eat. On the third night, unaccountably, the Koreans took him along on an attack. As they neared the objective, Barnett noticed that all but one of his NPKA guards had gotten ahead of him. He deliberately fell, throwing a rock in the face of the nearby guard, and raced for safety. Successfully eluding his captors, Private First Class Barnett later rejoined his own forces. MacDonald, *POW*, pp. 8-10.

On 21 April the 1st Marine Division launched its attack, on IX Corps order, encountering moderate to heavy resistance. Throughout the first half of 1951, only five Marine infantrymen were captured.

Truce negotiations, as earlier noted, began at Kaesong on 10 July 1951 and ground fighting slowed. When the Communists broke off the truce sessions in late August General Van Fleet, then EUSAK commander, ordered an offensive by the X Corps to seize the entire Punchbowl. Along with other X Corps divisions, the Marines attacked on 31 August. They secured initial objectives, and then moved north to the Soyang River to seize additional designated objectives. Following the bitter action in the Punchbowl area, the Marines were involved in consolidating and improving their defenses.

As the battle lines became comparatively stabilized in 1951, the enemy began to develop his AA defenses to peak efficiency. Marine pilots engaged in CAS, observation, interdiction, and armed reconnaissance missions began to encounter accurate and intense ground fire.³⁷ Aircraft losses increased, and with them, the number of USMC aviators who fell into enemy hands. More than half of the Marine POWs taken during the year—18 of 31—were on 1st MAW station lists. Captive airmen represented VMF-323, VMF(N)-513, Hedron MAG-33 (Headquarters Squadron 33), VMO-6, VMF-312, VMF-311, and VMA-121.

The year 1952, like 1950, saw a large number of Marines taken into hostile custody—a total of 70. As the year began, CCF and UNC ground forces had settled down to a bunker warfare system often compared to the trench warfare of World War I. Air activity remained much as it had the preceding year. Air losses decreased, however, with only 11 pilots becoming POWs, in contrast to the 59 infantry Marines captured. In March, the 1st Marine Division moved from the X Corps zone of action on the east-central front to the I Corps western coastal flank. Here the Marines encountered “steadily increasing aggressiveness as the enemy launched larger and more frequent attacks against outpost positions.”³⁸ Probes, patrol

³⁷ One Marine who had conducted volunteer AAA reconnaissance missions over North Korea was Lieutenant Colonel Charles W. May, CO of the 1st 90mm AAAGunBn. In December 1951 he was lost in such a mission—the same flight in which Lieutenant Colonel Thrash, of VMA-121, was captured. MajGen A. F. Binney ltr to Hd, HistBr, G-3 Div, HQMC, dtd 14 Sep 66.

³⁸ MacDonald, *POW*, p. 139.

actions, and aggressive defense of the MLR and its outposts took their toll.

Enemy pressure reached its height in October, when 41 Marine infantrymen were seized, the second highest number taken in any month during the war. In the COPs Detroit and Frisco defense of 6–7 October, the 7th Marines listed 22 MIA, of whom 13 became POWs, practically all of them being wounded prior to capture. On 26 October, the Communists lunged at 7th Marines COPs Ronson and Warsaw, adjacent to the main battle position, the Hook. In the ensuing action, 27 Marines were “marched, carried, or dragged off the hill and taken into the Chinese lines.”³⁹ Surprisingly, all 27 were recovered alive in the prisoner exchanges the following year.

Of the 11 Marine airmen who became statistics on a POW list in 1952, 4 were shot down in an ill-fated 10-day period beginning 6 May. Again, all-too-accurate hostile AA fire was the villain. In similar incidents during the year, two Marines engaged in “good Samaritan” aerial activities became POWs for their efforts. In February, First Lieutenant Kenneth W. Henry, an AO assigned to the Marine detachment aboard the light cruiser USS *Manchester*, and Lieutenant Edwin C. Moore, USN, whirled off in the cruiser’s HO3S to attempt rescue of a downed Navy fighter pilot, Ensign Marvin Broomhead. In the bright early afternoon, as Henry was maneuvering the helicopter sling, their ship suddenly crashed—apparently from enemy machine gun fire intended for a combat air patrol operating in the vicinity. Two of the three men—Broomhead and Henry—were injured, but managed to drag themselves to a hidden position and waited to be rescued. Instead, they were discovered shortly before midnight by a Chinese patrol.

A similar mishap occurred on 16 May to First Lieutenant Duke Williams, Jr., of VMF-212. Searching for a crashed pilot, his plane was struck by AA and he managed to jump. His parachute blossomed down into the midst of 15 waiting Koreans who had gathered to take him prisoner.

During the last seven months of hostilities in Korea, from January–July 1953, 41 Marines were captured. These included a VMO-6 pilot and air observer in the little OE-1 spotting planes shot down

³⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 149.

in two separate incidents, plus 39 ground Marines trapped in the vicious outpost struggles of March and July. Except for two Marines who died, the rest were freed a few months after their capture during Operation BIG SWITCH.

Summarizing it another way, of the 221 Marines captured during the three-year conflict:

- 49 were officers and 172 enlisted;
- 190 were ground personnel and 31 aviators;
- of the 190 ground troops, 19 were officers and 171 enlisted;
- of the 31 aviators, 30 were officer pilots and 1 was enlisted.

The 7th Marines, which was the unit on line at the time of several major CCF attacks, had the highest number of POWs in the division. A total of 70 men, or 59.3 percent⁴⁰ of the 118 infantry Marines taken, were from the 7th. The record during this 1950–1953 period for the others is as follows: 1st Marines, 15 POWs; 5th Marines, 33; and the division artillery regiment, the 11th Marines, 14. Six pilots from Marine Fighter Squadron 312 found themselves unwilling guests in North Korea. Four other units—VMO-6, VMF-323, VMF-311, and VMF(N)-513—each had five members who served out the rest of the war as POWs.

*The Communist POW Camps*⁴¹

The Communist POW camp system, under Chinese direction, began in late December 1950. Marines captured in November and December, along with U.S. Army troops, British Commandos, and other Allied personnel, were forced-marched north to Kanggye, not far from the Manchurian border.⁴² In the bitter cold, while winter howled through North Korea, the column of prisoners limped its way to its final destination, arriving the day after Christmas. Several

⁴⁰ Recapitulation of facts from MacDonald, *POW*, pp. 260–269 and *passim*.

⁴¹ Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: MacDonald, *POW*; Montross, Kuokka, and Hicks, *USMC Ops Korea—East-Central Front*, v. IV; Barclay, *Commonwealth*; Fehrenbach, *Kind of War*; Leckie, *Conflict*; Rees, *Korea*.

⁴² Although some American prisoners were taken in the summer of 1950, it was not until the late autumn that large numbers of men taken in several major engagements created a need for a permanent prison-camp system. Rees, *Korea*, p. 330.

of the group, including Marines, perished during the four-day march—victims of malnutrition, untreated combat wounds, pneumonia, the stinging, freezing wind, and subzero temperatures. Usually, “the Communists moved them [the prisoners] by night, because they feared the United Nations air power which . . . ranged over the whole of North Korea.”⁴³


During the first three months of 1951, a network of POW camps was developed along the southern shores of the Yalu River. Occupants of the forlorn villages were evacuated, and newly captured UNC prisoners moved in. The main camp operation at this time was in the Kanggye area. This was a temporary indoctrination center established in October 1950 before the development of regular POW camps. (For various CCF camp locations, see Map 34.) Ultimately a group of a half dozen or so permanent camps were developed northeast of Sinuiju, along a 75-mile stretch of the Yalu.

By early 1951, Major McLaughlin, a captured Marine staff officer previously attached to X Corps, was senior officer among the Kanggye prisoners which included a heterogeneous collection of U.S. 7th Division soldiers, U.S. Marines, 18 Royal Marine Commandos, and Navy hospitalmen. UN personnel were scattered throughout several farmhouses, with no attempt made to segregate the enlisted and officers. The Chinese designated prisoner squads of 8–12 men, depending on the size of the room to which they were assigned. CCF-appointed squad leaders were those prisoners who appeared more cooperative.

In direct opposition to orders, Major McLaughlin set about establishing communication between the small scattered POW groups, despite ever-present surveillance. He tried to achieve effective control of the POWs so that a united front of resistance against the enemy could be maintained. At mass indoctrination meetings, held regularly every few days, the Marine officer issued instructions to enlisted personnel through five Marine noncommissioned officers. As one ex-prisoner recalled, the “cold, smoke-filled barn was the locale for wide-spread exchange of information between the many little groups.”⁴⁴ Daily routine at Kanggye stressed study and political indoctrination. Squad leaders were responsible for lectures and dis-

⁴³ Fehrenbach, *Kind of War*, pp. 423–424.

⁴⁴ MacDonald, *POW*, p. 63.



cussions on assigned topics in Marxian dialectical materialism. The curriculum was more intense than most college courses. On the other hand, physical treatment of inmates—except for chronic malnutrition and grossly inadequate medical care—at Kanggye was less brutal than at most of the other prisoner compounds.

Interrogations went hand-in-hand with indoctrination. Prisoners were grilled regularly on order of battle, close air support, naval gunfire methods, UN aircraft, weapons, unit locations, and other tactical information. The Chinese were even more interested in the life histories and biographical data of their captives. POWs were required to answer "economic questionnaires" and at frequent intervals compelled to write elaborate self-criticisms of their political attitudes and class backgrounds. The CCF were satisfied only when prisoners—whose original truthful answers had been rejected—revised their own family status and income statistics downward. POWs, being interrogated, often found the Chinese arguing with them over such far-away matters as the prisoner's parents or his own family annual income and social level.

In March 1951, after an indoctrination period of about eight weeks, the Kanggye POWs were transferred, and the camp itself was later abandoned. The officers were relocated at Camp 5, Pyoktong, while the majority continued the march westward to the newly opened Camp 1, at Chongsong.

Despite its numerical designation as Camp 5, the Pyoktong compound had been organized two months earlier and was the first of the permanent CCF centers. It became the headquarters of the entire prison-camp system. Approximately 2,000 UNC prisoners were interned here by the early part of the year. They were housed in native huts. New inmates arrived regularly from temporary collection centers in the south, where they had been held for months. Sometimes they were marched to the Yalu during the Korean winter while still wearing their summer fatigues. Pyoktong offered little chance for escape. The compound, situated on a barren peninsula that jutted out into the Yalu Reservoir, was so secure that the Communists did not even surround it with barbed wire or employ searchlights. It was hemmed in on three sides by fast water currents, while the one exit from the peninsula was closely guarded.

Conditions were far more severe here than at Kanggye. A starvation diet and complete lack of medical care quickly had their

inevitable effect. Pneumonia, dysentery, and malnutrition were rampant. The basic diet of boiled corn or millet resulted in associated deficiency diseases, such as beriberi and pellagra. Between 20 and 30 prisoners died daily. Many experts, nonetheless, felt that "if the Chinese during the winter of 1950-51 killed their prisoners by deliberate neglect, the North Koreans who had handled the captives before they became primarily a Chinese responsibility killed them by calculated brutality."⁴⁵

Although now junior to some Army and Air Force officers, Major McLaughlin was elected by his fellow officer-prisoners to represent them. Recognized by the Chinese as a staunch non-cooperative and dedicated trouble-maker, the enemy concentrated their pressure on the Marine officer—and he was subjected to intimidation, maltreatment, and threats of death.

As they had at Kanggye, the CCF attempted to organize progressive groups to write peace appeals, propaganda leaflets, and articles condemning the United States for the war. Typically, progressive POWs (usually weaker, less resilient members) who went along with the Communist propaganda conditioning, received better rations and treatment. Rugged resisters, on the other hand, could dependably expect to stand a considerable amount of solitary confinement, usually in an unspeakably foul, vermin-infested "hole." Here a POW was forced to remain in a debilitating, crouched position usually 56 hours or more. Throughout the war a good many Marines were to know this particular enemy treatment. One Marine artilleryman, Second Lieutenant Roland L. McDaniel, tied to a Korean POW in the hole for 10 days, emerged with pneumonia and tuberculosis.

In addition to the POW compounds at Pyoktong and Chongsong, other sites where Marines were held were Camp 3, at Changsong (nearby and with a nearly identical name to Camp 1), primarily for enlisted personnel, and at "The Valley." This was a temporary medical processing center in the Kanggye area. Marine inmates here were often confined to a pig pen. Largely because of the filthy conditions of this camp, the death rate quickly earned the Valley the opprobrious name of Death Valley.

Another cluster of POW camps was located further south. These

⁴⁵ Rees, *Korea*, p. 330.

were primarily run by the North Koreans, and were transit camps where prisoners were collected and interrogated before being moved north by truck or on foot to the permanent establishments. Among them were collection centers at Kung Dong and Chorwon, and Camp 10, south of the North Korean Capital Pyongyang. The latter was also known variously as the Mining Camp, the Gold Mine, or Bean Camp—this due to its prevailing diet. At this southernmost Communist camp, POWs were required to dig coal in the nearby mine shafts. Loads of coal were then hauled in small hand carts over icy roads to the camp, a task made more difficult by the prisoners' skimpy mealtime fare.

The most notorious of all the camps, however, was Pak's Palace,⁴⁶ the interrogation center near Pyongyang. POWs also called it Pak's Death Palace for its chief interrogator, a sadistic North Korean officer, Major Pak. Captain Martelli, a F4U fighter pilot from VMF-323 shot down in April 1951, was the first Marine processed through Pak's, where POWs were continuously threatened and beaten with little or no provocation. Another Marine aviator, Captain Gerald Fink, VMF-312, upon being asked during interrogation here why he had come to Korea won a sentence of several days solitary confinement in the hole for his forthright answer: "to kill Communists." Second Lieutenant Carl R. Lindquist, also of VMF-312, was the only one of 18 Marine officers captured in 1951 not processed through Pak's before being sent north.

Gradually the Chinese developed the policy of segregating officer and enlisted personnel. Commenting on this procedure, one British observer offered the following:

By this means the lower ranks were deprived of their leaders and for a short time this had a depressing, and generally bad, effect. It was not long, however, before the natural leaders among the rank and file asserted themselves. The standard of leadership naturally varied in different compounds; but in all there was some organization and in some it was highly efficient. It was . . . the policy of the Chinese . . . to discourage the emergence of thrustful leaders. . . . Consequently, clandestine rather than open leadership was usual.⁴⁷

By midyear, noncommissioned officers were also separated from the enlisted men, in an attempt to better control prisoners. In

⁴⁶ The Secretary of Defense Advisory Committee on Prisoners of War later adjudged Pak's to have been "the worst camp endured by American POWs in Korea." MacDonald, *POW*, p. 104.

⁴⁷ Barclay, *Commonwealth*, p. 190.

October of 1951 another one of the Yalu River Camps was set up. This was Camp 2, at Pi-chong-ni, which thereafter served as the main officers camp. The next month a POW column of nearly 50 men, including 6 Marines, left Kung Dong for these northern camps on a death march that covered 225 miles in two weeks. During the excruciating march, prisoners had been forced to strip naked and wade across the Chongsong River, a procedure which caused several deaths and cases of frostbite. One British participant, however, recalled that the "Marines banded together during the terrible march, and the Royal Marines were drawn close to the U.S. Marines."⁴⁸

In December 1951 the Communist and UNC forces exchanged lists of captured personnel. The list of 3,198 American POWs (total UNC: 11,559) revealed that 61 Marines were in enemy hands. Nine others, captured late in the year, were still in temporary collection points and thus not listed. Although Marines represented only a small portion of the total POWs, they were present in most of the nearly dozen regular camps or collection points then in existence. In any event the 1951 POW list⁴⁹ gave a picture of the growing Communist camp system.

As 1951 was drawing to an end, the Camp 2 commandant, a fanatical Communist named Ding, ordered UNC prisoners to prepare and send a New Year's greeting to the commander of the CCF, General Peng Teh-huai. Senior UN officer, Lieutenant Colonel Gerald Brown, USAF, was determined that the prisoners would not sign the spurious holiday message. Major McLaughlin voluntarily organized Marine resistance, and senior officers of other nationality groups followed suit. No greetings were sent. As usually happened, an informer reported the organized resistance and furnished names of the reactionary leaders. The following month, the six ranking officers were sentenced to solitary confinement, ranging from three to six months, for their "subversive activities."

The episode marked the first really organized resistance to the Chinese. "Although the principals were subjected to months of solitary confinement, coercion, torture, and very limited rations during the bitterly cold months of early 1952, their joint effort laid the

⁴⁸ MacDonald, *POW*, p. 127.

⁴⁹ Negotiations broke down at this point. No other list was offered by Communist officials until the first exchange of wounded POWs, 17 months later, in the April 1953 LITTLE SWITCH operation. Montross, Kuokka, and Hicks, *USMC Ops Korea*, v. IV, p. 223.

foundation for comparatively effective resistance within Camp 2 during the remainder of the war."⁵⁰

In January 1952, Major McLaughlin and the other five officers were removed to begin their long tours of solitary confinement. Although the remaining Marine officers at Pi-chong-ni had "formed a tightly knit group and consulted among themselves on every major issue,"⁵¹ the atmosphere within the camp itself became highly charged and strained. Suspicion of informers and opportunists was rampant. The officers at Camp 2 were generally agreed that Marine Lieutenant Colonel Thrash, who arrived in June, was largely responsible for restoring discipline. He issued an all-inclusive order about camp behavior for all personnel which read, in part:

Study of Communist propaganda would not be countenanced. If study was forced on them, POWs were to offer passive resistance and no arguments.

If prisoners were subject to trial or punishment they were to involve no one but themselves.

There would be no letters written using any titles or return address which might prove beneficial to the Communists for propaganda value.⁵²

Expectedly, it was not long before Lieutenant Colonel Thrash's efforts to influence and organize his fellow officers outraged CCF officials. In September he was removed from the compound, charged with "Criminal Acts and Hostile Attitude against the Chinese People's Volunteers." The Marine airman spent the next eight months in solitary. Here he was subjected to constant interrogation, harassment, and duress. On one occasion he was bound, severely beaten, and thrown outside half naked in sub-zero weather. Shock of the severe temperature rendered him unconscious, and he nearly died. Throughout his eight-month ordeal there were demands that he cooperate with the "lenient" Chinese upon his return to the compound.

During 1952, the Communists developed the system of keeping newly-captured Marines (and other UNC troops) apart from those taken prior to January 1952 who had suffered more brutal treatment. Beginning in August, noncommissioned officers were also segregated. They were removed from Chongsong (Camp 1) and taken further

⁵⁰ MacDonald, *POW*, p. 138.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, p. 164.

⁵² *Ibid.*, pp. 165-166.

north along the Yalu to the "Sergeants Camp" (Camp 4) at Wiwon. Although a few Marines had been interned at the Camp 2 Annex, at Obul, from late 1951 on, they were not sent there in any sizable number until mid-1952.

Adjacent to a steeply-walled valley, the Obul camp was also known as "No Name Valley." Although the inmates of the annex were aware of other POWs in the main compound and throughout the valley, they were under heavy guard to prevent contact between the groups. An Air Force officer, the senior member, and Major Harris, the ranking Marine, went about organizing the prisoners in a military manner. In order to exchange information, notes were hidden under rocks at common bathing points or latrines. Messages were baked in bread by POWs on kitchen detail, and songs were loudly sung to convey information. Hospitalized POWs, meanwhile, were held at the Pyoktong (Camp 5) hospital or, in the southern sector, at a second hospital a few miles north of Pyongyang. Other locations where prisoners were confined in 1952 were "Pike's Peak," also in the same general southern area, and the Manpo Camp on the Yalu.

For POWs incarcerated behind the bamboo curtain, 1952 marked several other developments. It was the year that American airmen began to receive special grilling and threats from their Communist captors. This was in connection with the germ warfare hoax, to be discussed later. It was also the year that Marine POWs at Pi-chong-ni (Camp 2) observed their own traditional 10 November Marine Corps birthday ceremony. Eggs, sugar, and flour were stolen for a cake surreptitiously baked and suitably decorated with the Marine Corps globe and anchor. Another group accomplished the task of bootlegging rice wine. When the special date arrived, the Marine officers toasted the President, Commandant, and Marine Corps and spiritedly sang the National Anthem and Marine Corps hymn. One of the invited guests, Quartermaster Sergeant James Day of the Royal Marines, later recalled the reaction of other prisoners:

Firstly some were apprehensive in case of trouble with the Chinese, and its always consequent rash of gaol [jail] victims. Some thought it a little childish, and not worth the trouble of interrupting the daily routine of the place. And I feel that quite a lot were rather envious that the small band of USMC should be able to get together and do this sort of thing quite seriously, quite sincerely, and with no thought of any consequence.⁵³

⁵³ *Ibid.*, p. 190.

This same month the Chinese staged a "Prisoner of War Command Olympics" at Pyoktong. Although most Marines opposed the idea of participation in the event, because of its inevitable propaganda exploitation by the CCF, the decision rendered by the senior UN officer was that POW athletes would be represented. Much improved quality food was served for the occasion, Communist photographers were everywhere, and a CCF propaganda brochure (with articles written by POW turncoats) was later distributed in Geneva purportedly to show the healthy recreational activities available to UNC prisoners. An Air force pilot, in describing the performance of Major McLaughlin, noted that "his skill as an athlete helped restore the prestige of the officers torn down by the enemy's propaganda."⁵⁴

More important, he defied the guards by deliberately circulating among the enlisted men (often younger, impressionable, less mature individuals) to point out lies in enemy propaganda tactics designed to slander the U.S. government and its leaders. The Marine officer also collected names of American POWs held in isolated places where it was suspected the enemy might attempt to hold as hostages at the end of the war—possibly as a bargaining tool for the granting of a seat to Red China in the UN.

During the last year of the war although a number of prisoners were still being captured in some of the most savage attacks unleashed by the enemy, the lot of the average POW had improved. More attention was being paid to the former pitiful medical care. The men were more warmly clad, even though still huddled into filthy, crowded huts. And the monotonous poor chow had improved. Most POWs, although carefully kept from learning developments of the outside world, naturally suspected that some reason lay behind the changes. And so there was: the Communists had no desire to repatriate skeletonized prisoners.

CCF "Lenient Policy" and Indoctrination Attempts⁵⁵

As early in the war as July 1951, the CCF was seeking propaganda benefits out of its so-called "lenient" policy toward captured United

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 195.

⁵⁵ Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: MacDonald, *POW*; Barclay, *Commonwealth*; Clark, *Danube to Yalu*; Fehrenbach, *Kind of War*; Leckie, *Conflict*; Rees, *Korea*.

Nations personnel. Basically, this could be described as "calculated leniency in return for cooperation, harassment in return for neutrality, and brutality in return for resistance."⁵⁶ Others have characterized the CCF psychological techniques of indoctrination as monotonous and single-minded "repetition, harassment and humiliation."⁵⁷

In some respects, it is true that the Chinese treatment of prisoners appeared to be more humane than that of the North Koreans. The latter freely used physical cruelty and torture, to the point of being barbaric.⁵⁸ Sometimes it appeared that Allied POWs did not receive any harsher treatment from the CCF than did local civilian prisoners.

Whereas the NKPA regularly resorted to physical brutality, the Chinese "introduced a more insidious form of cruelty."⁵⁹ Although they used physical violence less often, it was usually more purposeful and combined with deliberate mental pressure. CCF officials announced that treatment of captives would be "fair and lenient," but that wrongdoers would be publicly punished. Usually this CCF punishment took the form of less drastic methods—solitary confinement, prolonged interrogation, and a reduced diet. Even under this decreed lenient policy, however, no relief parcels were delivered to POWs, nor were any neutral observers ever allowed to inspect the prison camps.

In any event, the Chinese were considerably more effective than the NKPA in their intelligence activities. Often their skilled interrogators were officers who spoke excellent English. Occasionally, they had even attended such U.S. schools as the University of Chicago and had considerable insight into American psychology, customs, and values—even slang. Interrogation sessions usually employed recording devices and sometimes were further equipped with one-way mirrors. One Marine, subjected to frequent interrogation, was kept

⁵⁶ MacDonald, *POW*, p. 61. One former Marine POW commented: "The 'lenient policy' applied to the 'liberated soldiers,' who had supposedly been 'liberated' from the American capitalists by the Chinese People's Volunteers. Unless a prisoner accepted this absurd concept, he was a 'war criminal' and subject to being treated as such. The North Vietnamese use this same characterization ('war criminal') in reference to U.S. POWs when queried by U.S. representatives at the Paris talks." MajGen John N. McLaughlin ltr to Dir, MCHist, HQMC, dtd 17 Jul 70.

⁵⁷ Rees, *Korea*, p. 337.

⁵⁸ There were, for example, instances when POW columns were being marched north and the NKPA treatment was so rough that "Chinese guards intervened to protect the prisoners from the North Koreans." MacDonald, *POW*, p. 43.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 60.

awake by the Chinese who slapped his face and blew smoke in his eyes.

From early 1951 to the end of the war UNC prisoners were subjected to a systematic attempt at mass conversion to Communism. This intensive indoctrination effort—like the riots of Communist prisoners in Allied POW camps and the CCF germ warfare fabrications—was designed to gain a propaganda advantage. From highest-ranking officer to lowly private, no one was immune to this thought-reform process. General Dean, prize Communist captive, who was subject to three years of intense Marxist-Leninist indoctrination, upon his release commented wryly, "I'm an authority now on the history of the Communist Party and much of its doctrine."⁶⁰

English-speaking POWs, both American and British, particularly became the target for Communist thought-control conditioning. Many experts have discussed glowingly the superb example and iron discipline—both on the battlefield and in POW camp—displayed by the Turkish soldiers. This is true, and their outstanding performance is to their credit as a national group. The fact remains, however, that the Turks were long-term professional soldiers. Usually they were left alone by the Communists who neither spoke their language nor needed them for propaganda purposes. As a rule all non-American troops of the United Nations received better treatment than American and British personnel.

The basic tenet of the Communist party line was that this aggressive war against the peace-loving people of Korea had been caused by American imperialists seeking additional foreign markets. All UNC soldiers were, therefore, by simple definition war criminals who deserved no better treatment than death. But as most UN soldiers were misguided and misled by their capitalist rulers they would "not be shot if they admitted their mistakes and showed themselves to be progressive"⁶¹ by becoming properly indoctrinated.

Often, the thought-reform processing started long before prisoners reached their permanent camps, while they were under initial interrogation in the transit collection center. Captain Samuel J. Davies, Anglican Chaplain of the British Gloucestershire Regiment,⁶² noted

⁶⁰ Rees, *Korea*, p. 334.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, p. 335.

⁶² Davies was the only one of the four captured UNC chaplains who survived the war. During his imprisonment, he visited hospitalized POWs at the makeshift hospital near Camp 2 and held weekly community services. Another well-remembered chaplain

that lecture subjects presented to his officer group at one North Korean temporary collection center included:

- Corruption of the UN by the American warmongers;
- The Chinese Peoples' right to Formosa;
- The Stockholm Peace Appeal;
- Progress in Peoples' China;
- Churchill, tool of the Truman-MacArthur-Dulles Fascist clique;
- The Soviet Union heads the World Peace Camp.⁶³

Systematically the enemy ground away at theory and practice of Communism, with its superiority to American democracy. From emphasis on the Korean War as imperialist aggression, the programmed thinking then dealt with shortcomings of western countries (particularly Southern lynchings, poor treatment of Negroes, and colonialism) to the idyllic socialism in people's democracies where "everyone is equal." "Together with the emotional pressures involved, this dramatic presentation of Marxism-Leninism to prisoners who often not only failed to comprehend why they had fought in Korea, but even the rudiments of democracy itself, was bound to have some sort of effect."⁶⁴

Compulsory lectures and discussions often went on until 2200. Together with the unceasing indoctrination efforts, the CCF attempted to maintain complete control over every aspect of POW life. Each camp was divided into POW companies (ranging from 60 to 300 men), platoons, and squads. Squad leaders, appointed by the Chinese, reported regularly to authorities the opinions of men in their group. "Converted" progressives were responsible for much of the internal policing. Every prisoner with reactionary tendencies was isolated. The varied pressures of hunger, fear, constant threats of torture, coercion, nonrepatriation, anxiety, and guilt⁶⁵ were used to break him down.

In an attempt to convert the Marines and other prisoners to their own beliefs, the Communists prohibited the use of the term "prisoner of war." Instead they used the phrase "newly liberated friends"

was Captain Emil J. Kapaun, Chaplains Corps, USA. The Catholic priest stole food and sneaked into the enlisted compounds at Camp 5 to distribute it. His heroic behavior and selfless interest in his fellow-men were an inspiration to fellow POWs. MacDonald, *POW*, pp. 77, 136.

⁶³ Rees, *Korea*, p. 336.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 337.

⁶⁵ Some analysts have pointed out that the Lenient Policy with its "emphasis on confession and repentance, and its propaganda exploitation" closely resembled POW indoctrination tactics developed by the Russians with their German prisoners in World War II. Rees, *Korea*, p. 338.

and insisted the POWs do likewise. They also denounced religion as a superstition and device for controlling people's minds. Curiously, POWs were often permitted to retain whatever religious articles they had on them when captured, so that Bibles, rosaries, etc., were available for squad groups that sought to hold informal religious discussions and readings. Such religious expression was, of course, strictly forbidden. It might be noted here that Marines, as a group, did not appear to be any more or less interested in religious services than other POWs.

By mid-1952 the compulsory lectures were considered a failure, and the emphasis shifted to "voluntary" study groups led by progressives. More insidious methods of indoctrination were being used—books, papers, and articles written by camp progressives. Personal interrogation and indoctrination had proved it could have a more powerful effect than attempts at mass conversion. Then, too, the Chinese had by this time perfected another propaganda tool that admirably suited their purposes. It was to have even still more effective, far reaching results.

*The Germ Warfare Issue*⁶⁶

Besides their routine interrogations and indoctrinations, by 1952 the Communists had found a new angle to exploit. This was to have strong repercussions on the treatment of some captured personnel. And, ultimately, it was to affect American public reaction to the entire Korean War and to shake the nation's confidence in some of its fighting men who became POWs.

The germ warfare issue developed from an incident in January 1952 when the Communists shot down a U.S. Air Force B-26 bomber. Several months later, in May, the enemy propaganda campaign moved into high gear when the navigator and pilot both purportedly confessed that they took part in a raid in which germ bombs were dropped on North Korean towns. After the CCF successfully extracted false confessions from the two USAF officers, the enemy exposed both prisoners to a select group of Oriental medical specialists

⁶⁶ Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: MacDonald, *POW*; Fehrenbach, *Kind of War*; Leckie, *Conflict*; Rees, *Korea*.

and newspapermen. The two Americans apparently performed according to plan, and a relentless flood of Communist propaganda was unleashed on the world.

While the allegation of bacteriological warfare was not new in the Korean War, it was not until 1952 that the Chinese successfully exploited it. After suffering their first reverses in Korea in September 1950, the Communists charged that Americans were waging germ warfare. Even after they regained the tactical initiative in late 1950 they continued their campaign of vilification. In early 1951, while the UNC battled epidemics of smallpox, typhus, and amoebic dysentery prevalent among the civil population and within the POW camps, the CCF branded medical efforts to curb the diseases as experiments in germ warfare. A formal complaint was made by the CCF to the United Nations in May 1951; thereafter, the germ warfare charges lay dormant for the rest of the year.

The effect of the two airmen's "confessions" in 1952 was far-reaching. From that time until the end of hostilities "captured aviators of all services were subjected to a degree of pressure and coercion previously unknown by prisoners of war. Prior to the turn of the year aviation and ground personnel received relatively the same treatment in Communists' hands. After January 1952, aviators were singled out for a special brand of treatment designed to wring bacteriological warfare confessions from them."⁶⁷ North Korean officials joined the CCF spokesmen in loudly denouncing American bacteriological attacks. As the campaign gained momentum, an elaborate, cleverly-concocted "War Crimes Exhibit" was set up in Peiping in May. Similar displays were later on view at the UNC officers' camp at Pi-chong-ni, including hand-written and sound-recorded confessions by the two American pilots, as well as a convincing array of photos depicting the lethal "bomb containers."

All the while air personnel were being put under acute stress to confess alleged war crimes. Captured Marine aviation personnel encountered this new subject in their interrogations. Lieutenant Henry, captured in February, was asked about germ warfare. Major Judson C. Richardson, of VMF(N)-513, during interrogations at Pak's was told he would never leave Korea when he denied that the U.S. was waging bacteriological warfare. Master Sergeant John T. Cain,

⁶⁷ MacDonald, *POW*, p. 175.

VMO-6, a well-known Marine enlisted pilot whose plane was shot down in July 1952, was questioned, confined to the hole, and taken before a firing squad when he refused to acknowledge American participation. Captain Flynn was also subjected to intensive and brutal interrogation by North Korean and Chinese Communist Air Force personnel who sought a confession. Others were to meet similar pressure and be questioned until their nerves shrieked.

On 8 July 1952, the first of a chain of events occurred that was to link the Marine Corps with the spurious bacteriological warfare propaganda. Colonel Frank H. Schwable, 1st MAW Chief of Staff and Major Roy H. Bley, wing ordnance officer, were struck by Communist ground fire while making a reconnaissance flight. The enemy had little difficulty in compiling Colonel Schwable's biography. Although he repeatedly maintained he had just arrived in Korea and had not yet received an assignment, he was in uniform with insignia and full personal identification. A Department of Defense press release issued two days later gave considerable data, correctly identifying him as the Marine Wing Chief of Staff. The Chinese knew they had a prize.

Two weeks after his capture, the colonel was taken to an interrogation center where he remained in solitary confinement until December. He quickly became aware of CCF intentions to utilize him for their propaganda mill. He was interrogated relentlessly, badgered, accused of being a war criminal, fed a near-starvation diet, denied proper latrine privileges, refused medical and dental attention, and subjected to extremes of temperature. Ultimately the discomfort, almost constant diarrhea, extreme pain from being forced to sit in unnatural positions, fatigue, and naked threats wore him down. At the same time he was also convinced that had he continued to resist Communist demands for a confession the enemy would have affixed his forged signature to a document to achieve their ends. He later commented:

In making my most difficult decision to seek the only way out, my primary consideration was that I would be of greater value to my country in exposing this hideous means of slanderous propaganda than I would be by sacrificing my life through non-submission or remaining a prisoner of the Chinese Communists for life, a matter over which they left me no doubt.⁶⁸

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 180.

General Dean, held in solitary confinement for much of his three years' captivity, stated the greatest problem facing a prisoner of war is "maintaining his judgment—he has no one on whom he can try out his ideas before turning them into decisions."⁶⁹ Possibly this was also Colonel Schwable's problem. Many drafts of his confession were made before the Chinese were satisfied that specific details reinforced the information earlier obtained in other prisoners' false statements. The confession that finally evolved in December cleverly combined factual order of battle data and technical terminology to create a most convincing lie. It was more sophisticated than efforts of earlier captives and was, unquestionably, damaging.

*Problems and Performance of Marine POW's*⁷⁰

Problems faced by Marine and other UNC prisoners ranged from the fundamentals of sheer survival to more abstract questions involving honor and duty that have less sharply defined interpretations. Was it, for instance, a prisoner's duty to overtly resist the enemy at all costs and on all possible occasions? Or was an attitude of passive resistance that created less hostility and attention better in the long run? Were such passive techniques liable to render a POW unable to continue making fine distinctions in his conduct and behavior so that he unwittingly went over the line to become a collaborator with the enemy? What about a ranking POW's responsibility of leadership?

In a practical, day-in, day-out way, every prisoner had to decide for himself as to how actively or passively he would resist the enemy. In a number of cases Marine (and other Allied) POWs gave deliberately false or misleading information in response to threats, coercion, or maltreatment. Three Marines at Pak's regularly held counsel "to determine their courses of action and to coordinate their false stories."⁷¹ Captain Fink's list of ships, all sunk in World Wars I and II, was similar to the story told by an Air Force officer of the new B-108 bomber (three B-36s).

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 182.

⁷⁰ Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 6, Chap. 10; MacDonald, *POW*; Fehrenbach, *Kind of War*.

⁷¹ MacDonald, *POW*, p. 121.

Not infrequently a POW faced threats of death, reduced rations, still worse medical care, solitary, or physical beatings and torture if he failed to make some response to questions. Major Richardson finally wrote untruthful answers to five questions about the Navy, although his NPKA interrogators told him his lies were detected. Master Sergeant Cain authored a fanciful report about the Fleet Logistic Wing, an organization about which he knew nothing, not too surprisingly since it did not exist. He later admitted, however, that he felt he'd "made a mistake at that time [his first interrogation] by lying about inconsequential things."⁷²

Expressed in simplistic terms, a spirit of cohesion and of group identity seemed to be the key factor in—to use a bromide that is particularly apt here—separating the men from the boys. Even when avowed reactionary leaders were removed to serve one of their many solitary tours, there seems little doubt that their example served to instill a spirit of resistance (either open or underground) in fellow POWs. This was particularly true when the leadership gap was filled by the next senior man and the chain of command remained unbroken.

Prisoners who were able to rise above their own personal situation (*i.e.*, to adjust, without giving in) and to assist others seemed, unquestionably, to have gained greater resiliency and determination. Whether this is a cause-or-effect reaction, however, might be a grey area difficult to pinpoint precisely. In any event, glimpses of Marines from behind the barbed wire indicated that steadfastness under pressure, ingenuity, and outstanding leadership earned them the respect of fellow prisoners as well as a place in Marine Corps history.

Even in a situation as inhospitable and hazardous as a POW camp, it is not surprising that characteristic behavior and certain distinctive personality traits tend to show through, no matter what. Captain Fink, captured early in the war, endured unspeakable humiliations at the hands of the North Koreans. Although he felt his morale was at its lowest point at this time, and was not sure he could go on, he was later responsible for providing a high degree of civility for POWs confined to Camp 2. His most notable artistic and mechanical

⁷² *Ibid.*, p. 185.

achievement was probably the construction of an artificial leg⁷³ for USAF Major Thomas D. Harrison. This prosthetic was so expertly fashioned that its owner could play volley ball using his new limb! Fink also built stethoscopes for POW doctors, using resonant wood and tubing stolen from Chinese trucks. After a discussion with other POWs on the need for a religious symbol in camp, the resourceful Marine made a 22-inch crucifix, christened "Christ in Barbed Wire."⁷⁴ His efforts on behalf of religion earned him a 10-day sentence in the hole.

Captain Arthur Wagner, VMF(N)-513, spent an unusually long six-month tour at Pak's during 1951. For new captives headed in that direction, the word via USMC grapevine was that he "could be trusted."⁷⁵ Captain Wagner counselled other prisoners at Pak's, helped chop wood, draw water, cook, ease the burden of sick POWs, and resisted the Communists at every turn.

Another member of the same squadron, Captain Flynn, had completed 59 combat missions against the enemy in North Korea before being shot down in May 1952.⁷⁶ While captive, the veteran Marine fighter pilot withstood intense interrogation, influenced others to suppress CCF-inspired talks made by progressives, and strengthened morale by planning a group escape. He was sentenced to 20 years imprisonment by a mock court. Throughout it all, according to Master Sergeant Cain, the POWs "owed much to Flynn who kept them amused."⁷⁷ First Lieutenant Robert J. Gillette's "reactionary" attitude resulted in his being placed in the hole on several occasions. Once, at No Name Valley, he managed to scribble a novel on toilet paper which subsequently provided some light moments for fellow prisoners. And First Lieutenant Felix L. Ferranto, 1st Signal Battalion, spent more than two years of his 33 months' imprisonment in solitary confinement or isolated with small units of "non-coopera-

⁷³ A hollowed-out compartment of the leg was used to hide written records on deaths, atrocities, and other administrative data. Ultimately, the records were brought back to the U.S. The Air Force officer was a cousin, interestingly enough, of the chief Allied truce negotiator, General Harrison. MacDonald, *POW*, p. 227, and *Washington Post*, dtd 5 Aug 53, p. 1.

⁷⁴ The crucifix was brought back to freedom by Camp 2 POWs and later placed in the Father Kapaun High School, in Wichita, Kansas. MacDonald, *POW*, p. 172.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 121.

⁷⁶ Parachuting from his burning plane after it was struck by hostile AA fire, Captain Flynn duplicated an earlier action from World War II. In July 1945 he had bailed out of an aircraft similarly hit by fire while on a combat patrol over Japan. Biog File, HRS, HistBr, G-3 Div, HQMC.

⁷⁷ MacDonald, *POW*, p. 185.

tive" POWs. The CCF pronounced him a "hopeless capitalist, an organizer with an 'unsincere attitude.'" ⁷⁸

The type of amiable accommodation that could sometimes be made, without compromising one's standards, was once successfully demonstrated by Captain Jack E. Perry, VMF-311 briefing officer. On a bombing run his F9F fuel tank was hit, and he parachuted down. Seized almost immediately by the Chinese, his captors "showed him bomb holes from numerous strikes in the area, and they pointed out several wounded soldiers. Then, as he describes it, 'They laughed like hell.' Although Captain Perry failed to see anything funny, he laughed along with them." ⁷⁹

Three Marines captured during the Korean War had suffered a similar fate in World War II. Ironically, Staff Sergeant Charles L. Harrison, of the Military Police Company; Warrant Officer Felix J. McCool, of 1st Service Battalion; and Master Sergeant Frederick J. Stumpges, Headquarters Company, were all captured in the same 29 November 1950 action. Comparisons of treatment by the Communists and Japanese were inevitable. A survivor of the Bataan Death March, Stumpges felt that although the Japanese confinement was more difficult physically, imprisonment in North Korea was a far worse mental ordeal. "They [the Communists] were around all the time and you could never speak your mind." ⁸⁰

The other two Marines similarly thought that the Japanese were more brutal but had more character. Harrison, captured at Wake Island, said he admired them because "they really believed in their cause and were loyal to it." ⁸¹ The Chinese, on the other hand, he characterized as employing "false friendship and deceit." ⁸² McCool, who had spent 70 hours in a slimy, lice-infested hole for refusing to confess to a phony charge of rape and pillage, knew that he "hated the Chinese Communists far more than he had hated the Japanese." ⁸³

Master Sergeant Cain had distinguished himself by flying little OE reconnaissance planes 184 hours and had 76 combat missions in one month. Just before his capture, Cain had paid for six months' education for nine Korean youngsters who lived near his air base.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 122.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 109.

⁸⁰ *New York Times*, dtd 30 Aug 53, p. 2.

⁸¹ MacDonald, *POW*, p. 79.

⁸² *Ibid.*

⁸³ *Ibid.*, p. 167.

Because of his graying hair and lack of rank insignia, Sergeant Cain was mistaken for a senior officer. In fact, the Chinese insisted that he was Lieutenant Colonel Cain, CO of VMF-121. His equal amount of insistence that he was not a Marine officer, plus his refusal to reveal any significant information, made him a particular nuisance to the CCF. He was subjected to intensive interrogation sessions, confined to the hole, and stood at attention for periods of five to eight hours. Describing the occasion on which he thought it was all over, Sergeant Cain related that he:

. . . was taken to a hillside, blindfolded, and placed in front of a firing squad. He heard rifle bolts click. The commander of the firing squad asked if he was ready to tell all.⁸⁴

When the Marine sergeant replied that he was not going to talk, the Chinese returned him to solitary confinement. Eventually, after questioning him for 84 days, the CCF gave up trying to indoctrinate him in the ways of Communism. Major Harris, senior officer of the Obul complex, freely acknowledged that Sergeant Cain "assumed more than his share of duties and responsibilities and set an example for all to follow."⁸⁵

*Marine Escape Attempts*⁸⁶

As the Korean War came to a close, assessments were being made of America's role in it. Operation BIG SWITCH swung into high gear and national attention focused on the returning POWs and their experiences in Communist camps. The widely-accepted statement was that no prisoners had escaped. Even more discrediting was the prevailing belief that, "worse, not a single American attempted to escape from captivity."⁸⁷ These reported facts are not borne out by the actual record.

In May 1951, a group of 18 Marines and a U.S. Army interpreter found their way back to American control through a combination of fortuitous events and quick thinking. All of the Marines had been captured several months earlier, in the 28 November-11 De-

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 186.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 186-187.

⁸⁶ Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: MacDonald, *POW*; Korean War casualty cards from Statistical Unit, Casualty Section, HQMC.

⁸⁷ Leckie, *Conflict*, p. 389.

cember period, the majority on the night of 29–30 November. There were peculiar circumstances connected with their escape. In early April, a group of nearly 60 UNC prisoners had been brought south by the enemy from the Majon-ni area. Presumably they were to perform working details in the rear of Communist front lines.

While a larger number of prisoners, both Army and Marine, were marched westward to Pyoktong, First Lieutenant Frank E. Cold and a group of 17 enlisted were sent further south to the general Chorwon area, not far from the 38th Parallel. In the meantime the Chinese launched their spring counteroffensive on 22 April. It appears that, subsequently, the Marines and Army interpreter, Corporal Saburo "Sam" Shimamura, who had been attached to the 1st Marine Division, were told they would be taken to the area in which the Marine division was operating and released there.

The group was then trucked southeast to Chunchon, just below the Parallel, under guard, and marched toward the vicinity of the front lines. On 24 May, while in proximity to the main battle area, an artillery preparation suddenly registered nearby. The CCF guards fled, while the prisoners ran in the opposite direction, heading for high ground where they successfully eluded the guards. For the rest of that day and night the escapees quietly watched Communist troops retreat past them. The next day, 25 May, the Marines fashioned make-shift air panels from wallpaper they stripped from a ruined Korean house in the area. They spelled out "POWS—19 RESCUE." Their signal attracted the attention of an Army observation pilot who radioed their position to an Army reconnaissance unit.

Three Army tanks were dispatched and escorted the ex-prisoners to safety. They entered friendly lines in the vicinity of Chunchon, "the first and only group of prisoners to experience Communist indoctrination and to reach freedom after a prolonged period of internment."⁸⁸ Two members of the unit⁸⁹ were of special interest.

⁸⁸ MacDonald, *POW*, p. 84, reporting news stories in *The Washington Post*, dtd 27 Aug 53, p. 7, and *Saturday Evening Post*, 25 Aug 51, p. 109.


⁸⁹ Roster of this May 1951 escape group: 1stLt Cold, H&S/3/7; MSgt Dunis, Military Police Co; SSgt Harrison, MPCo; SSgt James B. Nash, MPCo; Sgt Charles W. Dickerson, 1stTkBn; Sgt Morris L. Estess, 1stSigBn; Sgt Paul M. Manor, A/7 MT Bn; Cpl Clifford R. Hawkins, 1stTkBn; Cpl Ernest E. Hayton, 1stTkBn; Cpl Frederick G. Holcomb, 11thMar; Cpl Leonard J. Maffioli, 1stTkBn; Cpl Theodore R. Wheeler, 1stServ Bn; Cpl Calvin W. Williams, Hq, 1stDiv; PFC John A. Haring, 7thMar; PFC Theron L. Hilburn, 1stTkBn; PFC Charles M. Kaylor, W/2/7; PFC Paul J. Phillips, A/7 MTBn; and PFC Charles E. Quiring, 5thMar. MacDonald, *POW*, pp. 260–263.



DOD Photo A 169702

Ice-Breaker at Work—Amphibian tractor of 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion destroys thick-crusted ice to prevent its backing up against Spoonbill Bridge. Below, the 1st Engineer Battalion maintenance shop in operation at Ascom City.

DOD Photo A 168178





DOD Photo A 16373

Captured Enemy Weapons—Various types of mortar and artillery shells, machine guns, rifles, and a 60mm mortar are displayed at 1st Marine Division CP. Below, F9F Pantherjet fighter taxis down runway for takeoff.

DOD Photo A 346720





DOD Photo A 170084

Outpost Defense—Inside view of one of the many sleeping caves, which shelter two to four men, on Marine outpost Carson. Below, COP Dagmar under artillery bombardment preceding enemy diversionary ground attack on 26 March 1953.






DOD Photo A 17096

POW Exchange—Frontline Marines watch Army convoy bringing first UN prisoners to Freedom Village in Operation LITTLE SWITCH. Below, NKPA and CCF delegation upon adjournment of first day's truce talks, April 1953.

DOD Photo A 170778





DOD Photo A 170795



DOD Photo A 170766

Freedom Village—Marines of 1st Engineer Battalion raise welcoming sign at entrance to camp. Rear Admiral John C. Daniel, USN, senior delegate at truce talks, reports progress at press conference. Below, KSC workers and Marine reroll barbed wire for use at the front.

DOD Photo A 170106





DOD Photo A 133927

Ready to Strike—Ground crew loads rockets on "Devilcat" Corsair in preparation for day's mission. Below, protective screen of M-46 dozer of 1st Tank Battalion is designed to explode 3.5-inch rockets before they hit armored vehicle. The wire fence turns with the turret.

DOD Photo A 170228





DOD Photo A 171000

Evacuation from MLR—Improvised trolley rigged up by 2d Battalion, 1st Marines, safely transfers Marine casualty. Below, front view of first aid bunker, built on reverse slope, by 1st Engineer Battalion personnel.

DOD Photo A 171077





DOD Photo A 171351

DOD Photo A 16050

Marine Relief—Advance party of the Turkish 3d Battalion arrives at 3/7 CP to reconnoiter its new sector preparatory to relief of 1st Marine Division, May 1953. Below, mine damage absorbed by thermo boot. Its sturdy construction saved limb of wounded Marine. Navy corpsman displays armored jacket worn by infantryman who survived blast of 5 lbs. of TNT accidentally exploded at close range.

DOD Photo A 172596





DOD Photo A 171293



DOD Photo A 173207

Street Signs—Markers for the new Marine division CP at Camp Casey await completion of road work. Casey is command post of 1st MarDiv while in I Corps reserve. Marine tank fires in support of Turkish Brigade during May attack. Below, 5th Marines slog through flooded area on way back from day's training.

DOD Photo A 173233





DOD Photo A 173914

Defense of Boulder City—Men of 1st and 7th Marines receive supplies during CCF assaults in July 1953 against Boulder City. Below, aerial view of pock-marked terrain in front of Boulder City as seen from HMR-161 helicopter.

DOD Photo A 173886





DOD Photo A 174359

Cease-fire—1st Marines move off MLR on 28 July, following cease-fire order. How Company marches to Camp Lee from position at the front. Below, contemplative Marine surveys trench line being filled in in accordance with armistice agreement.

DOD Photo A 173720





DOD Photo A 174381


Operation BIG SWITCH—Road map of route taken by repatriated UN prisoners of war as convoy reaches radio check points. Progress of convoy is immediately relayed to Freedom Village and entered on map.



DOD Photo A 174586

UN Custodial Forces—Indian troops board Marine helicopter on deck of USS Point Cruz. They are then flown to the buffer zone to guard CCF and NKPA nonrepatriated POWs. Below, LtCol William G. Thrash receives naval aviator wings upon his release at Freedom Village from MajGen Vernon E. Megee, CG, 1st MAW.

DOD Photo A 349140






DOD Photo A 173860

Dismantling the MLR—KSCs, under Marine supervision, load and carry lumber from torn-down bunkers to new sector. Below, guard shack at entrance to 1/1 CP show results of flood waters, August 1952. Road approach to Spoonbill Bridge completely submerged by annual summer rains, in July 1953.

DOD Photo A 164548

DOD Photo A 173282





DOD Photo A 349563

Shore-to-Ship Operation—F3D is hauled aboard ship after being ferried by four DUKWs, as 1st MAF redeploys from Korea to Japan in June 1956. Below, 1st Marine Division in Korea functions as security force. Marine DMZ policemen inspect enemy positions, February 1955.

DOD Photo A 366097





DOD Photo A 366210

Mission Completed—1st Marine Division equipment and records at dockside prior to loading for division's return to the States. Below, 1st Marines march across Freedom Gate Bridge on their way to Ascom City and thence home to U.S., March 1955.

DOD Photo A 366127



One man was 56-year-old Master Sergeant Gust H. Dunis, who had barely survived the brutal, frozen death march to Kanggye in late December. The other was Staff Sergeant Charles L. Harrison, previously introduced as a unique two-time prisoner of war.

An additional four enlisted Marines returned to military control after a brief period of capture. Corporal William S. Blair, B/1/7, and PFC Bernard W. Insko, D/2/11, were taken prisoner on 24 April 1951 while the 1st Marine Division was operating as a component of IX Corps. Although originally sent north to a POW camp, both were released on 12 May by the enemy after less than a month's captivity. Another pair of lucky Marines were PFC Richard R. Grindle and Corporal Harold J. Kidd, both of B/1/7. Seized on 11 May in patrol actions, they were the only Marines captured in ground fighting that month, and escaped to return to the division four days later.

At least six escape attempts are known to have been made by Marine POWs, and another elaborate plan late in the war was foiled before it got under way. The incidents follow:

#1. In the early winter months of 1951, Sergeant Donald M. Griffith, F/2/5, became increasingly upset by the filth, steady attrition of POWs, and semi-starvation diet at The Valley. He vowed to escape. Late one night he pretended to go to the latrine and finding the guard asleep, instead hurried down the path leading out of the valley. He walked until dawn, then found a hut where he hid among a pile of rice bags for some much-needed sleep. Later, he knocked at a hut, asking for food. While he ate, however, his genial host's son was out contacting a military patrol which even then was on Griffith's trail.

A group of Communist soldiers closed in to recapture him. As early punishment, Griffith's shoe pacs were taken from him and he was forced to walk back to the Valley in his threadbare ski socks. Returned to the camp, the Marine sergeant was beaten across the face. He was also directed to walk up a nearby hill and for three successive times a rifle bullet tearing by his head barely missed him. Later he learned that plans of his escape were leaked to the CCF by an informer, thus triggering an early search.

#2. In May 1951, Captain Bryon H. Beswick, VMF-323, was a member of a large POW column being marched north. Although still suffering severe burns on his face, hands, and leg incurred

while bailing out of his plane that had caught fire, Beswick and four others attempted to outwit their guards while on the march. All the would-be escapees were placed in solitary confinement.

#3. Shortly after his capture in July 1951, PFC Alfred P. Graham, Jr., H/3/5, was interned temporarily at what appeared to be a divisional headquarters. One afternoon when the guards seemed slack, Graham and another Marine sneaked off. Ultimately they approached a farmhouse to get food and there stumbled into a half dozen Koreans who took them into custody. The two Marines were beaten with a submachine gun and their hands were bound behind their back with communications wire. On their forced reappearance at the original site of escape, a Korean officer beat and interrogated them for three days.

#4. A short-lived escape attempt at Pak's Palace, not long after his capture in October 1951, had earned Lieutenant Gillette a solitary confinement tour. Arriving at Officers' camp in Pi-chong-ni the following spring, the former VMF(N)-513 squadron member and a South African air force pilot laid plans for a mutual escape. Gillette deliberately set himself on a course of reduced rations to prepare himself for the coming feat. When the two men made their break, they were shot at but managed to safely clear the camp.

The first night out the other pilot so badly injured himself in a fall that Gillette had to leave him and go on alone. Although the apparent escape route lay to the west, nearer the coast, the Marine chose to go east across rugged mountains that offered little in the way of cover, concealment, or food. His unorthodox planning nearly paid off. "Whereas most escapees were recaptured within hours, or at best within days, Lieutenant Gillette was free for several weeks before the Communists found him halfway across Korea."⁹⁰ One Royal Marine described the attempt as "the finest and most determined one he knew of."⁹¹

#5. In July 1952, three Marine officers were involved in an abortive escape attempt at Camp 2. They were Lieutenant Colonel Thrash, Major McLaughlin, and Second Lieutenant Richard L. Sill, 1st 90mm AAA Gun Battalion. When detected outside of camp they were able to get back inside the compound, but the Chinese

⁹⁰ MacDonald, *POW*, p. 169.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*

did identify Lieutenant Still. His escape attempt earned him a three-month sentence in the hole from which he later "emerged unbothered and steeled against the Communists."⁹²

#6. Captain Martelli escaped from the Camp 2 compound in September 1952. Retaken 10 days later, he was put in the same hole for two months. On release from the confinement, he was visibly upset by the experience, but quickly recovered. As a matter of interest, Martelli, like the other men whose exploits are recounted here, returned home in Operation BIG SWITCH.

#7. In the spring of 1953 a group of 30 officers, including two British Marines, at Camp 2 organized classes in mathematics, physics, and survival lectures. Conferences on escape and evasion techniques were held and the men formed escape groups. The teams drew straws to pick priorities for escape, and each one presented its plan to a senior body for approval. On 1 July, with support of the other teams, the first group went over the fence surrounding their house. Their freedom was brief, however, and the camp guard doubled. When rumors of armistice began circulating, further escape plans were cancelled. Clandestine prisoner escape committees—although unsuccessful in terms of actual results achieved—had existed at various camps. Second Lieutenant Rowland M. Murphy had been a member of such an organization at Obul. Major McLaughlin had assumed similar responsibilities at Camp 5, in 1951, and later at Camp 2 served on the secret all-UNC prisoners escape committee and senior officers' organization within Camp 2. In early 1953 Major Harris became senior officer at the Camp 2 Annex. He organized Spanish classes as a facade for having a regular meeting place to announce policy and issue orders. Maps of North Korea were prepared for use in escape attempts and counter-Chinese political indoctrination was disseminated.

The Camp 2 officers performed another useful service. As rumor leaked out of the impending truce, they drafted a policy guide on POW behavior that was secretly circulated to other camps. UNC prisoners were directed to refrain from any appearance of fraternizing with the enemy, or acts of exuberance or violence. Specifically, they were reminded not to show any great enthusiasm upon

⁹² *Ibid.*, p. 170.

their release, to prevent the Communist cameras on the scene from recording this as another propaganda victory.

*Evaluation and Aftermath*⁹³

With but a few exceptions, circumstances indicated that capture of most Marines was unavoidable. Theoretically, it can be argued that several seized in bunkers might have avoided captivity had they been occupying fighting-holes instead. On the other hand, they might just as readily have become statistics on a KIA list, instead, by falling victim to preparatory fire that preceded the enemy's main assault.

As Marine historian, then-Major, MacDonald has noted:

A shadow fell over American POWs in the aftermath of the Korean War. Courts-martial and other official inquiries revealed that a small segment of the Americans captured by the Communists had been guilty of behavior ranging from questionable to treasonable.⁹⁴

Both the Secretary of Defense Advisory Committee on Prisoners of War and the United States Congress, which investigated the entire POW issue, returned favorable verdicts for Marine POW conduct. The U.S. Senate report summarized its findings:

The United States Marine Corps, the Turkish troops, and the Colombians as groups, did not succumb to the pressures exerted upon them by the Communists and did not co-operate or collaborate with the enemy. For this they deserve greatest admiration and credit.⁹⁵

In commenting on prisoner attitudes and activities that seemed to account for those men who became "survival types", an Army psychiatrist, Major William F. Mayer, observed:

The Marines were a statistically significant group from the standpoint of size, something over two hundred; the only thing I can say about them is that more of them survived than we. I think this is a function of discipline and morale and esprit; and the attitude in the Marine Corps I expressed a little while ago, that if something happens to me, these jokers will take care of me.⁹⁶

⁹³ Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: HRS Subject File: VE23.2.S8 "CMC Statements on Korean POWs"; Biog File, HRB, HistDiv, HQMC; MacDonald, *POW*; Fehrenbach, *Kind of War*; Elliot Harris, *The "Un-American" Weapon—Psychological Warfare* (New York: M. W. Lads Publishing Co., 1967); Leckie, *Conflict*; Rees, *Korea*.

⁹⁴ MacDonald, *POW*, p. 3.

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 237.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 236-237, address to U.S. Army Chaplain School, 1957.

In the nature of self-judgment, Sergeant Griffith referred to "that certain 'something' that seems to weld men together prevailed more among the Marine POWs than it did with the other captured UN Troops."⁹⁷ The Marine with probably more experience as a POW than anyone else, Sergeant Harrison, noted that "without USMC training I would never have lived through several tight spots. I am not talking strictly about physical training as I am mental conditioning. It is something that causes you to think . . . about what the other guy will think or how it [your action] might affect or endanger them."⁹⁸

A senior Air Force officer, Lieutenant Colonel Gerald Brown, who headed POW units at Camp 2 and 5 between his tours of solitary confinement, declared:

I was extremely proud of the conduct of U.S. Marine Corps personnel with whom I came in contact during my period of confinement. Their esprit de corps was perhaps the highest of any branch of the Armed Forces of the United States during this period.⁹⁹

And Navy Chief Duane Thorin, a former inmate of the Camp 2 annex, who later inspired the character of the helicopter pilot in James A. Michener's *The Bridges of Toko-ri*, pointed out:

The Navy and Marine Corps POWs were generally excellent. The Marines who left something to be desired were more than compensated for by the majority of them.¹⁰⁰

Another view was offered by a prominent neurologist and consultant to the Secretary of Defense Advisory Committee, Dr. Harold G. Wolff. After investigating the performance of American POWs in Korea, Dr. Wolff concluded they had not "behaved much differently from other men in other armies and places" but that Americans had been made to appear much worse "by the enemy's propaganda devices and our own initial ineptitude in countering the Communist propaganda."¹⁰¹

As a postscript to the POW story, five Marines received awards, on 11 January 1954, for their exceptionally meritorious conduct while serving as prisoners of the Communists in Korea. They were:

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 88.

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 238.

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 220.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 223.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*, p. 237.

Lieutenant Colonel Thrash—awarded a Gold Star in lieu of a second Legion of Merit;

Major McLaughlin—awarded the Legion of Merit;

Major Harris—also awarded the Legion of Merit;

Captain Flynn—awarded the Navy and Marine Corps Medal;
and

Master Sergeant Cain—awarded a Letter of Commendation with Ribbon.

On the negative side, one enlisted Marine was disciplined for his cooperation with the enemy in writing a pro-Communist magazine article. A Court of Inquiry, convened in March 1954, did not recommend a court-martial for the 45-year-old pilot, Colonel Schwable. After a month-long review of circumstances involved in the case, the court opined that he had resisted Communist pressure and torture "to the limit of his ability before giving in."¹⁰² Its final judgment was that Schwable—a Naval Academy graduate, veteran of 20 years' military service, and distinguished WW II night-fighter pilot and squadron CO—not be subjected to disciplinary action. At the same time the court held that his future usefulness as a Marine officer was "seriously impaired" by his conduct as a war prisoner.

On a larger scale, 192 Americans were found guilty of misconduct against fellow prisoners or various degrees of collaboration with the enemy. None of these was a Marine. In comparison with some 22,000 Communists who refused repatriation, 21 U.S. and 1 British prisoner succumbed to CCF brainwashing tactics. Twelve of the Americans have since returned to the U.S., apparently disenchanted with the Communist version of "people's democracy" after getting a closer look at it.

Investigations later showed that "only a handful of the POWs in Korea were able to maintain absolute silence under military interrogation. Nearly all of the American prisoners went beyond the [Geneva Convention] 'absolute', name, rank, serial number, and date of birth restriction."¹⁰³ Although giving false or misleading information was a common occurrence in POW camps, such testimony was usually quickly detected. American military authorities, drawing up a revised Code of Conduct (1955) subsequently recom-

¹⁰² *Ibid.*, p. 233.

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*, p. 230.

mended against making untruthful statements. Further, even though several Marines seemed to have suffered none the worse for giving false information, in at least one case a prisoner's own situation was weakened by enemy detection of his lie and increasing pressure was brought against him.

It was found too, that in every group of prisoners there were always gradations of those more cooperative with the enemy ("progressives") and those who offered open or passive resistance ("reactionaries"). One Korean War analyst, in seeking the final explanation of what POW tactics succeeded best against a dedicated enemy, cited the Turkish "chain of command that was never broken" and which helped to mold them together. He noted the "permissive" culture and background of Americans where freedom of choice and individual decisions are basic tenets. Despite the effect of military indoctrination and discipline, this concept of individualism and freedom appeared to be so strongly engrained that unless there was a corresponding emphasis on responsibility and strong beliefs it tended to weaken a man when his action and values were put to a prolonged test—as in the POW compound. The analyst concluded:

Only an extremely cohesive group, with tight leadership and great spiritual strengths, coupled with inner toughness and concern for one another, could have survived the shocks visited upon their minds and bodies . . . They [the Turks] remained united against the enemy, and they survived.¹⁰⁴

This judgement, to a large degree, tells the Marine POW story.

¹⁰⁴ Fehrenbach, *Kind of War*, pp. 541-542.

CHAPTER XI

While Guns Cool

The Postwar Transition—Control of the DMZ and the Military Police Company—Organization of New Defense Positions— Postwar Employment of Marine Units in FECOM

*The Postwar Transition*¹

TERMS OF THE Armistice Agreement required EUSAK components, including the 1st Marine Division, to carry out a number of major tasks in the months following the end of active hostilities. As stipulated by the cease-fire, UNC troops all along the front withdrew to a new main battle position (MBP) south of the main line of resistance. A military demarcation line (MDL) was established between enemy and friendly positions, corresponding to the end-of-war battle lines. Each side pulled back 2,000 yards from this MDL, with the combined 4,000-yard buffer strip on both sides being known as the demilitarized zone (DMZ).

A continuous double-strand barbed wire fence, known as the No-Pass Fence, or No-Pass Line, was erected 200 yards below the southern boundary of the DMZ by infantry units manning the MLR at the time of the cease-fire. Appropriate marking signs, in Chinese, Korean, and English, were placed at regular intervals along the

¹ Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 6, Chaps. 9, 10; 1stMarDiv ComdDs Jul-Sep 53; 1stMarDiv Type "C" Rpt—Defense of "C" Sector, 27 Jul-31 Oct 53, Folder #3 (this and following 1stMarDiv end-of-war records currently retired in 61 A2265, Box 74, FRC, Suitland, Md.); 1stMarDiv G-3 Jnls, 30 Jul-31 Aug 53; 1stMar Hist of Defense of "D" Sector, 27 Jul-31 Oct 53, Folder #3 (contains brief histories of 1/1, 2/1, 3/1, AT Co/1, 4.2-inch MortCo/1); 5thMar Hist of Def of "D" Sector, 27 Jul-31 Oct 53, Folder #3; 5thMar Hist, same period, Folder #4 (brief histories of 1/5, 2/5, 3/5, AT Co/5, 4.2-inch MortCo/5, DMZ Police Co/5), dtd 26 Dec 53; 7thMar Hist of Defense, 27 Jul 53-10 Feb 54 (brief histories 1/7, 2/7, 3/7, AT Co/7, 4.2-inch MortCo/7), Folder #5; 1stMarDiv-Type "C" Rpt—Defense of "C" Div Sect, 27 Jul-31 Dec 53, Folder #6 (containing, among others, brief rpts 11thMar, 1st TkBn, 1st Engr Bn, 1st MT Bn, 7th MT Bn, 1st KMC Regt, 2d KMC Regt).

fence, prohibiting unauthorized entry into the Demilitarized Zone.

Strict requirements by I Corps enjoined that the "fence on the southern boundary of the DMZ must present a continuous unbroken line except for gates and where it crosses large streams."² Beginning late on 27 July 1953, the 1st Marine Division's modified mission became that of withdrawal to and organization of the post-armistice MBP, establishment of the No-Pass Line, and defense of the new position in readiness for any possible resumption of hostilities by the enemy.

Division officers, from commanding general to platoon leader level, repeatedly emphasized that the armistice agreement was only a cessation of active fighting. As such, it could be violated by the enemy at any time. The armistice was not a peace, but had simply paved the way for a political conference. As the UNC commander, General Mark W. Clark, had stated, the 27 July document was merely "a military agreement between opposing commanders to cease fire and to permit the opposing sides to arrive at a peaceful solution of the conflict."³ Since many felt the cease-fire might be only temporary and not necessarily a permanent peace, all hands showed an attitude of skepticism and watchful waiting. There was little disposition or time for celebration. The response of many men to the complete lack of noise across the front was one of simple restlessness and expectancy.

From the 7th Marines just engaged in the vicious Boulder City battle, the reaction

. . . was one of disbelief and caution. Extensive movements of the enemy during the night of 27 July only bolstered the feeling of wariness and suspicion. Only after dawn broke on 28 July, without any shots being fired, did the realism [reality] of the truce become apparent, followed by a wide-spread sensation of relief.⁴

A 5th Marines representative noted:

The fact that negotiations had been going on for some time with numerous false alarms dulled the edge for most people, and a prior announcement that the agreement would be signed took most of the steam away from the actual culmination of the fighting . . . in effect [the cease-fire]

² 1stMarDiv G-3 Jnl, dtd 2 Aug 53.

³ 1stMarDiv ComdD Aug 53, App. VII, Annex E to IMARD-00-10-53, p. 2.

⁴ 7thMar Hist, p. 1, Folder #5.

meant "we're giving you ten dollars but don't spend it for we might take it back."⁵

The view expressed by a Korean regimental commander was that:

Many of the officers and men were relieved to see the fighting cease; others, particularly among the officers, would rather have seen the fighting continue until the country could be united. However, the officers and men accepted the cease-fire as a military order and acted accordingly.⁶

Division MLR units on 27 July had been the 1st KMC, the 5th Marines, and 1st Marines in the left, center, and right regimental sectors, respectively. With the pullback of the division to new defensive positions, the 5th Marines—the infantry regiment that had not been heavily engaged in recent combat—was assigned the mission of defending the forward general outpost (GOP) line across the division front. In addition, the 5th Marines, or Northern Regiment as it came to be called since it was the only one remaining north of the Imjin River, was also charged with police duties and security of the UNC part of the DMZ located in the division sector.

Marine regiments, battalions, and companies began withdrawing from the DMZ to move to their new MBP early on the morning of 28 July, less than 24 hours after the signing of the Korean armistice. To some extent, the relocation of units was facilitated by the fact that the forward part of the division sector had been defended by the three MLR regiments. Since the lateral boundaries, initially, would remain the same, the three 5th Marines battalions were to occupy positions held by the three line regiments. Orders called for 2/5 to occupy the left regimental sector previously held by the 1st Korean Marine Corps Regimental Combat Team; 1/5 to man the 5th Marines center sector; and 3/5 to assume the right regimental sector.

Whereas 5th Marines battalions were directed to occupy their new positions by D+84 hours (or 2200, 30 July), other units in some cases were not required to pull out of their respective positions until positions by D+108 hours (2000, 1 August). This was done to insure that no portion of the division front was left unmanned during this very critical period. It did, however, force small units to make two

⁵ Co H Rpt of Post-Armistice Activities, Encl (2), CO 3/5 ltr ser 00208, dtd 11 Jan 54, p. 1, in 3/5 Hist, Folder #4.

⁶ 1st KMC Regt Rpt, dtd 7 Apr 54, p. 1, in 1stMarDiv Type "C" Rpt, Folder #6.

moves and "in one instance, a battalion and a regimental headquarters were occupying the same area."⁷ Because of the need to move almost immediately, only a hasty physical reconnaissance was made. Small unit leaders were not always familiar with the area and this gave rise, in some instances, to confusion about exact unit boundaries. This resulted in a later relocation of several units.

For the first 72 hours after the armistice, Marines were engaged in a maximum effort to tear down installations, salvage fortification materials, and physically move out of the Demilitarized Zone. Infantry units were responsible for this destruction and salvage work within assigned sectors, with 1st Engineer Battalion assistance and supervision, as available. For the nearly 50 Marine infantry companies and attached KMC units, the order of priorities for those first three days generally appears to have been:

- (1) Recovery of ordnance and removal to company supply dumps;
- (2) Removal of all combat equipment to supply dumps; and
- (3) Destruction of field fortifications and salvage of all bunker timbers and other building materials from the old MLR sector.

Specifications of the initial armistice agreement, as originally drawn up in August 1952, had called for a complete withdrawal of all military personnel, supplies, and equipment from the DMZ within 72 hours after the cease-fire. Destruction of all fortifications within the DMZ likewise was to be accomplished within this 72-hour deadline. It subsequently became evident, however, that it would be impossible to complete the entire job of dismantling and salvaging MLR fortifications within a three-day period. In mid-June 1953, CinCUNC had advised major commands that Communist and UNC negotiators had agreed to extend the original 72 hours to an additional 45-day period, or until 13 September.⁸

Division order 1MARD-OP-11-53, issued at 1600 on 27 July, clearly stated that all "removable materials"⁹ would be taken out

⁷ 5thMar Hist, dtd 26 Dec 53, p. 4, Folder #4.

⁸ Other modifications and deadline extensions included: (a) withdrawal of all military forces, supplies, and equipment from coastal islands and waters north of the 38th Parallel within 5 days increased to 10 days; (b) Personnel and equipment to be evacuated from Korea only through those ports of entry specified in the armistice agreement. 1st MAW ComdD, Vol. III, Jun 53, Msg from CinCUNC to CG, AFPE, COMNAVFE, CG FEAF, info 1st MAW and others, dtd 17 Jun 53.

⁹ 1stMarDiv Folder "Withdrawal to and Organization of Post Armistice MBP 1MARD-OP-11-53-July 1953," dtd 27 Jul 53.

of the DMZ within the immediate 72-hour period following the effective date of the armistice (2200, 27 July). The end-of-war order further directed that division personnel would "locate and list all valuable materials which should be salvaged but cannot be moved during this prescribed time . . . an additional period of 45 days, after the initial 72-hour period, will be used to complete salvage operations within the Demilitarized Zone under the supervision of the Military Armistice Commission. . . ." ¹⁰

From top to lower echelons, however, a breakdown in communications seems to have taken place in the maze of post-truce orders. At the pick and shovel level, initial instructions were sometimes to the effect of:

Salvage everything possible in the 72 hours we have to get out of here. If unable to salvage; then destroy. . . . No word was passed that there would be a period following the truce in which we could conduct a thorough salvage operation. Had this information been available, a more systematic process could have been devised. . . . ¹¹

One regiment commented that early directives from higher authorities did not clearly establish the relative priority for salvage operations. ¹² More specifically, 1/7 related:

Periodically, messages would be received stressing certain items of salvage as critical. This required revision of working schedules and shifting of men to other jobs . . . if all salvageable material had been designated as critical at the commencement of salvage operations, the work could have been completed more expeditiously. . . . ¹³

A 5th Marines observer commented on the confusion in these words:

It is evident, however, that in dissemination to some of the lower echelons, pertinent information was either ignored or improperly passed . . . some Company Commanders were under the impression that the entire job of dismantling and salvaging was to be completed in 72 hours. The result of this misconception was that in some areas bunkers were filled in with earth and then later had to be evacuated [excavated] in order to salvage the materials. ¹⁴

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

¹¹ Co H Rpt, *op. cit.*, p. 1, 3/5 Hist, Folder #4.

¹² 7thMar Hist, dtd 28 Jan 54, p. 5, Folder #5.

¹³ 1/7 Hist, in 7thMar Hist, p. 4, Folder #5.

¹⁴ 5thMar Hist, p. 1, Folder #4.

Initial salvage operations were conducted from 28–30 July. Trenchlines were filled in; tank slots dozed under; bunkers torn down and usable timbers carried to salvage collecting points.

Beginning on 28 July, 1st Marines line units on the division right flank came under operational control of the 5th Marines, with their new mission being to "man an outpost line on the most formidable ground south of the southern boundary of the newly planned Demilitarized Zone in the MLR regimental sector."¹⁵ Movement to the new outpost positions was under way by 29 July.

As the Marine units moved south to establish their new outpost positions in previously undeveloped areas, the limited engineering equipment available for simultaneously dismantling bunkers and constructing new camps tended to slow the latter job. Personnel of 1/1, which had utilized 124 vehicles for the transfer, were among those housed in widely scattered areas for several days during the moving and setting up of new camps. Torrential rains, of several days' duration, which had engulfed the division's transport operations on so many occasions in the past, caused the new campsites to turn into a muddy quagmire. Men of 2/5, during part of the relocation period, lived in shelter tents until regular tentage became available.

A short moratorium on salvage activities took place between 31 July–3 August while the details for entry into the DMZ were being settled. Marine division salvage efforts encompassed an area extending from the MLR to the sector rear, in the vicinity of the KANSAS Line, as far as the Imjin River. Work in the areas south of the DMZ did not begin, in most cases, until after 13 September, and fortifications of secondary defense lines were left in place.

All salvage materials removed from the DMZ were placed in battalion and regimental dumps where they would be readily available for use in building the new battle positions. Recovery of ammunition was accomplished in some sectors early on the 28th. At the far right flank of the division line, the scene of the Marines' final action in the Korean War, salvage efforts took on an additional task. Most of the first day was allotted to recovery of the dead at Hills 119 and 111 and the removal of their bodies to rear areas.

Although the enemy had policed in front of Marine lines on the

¹⁵ 1/1 Hist, in 1stMar Hist, p. 1, Folder #3.

night of 27–28 July, at first light the CCF indicated the desire to recover their dead from Marine positions. Enemy parties were thus permitted to temporarily enter 3/1 lines to retrieve these bodies. This procedure provoked some consternation and renewed vigilance by Marine personnel upon "seeing the enemy moving around within a stone's throw of our front lines so soon after his determined attacks."¹⁰

As soon as the Marines' own corresponding unhappy task was completed, ammunition was removed to supply dumps, a laborious task not finished in the 1st Marines sector until noon on 29 July. The fierce fighting that had started after dark on 24 July and lasted until the morning of the ceasefire also accounted for the large amount of salvageable items found in the area including M-1 rifles, helmets, armored vests, and quantities of blood serum. All ordnance, equipment, and building materials were separated into stockpiles of good or nonrepairable items. Ammunition in excess of a one-half a basic JAMESTOWN fire unit (a unit of fire is the amount of ammunition a weapon will use in a day of combat), was placed in company and battalion dumps for collection by regimental ordnance teams.

On occasion, salvage of friendly ammunition was made more difficult because COP stockpiles struck by enemy mortar fire contained both damaged and live, usable ammunition mixed together. Although 1st Engineer Battalion ordnance disposal teams covered the positions thoroughly, unexploded mortar and artillery rounds were often unearthed by Marines filling in the old trenches, knocking down bunkers, or recovering wire. Anti-personnel mines forward of the protective wire prevented full salvage operations in some cases.

Three Marine combat outposts required special attention. These were Bunker Hill and Esther, in the central part of the MLR, and Ava, in the right sector. Although occupied by Marines at the time of the cease-fire, the COPs fell north of the MDL and thus became inaccessible for salvage after the initial 72-hour period. The positions were reduced and materials salvaged in the allotted time.

During the first night, Marines of 3/5 (originally the right battalion, center sector) removed more than 11 truckloads of ammunition. Outposts Hedy and Bunker offered a particular problem due

¹⁰ 3/1 Hist, in 1stMar Hist, p. 2, Folder #3.

to the distance from the MLR and nearest road. As described by some veterans of 24-hour work crews, the trail to Bunker was "particularly tortuous and made the packing of first the ammunition and later the fortification materials a physical ordeal."¹⁷

At Hedy the extreme proximity of CCF and Marine lines posed an additional difficulty. On the afternoon of the 28th, an interval of 20 yards separated the two; by the following day the enemy had completed his work in the area and was never again that close. Operations here were also somewhat delayed "by an influx of visitors: newspapermen and newsreel cameramen all interested in the great numbers of enemy visible to our front engaged in the same tasks that we were."¹⁸

Dismantling bunkers was the single biggest problem of the entire salvage program. This operation began at dawn on the 28th and was not completed until the second week of September. Ultimately, more than 500 bunkers were reclaimed from MLR materials and installed in the new division position. Most of the bunkers were built of 12x12 timbers, buried deep in the ground, fastened together with 10- to 16-inch spikes. Infantry organic tools and equipment were inadequate to dismember bunkers so constructed. Crowbars, picks, shovels, pinch bars, and sledge hammers were all in short supply. Engineer equipment and other tools were not stockpiled in sufficient quantity to buttress a demolition program of such magnitude.

In places where the terrain permitted operation of bulldozers, their use drastically shortened the time spent uncovering bunkers. Where these had been emplaced on reverse slope positions of steep hills, however, the timbers had to be removed by hand. The latter was the generally prevailing situation.

Not surprisingly, throughout the demolition program "basic equipment was usually the Marine himself and his ingenuity."¹⁹ Effective on-the-spot, problem-solving was seen in the many "jury-rigged" levers or prybars fashioned from timbers and crowbars from scrap steel. The "Korean Sling Method," with heavy rope and carrying poles, was often used to move heavy timbers. Trucks equipped

¹⁷ Co I Rpt of Post-Armistice Activities, Encl (3), CO 3/5 ltr ser 00208, dtd 11 Jan 54, p. 1, in 3/5 Hist, Folder #4.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁹ 5thMar Hist, p. 2, Folder #4.

with winches and wreckers were effective for this purpose. Dozer tanks were also used, but only after having their guns removed as required by the armistice agreement. Division engineers experimented at some length with three different ways to pull apart the larger 12x20 bunkers, in which the cross beams were secured to columns with two-foot spikes. The least technical approach which involved "winching the bunkers out of their positions and bouncing them down a steep slope until they broke apart proved the most successful and the quickest method."²⁰

Besides the lack of engineering tools, limited motor transport facilities and manpower shortages also created difficulties. Heavy commitments across the front, with virtually every division unit displacing to a new location, resulted in a shortage of trucks that slowed both salvage and logistics operations. Assignment of personnel to around-the-clock shifts during the critical initial 72-hour period and use of lighting trailers produced maximum results from the available equipment. Company G, 3/5 reported that its men were allowed "ten minute breaks every hour and, because of the heat, they were given from 1200 to 1500 hours for sleep and worked all through the darkness."²¹ During this three-day period alone, the 1st Tank Battalion transported 275 tons of ammunition and fortification material, or a total of 111 loads in 2½-ton trucks.

At this time, the restrictive provisions of the truce agreement led to a problem involving the use of heavy engineer vehicles. After 3 August, it was difficult to bring into the DMZ any hauling or motorized gear that could be construed as "combat equipment." The 2½-ton trucks, however, continued to be employed for much of the motor transport operations.

By 0930 on 1 August, the 1st Marine Division had completed its withdrawal and manned the new MBP south of the DMZ. The 5th Marines continued its mission as the northern outpost regiment. South of the Imjin, the 7th Marines occupied the right regimental sector; the 1st KMC moved into the center of the MBP; and the 1st Marines became the division reserve.

Between 3 August–13 September, each rifle company sent daily working parties into the DMZ to excavate those sectors occupied

²⁰ 1st EngrBn Rpt, dtd 19 Apr 54, p. 3, Folder #6.

²¹ Co G Rpt of Post-Armistice Activities, Encl (1), CO 3/5 ltr ser 00208, dtd 11 Jan 54, p. 1, in 3/5 Hist, Folder #4.

by Marine units on 27 July. Depending on available transportation, the size of the working parties varied from 25 to 100 men. These shortages were alleviated, to some extent, by KSC (Korean Service Corps) personnel.²² The heavy-duty, "pure drudgery without glamour," monotonous tasks performed in tropical weather, 103 degree-plus temperatures and high humidity, caused one Marine infantryman to comment ruefully:

Close officer supervision proved to be absolutely necessary due to the nature of the work, which made the maintenance of interest and enthusiasm in the average individual, very difficult.²³

In another 5th Marines unit the motivation gap was partially solved by "use of a graph posted on the bulletin board showing the money value of materials salvaged each day, with the exhortation to better the previous day's total."²⁴

Throughout the month of August and until 13 September, destruction of MLR positions and removal of materials took place concurrently with organization of defensive positions in the new sector. After the initial three-day period and its top priority of physical withdrawal of troops from the DMZ, division tactical requirements called for completion of the MBP as rapidly as possible. This now became the first priority. New company perimeter defense sites, battalion blocking positions, coordinated fire plans in event of attack, counterattack orders, and evacuation routes were mapped out. Construction began immediately. By 5 August, the new battalion camps had begun to take form and work on the blocking positions was in progress. Marine units, like other UNC forces, had to be prepared at all times for any act of enemy aggression. Whether the Communists would continue to respect the cease-fire agreement or not remained an open question.

Stockpiling, meanwhile, had been accomplished at company, battalion, and regimental dumps. All materials were stacked by size to facilitate reissue during construction of new positions. As much as 90 percent of the materials salvaged were usable in the new

²² KSC units were deactivated shortly thereafter. Following a EUSAK order in August to begin discontinuing use of the Korean laborers, the number of KSC workers was reduced. By the end of October, the 103d KSC Regiment attached to the division had been completely disbanded.

²³ 1/5 Hist, in 5thMar Hist, p. 3, Folder #4.

²⁴ 4.2-inch Mort Co/5, in 5thMar Hist, p. 3, Folder #4.

fortification. Although a certain amount of inter-battalion exchange took place, battalion stocks—with the exception of sandbags—were usually adequate to provide sufficient fortification materials for the rebuilding. For 5th Marines units that had the least distance to relocate, timbers moved from the old MLR in the morning were sometimes emplaced in the new defensive positions by late afternoon. Helicopters, as well as trucks, were used extensively to move stockpiles from company and battalion areas to rear regimental supply dumps.

Division MLR supplies salvaged by the 5th Marines represented:

T/E material	12 tons
Signal equipment (wire)	2,000 miles
Engineer items	
barbed wire	2,850 rolls
concertina	340 rolls
pickets, 6-foot	11,000
pickets, 3-foot	8,000
sandbags	339,000
timbers (from 3x8 to 12x12)	150,000 linear feet
Total tonnage	2,000 short tons

The 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines estimated that wire rolls, sandbags, timbers, and other materiel "recovered by this battalion and assisting units was valued at approximately \$150,000."²⁵

By early September, the 1st Marine Division work priority once again had reverted from camp construction to salvage operations. It had become apparent that another maximum effort period would be necessary if all salvageable materials were to be removed from the DMZ no later than the 13 September deadline reaffirmed by I Corps on 2 September. During this last phase of salvage work, participating battalions again came under operational control of the 5th Marines. Elements of the 1st and 11th Marines, neither of which at that time had a sector of responsibility for salvage, as well as KMC troops, augmented the organic units. One battalion alone, 1/1, detailed 400 men in work parties. At 2130, on 13 September, the division completed its salvage mission in the Demilitarized Zone, thus meeting the specified time limit. Under terms of the armistice

²⁵ 2/5 Hist, in 5thMar Hist, dtd 12 Dec 53, p. 3, Folder #4.

agreement, after 13 September all personnel were prohibited from entering the Korean Demilitarized Zone. The only exceptions were members of the DMZ police companies of the Allied and Communist sides and other persons specifically authorized passage by the Military Armistice Commission (MAC).

*Control of the DMZ and the Military Police Company*²⁶

Since the late July signing of the armistice, one of the missions of the 5th Marines GOP regiment had been the marking, control of entry, and policing of the DMZ. At the time the No-Pass Fence was constructed, roadblocks, called "crossing stations" were located at each route leading into the DMZ. Initially, 21 crossing stations were opened across the regimental front. When it later became apparent that not all of these security points would be needed, some were closed and the roads barricaded. Each crossing station was manned by a minimum of two sentries who insured that no weapons were carried into the DMZ. Along the fence itself, signs printed in three languages prohibited unauthorized entry into the southern boundary of the DMZ. On roads and trails approaching the southern boundary fence, additional signs placed 200 yards from the fence warned of the proximity to this southern end of the military zone. Air panels and engineer tape also marked the DMZ.

After 31 July, entry into the DMZ was limited to those persons holding a valid pass, issued under the auspices of the Military Armistice Commission. Authority was also delegated to CG, U.S. I Corps to issue passes for the I Corps sector. With salvage operations requiring a large number of passes, authority was further delegated to the CO, 5th Marines, to issue permits for the regimental sector, good only for unarmed²⁷ working parties engaged in salvage operations. The regimental S-2 established a pass control center, and anyone desiring to enter the DMZ made application through that office. Each pass contained the bearer's name, rank, service number, organi-

²⁶ Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: 1stMarDiv G-3 Jnls, 30 Jul-31 Aug 53; Demilitarized Zone Police Co Rpt, dtd 18 Dec 53, in 5thMar Hist, Folder #4; MSgt Paul Sarokin, "DMZ Marines," *Leatherneck*, v. 37, no. 10 (Oct 54), hereafter Sarokin, "DMZ Marines."

²⁷ With the exception of the DMZ Police, all persons entering the DMZ for salvage were required to check their weapons at the zone entry.

zation, number of personnel and vehicles in the working party, and reason for entry.

Security procedures also required that a log book of all zone entries and exits be kept by crossing station guards. This information was ultimately telephoned or radioed to higher echelons. At battalion and regimental levels a master log or "status board" indicated the number of people, vehicles, passes, and pass identification numbers present in the DMZ at all times. As the salvage program reached its height in August and early September, just the "issuance and recording of passes and the checking of the working parties into the zone became a major operation."²⁸ Between 4 August-13 September, a total of 3,523 vehicle passes and an unknown number of personnel permits were issued. With the ending of salvage operations on 13 September, the Marine regiment no longer issued DMZ passes, although I Corps continued to authorize MAC personnel entry permits.

A stipulation set by the armistice agreement was that both the Communist and UNC sides police their respective sections of the DMZ with "civil police," not to exceed 1,000 in the zone at any one time across the entire front. With further allocation of police personnel to army and I Corps units, the number of 1st Marine Division police on duty within the DMZ at any one time was originally set at 50. Since no civilian police were available to either side, requirements were modified so that a specially designated military unit, in lieu of civil police, could be employed and the original quota enlarged if this became feasible.

Due to the delicate political aspect of the DMZ as well as the non-repatriated POWs in the custody of Indian forces, security measures were of utmost importance. The Marine division activated a new unit, the 1st Provisional Demilitarized Zone Police Company at 0800 on 4 September. The new unit, charged with maintaining security throughout the 1st Marine Division sector, became operational three days later. Commanding officer was Captain Samuel G. Goich, formerly of F/2/7. Each regiment from the division furnished 25 enlisted men and 1 officer to form the company, including standby personnel. On 21 September, the DMZ Police Company was attached to the 5th Marines. Police Company personnel were required to have had at least three months' Korean service, a General Classifica-

²⁸ 5thMar Hist, p. 2, Folder #3.

tion Test score of at least 95, a minimum height of 5 feet 10 inches, and were "selected for physical stature and mental capacity required in coping with the delicate situation existing within the Demilitarized Zone."²⁹ The average DMZ company member was said to know "map-reading on an officer level, first aid, radio, and understand the fine print of the cease-fire agreement like a striped-trouser diplomat."³⁰

The mission of the Marine provisional police company as set up by the truce agreement was to furnish military police escort for special personnel visiting the DMZ and to apprehend truce violators or enemy line crossers. Visitors who rated a military escort were members of MAC, Joint Observer Teams, Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission personnel,³¹ NNSC inspection teams or agency assistants, or other VIPs authorized to enter the UN half by the Military Armistice Commission.

Six Marine DMZ military policemen, each armed with a .45 caliber pistol and M-1 rifle, accompanied UN joint observer teams to the demarcation line, midpoint between enemy and friendly boundaries, but did not cross the DML. I Corps orders directed that military police were to be "responsible for the safety of the United Nations members of the team and, when meetings are held south of the demarcation line, they will be responsible for the safety of the CCF members of the team as well."³²

Major tasks performed by the 104-man company operating within the 2,000-yard wide, 28-mile-long zone were:

To maintain surveillance over civilians within the UN half of the DMZ;

To apprehend and deliver to the Division Provost Marshal any line crossers encountered who did not possess an authorized pass, regardless of the direction from which such persons entered the DMZ; and

To provide check points on known routes through the zone and observation posts, especially during the hours of reduced visibility, and telephone all suspicious incidents to Regimental S-2.

²⁹ 1stMarDiv ComdD, Sep 53, p. 2.

³⁰ Sarokin, "DMZ Marines," p. 23.

³¹ The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission supervised all phases of implementation of the armistice. It consisted of the Secretariat and 20 neutral nations inspection teams staffed by personnel from Sweden, Switzerland, Poland, and Czechoslovakia.

³² 1stMarDiv G-3 Jnl, dtd 1 Aug 53, msg CG I U.S. Corps to addressees, dtd 31 Jul 53.

DMZ Police Company personnel operated in motorized patrol teams and traveled the entire division sector in radio or cargo jeeps. One platoon was kept on a standby basis at camp to serve as a mobile reserve in the event of an emergency. The roving patrols submitted reports of all incidents, which were then compiled in a company report. A copy was submitted to the S-2, the Northern Regiment, and 1st Marine Division G-2.

UNC security measures at all times were strict and uncompromising in the Korean DMZ buffer zone. This included the salvage period, the BIG SWITCH prisoner exchange that took place within the division sector at Freedom Village from 5 August–6 September, and the lengthy nonrepatriate POW settlement that extended through January 1954. In places where the military demarcation line was not marked on the ground or clearly recognizable, the conservative ruling was to stay at least 500 yards south of its estimated location. This applied both to body recovery and salvage operations. The No-Fly line was scrupulously verified.

Alleged violations charged by the CCF/NKPA were checked out with the Marine ground observation posts set up in August to record all movements of fixed-wing (reconnaissance) and rotary aircraft in the area. Helicopters were allowed to fly in the DMZ but no closer than the 500 yard limit from the MDL. Helicopters operating forward of CPs of 5th Marines units having sector responsibility were required to obtain clearance from the ground unit concerned for each flight. Medical evacuation copters, generally, were exempted from this restriction and authorized a standing clearance.

Commitments for the DMZ Police Company increased substantially with arrival of the nonrepatriated POWs at their camp in the DMZ corridor west of the 2d Battalion, 5th Marines area. The Communist "explainers," as well as Polish and Czech members of the neutral Nations Commission, had to be escorted while in the UN half of the DMZ. This required that a 24-hour checkpoint and escort cadre be established in the zone. As the number of enemy sightings, a daily occurrence in the DMZ, continued to increase, the size of the police patrols increased correspondingly. A typical example was related by a member of the police company:

It was common practice of the Communists to have a group of their men, supposedly their DMZ Police, walk up to the Military Demarcation Line and either stand close to it or step across. When one of our patrols

approached in superior numbers to attempt to apprehend them, the Communists would immediately reinforce with more men. This made it necessary to have our patrols at sufficient strength that they could protect themselves from being kidnapped.³³

As these requirements for security increased, the original complement of approximately 5 officers and 99 men became inadequate to patrol the DMZ. By late October the T/O strength of the 1st Provisional Demilitarized Zone Police Company had been increased to 6 officers and 314 men. Authorization for the number of police personnel on duty in the DMZ had similarly been augmented from 50 to 175.

During the September salvage operations, five Marines in the DMZ were taken into custody by the Chinese Communists. Charged with being in unauthorized territory and violating terms of the armistice agreement, they were later returned to United Nations jurisdiction.

*Organization of New Defense Positions*³⁴

Upon withdrawal from the demilitarized zone and organization of the MBP, the Eighth Army established its plan for defense on a wide front. This was based on the organization of strongpoints disposed in depth, with planned counterattacks by mobile reserves.

As it had during active hostilities, the 1st Marine Division in the post-armistice period continued as one of the four UNC divisions manning the general outpost and MBP in the U.S. I Corps sector. Immediately east of the division was its long-time neighbor, the 1st Commonwealth Division. Still further east in I Corps were the 1st ROK and U.S. 7th Infantry Divisions.

Since 1 August, the Marine division had continued to outpost the most favorable terrain in its sector below the southern boundary of

³³ Demilitarized Zone Police Co/5 rpt, p. 4, in 5thMar Hist, Folder #4, *op. cit.*


³⁴ Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: 1stMarDiv ComdDs Jul-Sep 53; 1stMarDiv Type "C" Rpt Defense of "C" Sector, 27 Jul-31 Oct 53, Folder #3 (this and following 1stMarDiv end-of-war records retired in 61 A2265, Box 74, FRC, Suitland, Md.); 1stMar Hist of Defense of "D" Sector, 27 Jul-31 Oct 53, Folder #3 (contains brief histories of individual units); 5thMar Hist of Defense of "D" Sector, 27 Jul-31 Oct 53, in Folders #3 and #4; 7thMar Hist of Defense of "D" Sector, 27 Jul 53-10 Feb 54, in Folder #5; 1stMarDiv Type "C" Rpt Defense of "C" Div Sect, 27 July-31 Dec 53, Folder #6 (containing, among others, brief rpts 11thMar, 1st TkBn, 1st EngrBn, 1stMTBn, 7th MTBn, 1st KMC Rgt, 2d KMC Rgt).

the DMZ. The division manned the No-Pass Line and prepared its defenses to resume full scale military operations, if necessary. The Munsan-ni Provisional Command, composed of the Marine-Navy-Army personnel responsible for implementing the final prisoner exchange, was also headquartered in the 1st Marine Division sector.

The strongpoint organization of the division's main battle position was accomplished by the deployment of the 5th Marines at the general outpost line of resistance (or OPLR, a term and concept not in use since April 1952). The outpost defense concept embodied a number of forward positions, lightly held in actual numbers of men but strongly defended in numbers of automatic weapons and firepower. (This capability was possible due to the excess number of automatic weapons on hand, above normal T/E allowances, which previously had been required by MLR defenses.) In the organization of the positions, emphasis was placed on construction of bunkered observation posts, the emplacement of automatic weapons with flanking fires, and clearing of fields of fire for these weapons.

Basically, the general concept of OPLR defense was to establish mutually supporting defensive positions across the front, as well as to develop additional defense in depth positions whose strength increased from front to rear. The positions thus formed successive defense lines, from the southern DMZ boundary—the new Marine division front—south to the KANSAS Line, the Main Battle Position. (These defense lines were the old secondary defensive lines of WYOMING, KANSAS, and KANSAS SWITCH.) The KMC, 1st Marines, 7th Marines, and other units located in the KANSAS vicinity engaged in bunker construction and trench improvement. Battalion fire plans coordinated the organic, attached, and supporting weapons. Construction of the new positions and development of the KANSAS Line would be a continuing process throughout the rest of the year.

The 1st Marines received the assignment of developing the blocking positions, most of these battalion-sized strongpoints. As in the past, division support units continued to be located in the old rear supply areas south of the Imjin. In early August the division had stationed the 7th Marines in the right sector; the 1st KMC in the center; and the 1st Marines, to the south of the KMC sector. The 11th Marines, to the rear of the 7th Marines, had displaced its artillery, relaid, and was prepared to fire in support of the general outpost and MBP. (Map 35.) Additional artillery battalions included I Corps and



army units. Essentially these were the positions held until early October when, during a period of political unrest resulting from the prisoner exchange, the 1st Marines relieved the 1st KMC/RCT in the center sector (which held the southern approaches to Freedom Bridge and the nonrepatriate war compound). The Korean unit then relocated to blocking positions and assumed the mission of reserve regiment.

Marine support units—motor transport, tank, service, medical, aerial liaison (VMO/HMR)—were in the same general rear area, as was the headquarters of the U.S. 25th Infantry Division. The Marine Division CP continued to be located at Yongji-ri, although construction of a new site further south at Chormyon was due to be completed by engineer personnel on 1 October. The division railhead and truckhead remained, respectively, at Munsan-ni and Ascom City. To the left of the KMC sector was the 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion. Still further west, separated from other units by the Han River, was the Kimpo Provisional Regiment, in its former wartime sector.

As the division OPLR regiment, the 5th Marines held a line 36,000 yards in length—about 21 miles—roughly corresponding to the front manned by three regiments during the war. The OPLR sector included the entire area in the divisional zone of responsibility north of the Imjin. Boundaries of the 5th Marines territory were the southern DMZ truce line on the west and north, the Samichon River to the east, and that major water barrier, the curving Imjin River, to the rear.

After establishment of the DMZ, the division occupied unfavorable low ground poorly suited to the defense and inferior to that held by the enemy—continuing the same situation that had existed during the period of stabilized combat operations in West Korea. Almost without exception the southern boundary of the DMZ prohibited the Marines from moving onto the commanding terrain, as the No-Pass Line was behind or along the reverse slopes of the high ground. On the other hand, in most cases the CCF had the advantage of having forward slope positions as well as the crests plus most of the commanding terrain in the area.

Communist territory in the northern DMZ sector included the former strongholds of Yoke, Bunker Hill, Carson, Reno, Vegas, Berlin, East Berlin and Warsaw. Within the Marine division postwar area

were the Panmunjom Corridor and outposts Marilyn, Kate, the Boulder City hills, and the Hook. Much of the terrain between the major hill positions along the 5th Marines regimental front and the Imjin River consisted of low-rolling hills rising abruptly out of the rice paddies.

Construction of new positions and the defense system of the 5th Marines was based on several assumptions about enemy capabilities, made by G-2 and the new regimental CO, Colonel Rathvon McC. Tompkins, who had assumed command on 2 August. These were: that in the event of resumption of hostilities by the CCF the enemy would use his jet fighters and bombers in support of operations; that he would continue to have numerical superiority in artillery; and that the northern outpost regiment would have no reinforcement or surface resupply from units south of the Imjin.

The defense plan for the forward part of the 5th Marines sector in event of a resumption of hostilities called for furnishing patrols equipped with radios and FO teams to occupy Hills 155, 229, and 181. (Hill 155 was directly south of the DMZ in the 2/5 left battalion sector; Hills 229 and 181 were, respectively, just inside and just outside the southern boundary of the truce line in the center 1/5 sector.) From these three elevations the patrols would then have the mission of bringing down artillery fire on enemy concentrations and relaying communications about the situation to the friendly main attack force. Other critical hill masses in the OPLR regimental sector were Hill 126 (in the 3/5 eastern battalion sector, just inside the Marine side of the DMZ) and Hill 163, in the Hook area. The latter hill was not as suitable for defense since it was located south of the military demarcation line and was thus less accessible.

These hill masses so completely dominated the major enemy approaches through the division sector to the Imjin, the lower river crossing sites and bridges, that their occupation by Marine personnel was considered essential in the event of any attack. Hill 229, adjacent to the Chan-dang corridor and part of the 229-181 axis, was considered the most critical terrain feature in the entire northern section.

Key areas to the rear of the 5th Marines' sector were the two operating bridges (Freedom in 2/5 territory and Libby on the 3/5 right) and the two interior crossing sites (Honker and Spoonbill). All provided access to the Imjin and division support units deployed on the south side of the river. In the event of threatened hostile

attack, the Northern Regiment was under orders to destroy the bridges to prevent their use by the enemy on any attempted advance to the rear.

Strong perimeter defenses, called "Bridgehead Positions" were to be built by 5th Marines' battalions. Two were to protect the two bridges and a third, to include both ferry sites. Between the forward defended localities and the rear bridgehead positions, alternate and secondary sites were organized to create mutually supporting defenses in depth. The bridgeheads were a combination of linear and strong-point defense, capable of withstanding severe pressure.

Organization of the defensive positions in the 5th Marine sector was complicated both by peculiarities of the terrain and political restrictions due to proximity of the DMZ. In addition to the regiment's excess frontage, the demilitarized zone immediately to the front precluded use of either aerial or motorized reconnaissance for early warning. Security measures for the OPLR were less than ideal. Neither proper patrols nor a covering force in front of the OPLR was possible; the best that could be done was to maintain patrols along the friendly side of the No-Pass Line.

As the regimental left battalion pointed out: "Location of the DMZ and the No-Pass Line made the trace of the OPLR follow an artificial and arbitrary line rather than that of the best terrain."³⁵ The most critical terrain feature in the sector, Hill 155, was located just outside the southern boundary of the DMZ. Although its possession was essential to successful defense of the OPLR and the bridgehead defense positions being developed to the interior and rear of the battalion sector, Hill 155 could not be occupied because of the armistice agreement. The solution to the problem was simply to occupy the best ground adjacent to the No-Pass Line.

Placement of automatic weapons was a factor of great importance in organizing the defensive positions. In order to accomplish the mission of an OPLR, weapons had to be situated to bring the enemy under fire at maximum ranges. Accordingly, machine guns and other weapons were placed on high ground well to the front. Some Marines commented that:

Many individuals having the MLR concept in mind insisted that weapons should be located forward on low ground to provide grazing fire. A period

³⁵ 2/5 Hist, in 5thMar Hist, dtd 12 Dec 53, p. 4, Folder #4.

of education was required. For the same reason, it was necessary to place 81mm mortar and 4.2-inch mortar positions further forward than they would normally be in support of the MLR.³⁶

The problem of establishing depth to the defensive positions was never solved to the satisfaction of everyone. This was due primarily to the extended front which necessitated using more units for support elements than would normally be done. This situation was partly alleviated by establishing some unit defensive sectors further to the rear in the company areas.

Another difficulty was the inadequate allocation of ammunition: one-half JAMESTOWN load on position, and another half-load available at the regimental dump. The JAMESTOWN load unit had been developed for use in a stabilized defense situation where automatic weapons were aimed as the enemy came in close proximity to the MLR. On the other hand, OPLR machine guns and weapons were required to open up at maximum ranges and might well be fired for extended periods of time. It was calculated that A4 machine guns firing at medium rate (75 rpm) would expend the one-half JAMESTOWN load in 22 minutes, while an A1 machine gun at medium rate (125 rpm) would exhaust the same load in 13 minutes. A partial improvement was obtained by moving the ammunition loads from regimental to battalion dumps although the basic problem of limited allocation—shared also by rear infantry regiments—continued to exist.

An unique situation that had confronted the 2d Battalion and at times the adjoining 1st Battalion stemmed from the large numbers of Army engineer personnel building the nonrepatriate POW camp in the DMZ immediately west of the 2/5 sector. During August and the first part of September, the area in front of 2/5 had been used as a base camp for 5,000-7,000 construction personnel. Although their area was crowded with these additional units, the Marine battalions could not exercise any control over them. The Marines were still responsible for security of the sector, however. Presence of as many as 22,000 nonrepatriate CCF and NKPA prisoners as well as the Indian custodial forces further complicated the matter. It was noted that:

³⁶ *Ibid.*

At the same time the Army engineers were building the camp, the prisoners were situated in the middle of the 2/5 area and the MSR to Panmunjom led completely across the battalion position into the 1/5 sector [and thence] into the DMZ. Upon completion of the camp, the engineers withdrew from the area but as they withdrew the 5,500 troops of the Custodial Forces India were brought in to guard the nonrepatriate prisoners. With the arrival of the prisoners, the number of personnel in the regiment's sector of responsibility rose to 28,000-30,000. Thus, the problem of having a GOP mission and at the same time having never less than 5,000 and as many as 30,000 friendly, neutral, and/or prisoner personnel in front of our most forward defended localities was always present.³⁷

Camp construction and development of the new positions south of the river continued at a furious pace from August through early October. Since the new camp sites were in civilian populated areas, "it was necessary to secure real estate clearance before they could be occupied or improved."³⁸ After clearance was obtained on 29 July, division engineers immediately began work on five separate camps. These camp building activities and reconnaissance of assigned blocking positions continued until 10 August. At this time, construction began on the major blocking positions, so organized and developed as to be self-sustaining for several days. Whether squad, platoon, or company, all positions were organized using a perimeter type defense and were mutually supporting laterally and in depth. Connecting trenches, bunkers, ammunition holes, and tank slots were also built.

By early October, construction of the blocking positions was completed by the 1st Marines despite the fierce summer heat, the numerous rock formations in the area that were difficult to dig out with limited tools and demolitions, and the shortage of personnel due to units participating in the new series of division MARLEX exercises, resumed in October. Within three months, the Marine division had thus largely completed building of a solid defense in its new main battle position. The importance of maintaining combat readiness for any renewed hostility on the part of the enemy demanded continuing vigilance at all times.

Defense specifications throughout the 5th Marines northern general outpost sector called for some 1,560 individual fighting positions, 400 automatic weapons sites, 8 bunkered infantry OPs, 30 bunkered

³⁷ 5thMar Hist, pp. 6-7, Folder #3.

³⁸ 1st EngrBn Rpt, Operations during 27 Jul-31 Oct 53, dtd 19 Apr 53, p. 4, Folder #6.

CPs, 15,400 yards of trenchlines, and 70,000 yards of protective and tactical wire. In construction of the MBP, all bunkers were so blended and camouflaged with the natural terrain that they were almost impossible to be seen.

To the division rear, the location of recoilless rifle positions, FDC bunkers, and tank slots in the blocking positions and bridgeheads was the major priority. In the antimechanized defense plan, tanks covered likely avenues of approach into the general outpost area and also overlooked critical river crossing sites. Wherever possible old firing positions which had been previously prepared to support the secondary lines WYOMING and KANSAS were utilized. By the end of the year, 204 tank firing positions had been emplaced throughout the Marine division sector.

Three rehearsals for the occupation of the main battle position were held by the 1st Marine Division in September. All division units, both combat and service, participated in these exercises. Tactical units were required to occupy the MBP and be fully prepared for combat on four hours' notice; service units were to provide additional local security required for the elimination of enemy infiltrators or guerrilla agents. Divisional and I Corps test exercises indicated that three hours were necessary to man the MBP during daylight and approximately three and one half hours at night.

*Postwar Employment of Marine Units in FECOM*³⁹

The 1st Marine Aircraft Wing Post-Armistice Plan, as part of Fifth Air Force operations, was effective at 2200, on 27 July. Its purpose, basically, was to insure that wing elements carried out provisions of the armistice and yet continued to maintain a high level of combat readiness in the uneasy truce period.

Two major operational restrictions had been imposed on the UNC air force by the armistice. The first was establishment of the "No-

³⁹ Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 6, Chap. 10; *AnlRpt CMC to SecNav for FY 1954*, dtd 11 Aug 54; *AnlRpt CMC to SecNav for FY 1955*, dtd 15 Aug 55; 1st MAW ComdDs, Aug-Sep 53; MAGs-12, -33 ComdDs, Aug-Sep 53; MSgt Roy E. Heinecke, "Four Star Visit," *Leatherneck*, v. 37, no. 1 (Jan 54).

Fly Line" south of the Allied southern boundary of the DMZ. Any flight beyond that point had to be authorized by JOC and a barrier patrol was maintained by FAF to apprehend any violators of the truce provisions. The 1st MAW contribution to this aerial security team was night patrols performed by F3D-2s from VMF(N)-513 and radar-configured AD aircraft from VMC-1 (later, by the new VMA-251 squadron).

The second post-truce restriction, which affected wing logistic movements, limited the entry and departure of all Korean air traffic to five airfields. These aerial ports were K-2, K-8, K-9, K-14, and K-18. (K-16 was later added.) Neither K-3, the east coast home field of MAG-33 nor K-6, located just inland from the west coast and the site of MAG-12 operations, was included. All Marine traffic landed either at K-9 or K-2 for inventory, a procedure which subsequently developed into a bottleneck, and caused supply delays due to the substantial reduction in payload made to accommodate the necessary extra fuel due to greater overland distances between airfields. When the CG, 1st MAW requested that K-3 be made a port of entry to avoid the difficulties involved in use of the two FAF fields, ComNavFE disapproved the request with the following rationale:

ComNavFE feels that to ask for designation of K-3 as an additional port of entry would be politically inadvisable. It would provide the Communists with a basis for a propaganda claim that the United Nations were attempting to further delay an armistice agreement. Should the Communists propose an additional port of entry for their side, COMNAVFE states the UN Military Armistice Commission will offer designation of K-3 as a *quid pro quo*.⁴⁰

Removal from Korea to Japan of operational combat aircraft for routine maintenance runs and their return thus had to be made through the same port of exit and reentry. Inspections were conducted by the USAF combat aircraft control officer at the port.

The post-truce 1st MAW mission, in part, comprised the following:

... to maintain assigned forces in a state of combat readiness, provide for security of assigned forces, areas, and installations; observe the conditions of the Armistice Agreement; support other elements of the United

⁴⁰ *PacFlt EvalRpt*, No. 6, p. 10-74.

Nations Command as required; be prepared to counter any attempt on the part of the enemy to resume active hostilities; continue current missions other than combat; insure that 1st MAW personnel and combat material are not increased beyond the level present at the instant of the effective time of the Armistice Agreement; submit reports on 1st MAW personnel and controlled items of Wing equipment entering or leaving Korea; be prepared to disperse air units within or from Korea as necessary to provide maximum security during an Armistice. . . .⁴¹

The strict interpretation of replacing combat aircraft, armored vehicles, weapons, and ammunition that were destroyed, worn out, or used up during the period of armistice was, of course, due to the sensitive political considerations. It was felt that replacement of combat equipment by UNC forces:

... would result in the Communists adopting the same liberal interpretation which is undesirable since it will lessen the control of combat material in North Korea and could permit them to replace phenomenal unauthorized quantities of material damaged, destroyed, worn out or used up prior to the effective date of the Armistice Agreement.⁴²

In August, postwar procedures were mapped out for 1st MAW personnel, as part of the overall quota limitations prescribed by FECOM (Far East Command) through FEAFF and FAF echelons. A 1st MAW headquarters section, designated as 1st MAW, rear echelon, was established at Itami AFB, Japan, two hours' flight from Korea. All incoming or outgoing aviation personnel on permanent change of station orders were to report to the rear echelon, 1st MAW. Announcement of Marine Corps plans to initiate future postwar rotation on a stretch-out basis (for both air and ground personnel) was also made in August. Preliminary plans called for changing the current 11-month combat tour in Korea to 14 months by March 1954, and possibly 16-month tours by July 1954, if extension of Korean service proved necessary. As with division personnel, monthly cumulative arrivals were not to exceed the number of departing aviation Marines. The quota set by FEAFF for 1st MAW rotation for the month of August was 600, compared to the Marine division quota of 3,000 for ground personnel.

With the 1st Marine Division engaged for an unknown length of time in its postwar mission as an occupation force and 1st MAW

⁴¹ 1st MAW ComdD, Aug 53, Folder #1, p. 1.

⁴² 1st MAW ComdD, Aug 53, Folder #2, msg ComNavFE to all units, dtd 16 Aug 53.

units continuing to operate under FAF in Korea, new Marine ground and air units were assigned to the Far East theater shortly after the conclusion of Korean hostilities. On 23 July, the 3d Marine Division, together with supporting air units, was readied for deployment from Camp Pendleton to Japan the following month. On 13 August the division CP was opened afloat and units proceeded to Japan between 16–30 August. The mission of this division and the two major air units, MAGs-11 and -16, was to maintain a high state of readiness in the Far East Command and to assist in the air defense of Japan. As explained by the Commandant, their redeployment was accomplished "in order to provide the amphibious capability which is an important element of national strategy in that predominantly maritime theater."⁴³

The new Marine units thus joined in the Pacific, the 1st Provisional Marine Air-Ground Task Force⁴⁴ that had been activated in Kaneohe, Hawaii in January of 1953. Commanded by Brigadier General James P. Risely, it was to include a headquarters company, reinforced regiment, and reinforced aircraft group. The special task force was designated as a hard-hitting, air-ground team that could respond immediately as a force-in-readiness to any emergency in the Pacific area.

Commanded by Major General Robert H. Pepper, the 21,100-man 3d Marine Division was called the "Three-Dimensional Division," in reference to its training in airborne, amphibious, and atomic warfare. Within six months, its components were to stretch from Kobe to Tokyo, with division headquarters and the 9th Marines at Gifu, the 4th Marines at Nara, and other units at Otsu.

New Marine air units, which included Marine Transport Squadron 253 and Marine Observation Squadron 2, as well as MAGs-11 and -16, all came under 1st MAW operational control. Commanded by Colonel John D. Harshberger, the all-jet MAG-11, formerly based at Edenton, N.C., arrived at NAS Atsugi on 10 September. It comprised three F9F squadrons, VMFs-222, -224, and -314. Also at Atsugi, the Marine Corps aerial gateway to Japan, was the new transport squadron, VMR-253, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel

⁴³ AnRpt CMC to SecNav for FY 1954, dtd 11 Aug. 54, p^o II-2.

⁴⁴ The Task Force was subsequently redesignated as the 1st Marine Brigade, FMF, in May 1956.

Carl J. Fleps, which reported in to CG, 1st MAW, on 16 August. Following numerous FMFPac requests for additional air transport capability, the Commandant had authorized transfer of the squadron from El Toro to assist the veteran wartime carrier VMR-152 in the enormous postwar airlift program.

Flying new R4Q Fairchild Packets, which could carry 42 troops, the squadron from August to May 1954 logged more than 5,000,000 passenger miles in transporting Marine replacements for the 1st and 3d Marine Divisions. Additional air capability was provided by Marine Helicopter Transport Group 16 (at Hanshin AFB) under Colonel Harold J. Mitchener, with its two HRS-2 (HMR-162, HMR-163) and service squadrons (MAMs-16, MABS-16) and VMO-2, commanded by Major William G. MacLean (based at Itami). Both units reported to 1st MAW and FECOM on 13 August.

Major command changes within the 1st MAW that month were: Brigadier General Verne J. McCaul, vice Brigadier General Alexander W. Kreiser, Jr. as ACG, 1st MAW, effective 16 August; and Colonel William F. Hausman, vice Colonel Carney, CO, MAG-12, on 8 August. (The new MAG-33 CO, Colonel Smith, had succeeded Colonel Stacy in late July.)

In the immediate post-armistice period, extensive training programs were instituted by MAGs-12 and -33 to maintain high operational efficiency. Marine aircraft remained on JOC alert as required by the Fifth Air Force and flew training missions scheduled by 1st MAW and FAF. These consisted of practice strikes against heavily-defended targets, practice CAS for Eighth Army units, GCI (ground control intercept) flights under MGCIS-3 control, and bombing practice using the Nakdong Bombing Range. Other training sorties were scheduled in reconnaissance navigation, weather penetration, determining fuel bingos,⁴⁵ target location and identification, air defense patrolling, and coordination of tactical procedures in the target area. The training schedules provided a well-balanced indoctrination program for new squadron flight leaders, pilots, radar operators, and other crew members arriving in Korea on the postwar personnel drafts.

A new work day schedule of 0700-1500 implemented in Aug-

⁴⁵ A fuel bingo is the amount of fuel needed by a pilot to reach home base plus enough additional fuel to divert to an alternate airfield.

ust made more time available for athletics, swimming, studying, and R&R (Rest & Recreation). That same month the MAG-12 softball team won the Fifth Air Force "All Korea" softball championship. Following this achievement, the team left for Japan to compete in the FAF "Far East" softball tournament which included teams from all the major Pacific bases. Subsequently, the K-6 players "disguised in Air Force uniforms, went onward and upward to become FEAF champions in September."⁴⁶ MAG-33 pilots, meanwhile, participated in Operation SPYGLASS, a FAF training exercise in August and Operation BACK DOOR, the following month. Both emphasized interception flying and work with GCI squadrons. As "aggressors," the Pohang-based airmen made simulated attacks on South Korean targets "defended" by Air Force and other land-based Marine units. In October, MAG-33 pilots flew CAS missions for the 1st Marine Division training problem, MARLEX IV, a battalion landing exercise staged by 1/7 on Tokchok-to Island. Beginning that month a new procedure was inaugurated by MAG-33 and the recently-arrived MAG-11. Every week, four MAG-11 pilots came to Korea for a week of orientation flying with a MAG-33 squadron to gain a better picture of typical flying conditions in the Korean theater.

Early in 1955 the 1st Marine Division, which had been in the Korean front lines almost continuously since September 1950, returned to Camp Pendleton. Redeployment by echelons began in February. By June, all units had returned to CONUS. The transfer from Korean occupation duty was effected in order that the division's "valuable capability as a highly trained amphibious force in readiness may be fully realized."⁴⁷ Now under Major General Merrill B. Twining,⁴⁸ the division had been a part of Eighth Army occupying postwar defense positions in Korea until its relief on 17-18 March 1955 by the U.S. 24th Infantry Division.

In addition to its official mission in the Eighth Army line, the 1st Marine Division had conducted an active small-unit amphibious training program during its postwar Korea duty. All but two of its infantry battalions had carried out assault landings on Tokchok-to,

⁴⁶ Field, *NavOps, Korea*, pp. 456-457.

⁴⁷ AnlRpt of CMC to SecNav FY 1955, dtd 15 Aug 55, p. 3, quoting statement made by SecDef in Dec 54 on forthcoming departure of 1stMarDiv from FECOM.

⁴⁸ Postwar commanders of 1stMarDiv to date had been Major General Robert H. Pepper, who succeeded General Pate, and served from 12 May 54-22 Jul 54; Major General Robert E. Hogaboom, 23 Jul 54-17 Jan 55; and General Twining, beginning 18 Jan 55.

off the Korean west coast south of Inchon, prior to its departure for the United States. The 3d Marine Division had also conducted an active training program, with numerous small-unit exercises and regimental landings staged at Iwo Jima and Okinawa as part of its continuous readiness conditioning.

For Marine air personnel, their official departure from Korea following the 1st MAW wartime assignment there, came the next year. Beginning in June 1956, initial units of the Marine aircraft wing were withdrawn from Korea and relocated at NAS Iwakuni, Japan. Plans called for the wing, then under Brigadier General Samuel S. Jack⁴⁹ and occupying bases in both Korea and Japan, to be permanently headquartered at Iwakuni and revert to CinCPacFlt control. The wing remained on station in the Far East as a component of postwar United States defense strength in that area.

The prewar Fifth Air Force and Eighth U.S. Army commands, under which Marine Corps air and ground units had functioned during the Korean War, were permanently deployed in the Far East as operative military echelons. EUSAK-FAF transferred from its wartime JOC location at Seoul to Osan-ni in January 1954 and in September of that year relocated to Nagoya, Japan. Eighth Army headquarters remained at Seoul.

⁴⁹CGs, 1st MAW, in the immediate post-armistice period were: Major General Megee, until 4 Dec 53; Major General Albert D. Cooley, 5 Dec 53–25 Mar 54; Brigadier General McCaul, 26 May 54–24 Aug 54; Brigadier General Marion L. Dawson, 25 Aug 54–24 Sep 55; and Brigadier General Jack, 25 Sep 55–30 Jun 56.

CHAPTER XII

Korean Reflection

*Marine Corps Role and Contributions to the Korean War:
Ground, Air, Helicopter—FMF and Readiness Posture—
Problems Peculiar to the Korean War—Korean Lessons*

Marine Corps Role and Contribution to the Korean War: Ground¹

GROUND OPERATIONS of the 1st Marine Division during the Korean War can be divided into six periods. These are the Pusan Perimeter defense (August–September 1950), Inchon-Seoul assault (September–October 1950), the Chosin Reservoir campaign (October–December 1950), East-Central Korea (January 1951–March 1952), West Korea (March 1952–July 1953), and the post-armistice period (July 1953–February 1955).

Marine Corps traditional concepts of readiness and fast, effective deployment were never better illustrated than in the hectic weeks following 25 June 1950. The NKPA invasion of South Korea came at a time when U.S. military forces were in the final stages of a cutback

¹ Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: U.S. Dept. of Defense, Semiannual Reports of the Secretary of Defense, 1951–1954, hereafter *Rpt of SecDef*; *PacFlt EvalRpts*, No. 6, Chaps. 9, 10, No. 5, Chaps. 8, 9, No. 4, Chaps. 9, 10; Marine Corps Board Study, An Evaluation of the Influence of Marine Corps Forces on the Course of the Korean War (4 Aug 50–15 Dec 50), vs. I and II, hereafter *USMC Board Rpt*, held in James C. Breckinridge Library, MCDEC, Quantico, Va; A Summary of the General Officers' Conference, HQMC, 19–21 Aug 53, hereafter *Generals' Summary*, at Breckinridge Library; 1stMarDiv ComdD, May 53, App. IX, Summary of USMC Action in Korean War; *USMC Ops Korea*, vs. 1, II, III, IV, *passim*; Cagle and Manson, *Sea War, Korea*; Robert D. Heinl, Jr., *Soldiers of the Sea: The United States Marine Corps, 1775–1962* (Annapolis, Md.: United States Naval Institute, 1962), hereafter Heinl, *Soldiers of the Sea*; Release "1st Marine Division 'The Old Breed'" from 1st MarDiv folder, HRB RefFile; Release "Outline of the First Two Years of the 1st Marine Division in Korea," HistBr, G-3 Div, HRS Folder; *CheVron*, MCRD, San Diego, Calif., v. 27, no. 31 (2 Aug 68), p. 4–5, "From Camp Pendleton to Inchon—18 Years Later, LtGen E. A. Craig, 1st Provisional Brigade CG, Recalls Experiences in Korea," Cpl C. N. Damopoulos, hereafter *CheVron*.

to peacetime size. Ships and planes were being "mothballed"; personnel of all the Armed Services were being reduced in number to the lowest possible effective manpower levels.

From the peak of its six-division, five-wing wartime strength of 475,600 in 1944-1945, the Marine Corps at the outbreak of the Korean emergency had only two skeletal divisions and two air wings. There were but 74,279 Marines on active duty, 97 percent of the Marine Corps authorized strength. Although a ceiling of 100,000 had been established for the Corps by law, it was a period of tight purse strings for all defense components. Fiscal austerity in the post-World War II period had whittled Corps numbers from 85,000 in FY 1947 to what was projected at 67,000 by the end of FY 1950.

This critically reduced strength found the normal Marine triangular infantry organization cut back to two companies per battalion, two battalions per regiment, and two regiments per division. The 1st Marine Division, at Camp Pendleton, and 2d Marine Division, at Camp Lejeune, were structured along the regular peacetime T/O of 10,232 USMC/USN vice the wartime minimum T/O of 22,355. No Marine units of any size were located in the Far East.

Despite its lean numbers in late June 1950, the Marine Corps once again would be in the forefront of American military response to the Communist aggression 6,000 miles across the Pacific. As hard-pressed South Korean forces and understrength U.S. occupation troops from Japan attempted to halt the Communist invaders, General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, on 2 July, requested the JCS to send immediately a Marine RCT with supporting air to the Far East. On 7 July, the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade was formed at Camp Pendleton from units of the 1st Division. Major components of the brigade—a balanced force of ground, service, and aviation elements—were the 5th Marines and MAG-33. Five days later, the 6,534-man brigade had mounted out from San Diego to answer the CinCFE plea for Marines to help turn the Communist tide engulfing Korea.

The brigade buttressed the faltering UNC defense in the Pusan Perimeter. Employed as a mobile reserve it helped prevent three enemy breakthroughs—at Chinju and the two Naktong River battles. On 7 August, a month after its activation, the brigade launched an attack toward Chinju. The Marine brigade was the first unit sent from CONUS to see combat in what was then considered a short-term police action. Later, in leading the way to destruction of an enemy

bridgehead at the Naktong, the Marine brigade gave the defending Eighth Army its first victory against the NKPA in the Korean conflict.

Even before the brigade had been dispatched to the Far East, as the Korean situation continued to deteriorate, MacArthur had requested the JCS to expand the brigade to a full war-strength division. Between 10–21 July MacArthur, now CinCUNC, had made three separate requests for a Marine division. This persistence was reinforced by his growing determination to conduct a tactical amphibious operation to the rear of the over-extended NKPA lines and thereby seize the initiative from the enemy.

In the States, meanwhile, authorization was received to bring the badly understrength 1st and 2d Marine Divisions up to full 22,000-man war levels. By stripping posts and stations, reassignment and rerouting of units, and callup of additional reserve personnel, major elements of the 1st Marine Division were on their way to Korea by mid-August. Timing was critical in order to meet the projected D-Day target date of 15 September.

Pulled out of the Pusan line on 12 September, the brigade was absorbed by the newly arrived 1st Marine Division in preparation for the coming Inchon invasion. As the brigade commander, Lieutenant General Edward A. Craig, USMC, later reminisced:

Although the 1st Provisional Brigade and the 1st MarDiv had never actually trained or worked together, they still combined and executed a successful landing. To me, this simply emphasized the fine training and techniques laid down for amphibious landings by the Marines.²

Organized as a unit less than four months, the brigade left behind it a reputation for mobility, effectiveness, and rapid deployment in the face of national emergency. Although Marine air and ground forces had operated together since 1919 in Haiti, formation of the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade "marked the first time that the air and ground elements, task organized under a single commander, had engaged in combat."³

In the brilliant Inchon landing of 15 September 1950, Major General Oliver P. Smith's 1st Division Marines led the X Corps attack

² *CheVron*, pp. 4–5.

³ *Ibid.* Even though Marine air and ground forces had on occasion operated jointly ever since the 1920s, air support in the early days was considered a subsidiary rather than integral part of the team. The doctrine of Marine close air support was formulated in WW II but not fully employed before the end of hostilities.

in the first major counterstroke by United Nations forces on Communist-held territory. This maneuver was closely timed against enormous odds of personnel, logistics, and hydrography (tidal fluctuations of 31 feet) which made 15 September the only suitable assault date until mid-October. When outlined in earlier planning sessions by General MacArthur, the mammoth difficulties of the operation had been so unsettling that the designated Attack Force Commander for the landing, Rear Admiral James H. Doyle, expressed the view that "the best I can say is that Inchon is not impossible."⁴

Despite all the difficulties, the landing at Inchon and recapture of Seoul, the South Korean Capital, and its adjacent Kimpo airfield by the Marines was a stunning tactical blow by the UNC that broke the backbone of the North Korean People's Army 1950 offensive. The 1st Marine Division, in its successfully executed amphibious landing, had offered UNC forces an opportunity to defeat the enemy decisively before a Siberian-like Korean winter set in. Accomplished under the most adverse weather and geographic conditions, the assault proved anew the decisive power of amphibious forces employed at a critical time and place. This capability and readiness of the Marine Corps had totally reversed the military situation, and a battered enemy was on the run. The subsequent routing of the NKPA divisions in the Inchon-Seoul campaign by X Corps and the Eighth U.S. Army forces would have led to an early UN victory had not the Chinese Communists intervened to support their Korean counterparts. The operation had validated Far East Commander General MacArthur's early premise that:

. . . air and naval action alone could not be decisive, and that nothing short of the intervention of U.S. ground forces could give any assurance of stopping the Communists and of later regaining the lost ground.⁵

The Inchon operation, moreover, had been planned in record time—approximately 20 days. This was one of the shortest periods ever allotted to a major amphibious assault, involving the planning, assembly of shipping, and mounting out of a combined force of 29,000 Marines and support personnel.

⁴ Quoted in *USMC Ops Korea*, v. II, p. 46. Admiral Doyle was Commander of Amphibious Forces for the Pacific Fleet.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 3.

With the Inchon-Seoul operation ended, the 1st Marine Division (including the 7th Marines which had reached Inchon in time for the liberation of Seoul) reembarked on 12 October for deployment to the east coast of Korea. A new military operation was envisioned north of the 38th Parallel against Pyongyang, the North Korean Capital. As part of the drive, X Corps was to make an amphibious envelopment on the east coast, in the area of the enemy-held port of Wonsan. From here X Corps would advance westward toward Pyongyang, to link up with Eighth Army troops and trap NKPA forces withdrawing from the south.

While the Marines were en route to the objective, word was received that ROK troops had overrun Wonsan and were pushing north. The revised X Corps plan of operation called for a three-pronged attack towards the Yalu. The Marine division would advance on the left, the U.S. Army 7th Division in the center, and 1st ROK Division on the right flank. This drive to the north and subsequent action at the Chosin Reservoir would rank as one of the most rigorous campaigns in the entire history of the Marine Corps.

Fighting as part of EUSAK, by this time fanned out throughout North Korea, the 1st Marine Division did not meet the expected NKPA resistance. Instead, large-scale Chinese Communist Forces had entered the war. As X Corps swept north toward the Yalu River in November 1950, the Marines became the first United States troops to defeat the Chinese Communists in battle. At Sudong, after four days of savage fighting, the Marine RCT-7 so badly crippled major elements of the 124th CCF Division that it was never again committed as an organic unit.

When the Chinese forces struck in full force at the Chosin Reservoir, X Corps units were forced back. Elements of a nine-division assault force, the CCF 9th Army Group, which had been sent into Korea with the specific mission of annihilating the 1st Marine Division, began to attack. On 27 November, the Chinese directed a massive frontal assault against 5th and 7th Marines positions at Yudam-ni, west of the reservoir. Another CCF division, moving up from the south, cut the MSR held by the 1st Marines so that the division at Yudam-ni, west of the reservoir, was completely encircled by Communist forces. Many experts considered the 1st Marine Division as lost. Others thought the only way to save it was to airlift it out, leaving its equipment behind. Instead, the Marines seized the

initiative at Yudam-ni and cut a path through CCF units blocking a route to Hagaru. The division battled its way out in 20-degree-below-zero weather 78 miles over icy, winding mountain roads from the reservoir to the Hamhung-Hungnam area where, on 15 December, it redeployed to South Korea.

Integrated ground and air action enabled the 10,000 Marines and attached 4,000 Army-Royal Marine troops to break out of the entrapment and move south. During 13 tortuous days the Marines had withstood hostile strength representing elements of six to eight CCF divisions. The major result, from the military view, was that the Marine division properly evacuated its dead and wounded, brought out all operable equipment, and completed the retrograde movement with tactical integrity.

Not only had the Chinese (with a total of 60,000 men in assault or reserve) failed to accomplish their mission, destruction of the division, but the Marine defenders had dealt a savage blow to the enemy in return. POW debriefings later revealed that assault units of the CCF 9th Army Group had been rendered so militarily ineffective that nearly three months were required for its replacement, re-equipment, and reorganization.

Early in 1951, the 1st Marine Division was reassigned to IX Corps for Operation KILLER, a limited offensive ordered by the EUSAK Commander, General Matthew B. Ridgway. In Operation RIPPER, in March, the division led another IX Corps advance as it drove toward the 38th Parallel on the east-central front. When the Chinese struck back with their spring offensive on 22 April, the Marines were transferred to operational control of X Corps and counterattacked to restore the UNC defensive position in the far eastern sector. During May and June, the 1st Marine Division continued to punish the enemy in the Punchbowl area of eastern Korea, driving the CCF back to Yanggu and the Soyang River corridor.

Activity all along the UNC front came to an uncertain halt in July 1951 when Allied and Communist negotiators met at Kaesong for truce talks initiated by the enemy. In August the MLR flared into action again, and the Marine Division was engaged in new counterthrusts in the Punchbowl area. Fighting during the next three weeks involved the division in some of its hardest offensive operations in Korea. It also developed that this would be the last offensive for the Marines. In November 1951, as a result of the truce talks and possi-

bility of ending hostilities, General Ridgway, now UNC Commander, ordered the Eighth Army to cease offensive operations and begin an active defense of the front.

The war of fire and movement had turned into one of positional warfare, a defensive posture by UN forces that would continue for the last 21 months of the three-year conflict. Throughout the winter of 1951–1952, the Marines conducted vigorous patrol activities in their sector of X Corps. Although it was a lackluster period of trench warfare for the average infantryman, major tactical innovations were being pioneered by the division with its use of the transport helicopter for logistical and resupply missions.

In March 1952, the 1st Marine Division was transferred from the eastern X Corps line 140 miles west to strengthen the far end of the Eighth Army MLR in the I Corps sector. The division was relocated in the path of the enemy's invasion route to Seoul, where weak defenses in the Kimpo coastal area had threatened the security of the UNC front. Here the division's four infantry regiments (including the 1st Korean Marine Corps RCT) held nearly 35 miles of front line in the critical Panmunjom-Munsan area. The demilitarized route for the United Nations negotiators led through the Marine lines. It was the most active sector of the UN front for the next 16 months. This key position guarded the best routes of advance from North Korea to Seoul and indicated the high regard in which General James A. Van Fleet, EUSAK commander, held the Marines.

West Korean terrain was rugged, hilly, and friendly to the CCF who had the advantage of high ground positions as well as considerably more manpower. Although cast in an unaccustomed defensive warfare role, rather than a true attack mission, the Marines repelled an almost continuous series of enemy probes. While truce talks went on at nearby Panmunjom, fighting as furious as at any time earlier in the war flared up intermittently as the CCF tried to gain additional terrain for bargaining purposes. During 1952–1953, the Marine division beat off determined CCF limited objective attacks on Bunker Hill, the Hook, Vegas, and Boulder City outposts up until—literally—the final day of the war, 27 July 1953.

In reviewing Marine actions during this period, the Secretary of the Navy commented:

Marines in Korea have established an enviable record of success in carrying out their assigned missions. The First Marine Division began its third

year in Korea holding an active sector of the United Nations front guarding the enemy's invasion route to Seoul. It was frequently subjected to fanatical Chinese attacks supported by intensive artillery fire. Some of the heaviest fighting during the year took place along the front held by this Division. Enemy attacks were well coordinated and numerically strong. Continued patrol activity to keep the enemy off balance frequently resulted in bitter hand-to-hand fighting with numerous casualties on both sides.⁶

This type of prolonged static warfare gave little real satisfaction to Marines accustomed to waging a war of movement and a more tangible "mission accomplished." The year of positional warfare in western Korea was costly, too. Total U.S. casualties in the Korean War numbered approximately 137,000 men killed, missing, or wounded. The Marine Corps toll was 30,544. Of this number, 4,262 were KIA, an additional 244 were listed as non-battle deaths, and 26,038 were wounded. During this last part of the war, Marine casualties (both ground and air) totaled 13,087, plus an additional 2,529 for the attached 1st KMC/RCT. Astonishingly, 1,586 Marines or 39.6 percent⁷ of the infantry Marines killed in the entire war were victims of the "static," outpost warfare in the west. Another 11,244 were listed WIA during this period—representing 43.9 percent of the total number of ground Marines wounded during the three years of conflict.

Conditions varied widely during the 1950–1952 and 1952–1953 periods of the war. The enemy's improved capability in artillery during the latter period of positional warfare largely accounts for the high casualty rate at this time. It has been noted that:

Prior to February 1952, with a warfare of mobility prevailing, the enemy was inferior in artillery, the causative agent of most personnel losses. Afterwards, during the outpost warfare of western Korea, the front remained more or less static, and the Chinese Reds had as much artillery support as the Marines.⁸

It might be valid to question the use of Marine Corps specialists in amphibious warfare in an Army-type conventional land war. The protracted land campaign that characterized the latter stages of the

⁶ Semianl Rpt of SecNav (1 Jan–30 Jun) 1953, p. 185.

⁷ See Appendix E. Percentages represent Marine ground only; air casualties have been deducted. Of 1st MAW casualties of 432 (258 KIA, 174 WIA) during the entire war, 103 were KIA and 41 WIA during the April 1952–July 1953 period cited above.

⁸ Lynn Montross, "Development of Our Body Armor," *Marine Corps Gazette*, v. 39, no. 6 (Jun 55), p. 16.

Korean conflict actually was waged for the majority of the war period—from September 1951 to July 1953, or nearly two years. In terms of economy of manpower it could be considered an inefficient, though not ineffective use of Marines. On the other hand, the history of warfare down through the ages makes it repeatedly clear that a nation fights the pitched battle against its opponent with the arsenal of weapons and personnel at hand.

As an Eighth U.S. Army component (attached variously to the X, IX, and I Corps), the 1st Marine Division (one of nearly 20 divisions representing U.S. Army, British Commonwealth, and ROK troops) performed its assigned mission—to repulse and punish the enemy. It contributed heavily to maintaining the integrity of the EUSAK front and was considered one of the two crack EUSAK divisions—the other being the Marines' neighbor to the right, the British Commonwealth Division. With the attached KMCs, the 1st Marine Division, moreover, was also the biggest and strongest division in EUSAK.

Most importantly, fast deployment of the Marine division had made possible the brilliant tactical maneuver at Inchon. Many military experts, following World War II, had envisioned future conflicts only in terms of atomic warfare and massive strategic air assaults. Even the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff "had predicted publicly, hardly six months before, that the world would never again see a large-scale amphibious landing."⁹ In contradiction to new atomic-age tactics, however, the United Nations commander in September 1950 had turned the tide of the battle by his use of a conventional maneuver—envelopment by amphibious assault. The performance of the Marine Corps was thus responsible, in part, for changing post-Korean War military doctrine from total reliance on new tactics and weaponry to a more balanced concept that combined both sophisticated innovations and viable, established procedures.

Although unemployed in its primary amphibious role after late 1950, the 1st Marine Division had originally been positioned on the eastern front because of this capability. It was the UN commander's desire to have EUSAK's only amphibious trained and equipped divi-

⁹ Statement by Gen Omar N. Bradley, USA, as quoted by Gen G. C. Thomas, Col R. D. Heintz, Jr. and RAdm A. A. Ageton, *The Marine Officer's Guide* (Annapolis: United States Naval Institute, 1956), p. 130.

sion near the coast in the event that an amphibious maneuver was required for offensive or defensive purposes. Again, in the division's 1952 move to the western coastal front in the Kimp'o area, this fighting capability was a major consideration.

To a large extent, U.S. forces in Korea fought the early part of the Korean War with weapons from the preceding war—only five years removed. Three tactical innovations employed by the Marine Corps during the Korean War were highly successful and largely adopted by the other services. These were the thermal boot, individual body armor, and the helicopter. All were first combat tested in 1951.

Frostbite casualties during the first winter in Korea resulting from inadequate footwear made it necessary to provide combat troops with specially insulated footgear. The new thermal boot virtually eliminated frostbite for both Marine infantrymen and aviators. Armored utility jackets had been developed toward the end of World War II but were not actually battle tested. The Marine Corps had renewed the experimentation in 1947. First combat use of the plastic, light-weight body armor was made in July 1951 by Marines while fighting in the Punchbowl and Inje areas of X Corps. Improvements were made to the prototypes and by the following summer the Marine Corps, following a request made by the Army Quartermaster General, furnished some 4,000 vests to frontline Army troops. By 1953 the 1st Marine Division had received its authorized quota of 24,000 vests and new lower torso body armor had also been put into production.

Medical experts reported that the effectiveness of enemy low-velocity missile weapons striking a man wearing body armor was reduced from 30–80 percent. Chest and abdominal wounds decreased from 90–95 percent after issuance of the armored vests. Overall battle casualties were estimated to have been cut by 30 percent. By the time of the cease-fire, the protection offered by the Marine body armor had been extended to some 93,000 Marine and Army wearers. Hardly anywhere could the U.S. taxpayer or fighting man have found a better buy for the money: mass production had reduced the per unit cost of the Marine armored vest to just \$37.50.

*Air*¹⁰

On 3 August 1950, eight VMF-214 Corsairs led by squadron executive officer, Major Robert P. Keller, catapulted from the deck of the USS *Sicily* to launch the first Marine air strikes in the Korean action. From then until 27 July 1953, units of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing flew 127,496 combat sorties in the Korean War, considerably in excess of the 80,000-odd sorties for all Marine aviation during World War II. Of this Korean number nearly a third, more than 39,500, represented the Marine Corps close air support specialty, even though 1st MAW pilots were heavily engaged in other assignments from Fifth Air Force. These included interdiction, general support, air defense patrols, air rescue operations, photo and armed reconnaissance, and related tasks to insure Allied air superiority.

With the outbreak of Korean hostilities, Stateside Marine air units were alerted for combat duty by 5 July. At Major General Field Harris' 1st MAW headquarters, El Toro, MAG-33 elements were quickly readied for deployment to Japanese bases and thence to Korea. Commanded by Brigadier General Thomas J. Cushman, MAG-33 comprised Headquarters and Service Squadron 33, fighter squadrons VMF-214 and -323, an echelon of nightfighters from VMF(N)-513, two radar units (Marine Ground Control Intercept Squadron 1 and Marine Tactical Air Control Squadron 2), plus the observation squadron, VMO-6. Forward elements were quickly on their way, arriving in Japan on 19 July, while the rear echelon reached the Korean Theater on 31 July. Twenty R5Ds from Marine Transport Squadrons 152 and 352 were already providing logistical support for Pacific lift operations.

After practicing some last minute carrier landing approaches, the fighter pilots got into combat almost at once. Following -214 into

¹⁰ Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: *PacFlt EvalRpts* No. 6, Chap. 9, No. 5, Chap. 8, No. 4, Chap. 10; *USMC Board Rpts*, vs. 1-11; *Generals' Summary*; *AnlRpt SecNav* 1952-1953; *USMC Ops Korea* vs. I-IV, *passim*; Monograph, *A Brief History of Marine Corps Aviation*, (HistBr, G-3 Div, HQMC, 1960); Cagle and Manson, *Sea War, Korea*; Sherrod, *Marine Aviation*; LtCol C. A. Phillips and Maj H. D. Kuokka, "1st MAW in Korea, Part I, Pusan to the Reservoir: The Acid Test," *Marine Corps Gazette*, v. 41, no. 5 (May 57), pp. 22-27; LtCol C. A. Phillips and Maj H. D. Kuokka, "1st MAW in Korea, Part II, January 1951 to the Armistice," *Marine Corps Gazette*, v. 41, no. 6 (Jun 57), pp. 22-26; Brochure, *Change of Command Ceremonies*, 11 Jul 56, First Marine Aircraft Wing, FMF, 1st MAW folder, HRB ref. file.

the war, VMF-323 started operations on 6 August, flying from USS *Badoeng Strait* in support of the Pusan ground defenders. When the brigade mounted out on 7 August on its drive to Chinju, the two MAG-33 carrier squadrons were there with their 5-inch HVARs, napalm, 100- to 500-pound bombs, and 20mm cannon. VMF(N)-513 began its regularly-scheduled night tours over the Korean perimeter that same date, lashing at enemy supply and transportation centers in the Sachon-Chinju area of southern Korea. VMO-6 had already started evacuating casualties from the Pusan area three days earlier.

Many Army ground commanders witnessed the Marine system of close air support for the first time during the Pusan fighting. After the second Naktong battle, when air strikes had silenced enemy guns and 300 troops near Obong-ni, the commander of the 23rd Regiment to the right of the brigade wrote General Ridgway in Washington:

Infantry and artillery is a good team, but only by adding adequate and efficient air support can we succeed without devastating losses . . . The Marines on our left were a sight to behold. Not only was their equipment superior or equal to ours, but they had squadrons of air in direct support. They used it like artillery. It was, 'Hey, Joe, this is Smitty, knock the left of that ridge in from Item Company.' They had it *day and night*.¹¹

And while Marine, Army, and Navy staffs were completing plans for the forthcoming Inchon assault, MAG-33's little aerial Photo Unit (part of Headquarters Squadron) took a series of reconnaissance photographs of the landing beaches in preparation for the closely coordinated maneuver.

During Inchon-Seoul operations, MAG-33 was joined by three MAG-12 fighter squadrons: VMF-212, VMF-312, and VMF(N)-542. After the capture of Kimpo airfield, 212's "Devilcats" and 542's nightfighters transferred from Itami to Kimpo. Flying out of 2d MAW headquarters, Cherry Point, N.C., on 18 August, the Devilcats had climaxed a hurried dash halfway around the world to get into action. The squadron flew its first combat mission from Kimpo a month after its departure from the East Coast. While the MAG-12 land-based squadrons and the carrier pilots functioned

¹¹ Quoted in Andrew Geer, *The New Breed—The Story of the U.S. Marines in Korea* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1952), pp. 94-95, quoted with permission of the publisher.

as the division's flying artillery, MGCIS-1 set up a radar warning system and MTACS-2 established a Tactical Air Direction Center to direct all aircraft in the X Corps zone of action.

With the conclusion of the Inchon operation on 8 October, VMF-312 and VMF(N)-542 remained at Kimpo. Other Marine squadrons (VMF-212, VMF(N)-513, VMO-6,, HqSq-12, and carrier-based VMF-323) shifted to the Korean east coast in readiness for the Wonsan landing and subsequent deployment north of the Marine infantry regiments. Wing elements began arriving at the port city's airfield on 13 October. Division Marines, meanwhile, on board ship in the Wonsan harbor while more than 3,000 expertly laid Communist mines were being removed, did not land until 26 October. For the men who fought the vertical war in Korea, it was "one of the rare times in the air-ground association, the 1st MAW had landed ahead of the 1st Marine Division. The aviators didn't miss putting up a big sign-board "*Welcome, 1st Division!*"¹²

As 30 CCF divisions slammed into UNC forces all across the fighting front in late November to change the nature of ground operations (and the future of the war), so did the onset of the first Korean winter test 1st MAW aerial skills and ingenuity. Low hanging ceilings, icing conditions, and three-inch snows on the carrier decks were common operating hazards. For the shore-based pilots, the bad weather often caused changed flight plans as they were forced to land at alternate fields or on Navy carriers. Nonetheless, Marine RD4s flew up to the southern tip of the Chosin Reservoir, at Hagaru, to air-drop ammunition and supplies and evacuate casualties from the entrapment. Logistical support to this tiny frozen makeshift air strip was also provided by Air Force C-47s and C-119s. Later on, during the first step of the grinding movement south, Air Force pilots paradropped a sectionalized steel bridge vitally needed at Koto-ri to replace a destroyed span over a chasm.

Beginning with the load-out for Wonsan in early October, the 1st MAW was placed under operational control of the Seoul-based Fifth Air Force.¹³ Echelons of FAF air command and control initially

¹² LtCol C. A. Phillips and Maj H. D. Kuokka, "1st MAW in Korea," Part I, *Marine Corps Gazette*, May 1957, p. 45.

¹³ Technically, FAF had also been the controlling agency for air support during Pusan operations. Marine aviation units, as a component of an integrated Fleet Marine Force, however, were directed to fly support for 1st ProvMarBrig as their highest priority. Ex-

slowed operational orders anywhere from 4 to 36 hours. Simplified interservice communications and command liaison between 1st MAW and FAF helped improve the situation. With a verbal agreement, on 1 December, for CG, 1st MAW to receive full control over X Corps area aircraft, problems eased substantially. To a large degree the close coordination of Marine aviation and ground forces during the Chosin campaign was due to the use of flexible, simplified, and fast battle-tested Marine Corps-Navy CAS techniques and to having increased the number of pilot FACs from one to two per battalion.

The Marine movement south from Hagaru was protected by one of the greatest concentrations of aircraft during the entire war. Twenty-four CAS aircraft covered the breakout column, while attack planes assaulted enemy forces in adjacent ridge approaches. Marine planes on station at Yonpo (south of the Hamhung-Hungnam axis) and carrier-based VMF-323 flew some 130 sorties daily. Another 100 attack sorties were flown daily by Navy carrier-based planes, while FAF flew interdiction missions beyond the bomblines. Marine Panther jets of VMF-311, operating with the Air Force from the Pusan area, got into the action at Yonpo. It was also at this time that an airborne TADC (tactical air direction center) was first improvised when the radio jeeps moving south with the column had communication failures. For six days, a VMR-152 R5D transport orbited 2,000 to 4,000 feet above the Marine units to control air support between Hagaru and Chinhung-ni as a flying radio nerve center.

From late November to early December, as the division battled its way from Chosin to Hamhung, Marine, Navy, and Air Force aircraft evacuated more than 5,000 Marine, Army, and ROK casualties. And during the most critical period, the little OY spotter planes and HO3S-1 helicopters from VMO-6 provided the only physical contact between units separated by enemy action. Marine tactical squadrons in these three early major offensives of the war, from 3 August to 14 December, flew 7,822 sorties, 5,305 of them CAS for the battered UNC ground units.

cept for the formality of checking in with the FAF Tactical Air Control Center (TACC) at JOC, 1st MAW units operated under the Marine Corps-Navy CAS doctrine. During the Seoul-Inchon campaign, control of air operations came under ComNavFE, since it was an amphibious operation, and the air system followed Marine-Navy doctrine. USMC Board Rpt, v. I, p. IV-B-9, 14.

From 1951–1953, 1st MAW pilots and planes came under direct control of FAF. They alternated between principal missions of interdiction raids to harass and destroy Communist supply lines north of the battlefield, general support sorties outside the bomblines, and CAS flights to support infantry forces threatened by enemy penetration. Typical of FAF focus on massive aerial assaults were the following assignments that Marine flyers participated in:

In January 1951 (prior to Operation KILLER), the 1st MAW undertook a series of interdiction raids against the Communist supply net located in the Korean waist between the 38th and 39th Parallels, to disrupt the CCF transport-truck system.

On 9 May 1951, 75 1st MAW Corsairs and Panther jets were part of the 300-plane raid staged by FAF against Communist airfields at Sinuiju, on the Korean side of the Yalu.

Operation STRANGLE, a major Fifth Air Force all-out interdiction effort to cripple the enemy supply life line, was undertaken 20 May. When the Chinese Communist spring offensive broke shortly thereafter, MAG-12 Corsairs and -33 Panther jets delivered maximum support to the MLR regiments, the 1st and 7th Marines. When the truce talks began in Kaesong, in July 1951, 1st MAW planes and the radar searches of MACG-2 stood guard. Batteries of the Marine 1st 90mm AAA Gun Battalion, attached to the wing, were also alerted to keep under surveillance the approaches to key military ports.

New tactical developments pioneered by 1st MAW during the Korean War advanced the UNC air effort and added to the 1st MAW reputation for versatility. Several major steps forward were taken toward Marine aviation's primary goal of providing real operational 24-hour CAS, regardless of foul weather conditions. The new MPQ-14 radar-controlled bombing equipment, developed between 1946 and 1950, was employed by MASRT-1, as a device to control night fighter sorties of a general support nature flown by day attack aircraft. By means of height-finding and directional radars, it enabled a pilot to leave his base, drop a bomb load on target, and return to home field without ever having seen the ground. It offered major practical improvement in blind bombing methods. MPQ was limited, however, in its use in sudden, moving battle situations because of some of its sophisticated, hand-built ABC components. A real tactical breakthrough in night CAS came in April

1953 when VMF(N)-513 and the VMO-6 spotter planes evolved the new searchlight beam control system which made possible 24-hour coverage for 1st Marine Division ground units.

In other innovations, it will be remembered that the Air Force in late 1952 had requested escort by VMF(N)-513's new two-place jet-intruder F3D Skyknights on Air Force B-29 night bombing missions. During a four-month period from 1952-1953, the Marine night fighters downed one enemy plane or more a month while escorting the B-29s. Once the F3Ds began their night escort role, Air Force bomber losses became negligible.

A unique capability of the long-range, jet-intruder night-fighter was that the F3D carried a radar operator who replaced the ground controller, thereby extending air-defense radar range to the aircraft. It could thus operate independently and effectively at great distance from its base. Without GCI (ground control intercept) aid, VMF(N)-513 direct escort to bombers at night was so successful that the squadron's planes were used as exclusive escort of the Bomber Command B-29s. In November 1952, the Marine squadron's two night kills were the first ever recorded by airborne intercept radar-equipped jet fighters. At the end of the war, Skyknights and -513 pilots (flying F3Ds as well as the earlier F7Fs) had destroyed more enemy aircraft than any other Marine or Navy day or night fighter plane. Tactics employed by VMF(N)-513 were original in concept and required a high-level of training and individual pilot-AIO (airborne intercept operator) proficiency. It was noted that:

The enthusiasm with which this Marine aid to the Air Force has been received by FEAF Bomber Command indicates that VMF(N)-513 had successfully adapted its equipment and personnel to a mission usually associated with Air Force operations, making an important contribution to interservice cooperation, but even more important, to tactical progress in the night escort of bomber formations.¹⁴

An operation somewhat in reverse of the nightfighters was that of VMJ-1, the Marine photographic squadron, which had its own Air Force escort. Formerly the Wing Photo Unit, VMJ-1 was commissioned in February 1952 and flew a total of 5,025 combat flights. Under FAF operational control until late in the war, the squadron's 550-mph F2H-2P twin-jet Banshees flew unarmed deep into enemy

¹⁴ *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 5, p. 9-82.

country—even as far as the MIG-guarded Yalu—photographing positions, airfields, power plants, and other targets. An escort plane flew cover while the photo ship took pictures. Photo missions to the Suiho Reservoir were rated so important that “24 Air Force F-86 jets flew an umbrella.”¹⁵ Introduction of the squadron’s jet Banshee early in 1952 was a major step in improved aerial photography. The Banshee was the superior photographic aircraft in the combat theater, because of its new advanced-design view finder and operating range.

Coverage from VMJ-1’s gross wartime output of 793,012 feet of processed prints was equal to a continuous photographic strip six and half times around the earth at the equator. The Marine photo squadron contributed a third to the entire UN photo reconnaissance effort and at times flew as much as 50 percent of all FAF intelligence missions.

Throughout the war the four attack squadrons of MAG-12 (VMAs-212, -251, -121; and -332 at the end of the war) had dumped seemingly endless bomb loads on CCF installations, while MAG-33’s two jet-fighter squadrons (VMF-115 and -311) had provided the Marine exchange pilots who scoured the lower side of the Yalu with the Air Force F-86s on fighter sweeps.

During Korea the Marine CVE/CVL squadrons (VMAs-214, -233, -312, and -251) flew more than 25,000 sorties, experimenting with improved techniques for carrier landings. The carrier qualification program of Marine air units, a regular part of their training, also proved its value in combat. In the earliest days of the war, VMF-214 and -323¹⁶ had operated from two CVEs based off the south coast of Korea, thereby providing close support to the brigade and other Eighth Army elements at a time when all shore-based aircraft were forced to operate from Japan.

In other tactical refinements, the 1st MAW had employed an airborne tactical air control center in combat for the first time. In July 1952, when the static ground situation led to a build-up of enemy flak along the front lines that interfered with effective CAS delivery, the 11th Marines had instituted a flak suppression program in front of the division sector. Later that year, CG Eighth Army had ordered a similar program used by all other Eighth Army commands.

¹⁵ “1st MAW in Korea,” *op. cit.*, Part II, Jun 57, p. 23.

¹⁶ With phaseout of the Corsairs in 1952, the VMF squadrons were subsequently redesignated as attack units.

By December, apparently because of lack of success with their own methods, EUSAK had adopted the system developed by the Marine artillery regiment. The antiaircraft program, together with a reduction in the number of runs per aircraft per mission,¹⁷ had measurably decreased casualties for CAS missions conducted within artillery range. During 1952–1953 this loss rate for pilots and planes had dropped by a third, with no corresponding reduction in the sortie rate.

Stabilized warfare and enemy AA build-up had also led to an increasing use of enemy radars. Passive electronics countermeasures (ECM) were instituted by FAF. This program was enhanced in September 1952 by the commissioning of VMC-1 (Marine Composite Squadron 1), administratively assigned to MACG-2. The squadron possessed the only Fifth Air Force ECM capability to locate enemy radars and was the primary source of ECM intercept equipment in FAF squadrons for early warning and radar control monitoring. Throughout the duration of hostilities, VMC-1 remained the only Navy-Marine unit in the Korean theater with ECM as its prime function.

For its combat action, the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing was awarded two Korean Presidential Unit Citations and the Army Distinguished Unit Citation for the Wonsan operation. Wing pilots were responsible for downing 35 enemy planes, including the first night kill made by a United Nations aircraft. Participation of the 1st MAW in the war could also be measured in a different way. On the inevitable red side of the ledger: 258 air Marines had been killed (including 65 MIA and presumed dead) and 174 WIA. A total of 436 aircraft were also lost in combat or operational accidents.

From the command level, Korean operations marked the first time the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing had functioned for an extended period as a component in a broad, unified command structure such as FAF. Despite the weak links initially inherent in such a situation, the command structure did work. Marine-Navy and Air Force-Army differing aerial doctrines and tactics of close tactical air support, however, were never fully reconciled. The Marine wing made a notable contribution in providing really effective close, speedy tactical

¹⁷ In August 1952, FAF had introduced a new policy limiting pilots to one pass on general support or interdiction missions and two passes on CAS flights.

support during the sudden fluid battle situation that erupted in mid-July 1953. Simplified Marine TACP control, request procedures, and fast radio net system enabled 1st MAW pilots to reach the target area quickly. During this final month of the war—and indicative of the enormous amount of coordination involved in the FAF administrative apparatus—1st MAW planes flew 1,500 CAS sorties for the 19 different EUSAK frontline divisions.

CG, 1st MAW noted in General Order No. 153 issued the last day of the war, that “the Wing’s association with the Eighth Army, the Fifth Air Force and the Seventh U.S. Fleet in combined operations had been a professionally broadening experience—teaching tolerance, teamwork, and flexibility of operations.”¹⁸

Besides the FAF interdiction work and support missions for front-line units, new 1st MAW tactics and equipment had diversified the wing’s skills and capabilities in its primary role of providing CAS for Marine ground units. Of new tactical air support developments in the Korean action none had a more revolutionary effect than those created by the helicopter—which dramatically reshaped battlefield logistics and pointed the way to a new era in Marine Corps air-ground teamwork.

*Helicopter*¹⁹

A promising newcomer on the Marine aviation scene was the helicopter, whose tactical employment in Korea was to far exceed all expectations. A few helicopters had been used experimentally in the European and Pacific theaters toward the end of World War II, too late to evaluate their performance. But it was the Marine Corps, beginning in 1947, that had pioneered the development of combat techniques utilizing the rotor-driven aircraft as a means of enhancing its capability for the amphibious assault. When the Korean incident erupted in June 1950, the Marine Corps was in a position to assign four HO3S-1 Sikorsky two-place helicopters and flight personnel from its Quantico test unit, HMX-1, together with fixed-wing planes and pilots to form the brigade observation squadron, VMO-6. These

¹⁸ MajGen V. E. Megee, GO 153, dtd 27 Jul 53, quoted in 1st MAW, Part II, *op. cit.*, p. 26.

¹⁹ Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from *PacFlt EvalRpts* No. 4, Chap. 9, No. 5, Chap. 8, No. 6, Chap. 9; *USMC Board Rpt*, v. I; *Generals’ Summary*; *USMC Ops Korea*, vs. I-IV, *passim*; Montross, *SkyCav*.

Marines had the distinction of being the first helicopter pilots of any U.S. service to be formed into a unit for overseas duty.

Further, the Marine Corps also had 31 months' experience with the strange looking, pot-bellied, ungainly aircraft in diverse battle-field tasks. These included casualty evacuation, reconnaissance, wire-laying, liaison, and administrative missions. But promising test exercises at Quantico and Camp Lejeune were hardly enough. The real test would come at the front. There, the helicopter's military value would reflect and "depend to a large extent on how well the Marine Corps had worked out combat doctrines and techniques where none had existed before."²⁰

Landing with the brigade in August 1950, the choppers performed invaluable service from the earliest days of Pusan, Inchon, Seoul, and the Reservoir. During the most critical phase of the Chosin operation, the helicopters provided the only liaison between isolated commands. Wire-laying by air was first employed by VMO-6 during the second battle of the Naktong River, in September 1950. The ground had changed hands several times and control was uncertain. Using makeshift communication rigs, VMO-6 pilots unreeled telephone wire at a mile a minute. This method of putting telephone lines across Korean mountains became routine through the rest of the war, and Marine choppers strung miles of lines in rain and wind with the enemy blasting away at them. Wire was laid over terrain in a matter of hours where it would have taken men on foot weeks—if it could have been done.

Perhaps the greatest innovation of VMO-6, however, was its night casualty evacuation techniques first employed at Pusan. Darting in and out at treetop level around the Korean mountains, the light, easily maneuverable craft could land on a tiny patch of earth to evacuate injured men or bring in supplies. Once, during the early part of the war, when the aeronautical pioneer Igor Sikorsky was asked how his revolutionary vehicles were performing in combat, Mr. Sikorsky, bowing from the waist in his Old World manner, replied:

Thank you. Our things go very well in Korea. The helicopter has already saved the lives of several thousands of our boys in Korea and the score is still mounting.²¹

²⁰ Montross, *SkyCav*, p. 108.

²¹ *Marine Corps Gazette*, v. 39, no. 10 (Oct 55), p. 61 quoting Eugene E. Wilson., *Wings of the Dawn* (Hartford, Conn.: Connecticut Printers, Inc., 1955).

With the advent of the helicopter, as little as 43 minutes elapsed between the time a Marine was hit and the time he was on board the USS *Repose* or other hospital ships. Later on when the Marine transport copters arrived in Korea, HMR-161 pilots felt a new record had been set when only 30 minutes²² intervened between the time a frontline Marine was hit and delivered to a hospital facility 17 miles from the zone of action. The *Consolation* had been outfitted with a helicopter loading platform in July 1951, and eventually all hospital ships had such landing platforms. In Korea the flying ambulances could make the trip from rear area aid station to ship in five minutes and unload the wounded and clear the deck in 45 seconds flat.

Throughout the war nearly 10,000 wounded Marines were evacuated by helicopter; more than 1,000 such missions were carried out at night. Records indicate that VMO-6 flew out 7,067 casualties and that another 2,748 medical evacuations were made by HMR-161, for which the task ranked as a secondary mission. Although these humanitarian gains were important, major tactical innovations made by the helicopter were even more significant.

In the fall of 1951, HMR-161 successfully executed the first combat troop resupply mission in history. At this time while the division was deployed in the jagged razorback-ridge Punchbowl area, "a glimpse of future warfare was provided when Marine helicopter lifts on a company scale led to the lift of an entire battalion and its organic equipment."²³ Arriving in Korea on 31 August, the squadron had a complement of 15 new 10-place HRS-1 transport vehicles, with cruising speed of 60-85 knots. Developed specifically to meet Marine Corps combat requirements, the HRS marked a new era in Marine airborne support to ground troops. Both VMO-6 and HMR-161 came under operational control of the division. (With 1st Division and Wing headquarters separated geographically by more than 200 miles, it was particularly expedient to have the two squadrons under division control.)

The first step toward using the rotor-blade aircraft in the mission most closely related to the USMC basic helicopter concept—that of

²² By contrast, in 1945 World War II campaigns the Secretary of the Navy James V. Forrestal had visited hospital ships and praised the air evacuation methods then in use when he commented, "I went aboard the *Samaritan*, where Navy surgeons and corpsmen were already dealing with the casualties from the day and night before." Capt Clifford P. Morehouse, *The Iwo Jima Campaign*, (Washington: HistDiv, HQMC, 1946), p. 139.

²³ HistBr outline, p. 4.

transporting troops and supplies by vertical envelopment—was accomplished 13 September 1951. In Operation WINDMILL I, HRS choppers carried out the first Marine mass helicopter combat resupply operation in history. A lift of one day's supplies was made to 2/1 in the Soyang River vicinity. A total of 28 flights were executed in overall time of 2½ hours (a total flight time of 14.1 hours) to transport 18,848 pounds of gear and 74 Marines a distance of seven miles.

HMR-161 first applied the Corps' new concept of vertical envelopment on 21 September when, despite heavy fog, it transported 224 fully equipped Marines and 17,772 pounds of cargo from the reserve area to the MLR. This was the first helicopter lift of a combat unit in history. Company-size troop lifts inevitably led to more complicated battalion-size transfers. In the 11 November Operation SWITCH, HMR-161 effected the relief of a frontline battalion, involving the lift of nearly 2,000 troops. Twelve of the 3½-ton aircraft made 262 flights in overall time of 10 hours (95.6 hours flight time).

The tactical and logistical possibilities of the multi-purpose rotor craft attracted considerable attention. So impressed, in fact, were Eighth Army officers by the mobility and utility displayed by Marine helicopters that in November 1951 General Ridgway had asked the Army to provide four Army helicopter transport battalions, each with 280 helicopters. Korea, Ridgway said, had "conclusively demonstrated that the Army vitally needed helicopters,"²⁴ and he recommended that the typical field army of the future have 10 helicopter transportation battalions.

Ridgway was thereby renewing requests for helicopters made in the early days of the war by both the Army (through General MacArthur) and the Air Force (by General Barcus). But the UNC Commander's enthusiasm, although understandable, turned out to be the undoing for substantial Army use of the rotary-blade aircraft in Korea. The scale of operations²⁵ envisioned by Ridgway unwittingly led to a "jurisdictional controversy"²⁶ about possible duplication of aerial functions not reconciled by the two services until a year later. Although both services had helicopters in limited use, "hostilities were in their last stages before either the Army or the

²⁴ Futrell, *USAF, Korea*, pp. 533-534.

²⁵ Hermes, *Truce Tent*, p. 184, comments: "In order to insure a steady flow of replacement craft, he [Ridgway] suggested that procurement be started on a scale that would permit manufacturers to expand production immediately."

²⁶ Futrell, *USAF, Korea*, p. 534.

Air Force began to receive the cargo helicopters which they had put on order in 1950 and 1951.”²⁷

A successful three-day Army regimental supply exercise in May 1953 and a combat maneuver the following month in which the choppers formed an air bridge to a heavily attacked, isolated ROK unit caused General Taylor, then CG, EUSAK, to observe: “The cargo helicopter, employed in mass, can extend the tactical mobility of the Army far beyond its normal capability.” He strongly recommended that the Army make “ample provisions for the full exploitation of the helicopter in the future.”²⁸

Pioneering developments by the Marine Corps had, of course, continued meanwhile. Logistical operations had grown increasingly complex and diversified. In Operation HAYLIFT II, 23–27 February 1953, Marine helicopters set an all time cargo-carrying record when they lifted 1,612,306 pounds of cargo to completely supply two JAMESTOWN regiments with daily requirements for the five-day period. This represented a total of 1,633 lifts and 583.4 flying hours for the operation. The record day’s lift was 200 tons, whereas plans had called for lifting a maximum 130 tons per day. Experience gained during the operation indicated that similar tactical maneuvers in warmer weather would be even more successful when troop fuel oil requirements were reduced.

Other Marine innovations by HMR-161 included supplying ammunition from the rear area ASP to the MLR and redeployment of 1st 4.5-inch Rocket Battery personnel and guns from one firing area to another. And although VMO-6 executed most of the mercy missions, the transport squadron performed an unusual assignment in July 1952. Flood conditions throughout Korea brought an urgent request from the Army for use of HMR-161. On 30 July, the Marine squadron evacuated 1,172 Army troops from their positions in the Chunchon area where they had been trapped by the heavy rains.

With a new tactical exercise held nearly every month, HMR-161 operations that once had rated world-wide headlines were now practically routine. VTOL-style battalion troop lifts were no longer novel and regimental resupply operations were becoming almost standard practice. In both relocation of units and logistical support,

²⁷ *Ibid.*

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 535.

combat helicopters had provided high mobility and reasonable speed. They had introduced a new infantry technique of "hit and run" tactics. The transport helicopter squadron had proved most effective when employed in major tactical movements and not when used piecemeal on minor missions. Marine Corps wartime use of the new aerial vehicle had clearly proven that helicopters had become a necessary and integral component of the modern-day balanced military force.

FMF and Readiness Posture²⁹

The flexibility and readiness capability inherent in the Marine Corps FMF structure was a strong undergirding factor in its swift response to the Korean crisis. As noted, in June 1950 the Marine Corps had 74,279 officers and men on active duty. Its Fleet Marine Force, consisting of FMFPac and FMFLant, numbered 27,656. The 11,853 personnel of FMFPac included 7,779 men in General Smith's 1st Marine Division at Camp Pendleton and 3,733 in General Harris' 1st Marine Aircraft Wing at El Toro. On the East Coast, FMFLant numbered 15,803 with approximately 8,973 Marines in the 2d Division at Camp Lejeune and 5,297 air personnel attached to the 2d Wing at Cherry Point.

Outbreak of Korean hostilities thus presented the Marine Corps with the tasks of organizing and deploying for combat first a brigade and then a full war-strength reinforced division, each with supporting aviation elements. Despite the low strength to which FMFPac had shrunk due to stringent national defense economy measures, the heavy demands placed upon it were met. Both missions were accomplished quickly and effectively. In fact, "few achievements in

²⁹ Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: Semianl Rpts of SecDef (including SecNav), 1951-1955; *PacFlt EvalRpts* No. 4, Chaps. 9, 10, No. 5, Chaps. 8, 9, No. 6, Chaps. 9, 10; *USMC Board Rpt*, vs. 1-11; *Generals' Summary*; Brochure titled "Historical Outline of the Development of Fleet Marine Force, Pacific 1941-1950 (Preliminary)," held at HRB; HRS Log Sheet of Korean War Statistics prepared for Policy Analysis Br., HQMC, dtd 21 Aug 67; Ernest H. Giusti, *The Mobilization of the Marine Corps Reserve in the Korean Conflict, 1950-1951* (Washington: HistBr, G-3 Div, HQMC, 1967 ed.), hereafter Giusti, *Mobilization*, MCR; *USMC Ops Korea*, vs. I-II; Public Affairs Unit 4-1, *The Marine Corps Reserve—A History, 1916-1966* (Washington: Division of Reserve, HQMC, 1966); HQMC Press Kit, "Men of Color," issued July 1968; U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Historical Statistics of the United States, Colonial Times to 1957* (Washington: U.S. Govt. Printing Office, 1961).

the long history of the Marine Corps can equal what was achieved in the 11 weeks which elapsed between the outbreak of the Korean War and the amphibious assault of the 1st Marine Division at Inchon."³⁰

As early as 2 July, CinCFE MacArthur had requested that a Marine RCT-air unit be dispatched to the Far East. On 7 July the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade was activated; on 12–14 July it embarked. With departure of the brigade, personnel shortages within the 1st Division and 1st Wing became acute. The division was reduced to 3,459, less than a RCT; and the wing to 2,300. Meanwhile, as the increasing demand had continued for a Marine Division deployed to Korea, it became equally apparent that if the Marine Corps were to fulfill this requirement of deploying a full-strength division to Korea,³¹ its reservists would have to be called up to alleviate these shortages.

Manpower potential of the Marine Corps Reserve was 128,959, nearly twice that of the regular establishment. In June 1950, the Organized Marine Corps Reserve (Ground) numbered 1,879 officers and 31,648 enlisted personnel being trained in 138 OMCR units of battalion size or less. Membership of the ground reserve was approximately 76 percent of its authorized strength. At the same time the Organized Reserve (Aviation) consisted of 30 fighter and 12 ground control intercept squadrons attached to the Marine Air Reserve Training Command organized at Glenview, Ill. in 1946. These MARTCOM squadrons numbered 1,588 officers and 4,753 enlisted, or approximately 95 percent of authorized strength. In addition to nearly 40,000 members of the OMCR, the Marine Volunteer (non-drill, nonpay status) Reserve carried approximately 90,000 on its rolls.

A warning notice went out on 19 July from the Commandant, General Cates, to District Directors that the OMCR would shortly be ordered to active duty; later that same day mobilization of the Reserve was authorized by President Truman, with Congressional sanction. On 20 July, the first 22 ground units, with nearly 5,000 men, were ordered to active duty on a schedule that took into account

³⁰ Historical Outline of the Development of FMFPac, 1941–1950, p. 49.

³¹ With 7,779 men in 1stMarDiv and 8,973 in the 2dMarDiv, even "had they been combined into a single unit, its numbers would still have fallen 20 percent short of one war-strength division." Giusti, *Mobilization, MCR*, p. 9.

the unit's state of readiness, proximity to its initial duty station, and facilities there for handling the personnel overload.

Less than a month after hostilities began in Korea, key infantry, artillery, and engineer units of the OMCR had been ordered to extended active duty. On 31 July, West Coast ground reserve units from Los Angeles, San Francisco, Oakland, and Phoenix were the first to report in to Camp Pendleton for augmentation into the 1st Marine Division. The following day their opposite numbers from the East Coast units arrived at Camp Lejeune. By 11 September, all of the organized ground units had reported for duty and the OMCR (Ground) had ceased to exist.

While the organized ground reserve was being mobilized, the first of the 42 MARTCOM fighter and intercept squadrons began arriving at El Toro. Personnel of six reserve VMF and three MGCI squadrons were ordered to duty on 23 July as replacements in the 1st MAW which had furnished units and men for the MAG-33 component of the brigade.

Commenting on the success with which the Marine Corps achieved this expansion, the Secretary of Defense was to note later:

The speed with which this mobilization was effected was an important factor in the rapid buildup of the First Marine Division, the first units of which sailed for the Far East in July 1950.³²

As late as 20 July, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had informed MacArthur that a Marine division could not be sent before November or even December. Finally, on 25 July, the CinCUNC's third request for the division was approved. It would, however, be a division minus one RCT, and the Joint Chiefs were "adamant in their decision that MacArthur must wait until autumn or even winter for his third RCT."³³

The JCS also directed on 25 July that the Marine Corps build its division (less one RCT) to full war strength. The date of 10-15 August was set for its departure to the Far East. Among the many steps taken in the mobilization schedule, the JCS directed that the Camp Lejeune-based 2d Marine Division be expanded immediately to war strength.

Fleshing out personnel—against short-fuzed manpower and time

³² Semianl Rpt of SecDef (1 Jan-30 Jun) 1953, p. 187.

³³ *USMC Ops Korea*, v. II, p. 23.

factors—for the 1st Marine Division and Wing, due to embark in mid-August, a month after the brigade had left, was a round-the-clock operation for all hands. Between 25 July-5 August, the Marine Corps provided personnel for the expanded Division/Wing by:

- transfer of FMFLant-selected, 2d Division/Wing air and ground units, of 6,800 men, to FMFPac;

- transfer of 3,600 regular Marines from 105 posts and stations throughout the U.S.;

- mobilization of 2,900 from early OMCR ground and air units; and utilization of two replacement drafts, number 900, intended for the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade.

Expansion of the 1st Marine Division was in two phases, bringing the division (less one RCT) up to war strength and then organizing its third reinforced infantry regiment, the 7th Marines. With the cadre of 3,459 men in the division after the brigade left and the influx of regulars and reservists, the 1st Division embarked for Korea between 10 and 24 August. It had reached wartime strength (less one RCT) on 15 August, just 27 days after beginning its buildup from a peacetime T/O. As it had approached war strength, the Division CG, General Smith, was directed by CMC ltr of 4 August to activate a third RCT and prepare it for departure to Korea no later than 1 September.

While mounting out, the division transferred approximately 1,000 of its rear echelon to be used in the buildup of the 7th Marines. The 6th Marines of the 2d Division provided the base for building this new regiment. (Approximately 800 Marines of 3/6 were reassigned from Mediterranean duty and ordered to the Far East, via the Suez Canal, to join the 7th Marines upon its arrival there.) By drawing men from widely scattered sources, it was possible to activate the 7th Marines on 17 August. Departure of this regiment on 1 September was thus far in advance of the late fall or winter target date originally set by the JCS.

With all OMCR ground units called up and absorbed into the 1st and 2d Divisions, and air squadrons being mobilized on a slower schedule (due to less-urgent combat needs for air personnel in the early war stage), the Marine Corps dealt with its remaining body of reserve strength. Bulk orders went out beginning 15 August to the Volunteer Reserve, and by the end of the year 58,480 men and

women in this category were on active duty. More than 80 percent of the volunteer reservists on Marine Corps rolls served during the Korean War.

Attesting to the impact of events in Korea is the fact that "following the epic withdrawal of the 1st Division from the Chosin Reservoir, the number of new enlistments into the active Volunteer Reserve jumped from 877 in December to 3,477 in January."³⁴

Complete mobilization of the organized ground reserve had been accomplished in just 53 days, from 20 July to 11 September. A previous estimate had shown an expected 80 percent availability of ground reserve on M-Day; the actual mobilization figure was 90 percent. Of 33,528 OMCR ordered to active duty, a total of 30,183 (1,550 officers/28,633 enlisted) reported. Marine aviation also expanded rapidly. By January 1951, 32 organized reserve air units (20 of the 30 existing VMFs and all 12 MGCI's) had been activated and by October of that year all of the reserve squadrons had been called to active duty. Of the 6,341 organized air reservists, 5,240 received orders; 4,893, or 93.4 percent, reported in. In contrast to the ground reserve, air units had been recalled on a staggered or partial mobilization schedule, a matter which was later to receive Congressional attention (and ultimately to set a new trend) when the Nation's entire Korean War mobilization procedures were reviewed and subsequently revised.

Of the Marines participating in the Inchon invasion, 17 percent were reservists. By June 1951 the proportion of reservists in Marine Corps units in Korea had increased to nearly 50 percent. Between July 1950 and June 1953, approximately 122,000 reservists, both recruits and veterans, saw active duty with the Marine Corps.

Throughout the war the Marine Corps effected approximately 34 replacement drafts and another 31 rotation drafts. Ground Marines served an average tour of 13 months overseas (although actual time attached to the division was about 10½ months). The collapse of North Korean forces after the Inchon-Seoul operation and the unopposed landing at Wonsan had pointed to an early end of the Korean conflict. Massive Chinese intervention in November 1950, however, changed the prospect of a short war to a long one and made it necessary to implement a rotation and release policy. By

³⁴ Giusti, *op. cit.*, p. 36.

March 1951, HQMC had worked out a preliminary phaseout program for reserve personnel (based on the various categories and length of service prior to recall) which was put into effect in June 1951.

During 1952 and up until July 1953, approximately 500 officers and 15,500 enlisted men joined the 1st Marine Division in Korea every six months. Individual monthly replacement drafts generally ranged from 1,900 to 2,500, depending on the combat situation and other personnel needs within the Marine Corps. Monthly rotation drafts of Marines assigned to the States or other duty stations from Korea were usually somewhat smaller than their corresponding incoming numbers. Ranks and MOS of replacement personnel to the end of the war, however, did not always meet the needs of the division. Specialty training conducted by the 1st Marine Division in Korea helped remedy most of the worst deficiencies.

During the latter half of 1952 and throughout 1953, tours for Marine pilots/combat air crews averaged 9 months, and for aviation ground officer/enlisted personnel, 12 months. Following a detailed HQMC study of the advantages of tactical unit as opposed to individual pilot rotation, a new squadron replacement policy was instituted. This procedure assured standard precombat training of all pilots³⁵ and development of a team spirit prior to the squadron's arrival in the combat theater. Previously this had not been possible with the continuing turnover of 1st MAW personnel under the individual release system. Despite plans during 1952-1953 for replacement and rotation of squadrons as an entity, this did not come about until late in the war when carrier squadron VMA-312 was replaced by VMA-332 in June 1953. With the end of hostilities, tours were extended to approximately 14 months for both aviation and ground Marines.

Buildup of Marine Corps personnel during the Korean War from the June 1950 base of 74,279 is seen in the following strength figures:

³⁵ Even as late as July 1952, the influx of Class III volunteer reserve pilots, many of whom lacked adequate recent precombat flying experience, had presented a serious wing personnel problem and resulted in on-the-job training for pilots in the VMO-6 fixed-wing section. As another measure to improve squadron operational proficiency and partially correct weaknesses of the individual pilot rotation system and fast turnover, a 100-mission ceiling was inaugurated in February 1953. This applied to aviators in the VMF/VMA tactical units, with the exception of VMF(N)-513 pilots who were rotated after 60 missions.

June 1951	192,620 Marines on active duty
June 1952	231,967 Marines on active duty
June 1953	249,219 Marines on active duty

Altogether, an estimated 424,000 Marines served during the period of hostilities. The war also witnessed a sizable increase in the number of Negro Marines on active duty. This figure grew from 2 officers/1,965 enlisted in 1950 to 19 officers/14,468 enlisted by 1953. Marine officials commented on their fine combat performance, including that of many outstanding NCOs. In line with the changing climate of events and legislation,³⁶ the Korean War marked the first time that Negro personnel were fully integrated into the military services, in contrast to the segregated units before and during World War II.

Peak strength of the Marine Corps during the Korean emergency occurred on 30 September 1953, when 261,343 were on duty. At the end of the war, 33,107 Marines (26,072 division, 7,035 wing) were stationed in Korea. The time of peak deployed strength in Korea during 1950-1953 appears to have been April 1953, when Marines of the 1st Division/Wing numbered 35,306.³⁷

While the Korean War was still in progress, Congress passed new legislation to remedy certain shortcomings that had become apparent during the emergency, particularly the Nation's recent experience with partial mobilization. These new laws affected the size of the FMF structure of the Marine Corps, its active-duty strength, and its reserve component.

Public Law 416, enacted 28 June 1952, represented several major advances for the Marine Corps. It authorized an increase of Marine Corps strength to a minimum of three combat divisions and three wings; raised the ceiling of regular active-duty personnel to 400,000 (except for normal expansion in a national emergency or war); and provided for the Commandant to sit as co-equal member of the

³⁶ Assignment of Negro personnel in the armed forces continued to expand as a result of the President's 1948 Executive Order on Equality of Treatment and Opportunity. The Far East Command in July 1951 and the European Command in April 1952 initiated steps towards the racial integration of combat units, followed by similar programs for service units. Semianl Rpt SecDef (1 Jan-30 Jun 1952), p. 21.

³⁷ For detailed breakdown of figures, see 1stMarDiv, 1st MAW ComdDs, Apr 53 and *PacFlt Eval Rpt* No. 6, Chap. 9, p. 9-54, Chap. 10, p. 10-29. Also, *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 5, Chap. 8, p. 8-33 and No. 4, Chap. 9, p. 9-26.

Joint Chiefs of Staff³⁸ on matters of direct concern to the Marine Corps. In reaffirming the role of Marine Corps in the seizure and defense of advanced naval bases, as well as land operations incident to naval campaigns, the law also cited the corollary Marine Corps mission of "performing such other duties as the President may direct." Commenting on Public Law 416, the Commandant observed: "Our views are considered. Our interests are protected. The entire Marine Corps has benefited greatly by these gains."³⁹ General Shepherd further noted that the new legislation "expresses clearly the intent that the Marine Corps shall be maintained as a ready fighting force prepared to move promptly in time of peace or war to areas of trouble. It recognizes that in the future there may be a series of continuing international crises—each short of all-out war, but each requiring our nation . . . to move shock forces into action on the shortest of notice."⁴⁰

The two new laws affecting the future training and composition of the Marine Corps and other services were: (1) the Universal Military Training and Service Act (UMT&S), as amended, approved 19 June 1951; and (2) the Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952 (Public Law 476), approved 9 July 1952. Basically, the two laws sought to establish a sounder mobilization base and were complementary in nature. The Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952 implemented a new mobilization concept: either a partial or total callup of the Nation's reserve forces. In the past, the M-Day target had been geared to a total war only. A limited war, resulting in a partial, Korean-type mobilization, had not been envisioned. The 1952 act thereby provided greater flexibility for dealing with both contingencies and also consolidated much of the existing legislation affecting reserve forces.

Members of the reserve were newly designated by different categories of M-Day priority: ready, standby, and retired reserve. These varying degrees of availability for callup reflected training status (OMCR/volunteer), length of prior service, and related factors (i.e., men with the least service were designated for first callup, or the "Ready" category.) Previously, they were all equally subject for recall in an emergency, regardless of prior service.

³⁸ Previously, Marine Corps views had been represented at the JCS level by the SecNav or CNO.

³⁹ *Generals' Summary*, p. 1.

⁴⁰ Thomas, Heintz, and Ageton, *op. cit.*, p. 70.

The 1952 act and its new provisions thereby distinguished between a future national emergency and an all-out war. Theoretically, at least, a national emergency could be proclaimed by the President, calling for a partial mobilization, as in Korea. A declaration of war by Congress, as in World War II, would call for total mobilization. Thus the Marine Corps Reserve was newly earmarked for either a partial or total mobilization.

Under UMT&S, a military service obligation of eight years was established for all young men under age 26 entering the armed forces (whether by enlistment, draft, appointment, or reserve) after 19 June 1951. The act also authorized drafting of male citizens for two-year active duty periods. This new system of eight-year obligors provided the post-Korean MCR with a stable body of personnel who had received their basic training but still had a reserve obligation.

Also as a result of the Korean mobilization, the Organized Marine Corps Reserve troop list was modified in order to provide a manpower pool for additional elements of the regular establishment. Supply, service, and security units were added to provide more of an FMF type of augmentation than that furnished by reserve units in the past. Reestablishment of the OMCR began in October 1951, when the first group of recalled reservists were released from Korean duty. Plans called for a larger reserve and more comprehensive training. Ground units were to be increased from 138 to approximately 255, with the air squadrons to number 42. The Volunteer Reserve was similarly to be strengthened by stricter requirements for participation.

Traditionally the mission of the Marine Corps Reserve, since 1916, had been defined as "providing trained personnel for integration into the Marine Corps in time of national emergency." The strengthened MCR program as a result of Korea and the new laws led to a more serious reappraisal of its role. In looking to its post-Korea future, the Marine Corps planned a revitalized training program that would now "assist in extending the 'force-in-readiness' concept to the Marine Corps Reserve."⁴¹ More than ever before, the Marine Corps sought to make its reserve a mirror-image of the regular establishment.

⁴¹ *Generals' Summary*, p. 96.

*Problems Peculiar to the Korean War*⁴²

The undeclared war of Communist China against United Nations forces resulted in major changes in high-level policy and strategy that affected military tactics for the rest of the war. In an attempt to prevent escalation of Korean hostilities into an all-out nuclear war, the decision was made that U.N. forces, both ground and air, would not strike enemy bases in Chinese territory. After the beginning of truce negotiations in July 1951, the mission of Allied ground forces was changed from initiating offensive operations to one of maintaining an active defense of the MLR across Korea. The basic strategy became one of containment and prevention of any further enemy gains south of the 38th Parallel. It involved attempting to inflict maximum losses on the enemy while attempting to minimize those of the UNC. Militarily, these restrictions removed the possibility of winning a decisive victory. For the next two years, fighting seesawed back and forth across the parallel.

Static and defensive warfare thus characterized the greater part of the Korean War. During this period, the Marine division performed a land war mission similar to other Eighth Army components while Marine aviation squadrons flew under control of Fifth Air Force. Both the 1st Marine Division and 1st Marine Aircraft Wing faced tactical restrictions that resulted from the strategic policies governing the overall role of EUSAK and FAF. Problem areas arose from the limited nature of this particular war. These involved not only the shift in the UNC strategy from an offensive posture to a defensive ("active defense") concept, but also from the paralyzing effect of the protracted truce negotiations on battlefield tactics.

For nearly two years (16 months in West Korea and 5 months earlier while in IX Corps on the East-Central front), the Marine division assumed an unaccustomed defensive role. Such a sustained, basically non-win position was hardly morale-building to the average Marine unable to see personally any yardage gained, any progress made in his particular war. Not surprisingly, such a passive battle assignment did result in a temporary loss of amphibious skills on

⁴² Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: *PacFlt Eval Rpts* No. 4, Chaps. 9, 10, No. 5, Chaps. 1, 8, 9, No. 6, Chaps. 1, 9, 10; *USMC Board Rpt* vs. I-II; 1st Marine Division Training Bulletin No. 5-53, "Lessons Learned," dtd 10 Jun 53, hereafter *Lessons Learned* 5-53; *Generals' Summary*; Futrell, *USAF, Korea*; Heinl, *Soldiers of Sea*.

the part of both individual Marines and the division. End-of-war evaluations noted that "long and indecisive defensive situations such as existed in Korea do little to foster the offensive spirit so long traditional with the Marine Corps and certainly tend to detract from the immediate amphibious readiness required of a Marine Division."⁴³

Prior to its tour of duty as I Corps reserve in mid-1953, the 1st Marine Division had noted that it would "require intensive training and reequipping for a period of at least 60 days" upon release from active combat in order to "reach a desirable standard of amphibious readiness."⁴⁴ Rigorous MARLEX and RCT exercises initiated in June 1952 after the division had moved to the western coastal sector off the Yellow Sea and expanded during its I Corps reserve period, were important steps in rectifying this skill attrition. This was, of course, in addition to the continuous training schedule in offensive and defensive warfare maintained by the division for the battalions and regiment periodically in regular reserve status.

Outpost warfare in West Korea was characterized by overextended MLR frontage. The more than 60,000 yards held by the division while in the I Corps sector resulted in a thinly-held line which invited penetration and encirclement. "Normal" frontage for an infantry division in defense with two regiments on line was considered by U.S. Army doctrine to be 8-9,000 yards. Even with four MLR regiments (two Marine, 1st KMC/RCT, and KPR) and the 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion on line (the third Marine regiment in reserve with a counterattack mission), this was a very lengthy sector. It was further complicated by the Han River obstacle on the left flank and the Imjin River to the rear of the sector that separated Marine frontline troops from rear support and reserve units.

Infantry battalions thus occupied "extremely wide fronts, as a rule 3,500 to 5,000 yards," while individual rifle companies were assigned anywhere from "1,200 to 1,700 yards of the MLR to occupy and defend."⁴⁵ Prior to the battle of the Hook in October 1952, one of the major engagements on the western front, the 7th Marines at the far right end of the division sector had emplaced all three battalions

⁴³ *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 6, p. 9-2.

⁴⁴ *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 5, p. 8-5. Subsequently, the division's ground readiness was rated as excellent; a conservative estimate placed individual unit amphibious readiness at between 25 and 60 percent; and indicated a 30-day training period would bring the division to complete amphibious readiness. *Generals' Summary*, p. 53.

⁴⁵ *Lessons Learned* 5-53, p. 19.

on line, rather than the customary procedure of two on line and the third in reserve. There was little other choice, for the regimental sector exceeded 10,000 yards, "more properly the frontage for a division rather than a regiment."⁴⁶

During a 100 percent watch, at least theoretically, a Marine could be spaced at intervals about every 10 to 15 yards along the MLR. A night 50 percent watch—with personnel of rifle platoons assigned to COPs, listening posts, combat patrols, repair of fortifications, and the KSC nightly supply trains—not infrequently spread personnel to a point where the MLR was dangerously thin, often with 50 yards between men.⁴⁷ Such an over-wide lineal deployment dissipated defensive strength and made mutually supporting fires difficult.

Division artillery, too, was thinly positioned across the wide sector, making it difficult to execute counterbattery missions. This led to development of the innovative counter-counterbattery program (or "roving guns") devised by the 11th Marines in May 1952 to deliberately mislead the CCF as to the strength and location of divisional artillery; the situation resulted as well in the reinforcement of the four Marine artillery battalions by heavier I Corps 155mm and 8-inch howitzers. The static situation in the prolonged land campaign also led to the growth of large, semi-permanent type camps which somewhat hampered traditional Marine mobility. Organizations had additional personnel and equipment above T/O and T/E because of the peculiar defense requirements of the sustained battle situation.

The lack of depth in the defense did not provide for receiving the shock of a determined enemy attack, particularly since the normal OPLR had been withdrawn to strengthen the overextended MLR in April 1952, shortly after the division's arrival in West Korea. Ultimately, as we have seen, this main line of resistance concept was modified and rather than a long thin trenchline the Marine division employed a defense-in-depth concept using a series of strong-points, as in Boulder City and the organization of the postwar main battle position. In contrast to the Marine situation (and that of most other divisions in the EUSAK line), the CCF confronting the 1st Marine Division beyond No-Man's-Land deployed their forces in great depth, boasted unlimited manpower, and employed an elastic type of defense on mutually supporting key terrain features. The

⁴⁶ Hicks, *Outpost Warfare*, p. 107.

⁴⁷ *Lessons Learned*, *op. cit.*

enemy had also developed an artillery capability that was numerically superior to ours. And they held high ground positions that overlooked virtually the entire Marine front.

As in World War II, Korean operations provided another instance in which various military services and components were coordinated by joint commands: EUSAK for the ground defense and FAF for air. These massive operational command structures accomplished the desired goals. On lower level echelons, however, some policies tended to be so restrictive that they precluded normal combat initiative and aggressiveness. The net result was thus to allow the enemy to maintain the tactical initiative while, in effect, hampering UNC counter-defense measures.

New directives issued by I Corps in late 1952, for example, changed the corps policy of large-scale raids for prisoners, previously encouraged in the spring of 1952, which affected infantry raids and patrol activities for the rest of the war. Plans for all raids, company size or larger, required both I Corps and EUSAK approval, and were to be submitted 10 days prior to planned execution. Complete patrol plans for even platoon-size operations had to be submitted at least 24 hours in advance. Although the reason for the new policy stemmed from a desire to minimize casualties during the prolonged stalemate, negative effects of such a lead-time factor were quickly apparent. Battalion or regimental commanders frequently were unable to capitalize on targets of opportunity that developed or changes in local conditions, such as weather or troop deployment, to gain maximum effectiveness from the operation.

Directives covering offensive maneuvers that could be taken on local initiative were so restrictive that "any independent action below the level of the Division Commander became practically nonexistent."⁴⁸ Similarly, counterattack plans to retake previously considered major COPs were countermanded, on several occasions, by corps or army higher echelons shortly before jump-off time with the reason given that the action was not worth the cost of further UNC casualties or possible jeopardy to the fragile peace negotiations.

Allied offensive capability was further restricted by various EUSAK and I Corps orders issued during the protracted period of truce talks. Many directives had as their well-intentioned rationale the desire

⁴⁸ *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 6, p. 9-84.

not to upset the precarious balance in UNC-Communist negotiations by providing the enemy further opportunities for exploitative propaganda victories. The actual record shows, however, that the Communists were never at a loss to conjure up and capitalize on fabricated "events" that suited their purpose—whether charging UNC aircraft had violated the Kaesong neutrality strip, that American fliers were engaging in germ warfare, or deliberately instigating POW camp disruptions and breakouts.

Neutrality restrictions⁴⁹ on supporting arms within the entire Kaesong-Panmunjom-Munsan-ni area further complicated the UNC tactical situation and hampered both offensive and defensive operations of the 1st Marine Division. This was particularly true of the center Marine regimental sector which was bisected by the Panmunjom corridor and the no-fire lines. The truce talk neutral zone restrictions prevented the Marines in this area from massing their artillery fires on a desirable scale and also, at times, interfered with proper CAS delivery forward of the MLR. The numerous and sometimes conflicting "no-fly, no-fire" restricting lines stemmed from original agreements made between UNC and Communist representatives in 1951. Subsequently, however, the prohibitions against firing any type of weapon in the area were modified from time to time and added to by FAF, EUSAK, and I Corps, "each time adding to the frustration of the local commanders."⁵⁰

The double-standard effect of the neutrality restrictions became readily apparent, however. The CCF artfully used this area, by means of his tactics of "creeping" toward the Allied MLR, as a supply and reserve buildup location. The enemy emplaced artillery, assembled troops, and even used the neutral territory for equipment buildups, including tanks, in the Kaesong vicinity.⁵¹ Thus the restrictive lines gave the enemy an opportunity to maneuver within an approximate 12 square-mile area, all within effective artillery range and outside of the Kaesong-Panmunjom restricted territory, but UNC units were powerless to take any action.

⁴⁹ Basically, these consisted of a no-hostile-act three-mile circular area radiating from Kaesong; a six-mile radius forbidding FAF planes in the skies over Kaesong and another two-mile, no-fly radius over Panmunjom; and various other prohibitions on military craft, air-dropped leaflets, and firing of artillery to include propaganda shell leaflets.

⁵⁰ *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 6, 9-78.

⁵¹ *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 4, p. 9-37.

Intelligence operations, during the latter stages of the war, were not considered optimum—for either the division or wing. While dug in on the western end of I Corps, the Marine information effort had been “seriously hampered by the lack of prisoners of war.”⁵² Only 94 CCF had been captured by the division during the period, compared with more than 2,000 prisoners taken earlier on the East-Central front.⁵³ This deficiency was attributed to the “static defensive situation, the reluctance of the Chinese to surrender and the heavy volume of fire placed on our reconnaissance patrols.”⁵⁴

In the air, photo reconnaissance results were not rated entirely satisfactory as a source of current information by either air or ground Marines. The command channels in effect designated the Air Force as responsible agent for control and coordination of all photo missions in Korea. Requests for photographic missions thus were relayed on to FAF and flown by its Reconnaissance Wing or the Marines’ own VMJ-1 squadron. The system produced relatively good vertical coverage with photos available in about 10 days. Special requests for immediate coverage on areas of local importance, however, customarily were either not flown or “delayed to the point where they were of no value”⁵⁵ because the tactical situation had been changed.

Delays were due to the shortage of photographic aircraft throughout FAF and the limited provision in T/Os for photo interpretation. Intelligence of air-strike targets (particularly post-strike) was consistently mediocre. Oblique photos of frontline positions took an average of three-four days to be processed and sometimes longer. As an expedient, aerial observers began to shoot their own vertical and oblique photos with hand-held cameras slung over the side of a VMO-6 plane.

Probably the most serious problem of all, from the Marine Corps point of view, was that during much of the Korean War Marine air-ground components, trained to work as a team, were to a large

⁵² *Generals’ Summary*, p. 39.

⁵³ Between December 1950–July 1953, the 1st Marine Division took 2,445 NKPA/CCF, with an additional 656 enemy seized by its attached 1st KMC/RCT, or a total of 3,101. Marine capturing units included Headquarters Battalion, 1st Tank Battalion, 11th Marines, the three infantry regiments, and 7th Motor Transport Battalion. An additional 4,792 POWs were also taken by the 1st Division in the early Inchon-Seoul operations. G-1 Folder, Aug 53 (Box 4), “Personnel Periodic Rpt. No. 94, dtd 15–31 Aug 53; USMC Board Rpt, v. I, p. II-B-46.

⁵⁴ *Generals’ Summary*, p. 39.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*

extent precluded from operating together. The separate missions of the wing and division reflected, on a smaller scale, the divergent UNC air and ground doctrine and tactics. After the early moving battles, Korean hostilities had settled down to a protracted land war in which ground and air tactical commands did not operate jointly and were never coordinated to deal a truly devastating blow to the enemy. Since the Korean War was a limited one most of the fighting was confined to the stabilized front across Korea. Both air and naval forces were viewed largely as supporting arms for the ground operation.

Due to political-military considerations, UNC tactical air power had been, in effect, handcuffed so that its use would not appear "overly aggressive" and threaten an enlargement of the Korean hostilities into a nuclear armageddon of World War III.⁵⁶ Since the earliest days of the war, a strict embargo had been placed on any bombing of Chinese rear supply areas or industrial complexes although it was obvious that much of the enemy's logistical strength lay beyond the Manchurian border.

Air efforts were concentrated largely on nuisance or harassing raids within North Korea and close air support efforts of various types, rather than a systematic destruction of the enemy's primary supply installations. Some ranking officers had informally interpreted official Washington policy as "Don't employ airpower so that the enemy will get mad and won't sign the armistice."⁵⁷ Indeed, it was not until after the Communists had rejected what the UNC called its "final truce package," in April 1952, that it was decided to exert greater pressure against the Communists. The list of approved aerial targets was then enlarged to include North Korean hydro-electric power facilities, previously exempted from air attack.

From late 1950 until early 1953, Marine air squadrons were assigned directly by FAF, with CG, 1st MAW, having virtually no tactical control over his own units. Marine Corps aerial doctrine traditionally employed close air support of ground operations as the

⁵⁶ Much of the unwritten but basic policy mitigating against full use of Allied air superiority stemmed from the desire to employ "humanitarian" standards in the UNC war effort. Following WW II there had been wide criticism of the "moral wrong of massed air bombardment" as well as employment of the atomic bomb by the U. S. to hasten the end of the war. The UNC goal, in Korea, was to avoid needless civilian casualties and for air strikes to be directed against purely military targets. Futrell, *USAF Korea*, p. 41.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 402.

primary role of its air arm. FFAF and FAF, however, in their interpretation of employment of tactical air power directed FAF maximum efforts toward interdiction missions, sometimes even to the expense of immediate CAS needs.⁵⁸ As Far East Air Forces stated late in 1951, "when required, close air support of United Nations Army forces may take precedence over other FFAF programs."⁵⁹ Interdiction, general support, and close support missions were the normal order of priorities flown by FFAF-FAF.

Operation STRANGLE, the 10-month, all-out, air interdiction campaign during 1951-1952 originally had as its objective the destruction of the North Korean road-rail network. The interdiction program had been defined at first as a move to "paralyze enemy transportation in the zone between the railheads at the 39th Parallel and the front lines."⁶⁰ and later somewhat more conservatively as a measure to so "disrupt the enemy's lines of communication . . . that he will be unable to contain a determined offensive by friendly forces . . . or to mount a sustained offensive himself."⁶¹

Despite more than 87,552 interdiction sorties flown during the period, CinCFE daily intelligence summaries showed that aerial harassment of the CCF had not hindered their defensive efforts. Instead, by the summer of 1952 the enemy had "actually doubled in troop strength, reinforced their artillery strength to equal that of the UN forces, developed a tremendous AA capability, and established the capability for launching a general offensive."⁶² With UNC air and sea superiority, the Chinese Communists had still succeeded in keeping their main supply route open. Rail track cuts were being repaired in as little as 36 hours. And the CCF was employing

⁵⁸ Comments Futrell, *USAF, Korea*, pp. 430-431: "Despite the fact that responsible Eighth Army and Fifth Air Force commanders had decided that the rail-interdiction attacks would best accomplish the United Nations mission in Korea, Eighth Army subordinate commanders were gravely dissatisfied with the limitations [96 sorties daily for the entire Eighth Army front, decided upon by EUSAK-FAF in November 1951] placed on close support." One of those dissenting subordinates at the time was CG, 1st Mar Div. Following the September 1951 heavy fighting in the Punchbowl area, General Thomas officially described the Marine division's air support as unsatisfactory and stated his division had "taken unnecessary casualties because its air support had not been adequate or timely." Average elapsed time between the division's CAS requests and its 187 approved missions that month had been nearly two hours. Only 32 immediate air-support requests had been filled within 30 minutes.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 432.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 296.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 435-436.

⁶² *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 5, p. 9-58.

more fire power than ever: in May 1952, some 102,000 rounds fell against UNC positions compared to only 8,000 the previous July.

Even the retiring UNC Supreme Commander, General Ridgway, admitted before Congressional representatives in 1952 that the enemy had greater offensive potential than ever before, and the Commander, Seventh Fleet, Vice Admiral Joseph J. Clark, declared flatly: "The interdiction program was a failure . . . It did *not* interdict."⁶³ USAF spokesmen felt it had attained its limited purpose but opined: "Seen abstractly, the United Nations railway-interdiction campaign was defensive and preventive rather than offensive and positive."⁶⁴ In early 1952, CG, FAF, General Everest, recognizing that his pilots "had been so long engaged in interdiction attacks that they were losing their skills in close support"⁶⁵ inaugurated a new system. Beginning in March all fighter-bomber squadrons were to be rotated on weekly close-support missions.

Actually, the skies had begun to clear for Marine aviation operational difficulties by the latter half of 1952. A better understanding had developed between both high-level officials and the working day-to-day liaison operations at JOC. CG, 1st MAW had "established his position so firmly he was able to guide establishment of the policies which governed his operations merely by expressing his desires to CG 5th AF."⁶⁶ The battle for Bunker Hill in August 1952 had marked excellent cooperation between Eighth Army and FAF, with the 1st Marine Division receiving air priority for two days. In any event, matters were substantially improved from late 1951-early 1952 when, during a 12-month period, 1st MAW CAS sorties for 1st MarDiv had plummeted to the incredibly low figure of 1,956⁶⁷ or 15.8 percent of the wing's total 12,372 CAS sorties during FY 1952 (1Jul51-30Jun52).

Commenting on this unhappy period for both air and infantry Marines, Lieutenant General Richard C. Mangrum, USMC (Retired), who was CO, MAG-12 during part of the STRANGLE operations, said "for the rest of 1951 and well into 1952 the major effort

⁶³ Cagle and Manson, *Sea War, Korea*, p. 270.

⁶⁴ Futrell, *USAF, Korea*, pp. 437-438.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 434.

⁶⁶ *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 5, p. 9-45.

⁶⁷ By contrast: in FY 1951, 1st MAW CAS sorties for 1stMarDiv were 7,000 of total 14,028 CAS sorties, or 50 percent; for FY 1953, the figure was 4,912 of total 14,540 CAS sorties, or 32.4 percent. *Generals' Summary*, Chart C, following p. 58.

of my Group and of MAG-33 was devoted to cutting the rail lines in North Korea. Without success, of course. Little by little we were able to increase the percentages of effort devoted to close support of the troops."⁶⁸ And by the last six months of the war the bulk of all CAS missions received by the division were flown by 1st MAW aircraft, in contrast to earlier periods when a third or half of the division's sorties were Marine-flown. As the last Korean War Wing CG noted, despite basic differences between Army-Air Force and Marine Corps-Navy concept and tactics, ultimately "the commanders of the Fifth Air Force in actual daily practice decentralized control to a marked degree."⁶⁹

Throughout the war, however, a lack of standardized terms and differences in request procedures continued to exist. (This was resolved by using Marine control procedures when flying for the division, and Army-Air Force procedures when scrambled on flights for other divisions.) Whereas EUSAK-FAF considered strikes inside the bomblines⁷⁰ as "close air support" and those outside it as "general support," the Marine CAS concept was one of support in close proximity to frontlines (ranging from 50 to 500 yards out) that affects the fire and maneuver of those ground units. In the hands of Marine FACs, Marine planes employed on close support strikes had a definite influence on the MLR tactical situation.

Then, too, the Marine system of maintaining aircraft "on air alert" resulted in CAS requests being filled in 5 to 15 minutes. Air support requests screened in the regular manner by Eighth Army and FAF at the JOC level resulted in a delivery of ordnance to the target in a minimum of 30 minutes and delays sometimes of nearly four hours.⁷¹ During fluid situations, when the division required more than 40 sorties per day, the "on station" system proved more tactically effective than the FAF preplanned "on call" procedure.

Operational differences between the Marine-Navy and Army-Air Force type of CAS in a critical ground situation were never more apparent than in a major CCF last-ditch effort when the enemy

⁶⁸ Quoted in Heinl, *Soldiers of Sea*, p. 647.

⁶⁹ MajGen V. E. Megee, "Tactical Air Support of Ground Forces," *Marine Corps Gazette*, v. 39, no. 12 (Dec 55), p. 17.

⁷⁰ The bomblines had been moved in to an average of 3-4,000 meters from the MLR in December 1952 to expose more targets to the "mass" strike treatment.

⁷¹ *PacFlt EvalRpt* Chap. 1. No. 6. D. 1-15.

slammed against ROK defenses in the Kumsong area. An end-of-war report noted:

CCF penetration of the II ROK Corps sector, in July, 1953, brought clearly into focus the ineffectiveness of the Air Force-Army close air support (CAS) system during periods of fluid operations. CCF eruption through the II ROK Corps MLR and deep into friendly territory eliminated, as effective or practical, the complete reliance by 5th AF on pre-planned CAS strikes (using aircraft from the ground-alert pool), against fleeting targets or targets of an immediate nature. These types of targets are considered normal during a fluid situation.

The inadequacy of communications for rapid transmission of air support requests in the CAS system employed in Korea, the impossibility of only four TACP's per division (U.S. and ROK Army) to keep up with frontline battalion battle actions in order to control CAS strikes, and the over-centralization of control of CAS request approvals and CAS aircraft allocation were all clearly demonstrated during that period of fluid ground operations in July.⁷²

Despite the accommodation reached during the Korean War, many of these fundamental differences in doctrine and employment of air support to ground troops in combat persisted until recent years.⁷³

As military history has shown countless times in the past, wars are fought under the prevailing difficulties of the time. There never was a war waged under ideal conditions. A reflection on operational problems of the Korean period is predicated on the thought that a review of them—and the solutions effected where possible—may help avoid their repetition in a conflict of the future.

*Korean Lessons*⁷⁴

In the early phase of the Korean War, the 1st Marine Division deployment was in a moving battle situation similar to numerous

⁷² *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 6, p. 10-3.

⁷³ For a penetrating discussion of interservice problems dealing with air-ground liaison and communications, use of FACs, and CAS capability, etc., see U.S. Congress, Rpt of Special Subcommittee on Tactical Air Support of the Committee on Armed Services, Otis G. Pike, Chairman (House of Reps., 89th Congress, 1 Feb 66), Washington: GPO, 1966.

⁷⁴ Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: *PacFlt EvalRpts* No. 4, Chaps. 9, 10, No. 5, Chaps. 1, 8, No. 6, Chaps. 1, 9; *Generals' Summary; Lessons Learned* 5-53; 1stMarDiv PIR 942, dtd 7 Aug 53; 1st MAW PIR 127-53, dtd 7 May 53, Encl (1) Estimate of Enemy Ground Situation #1-53 (end-of-war analysis);

engagements it had fought in the past 175 years. Most of the "lessons" learned from the enemy, the tactical situation itself, and the terrain in Korea are derived largely from the later outpost warfare stage when the Marines were employed in a stabilized and sustained defensive situation similar to that facing other Allied units across the entire Eighth Army front. Tactics of defense on a wide front, construction of permanent type field fortifications, and organization of the battle position in difficult terrain was a new experience to Marines. This period of limited objective attacks and battles of attrition highlighted the importance of small unit tactics and demonstrated some modified concepts regarding employment of supporting arms.

During the period of outpost warfare, the 1st Marine Division was never confronted by a general enemy offensive or combined infantry-armor-artillery-air assault. The nature of the conflict was one of limited objective attacks, with strong and sometimes sustained probes. Typically, these were two-battalion assaults against a platoon-size outpost.

Time after time, as UNC defending troops learned, the CCF characteristic pattern of attack was repetitive and almost predictable. After dark, heavy preparatory fires deluged an isolated advance outpost. Crude, but effective, improvised demolitions often reduced COP fortifications⁷⁵ so that the enemy could assail the position. Waves of attacking Chinese then overwhelmed the greatly outnumbered defenders. Almost invariably the initial attack made on the front of the position was a feint; the real attack would be made by troops that had enveloped the position and moved to the rear. Enemy ambush forces were also located to the rear of the outpost, between the COP and MLR, at normal reinforcement routes to prevent both

1st MAW PIR 169-53, dtd 18 Jun 53, Encl (1) Estimate of Enemy Air Situation 1-53, dtd 20 May 53 (end-of-war analysis); 5thMar ComdD, Nov 52, App. VI: Comments on Tactics, Techniques, and Equipment, pp. 1-12; J. Lawton Collins, *War in Peacetime—The History and Lessons of Korea* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1969); S. L. A. Marshall, *The Military History of the Korean War* (New York: Franklin Watts, Inc., 1963); S. L. A. Marshall, *Pork Chop Hill—The American Fighting Man in Action, Korea, Spring 1953* (New York: William Morrow & Co., 1956), quoted with permission of the publisher; Ridgway, *Korean War*; Hicks, *Outpost Warfare*; Batterton, *Korea Notes*.

⁷⁵ If the enemy advanced closer than 50 yards, by closely following under heavy preparatory fires, he could penetrate the position. At this close range, normal box-me-in artillery fires were not close enough to break up the attack. *Lessons Learned 5-53*, p. 10.

a pullback by the defenders to the MLR and to stop reinforcements from reaching the outpost.

Effective defensive fire plans for the COPs covered all likely enemy approaches and assembly areas, as well as close-in boxing fires of the COP on all sides. Marine defense positions were sited for all-round defense, with special attention paid to covering the rear approaches at night. This tactic of rear envelopment also applied on a smaller scale to patrols. Invariably the CCF maneuvered to the flanks and rear of a friendly patrol in an attempt to encircle it. The CCF skillfully employed both the terrain and troops and regularly attacked from more than one direction.

Experience with Communist combat techniques forced UNC leaders to reevaluate their own night-fighting tactics. The Chinese had a marked superiority in night operations. Every major attack on Marine outposts during the last year of the war was made at night. When they were not directly assaulting a friendly site, the CCF advanced their own ground positions by digging and their well-known creeping tactics. This enabled them to establish an OP line within small arms and mortar range of Marine COPs and the MLR. The battle for Bunker Hill came about as a result of this enemy tactic. Organization in early 1952 of COP-2A, adjacent to the Panmunjom corridor, was in direct rebuttal to this same tactic. By such indirect methods, the Chinese were further able to extend their already favorable high ground positions which gave them observation over practically all of the Marine front line. Defensively the enemy used the cover of darkness equally well: mountain roads were aswarm with trucks and supply movements, which UNC night-fighters and bombers slowed with only moderate success.

Skilled, rapid construction of field fortifications and excellent camouflage discipline by the enemy were also object lessons. Entrances to tunnels and caves, as well as the bunkers themselves were so carefully disguised by fresh branches, weeds, logs, and other natural foliage that they were rarely visible either by air observer or aerial photographs. Active weapons positions were also effectively camouflaged. Often 60mm and 82mm mortars were housed in bunkers and fired through a narrow opening at the top. If moved out temporarily to an open slope, they were quickly returned to the bunker to avoid detection. The Chinese elaborate underground system of trenchworks and radial tunnels between forward and rear

bunkers was sometimes as much as 35 yards long. Underground bunkers and tunnels often had 20 feet or more of protective dirt cover and offered security from anything except a direct aerial hit.

Destruction of the enemy's trenches, bunkers, and cave network by medium and heavy artillery was only partially successful. Napalm was generally ineffective due to the lack of combustible materials in CCF ground defenses. The well-prepared, deeply dug fortifications were virtually impervious to anything less than air assaults with heavy ordnance (1,000-pound bombs and over) which were required to destroy CCF reverse slope positions.

A well dug-in secondary line was located four to eight miles to the rear of the Chinese MLR. Intelligence indicated that an attack to infiltrate CCF defenses would "require the penetration of a fortified area to a minimum depth of 10 miles."⁷⁶ Some Korean War analysts maintained that behind their front line the Chinese had entrenched the ridges to an average depth of 14 miles and that the enemy "could have fallen back upon successive prepared positions for all that distance."⁷⁷ Although the trench warfare period of the Korean War was often likened to World War I, the Chinese defensive works were estimated to have "ten times the depth of any belt of entrenchments in World War I."⁷⁸ Some areas had even been engineered for defense against nuclear attack. Caves, tunnels, and particularly reverse slope positions also showed CCF skill in the selection and organization of terrain features.

Both the nature of the ground fighting and weather in Korea quickly indicated that our bunker construction needed to be improved. Siting them lower into the ground, so that the outline of the bunkers would not make them such ready targets, and reinforcing them to withstand a 105mm direct hit were steps in this direction. Use of sandbags (of which there was a continuing shortage) for both bunkers and trenches proved to be almost as much a problem as a solution. Bunkers above ground shored up with sandbags frequently collapsed in times of heavy rains or Korean spring thawing conditions.

Outpost warfare also proved that the average bunker often became a deathtrap when used defensively. This was due to the enemy

⁷⁶ *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 5, p. 8-29.

⁷⁷ Marshall, *Pork Chop Hill*, p. 24.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 116.

proclivity for sealing entrances with their satchel charges, as occurred in the Vegas Cities battle. It became evident that large living-fighting bunkers could easily turn into traps in which many men could become casualties simultaneously, and from which few could fight. Despite their exposed nature, fighting holes were often safer. Some Korean combat officers were of the opinion that rather than our six-to eight-man bunkers, smaller two-man fighting units would be obviously faster to build, more effective, and safer since they would present a smaller target.

A 1st Marine Division training bulletin issued near the end of the war stated categorically:

As a rule no bunker or cave should be large enough to accommodate more than four men. If the cave is bombardment proof, there is another greater danger that the men will fail to man their fighting positions quickly enough after the enemy fire lifts or ceases.⁷⁹

UNC reconnaissance and security activities also showed need for improvement. Night raids, patrol operations, and ambushes were conducted continuously to maintain contact with the enemy, keep him off balance, and obtain intelligence. This type of mobile, small-unit action repeatedly indicated an urgent need for more basic training in night combat operations at the squad and platoon level. The frequent breakdown of communications in night fighting, whether it involved a small patrol or besieged outpost, was particularly critical. Some regimental commanders noted the failure to employ properly organic small arms in combat action during darkness before requesting heavier supporting fires. It was felt that the practice of calling for mortar or artillery fire to the exclusion of using small arms was a dangerous practice which was being overused and that *"even in the defense the spirit of the offensive must be maintained."*⁸⁰ Meticulous planning was vital for effective fire plans, alternate avenues of approach, and evacuation. Detailed rehearsals of raids were essential.

Night operations proved it was necessary to have a combat patrol sufficiently large to allow for both the accomplishment of the mission and evacuation of casualties. In evaluating the Korean experience, Marine officers pointed to the difficulties of operating effectively on "pitch black nights when a man could barely see his own hand in

⁷⁹ *Lessons Learned*, 5-53, p. 11.

⁸⁰ 5thMar ComdD, Nov 52, App. VI, p. 4.

front of him or when the most prominent terrain feature could not be silhouetted.”⁸¹ Some commanders declared that such circumstances often lead to patrols accidentally walking into minefields—their own, as well as the enemy’s.

In their security measures, CCF strict policing of the battlefield after either a small raid or major assault was well known to every Marine infantryman as part of the Chinese elaborate precautions to preserve order of battle identity. CCF counterintelligence efforts were equally scrupulous. Despite extensive precautions to keep the relief of the Marines by the 25th Infantry Division secret in May 1953, enemy psychological warfare loudspeakers predicted the relief date one week in advance. Later they broadcast a change in date that was equally accurate. Two heavy enemy probes made in July while individual battalion reliefs were in process also demonstrated the Chinese acuity in intelligence activities.

The necessity for UNC commanders to avoid a fixed pattern in operations was insufficiently recognized. A battle diary found on a CCF soldier killed in early 1953, had observed about the Americans:

Two days before an enemy relief they clamor in their trenches, and at the same time heavily bombard our positions.

For small scale attacks, the enemy sends out a small group of men crawling on their hands and knees; however, in large scale attacks, they intensely bombard our positions.

An enemy artillery bombardment following air reconnaissance indicates that the enemy will probably launch a ground attack within a short period.⁸²

As the CG, 1st Marine Division further commented about overuse of established procedures:

The same tactics and techniques should not be followed in every raid. The pattern should be altered to the extent that the tactics and techniques employed will not indicate the objective to the enemy. The time selected for raids should vary to permit the conduct of both daylight and night raids. Employment of supporting arms including the delivery of smoke must be varied to prevent indication of the objective.⁸³

Enemy ability to locate listening posts and take them under direct fire or mortar attack also dictated the need for frequent change in location.

⁸¹ Batterton, *Korea Notes*, p. 34.

⁸² *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 6 p. 9–58 citing Eighth U.S. Army PIR No. 948.

⁸³ *Lessons Learned* 5–53, p. 2.

Regarding the use of supporting arms, the Korean terrain itself dictated a need for modification of traditional practices of employing both direct and indirect fire weapons in order to achieve maximum effectiveness. Standard Marine Corps use of both crew-served infantry weapons and artillery centered around the concept of interlocking and mutually reinforcing bands of fire. Neither the frontage nor terrain in Korea was what could be termed "normal." Battalion frontages were often more than twice the accepted maximum. The terrain consisted of steep main ridge lines with many steep finger ridges leading off both sides. Such contours require twice as many machine guns for adequate defense against enemy attacks if employed in positions affording the usual interlocking grazing fire.

For both infantry weapons on the forward COPs and MLR, and supporting artillery batteries, the combination of "stretching unit fronts and unstretchable ranges"⁸⁴ of the weapons caused them to lose a considerable amount of their mutual support capability, as one artillery regimental commander commented about the experience of the 1st Marine Division in Korea. As a result, a compromise was often effected whereby machine guns were emplaced on the high ground of the ridge line, with their individual sectors of fire extended to 180 degrees. Although the guns were no longer mutually supporting, the numerous finger ridges could be better covered by fire to prevent the enemy from gaining a foothold on them prior to assault on the main ridge line.

As previously noted, the Marine division also modified its concept about occupying the military crest, rather than the topographical crest, of forward slopes.⁸⁵ In view of CCF tactics, forward slope positions offered the advantage of observation and superior fields of fire and assisted in bringing fire on the enemy in those areas and approaches masked from the view of reverse slope positions.

Under conditions of stabilized defensive lines in Korea, the great offensive power of Marine tanks was somewhat limited. They were used extensively as direct fire weapons and supplemented the artillery regiment by firing deep H&I (harassing and interdiction) missions. In West Korea, it proved expedient to have friendly tanks positioned in defiladed assembly areas where they were on call and

⁸⁴ Col F. P. Henderson, "Amphibious Artillery of the Future," *Marine Corps Gazette*, v. 39, no. 12 (Dec 55), p. 30.

⁸⁵ See Chapter VI.

ready to move into MLR firing slots on short notice. They often provided close fire support to Marine patrols and outpost defense actions, sometimes being called in for fire missions before the direct support artillery.

Since tanks under enemy observation invariably drew retaliatory fire, they usually remained in firing positions on the MLR only long enough to complete their fire mission. Deployment of several M-46s in mutually supporting MLR positions, however, tended to reduce the volume of hostile fire. When operating forward of the MLR, it was important that the armored vehicles be protected by infantry from enemy tank-killer teams. Often the Marine artillery observer's knowledge of the terrain and familiarity with objective targets upon which the tank could be effectively used was thus relayed to the tanker, particularly when such targets were themselves obscured to the tank gunner. In registering the target, however, the adjustment system used by the gunner differed from that of the artillery FOs. It was recommended that use of tank guns and lights be made part of the regular COP fire plan.

The Korean experience demonstrated in particular the need for better rehearsed tank-infantry patrols. It also showed the need for a reliable tank-mounted searchlight with a range up to 2,000 yards. Smoke and muzzle blast of the 90mm gun often reduced the effectiveness of the tank searchlight. When two tanks were employed as a team (one spotting targets and adjusting fire with the light, while the other zeroed in on the illuminated targets), the searchlight was markedly more effective.

Outpost warfare, which was predominantly night fighting, was thus characterized by patrolling and ambushes, artillery dueling, and sharp battles for contested terrain that would offer improved observation. In this stand-off period of positional warfare, ground defenses were developed to the point where "both sides were incomparably stronger than they had been in actual [moving] battle."⁸⁶

Lessons from Korea dealt not only with modified battle tactics, but involved an evaluation of enemy performance and capabilities, as well as certain strategic considerations which had so markedly affected the course of the war. UNC forces in Korea faced an adversary who had vast resources of manpower and, accordingly, was

⁸⁶ Marshall, *Military History of Korean War*, p. 72.

wholly indifferent to the cost of victory in terms of personnel and time. In fact, the enemy believed that mass was the key to victory. In many instances Chinese commanders did not launch an offensive unless their attack force had a three-to-one superiority over the defending friendly unit.

Combat effectiveness of the CCF was evaluated as good to excellent. Chinese officers demonstrated good combat leadership. They were well schooled in both offensive and defensive military tactics. Some units had been trained for amphibious operations. During the long period of positional warfare, the CCF had built up their military capability (troops, artillery, AA guns) and resupplied their forward units. Maintaining a steady flow of supplies had been an earlier weakness of the CCF logistics system. During the last six months of the war Chinese stockpiles were adequate for 35 days of offensive operations; the enemy was capable of supporting a major offensive for a 17–24 day period.

By contrast, the North Korean soldier was considerably less effective. The larger number of NKPA prisoners taken and their greater desertion rate indicated poorer discipline and lower morale. NKPA units were rated from poor to good. After 1951, NKPA forces decreased in importance while the CCF assumed a greater role in the combat effort as well as in the truce negotiations.

Chinese weapons and equipment were characterized by a lack of standardization due to the absence of a central system of production or ordnance supply. Their weapons included a wide assortment of foreign manufacture—Japanese, U.S., German, Czechoslovakian, Soviet, and Chinese design. Because of a shortage of small arms, usually not more than a third of the personnel in their combat units were individually armed. Despite this fact the CCF soldier was convinced he was good and had “proved himself to be a formidable opponent in combat.”⁸⁷

Individually and as units, the CCF exhibited the traditional Oriental characteristics of extreme patience, passivity, and determination. Some authorities went so far as to declare that the Chinese ability to:

. . . remain quiet for a long period and to patrol stealthily are the main reasons for the success of his engagements. The enemy's successes which

⁸⁷ 1st MAW PIR 127–53, Encl (1), p. 1.

have resulted from his patience and stealth show that our troops need more training in the same technique.⁸⁸

The enemy's tenacious determination to hold key terrain, regardless of the costs of lives, was well known. Another evaluation concluded:

The Chinese [is] well and courageously led at the small unit level. He is thoroughly disciplined. He is an industrious digger. His conduct of the defense is accomplished in spite of UN superiority in the air, his inferior communications equipment and his hodgepodge of weapons and equipment.⁸⁹

Battlefront lightweighthness and mobility, particularly in Korean winter operations, was another important object lesson from the enemy. Marine cold weather clothing, including thermal boot and body armor which had saved so many lives, was of excellent design and quality. Despite this, some authorities felt that during the Korean War the Marine was "placed at a disadvantage when he met the CCF soldier,"⁹⁰ because of bulky cold-weather clothing that hindered freedom of movement. The weight of some of the Marine infantryman's weapons, such as the 16½ lb. BAR (plus magazines) and the 9½ lb. M-1 rifle, was felt to contribute further to this lack of mobility. In contrast, "the CCF soldier dressed in his quilted uniform and armed with a 'burp' [submachine] gun, moved freely and quietly over the roughest of terrain, thereby gaining a not inconsiderable advantage over his heavily burdened adversary."⁹¹

This superior mobility led to the related advantage of tactical surprise. Since CCF units were unencumbered by heavy weapons they could readily use primitive routes of approach in the darkness. Their movements through disputed terrain were typically so furtive that often there was no preliminary warning until the CCF were virtually within grenade-throwing distance of friendly patrols or installations. The enemy practice of hiding by day and moving by night also concealed their presence from UN air reconnaissance.

One observer of the Korean scene, both in the early battles of 1950 and again in 1953, has compared the CCF development of military skills during this period, as follows:

⁸⁸ *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 6, p. 9-41.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, No. 5, p. 8-31.

⁹⁰ *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 6, p. 9-82.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*

In 1950, the Red Chinese were a crude lot, given more to pell-mell attacks and diehard stands than to deception and protection. But they stayed and they learned as they went along. When they entered the war, apart from their exceptional skill and persistence with the machine gun, they were not accurate users of hand weapons . . . by 1953, few of the old signs remained. They had become as tenacious and as earth-seeking as ants, and in that lay a great part of their success. Two and one-half years of war in Korea were a bonanza for Communist China. On that training ground her armies became as skilled as any in the world in the techniques of hitting, evading and surviving.⁹²

The most telling characteristic of the Chinese Communist soldier, who essentially was a guerrilla fighter, may thus be his ready capacity to learn from experience, particularly the fine art of deception.

As important as any of the lessons from the battlefield was the experience of dealing with the Communists at the truce table. Cease-fire talks dragged on interminably over a period of 2 years and 17 days. Some 158 meetings were held, with more than 18 million words recorded, most of these dealing with the prisoner exchange that had been the major stumbling block since early 1952. During the two years of the truce talks, from July 1951–July 1953, an additional 56,000 Americans had been killed or wounded, bringing total U.S. combat losses to more than 136,000.⁹³ (U.S. forces suffered some 80,000 casualties in the first year of the war.) And in the end, the final solution to the POW problem was substantially that first proposed by the UNC in April 1952.

Commenting on the Communist stratagem that opened the truce talks in July 1951, U.S. government officials observed at the time the negotiations began:

The suggestion was received with caution since the free people of the world have learned that Communist words and Communist intent seldom coincide. Regardless, our leaders initiated action for preliminary ceasefire talks with the hope that the Communists were acting in good faith.⁹⁴

Despite this early realistic appraisal of the enemy, the degree to which the Communists were to employ truce negotiations as simply an extension of the battlefield was not immediately evident.

A key factor is involved here. The proverbial Chinese quality of passivity and seemingly endless patience, both on the individual and

⁹² Marshall, *Pork Chop Hill*, pp. 20–21.

⁹³ Marshall, *Military History of Korean War*, pp. 77, 78.

⁹⁴ Semianl Rpt SecNav (1 Jan–30 Jun), 1951, p. 187.

national level, was fully utilized to their advantage. In contrast, the Western people, particularly Americans, are characteristically impatient to complete a task once it is started. As Admiral C. Turner Joy, USN, who initially headed the UNC delegation to the Korean Armistice Conference, commented, "We are a people who like to get things *done* . . . The Communist negotiating method recognizes and seeks to gain advantage by aggravating our American tendency to impatience through the imposition of endless delays."⁹⁵ The American attitude is to feel that a deadlocked issue should be resolved by mutual concessions, which puts the enemy on favorable ground in employing his delaying tactics. The Communist view is that by deliberately slowing the progress toward completion of the armistice the position of their opponent will gradually be undermined. Thus, Communists regard any concession made by their opponents as a sign of weakness. Whereas Westerners often feel that to accept part of a negotiating proposal will encourage the Communists to respond in kind, such an action is apt to lead to an even more unyielding position on their part.

The armistice effort in Korea also taught the following lessons:

Never weaken your pressure when the enemy sues for [an] armistice. Increase it.

Armistice conferences should be brief . . . to allow . . . talks to become protracted is to indicate weakness on your part. This encourages your Communist opponents.

The site at which armistice talks are held should be outside the area of conflict.

Never concede anything to the Communists for nothing, merely to make progress.⁹⁶

Possibly no one had more first-hand experience in negotiating with the enemy in the Korean War than Colonel James C. Murray, the Marine Corps staff officer who was involved in the truce talks from 8 July 1951 to 27 July 1953. In these two years he served as liaison officer between the delegations of the two sides and participated actively in meetings. On three different occasions he negotiated the truce line which was to separate UNC and Communist forces. In July 1953, as Senior Liaison Officer, he was in charge of

⁹⁵ Joy, *Truce Negotiations*, p. 39.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 166-173, *passim*.

the UNC staff group that determined the final line of demarcation. He has noted that Communist rationalizations readily disregard whatever facts or logic which do not fit their purpose, no matter how inconsistent.

While customarily ignoring all restrictions of the Geneva Convention in dealing with prisoners, for example, when it was expedient to their interests the Communists would then argue for an incredibly narrow interpretation of the Convention's provisions. Declared Colonel Murray: "Having come to the conference table only because they were near defeat, the Communists were prepared from the very first to make the most of the negotiations to create . . . a 'climate of victory'."⁹⁷ This accounts for their concern with even the smallest detail of "stage setting," for maintaining "face," and for practical advantages from negotiating conditions, such as the physical setting of the truce talk site.

As the Marine officer further observed:

A fundamental objective of the Communists in respect to the truce was the appearance of the Communist victory in Korea . . . An armistice, no less than war, could be looked upon only as a means to an end . . . to this end they negotiate patiently and skillfully . . . temporary inconveniences must be borne for . . . the attainment of long-range political objectives.⁹⁸

Certainly, the close interaction between Communist military operations and truce negotiations, a key factor since 1951, was particularly apparent during April-July 1953 as the war drew to an end.

In addition to Communist China which had emerged stronger and with considerably more prestige from the war, the other Asian nation to have undergone marked military growth was the Republic of Korea. In June 1950, the ROK army had numbered approximately 98,000 inadequately trained troops, armed chiefly with hand-carried weapons such as rifles and carbines, ill-prepared to hold back a determined enemy attack. The ROK army was little more than a constabulary force organized by KMAC (Korean Military Advisory Group) for internal police duty. Only 65,000 men had actually received unit combat training. ROK armed forces during the three years of the war had increased six-fold and by July 1953 totaled nearly 600,000 men.

⁹⁷ Col J. C. Murray, "Prisoner Issue in the Korean Armistice Negotiations," *Marine Corps Gazette*, v. 39, no. 9 (Sep 55), p. 30.

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 29.

Training and equipment had steadily improved the ROK battle efficiency which, in the 1950–1951 period, had been handicapped by lack of heavy tanks, mortars, artillery, antitank mines and shells, and other heavy weapons. By the spring of 1951 the ROK army was being transformed into an effective fighting force, due largely to the determination of General Van Fleet, then EUSAK commander. In 1952 the ROK army had been enlarged to 12 divisions and the ROK Marine forces had been similarly expanded. Gradual augmentation resulted in a total of 16 ROK divisions, most of these with organic artillery; by July 1953 ROK troops had assumed responsibility for the majority of the UN line.

Marine Corps experience with its ROK counterpart had been instructive and generally encouraging.⁹⁹ Organized in 1949 by the Republic of Korea with assistance from KMAG, the 1st Korean Marine Corps Regiment had taken part in antiguerrilla operations until the NKPA invasion. With the outbreak of hostilities, the KMCs engaged in UN delaying actions in southwest Korea until September 1950 when the Korean regiment of nearly 3,000 men was attached to the 5th Marines as part of the Inchon assault force. Later the KMCs were involved in defense of Wonsan and the Hamhung-Hungnam beachhead as well as the Pohang patrol. After serving as a maneuver element with the ROK forces in early 1951, the 1st KMC Regiment was attached permanently to the 1st Marine Division in March of that year, participating in the Hwachon Reservoir fighting and performing valuable service in the interrogation of POWs.

The KMCs modeled themselves after U.S. Marines, particularly emulating the traditional offensive Marine *esprit de corps* and overriding goal to "close with the enemy and seize the objective" regardless of strong resistance. The combat courage and determination of the KMCs was cited by CG, 1st Marine Division, on several occasions.

During the 1952–1953 period, the KMC/RCT provided the Marine division with nearly a quarter of its combat strength and became the fourth regiment of the division. The ROK Marine Corps also consisted of the 2d KMC Regiment, which furnished personnel for the WCIDU/ECIDU island security forces, and the 5th KMC Battalion, attached to the Marine division in 1952. Classes in infantry tactics for KMC officer and enlisted personnel were conducted

⁹⁹ See "1stMarDiv, 1st KMC Regt. and Its Relationship to the 1stMarDiv," "SAR" File (Korea), Type "C" Rpt.

at the Korean Marine Corps Training Center at Chinhae. This was patterned after U.S. Marine Corps recruit and officers' basic schools, under supervision of USMC staff personnel. Coupled with an offensive spirit and desire to attain U.S. Marine Corps standards and combat performance, the Korean Marines largely overcame early major problems resulting from the language barrier, translation of U.S. basic training materials, and the insufficient number of qualified and experienced Korean military instructors. One early recruit class possibly established a record for brevity in training when its members, after only a few weeks, were ordered to participate in the Inchon assault which was the Korean Marines' first specialized amphibious operation.

Many of the hard lessons of Korea—as well as some of its unique problems—resulted from the fact that this was America's first major experience in a modern, undeclared, and limited war. Accustomed to the tradition of hard-hitting, all-out war and decisive victory, both the fighting man at the front and Nation tended to view the conflict as well as its ultimate accomplishments as inconclusive.¹⁰⁰

Most importantly, immediate collective security action by the UNC had prevented another small country from being subdued by direct, armed aggression. And the Communists had failed to attain their objective: the forced unification of Korea, not as a free nation but as a Russian satellite, as was North Korea. The balance sheet for UNC military intervention showed that 22 nations (including the ROK) had provided assistance, either personnel or materiel in defense of South Korea. Many of these countries had supplied token units of battalion-size or less and several had furnished noncombat medical facilities. Despite the fact these detachments from other Allied countries totalled "only 44,000 men they were disproportionately valuable in emphasizing the collective, coalition nature of the Korean war effort."¹⁰¹ Major losses, however, had been borne by ROK and American troops.

UNC casualties numbered 996,937 killed, wounded, and missing.

¹⁰⁰ The course of the war, particularly its protracted and static nature, had led to growing national apathy and opposition, particularly on the U.S. home front. In late 1950, national opinion polls found that 80 percent of the people were in favor of the war and seven months later that 67 percent were against it. On the Korean front lines, morale was generally highest during heavy ground actions or large scale air attacks. *Washington Post*, dtd 12 Jul 70, p. A-17; *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 6, p. 1-16.

¹⁰¹ Rees, *Korea*, p. 33.

U.S. losses were 136,937, of which 33,629 represented battle deaths and 103,308 wounded in action. A measure of the role that ground forces played in Korea "may be judged from the fact that, of the total United States battle casualties for the entire conflict, the Army and Marines accounted for 97 percent."¹⁰² Casualties of other UNC countries, exclusive of the U.S. and ROK, totaled approximately 17,000 although no other Allied nation lost as many as 1,000 dead. ROK casualties were listed at 850,000. Communist losses were estimated at 1,420,000 (CCF: 900,000 killed and wounded; NKPA: 520,000 killed and wounded).

For the Republic of South Korea, the end of the war in some respects represented a *status quo ante bellum*. Korea still remained politically partitioned and geographically divided. Whereas the 38th Parallel had been the territorial boundary prior to the Communist attack of 25 June 1950, the cease-fire line dividing North and South Korea in 1953 was the point of contact between ground forces at the time the armistice was signed. This demarcation line, however, "represented a stronger defense than the 38th Parallel as it possessed a geographical basis all along its approximately 155-mile length."¹⁰³ The new boundary ran above the KANSAS Line, the commanding ground north of the 38th Parallel.

Possibly the single, most important lesson to be drawn from the Korean War is that many of our nation's military assumptions—and resulting tactical decisions—tended to be based on a lack of appreciation of enemy capabilities. In many instances intelligence evaluations focused on "probable intentions of the enemy rather than on his capabilities."¹⁰⁴

While America put great military value and reliance on its massive destructive air power, for example, we were confronted by an enemy who practically never employed his own air capability, but instead moved freely at night and hid by day and was thus little deterred by our aerial harassment. And while our own battle summaries regularly cited kill ratios of 1 USMC to 3.75 CCF and sub-

¹⁰² Ridgway, *Korean War*, p. viii.

¹⁰³ Rees, *Korea*, p. 431. In the three years of war, North Korea had gained 850 square miles of territory southwest of the Parallel, while the ROK acquired 2,350 square miles north of the original June 1950 boundary.

¹⁰⁴ Collins, *War in Peacetime*, p. 175.

stantial Communist losses,¹⁰⁵ we seemed to ignore an enemy mind that thought in terms of numerical superiority and was little concerned about the high human cost of holding key terrain or annexing a desired position. In the last month of the war alone, Eighth Army estimated that CCF casualties numbered 72,000, with more than 25,000 killed.

In both battlefied tactics and high-level strategy, the Korean War revealed a strong tendency on the part of the UNC to predict enemy action by values and ideology largely reflecting our own. Whether because of wishful thinking, basic mistakes in judgment, or international *naïveté*, the 1950–1953 experience repeatedly indicated a need on the part of Allied nations for considerably more hard-headed realism in dealing with a Communist adversary. The original UNC military objective of halting Communist aggression in Korea had been successfully accomplished, without enlarging the conflict into a nuclear war. At the same time, Korea had also provided a sobering lesson. It demonstrated how, in a limited war, overriding political considerations may permit the enemy to operate from a privileged sanctuary and allow him to seize and, in many respects, retain the initiative.

The Korean War had made America more aware of the threat of world Communism and had resulted in the strengthening of our national defense commitments in the Far East as well as in Europe. It had also validated the concept of a balanced defense force. In contrast to the emphasis on air capability and atomic power that had dominated the strategic thinking in the post-World War II era, the Korean hostilities pointed to the requirement for a balanced, diversified military force of sufficient strength and readiness to cope effectively and on short notice with any emergency. Korea had underscored how severe peacetime budgetary cut-backs had led to unpreparedness. The Korean experience had also shown the need for flexibility in mobilization planning. Previously, this had been projected for an all-out, general war, based on America's role in World War II. The Nation's post-Korean policy thus sought, for the first

¹⁰⁵ Official records show that the 1stMarDiv inflicted approximately 59,805 CCF casualties (11,957 KIA; 15,111 estimated WIA or KIA; 32,643 estimated WIA; and 94 POWs) during the Apr 52–Jul 53 period on the western front. For the same time, Marine infantry casualties were approximately 13,000 plus some 2,500 for its 1st KMC/RCT.

time, a military strategy that would effectively deter either a major war or local aggression.

Korean hostilities illustrated another important lesson. South Korea had been attacked by an act of direct aggression, in flagrant violation of the Cairo Declaration and U.N. Charter. It was apparent that, despite the defense treaties and mutual aid pacts which the United States had signed during and after World War II, "any number of alliances, if not supported by strong military preparedness, would never restrain aggression."¹⁰⁶ It had taken the Korean War to drive home the harsh reality that military preparedness, possession of superior power, and *the willingness to use that power* were the only deterrent to enemy aggression throughout the world.

The Korean War also caused the Communists to modify their strategy from one of overt aggression to more insidious means of gaining their political and economic objectives. As the Marine Corps Commandant, General Shepherd, warned: "Their tactic is to use war by proxy, war by satellite, war by threat and subversion."¹⁰⁷ And, although it was not fully apparent at the time, the Korean attack "was to prove to be one of the first in a series of 'wars of liberation' "¹⁰⁸ that the world would be witness to.

In the final analysis, the Korean War evolved into a prolonged battle of position and attrition in which the Communists, operating close to their base of supply, were fought to a standstill by United Nations forces under unfavorable conditions of climate and logistics. In countering the enemy threat in Korea, the American units committed there initially suffered from the effects of peacetime apathy that had followed the rapid demobilization following World War II. As the Korean War, originally visualized as a "police action" of brief duration, ground on into a major effort spanning a period of three years and one month, loud voices were raised on the home front to protest the expenditure of lives and materiel in a venture that was not always clearly understood by all Americans.

Among the U.S. forces committed on this far flung battlefield, it was once again the Marine Corps component that stood out in its sacrifice, military skills, and devotion to duty. When rushed into the battle during the first desperate weeks and months of the war,

¹⁰⁶ Marshall, *Military History of Korean War*, p. 2.

¹⁰⁷ Anl Rpt of the CMC to SecNav, FY 1955, p. 3.

¹⁰⁸ Collins, *War in Peacetime*, pp. 3-4.

the quickly-augmented Marine units helped to restore stability to the shattered EUSAK front line. During the daringly conceived and executed operation at Inchon, Marines accomplished this incredibly complex amphibious operation with their customary spirit and precision. Never was their courage and tenacity more conspicuous than during those bitter days of the Chosin Reservoir campaign following the Chinese Communist intervention.

In the static, or positional, warfare that marked the final operations in Korea, the 1st Marine Division and 1st Marine Aircraft Wing executed their respective missions with professional skill and dispatch, regardless of tactical problems and the dreary monotony that characterized a large part of the Korean War. U.S. Marines had seen combat throughout much of the Korean peninsula. The fighting had taken them from Pusan to Inchon and Seoul, to the Chosin, to Inje and the Hwachon Reservoir in the Punchbowl area, and finally, in 1952-1953, to the critical 35-mile front in West Korea near Panmunjom. In Korea, as in past wars, Marines demonstrated the versatility, aggressiveness, and readiness which has always been a tradition of the Corps.

Marine courage and combat performance went far toward removing the image of Western softness and decadence which the Communists had so mistakenly construed in their own minds. It is a record of which all Americans and the Free World can be proud.

APPENDIX A

Glossary of Technical Terms and Abbreviations

AAA—Antiaircraft Artillery	ComNavFE—Commander, Naval Forces, Far East
AA—Antiaircraft	ComServPac—Commander, Service Force, Pacific
AD—Douglas "Skyraider" Single-Engine Attack Aircraft	CONUS—Continental United States
ADC—Assistant Division Commander	COP—Combat Outpost
ANGLICO—Air and Naval Gunfire Liaison Company	CP—Command Post
AO—Aerial Observer	CPX—Command Post Exercise
ASP—Ammunition Supply Point	CSG—Combat Service Group
AT—Antitank	CTE—Commander Task Element
AU—Attack model of Vought F4U "Corsair"	CTF—Commander Task Force
BAR—Browning Automatic Rifle	CTG—Commander Task Group
BLT—Battalion Landing Team	CVE—Escort Aircraft Carrier
Bn—Battalion	CVL—Light Aircraft Carrier
Brig—Brigade	Div—Division
Btry—Battery	DMZ—Demilitarized Zone
CAS—Close Air Support	DOW—Died of Wounds
CCF—Chinese Communist Forces	Dtd—Dated
CG—Commanding General	DUKW—Marine Amphibious Truck
CinCFE—Commander in Chief, Far East	ECIDE(U)—East Coast Island Defense Element (Unit)
CinCUNC—Commander in Chief, United Nations Command	ECM—Electronic Countermeasures
CinCPacFlt—Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet	Engr—Engineer
CMC—Commandant of the Marine Corps	EUSAK—Eighth United States Army in Korea
CNO—Chief of Naval Operations	F2H-2P—McDonnell "Banshee" Two-Engine Jet Fighter (photo model)
Co—Company	F3D-2—Douglas "Skyknight" Two-Engine Jet Fighter
CO—Commanding Officer	F4U—Vought "Corsair" Single-Engine Fighter
ComdD—Command Diary (also called Historical Diary, or War Diary)	F7F-3N—Grumman "Tigercat" Twin-Engine Night Fighter

- F9F-2,4,5—Grumman "Panther"
 Single-Engine Jet Fighter
 F-80—Air Force "Shooting Star"
 Fighter Aircraft
 F-84—Air Force "Thunderjet"
 Fighter Aircraft
 FAC—Forward Air Controller
 FAF—Fifth Air Force
 FASRon—Fleet Air Service Squadron
 FDC—Fire Direction Center
 FEAF—Far East Air Forces
 FECOM—Far East Command
 FMFLant—Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic
 FMFPac—Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
 FO—Forward Observer (artillery)
 FY—Fiscal Year
 HE—High Explosive
 Hedron—Headquarters Squadron
 H&I—Harassing & Interdiction
 HMR—Marine Helicopter Transport Squadron
 HO3S-1—Sikorsky Three-Place Observation Helicopter
 Hq—Headquarters
 HQMC—Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps
 HRS-1—Sikorsky Single-Engine Helicopter
 H&S—Headquarters and Service
 HTL-4—Bell Two-Place Helicopter
 Interv—Interview
 JCS—Joint Chiefs of Staff
 JOC—Joint Operations Center
 KCOMZ—Korean Communication Zone (sometimes KComZ)
 KIA—Killed in Action
 KMAG—Korean Military Advisory Group
 KMC—Korean Marine Corps
 KMC/RCT—Korean Marine Corps Regimental Combat Team
 KPR—Kimpo Provisional Regiment
 KSC—Korean Service Corps
 LogCom—Logistical Command
 Ltr—Letter
 LST—Landing Ship, Tank
 LVT—Landing Vehicle, Tracked
 M4A3E8—Flame Tank, Medium
 M-46—Medium Tank
 MAC—Military Armistice Commission
 MACG—Marine Air Control Group
 MAG—Marine Aircraft Group
 Mar—Marine(s)
 MARLEX—Marine Landing Exercise
 MASRT—Marine Air Support Radar Team
 MAW—Marine Aircraft Wing
 MBP—Main Battle Position
 MDL—Military Demarcation Line
 MGCIS—Marine Ground Control Intercept Squadron
 MIA—Missing in Action
 MIG—Russian Single-Seat Jet
 Fighter-Interceptor
 MLR—Main Line of Resistance
 MOH—Medal of Honor
 MOS—Military Occupation Specialty
 Mosquito—Single Engine Plane used as Airborne FAC and for Target Spotting
 MP—Military Police
 MPQ—Ground Radar-Controlled Bombing
 MS—Manuscript
 Msg—Message
 MSR—Main Supply Route
 MTACS—Marine Tactical Air Control Squadron
 MT—Motor Transport
 NCAS—Night Close Air Support
 NCO—Noncommissioned Officer
 NGF—Naval Gunfire
 NKPA—North Korean People's Army
 N.d.—Date not given
 NNRC—Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission
 NNSC—Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission
 N.t.—Title not given
 OCMH—Office of the Chief of Military History (USA)
 OE-1—Cessna Single-Engine Light Observation Plane

OOB—Order of Battle
 OP—Observation Post (Sometimes used to refer to an Outpost)
 OPLR—Outpost Line of Resistance
 OY—Consolidated—Vultee Light Observation Plane
 PIR—Periodic Intelligence Report
 PO-2—Russian Trainer Aircraft
 POW—Prisoner of War
 PPSH—Soviet-made 7.62mm Sub-machine ("Burp") Gun
 Prov—Provisional
 PUC—Presidential Unit Citation
 R4D—Douglas Twin-Engine Transport (Navy and Marine Corps designation of C-47)
 R5D—Douglas Four-Engine Transport (Navy and Marine Corps designation of C-54)
 RCT—Regimental Combat Team
 ROK—Republic of Korea
 SAR—Special Action Report
 SecDef—Secretary of Defense
 SecNav—Secretary of Navy
 Serv—Service
 Sig—Signal
 SOP—Standing Operating Procedure
 TACC—Tactical Air Coordination Center
 TADC—Tactical Air Direction Center
 TAFC—Turkish Armed Forces Command

TAO—Tactical Air Observer
 TE—Task Element
 T/E—Table of Equipment
 TF—Task Force
 TG—Task Group
 Tk—Tank
 T/O—Table of Organization
 TOT—Time on Target Fuze
 TU—Task Unit
 UN—United Nations
 UNC—United Nations Command
 USA—United States Army
 USAF—United States Air Force
 USMC—United States Marine Corps
 USN—United States Navy
 VMA—Marine Attack Squadron
 VMC—Marine Composite Squadron
 VMF—Marine Fighter Squadron
 VMF(N)—Marine Night (All-Weather) Fighter Squadron
 VMJ—Marine Photographic Squadron
 VMO—Marine Observation Squadron
 VMR—Marine Transport Squadron
 VT—Variable Time Fuze
 WCIDE(U)—West Coast Island Defense Element (Unit)
 WIA—Wounded in Action
 WP—White Phosphorous Shell
 YAK—Russian Fighter Aircraft

APPENDIX B

Korean War Chronology

1950

- 25 Jun North Korean People's Army, with 60,000 troops and 100 Russian tanks, crosses 38th Parallel to invade South Korea.
- 25 Jun United Nations Security Council calls for end of aggression and withdrawal of NKPA troops.
- 27 Jun UN, adopting a U.S. resolution, proclaims NKPA attack a breach of world peace. Asks member nations to assist ROK in repelling invasion.
- 27 Jun Pres Truman orders U.S. air-sea units to support ROK and for U.S. Seventh Fleet to neutralize Formosan Strait.
- 28 Jun NKPA captures Seoul, South Korean capital.
- 29 Jun Pres Truman orders naval blockade of Korean coast; authorizes Far East Commander, Gen MacArthur, to send U.S. ground troops into Korea.
- 30 Jun Pres Truman receives Congressional authorization to order into active service any or all reserve components of Armed Forces. for a period of 21 months.
- 2 Jul CNO directs that Marine reinforced regiment with supporting air be prepared for assignment to Far East.
- 2 Jul CinCFE requests Marine RCT-air unit for Far East. This was inception of 1st Provisional Marine Brigade, formed less than a week later.
- 3 Jul Inchon captured by North Koreans.
- 5 Jul- UNC fights series of delaying actions in Korea.
- 4 Aug
- 7 Jul U.N. Security Council authorizes formation of a United Nations Command as counterforce against NKPA aggression.
- 7 Jul 1st ProvMarBrig activated at Camp Pendleton, under BGen Edward A. Craig. Basic elements of 6,534-man Brigade are 5th Marines and MAG-33.
- 8 Jul Gen MacArthur named Commander, UNC.
- 10 Jul CinCUNC asks Joint Chiefs of Staff to authorize expansion of Marine Brigade to full war-strength division.
- 12-14 Jul 1st ProvMarBrig embarks for Korean theater.
- 12 Jul LtGen Walton H. Walker named CG, Eighth U.S. Army in Korea.

- 19 Jul CinCUNC makes 2d request for Marine division.
- 19 Jul Pres Truman authorizes Defense Dept to call up reserve units and individuals.
- 19 Jul CMC alerts Marine Corps organized reserve units for call to active duty following Presidential announcement.
- 20 Jul CMC, Gen Clifton B. Cates, orders to duty Organized Marine Corps ground reserve units, consisting of 22 units and 4,830 personnel. Partial callup for 6,000 air reservists in 30 Marine VMF and 12 MGCI squadrons.
- 20 Jul Taejon, temporary ROK capital, captured.
- 21 Jul CinCUNC makes 3d request for Marine division.
- 25 Jul UNC defense at Pusan deteriorates. CinCUNC orders 1st MarProvBrig directly to Korea.
- 25 Jul JCS directs Marine Corps to build 1stMarDiv to war-strength.
- 31 Jul Masan and Chinju fall to enemy.
- 2-3 Aug 1st ProvMarBrig arrives Pusan. Moves to bivouac area near Masan.
- 3 Aug First Marine air strike launched by VMF-214.
- 4 Aug Pusan Perimeter established by UNC in southeastern end of Korea.
- 4 Aug First evacuation of casualties from Pusan by Marine VMO-6 helicopters.
- 6 Aug First air mission flown by VMF-323.
- 6-8 Aug CinCUNC confers with U.S. military-diplomatic officials about proposed Inchon amphibious landing.
- 7-13 Aug Marine Brigade engaged in first combat operations at Chinju.
- 10 Aug First Marine helicopter rescue made by VMO-6 to recover downed pilot.
- 10-24 Aug 1stMarDiv units embark for Korea.
- 16 Aug EUSAK X Corps activated for coming Inchon-Seoul operation. Principal elements are 1stMarDiv and Army 7thInfDiv.
- 17 Aug Marine Brigade opens battle for Obong-ni ("No Name") Ridge, leading way to destruction of enemy bridgehead at Nakdong and first UNC victory in Korea.
- 17 Aug 7th Marines activated at Camp Pendleton and on 1 Sep embarks for Far East, arriving 21 Sep.
- 1-5 Sep NKPA launches all-out offensive to break UNC perimeter defense at Pusan. In Second Nakdong Battle, Brigade contains enemy at Yongsan.
- 13 Sep 1st ProvMarBrig deactivated and absorbed by 1stMarDiv for Inchon operation.
- 15 Sep D-Day, Inchon amphibious assault, spearheaded by 1stMarDiv.
- 17 Sep 1stMarDiv (5th Marines) recaptures Kimpo Airfield.
- 19-25 Sep Enemy resistance at Pusan begins to collapse. NKPA troops in retreat north from Pusan.
- 27 Sep 1stMarDiv recaptures Seoul. ROK Capital officially liberated 29 Sep.

- 30 Sep Communist China Foreign Minister Chou En-lai warns: "The Chinese people will not supinely tolerate seeing their neighbors being savagely invaded by the imperialists."
- 30 Sep- ROK 3d Div crosses 38th Parallel in pursuit of retreating NKPA.
- 1 Oct
- 7 Oct UN General Assembly authorizes UNC forces to cross 38th Parallel to defeat NKPA.
- 10 Oct Wonsan, east coast port at 39th Parallel, captured by ROK troops.
- 10 Oct Chinese repeat warning of intervention in Korean conflict.
- 16 Oct First Chinese Communist troops secretly enter Korea from Manchuria.
- 19 Oct Pyongyang, North Korean Capital at 39th Parallel, captured by EUSAK.
- 26 Oct Chinese troops attack ROK units at Yalu River and points south of Sino-Korean border.
- 26 Oct 1stMarDiv lands at Wonsan, establishes security for port, and drives north.
- 1 Nov UNC forward elements reach positions along Yalu. First Russian-built MIG appears along Yalu to attack U.S. aircraft.
- 2 Nov Strong Chinese and NKPA forces attack EUSAK at Unsan, causing withdrawal across Chongchon River. First identification of Chinese Communist Forces (CCF) in Korea.
- 3-7 Nov Initial Marine encounter with CCF. 7th Marines units defeat major elements of 124th CCF Division.
- 6 Nov MacArthur warns JCS that movement of CCF across Yalu threatens UNC position.
- 15 Nov Marine units reach Chosin Reservoir area in X Corps drive north.
- 24 Nov MacArthur announced "win the war" offensive. EUSAK begins advance toward Yalu.
- 26-27 Nov CCF, 200,000-strong, attack EUSAK troops forcing withdrawal. 1stMarDiv isolated at Yudam-ni, west of Chosin. MSR cut.
- 28 Nov- 1stMarDiv turns back CCF attacks. Prepares to move south.
- 3 Dec Regroups at Hagaru-ri for drive to Hungnam.
- 4 Dec Pyongyang recaptured by enemy.
- 5-7 Dec 1stMarDiv evacuates wounded by air and fights through to Koto-ri.
- 6 Dec Innovation of using airborne TADC as tactical CP to control air support.
- 10 Dec First Marine jet squadron to fly in combat, VMF-311, begins operations.
- 11 Dec 1stMarDiv completes fighting breakout from Chosin entrapment. Begins march to join rest of X Corps at Hungnam.
- 15 Dec 1stMarDiv deployed from Hungnam to Pusan.
- 15 Dec UNC establishes new defensive line at 38th Parallel.
- 18 Dec- Marine division routes enemy guerrilla forces in Masan-Pohang-Sondong-Andong area.
- 27 Jan

- 23 Dec EUSAK CG Walker killed in jeep accident. Gen Matthew B. Ridgway named to succeed him.
- 24 Dec Hungnam evacuation completed by X Corps.
- 29 Dec Large enemy buildup reported north of 38th Parallel, preparing for new attack.

1951

- 31 Dec- Enemy launches all-out offensive against UNC across 38th Parallel, pushing EUSAK back 10-12 miles.
- 1 Jan Seoul recaptured by Communists.
- 4 Jan
- 7-15 Jan Enemy offensive halted, UNC sets up new defense line along Pyongtaek-Wonju axis, at 37th Parallel.
- 25 Jan UNC reassumes offensive. Operation THUNDERBOLT launched by I and IX Corps to regain territory south of Han River.
- Jan-Feb 1stMarDiv continues antiguerrilla operations in Masan area.
- 7 Feb Communists forced north of Han River. UNC retakes Inchon peninsula.
- mid-Feb 1stMarDiv reassigned from X to IX Corps.
- 21 Feb Operation KILLER, a general limited objective advance by U.S. IX and X Corps, ordered by Gen Ridgway. 1stMarDiv reenters frontlines for operation.
- 7 Mar Operation RIPPER begins in central and eastern zones, with advance across Han by IX and X Corps.
- 14 Mar Seoul retaken by U.S. Eighth Army for second time.
- 27-31 Mar 1stMarDiv occupies 28,000-meter sector north of Hongchon. UNC elements reach 38th Parallel.
- 1-21 Apr 1stMarDiv in general advance north to the Hwachon Reservoir.
- 8 Apr Operation RIPPER clears enemy troops from South Korea east of Imjin River.
- 11 Apr Pres Truman relieves Gen MacArthur as CinCUNC, replacing him by Gen Ridgway, CG, EUSAK. LtGen James A. Van Fleet named Commander, EUSAK.
- 15 Apr UNC establishes defensive line along 38th Parallel, or KANSAS Line. Enemy heavily emplaced in Chorwon-Kumhwa-Pyonggang ("The Iron Triangle") assembly area.
- 22 Apr- CCF launches all-out "Spring Offensive."
- 8 Jul
- 23-27 Apr 1stMarDiv halts CCF left flank breakthrough of IX Corps, establishes defense line in Chunchon vicinity.
- 30 Apr UNC completes withdrawal to new defense line north of Seoul. Intelligence reports indicate CCF plans renewed attack.
- 1 May 1stMarDiv reassigned to X Corps.
- 9 May 1st MAW squadrons participate in FAF 300-plane strike on Sinuiju, near Yalu. Biggest raid of war to date.
- 16 May Second phase of enemy offensive begins. CCF drives south from Iron Triangle area, making penetrations 15-20 miles deep along the front.

- 20 May FAF launches Operation STRANGLE, massive all-out interdiction effort.
- 21 May UNC launches counter offensive, pushes enemy north of 38th Parallel again. 1stMarDiv drives toward Yanggu at eastern end of Hwachon Reservoir.
- 30 May Eighth Army back on KANSAS Line again.
- 1-16 Jun 1stMarDiv advances northeast from Hwachon Reservoir to Punchbowl. Claws out daily gains of 1,000-2,000 meters, reaching objective despite heavy NKPA fire.
- mid-Jun UNC forces consolidate positions at 38th Parallel. UNC front approximately the same line as when Communist spring offensive began.
- 23 Jun UN Soviet delegate, Jacob Malik, proposes cease-fire discussions.
- 30 Jun UN notifies enemy of its readiness to discuss an armistice.
- 10 Jul Truce talks begin at Kaesong and fighting dies down along front. UN delegation led by U.S. Vice Admiral C. Turner Joy. Communists represented by LtGen Nam Il, NKPA.
- 26 Jul Negotiators at Kaesong agree on preliminary agenda.
- 5 Aug UNC suspends truce talks because of armed enemy troops in neutral area. Cease-fire talks resumed 10 Aug.
- 22 Aug Communists halt cease-fire talks, charge UN aircraft has violated neutrality zone.
- 31 Aug In final UNC offensive action of war, 1stMarDiv opens assault at Punchbowl. UN launches limited attacks to straighten line.
- 5 Sep 1stMarDiv gains initial objectives in Punchbowl area, new ridge-line to become part of Line MINNESOTA, EUSAK defensive line. Heavy attacks by IX Corps at Heartbreak and Bloody Ridge.
- 13 Sep HMR-161 effects first Marine mass helicopter combat resupply maneuver, Operation WINDMILL I.
- 18 Sep Marines advance to Soyang River, north of Punchbowl.
- 21 Sep Operation SUMMIT, first helicopter deployment of a combat unit, lands 224 fully-equipped troops and 17,772 lbs of cargo in Punchbowl area.
- 25 Oct Following two weeks of discussion between liaison officers, truce talks resumed at new site, Panmunjom.
- 28 Oct Cease-fire line agreed upon as present line of contact.
- 11 Nov HMR-161 conducts first frontline relief of a Marine battalion, in Operation SWITCH.
- 12 Nov Gen Ridgway, CinCUNC, orders EUSAK Commander, Gen Van Fleet to cease offensive operations and begin active defense of UN front.
- Nov-Dec General stalemate along Korean battlefield during truce discussions.
- 18 Dec Prisoner of war lists exchanged by UN and Communists.

1952

- 2 Jan UNC proposes principle of "voluntary repatriation" in POW exchange.
- 3 Jan UNC proposal violently rejected by Communists.
- Jan-Apr Disorders in UNC prison camps as screening of prisoners begins.
- 22 Feb Communist Korean Foreign Affairs Minister charges America with renewed bacteriological warfare attacks in North Korea. Chinese Communist Foreign Minister Chou En-Lai, issues similar statement on 8 Mar, alleging U.S. flyers participate in "germ warfare."
- 17 Mar 1stMarDiv reassigned from X Corps eastern-Korea position to I Corps far western end of EUSAK line. Takes over approximately 35 miles of Line JAMESTOWN on 24 Mar.
- 28 Apr Adm Joy presents UN "final offer," insists on voluntary repatriation principle.
- 7-11 May Rioting prisoners at Koje-do camp seize Gen Dodd and hold him hostage, until order restored.
- 12 May Gen Mark W. Clark succeeds Ridgway as CinCUNC, upon latter's departure to assume NATO command from Gen Eisenhower.
- 22 May MajGen William K. Harrison succeeds Adm Joy as chief of UN delegation at Panmunjom.
- Jun-Oct General stalemate along battlefield while truce talks deadlocked on POW repatriation question. Sharp limited objective attacks made by enemy against UNC defensive line.
- 9-16 Aug First major Marine ground action in western Korea, Battle of Bunker Hill (1st Marines).
- 19-20 Aug HMR-161 Operation RIPPLE introduces tactical innovation of transporting 4.5-inch rocket battery weapons and personnel to new firing position.
- 29 Aug Largest one-day FAF air assault of entire war, "All United Nations Air Effort" sends 1,403 sorties against North Korean Capital, Pyongyang.
- 22-26 Sep First resupply of MLR regiment by helicopter in Operation HAYLIGHT.
- 8 Oct UNC adjourns armistice talks "indefinitely"; complete deadlock on POW question.
- 26-28 Oct Battle of the Hook (7th Marines).
- 4 Nov Dwight D. Eisenhower elected President.
- 17 Nov India introduces compromise truce plan at United Nations.
- 2 Dec President-elect Eisenhower begins three-day tour of Korea.
- 3 Dec UN General Assembly adopts compromise Indian resolution by 54 to 5 vote.

1953

- Jan-Feb Winter lull in fighting. Cease-fire talks remain suspended.
- 2 Feb President Eisenhower, in State of Union message, ends "neutralization" of Formosa Strait.
- 11 Feb Gen Maxwell D. Taylor assumes EUSAK command from Gen Van Fleet.
- 22 Feb UNC proposes exchange of sick and wounded POWs, as preliminary step in full exchange of prisoners.
- 5 Mar Premier Joseph Stalin of Russia dies. Georgi Malenkov named to succeed him.
- 26-30 Mar 1stMarDiv combat outposts Vegas-Reno-Carson (5th Marines) under heavy attack.
- 28 Mar Communists accept UN proposal to discuss exchange of sick and wounded POWs.
- 30 Mar Chou En-lai indicates Communists will accept Indian UN compromise proposal. Truce talks to be resumed.
- 12 Apr 1st MAW flies first night CAS missions, using intersecting searchlight beams to mark enemy targets.
- 20-26 Apr Exchange of sick and wounded POWs, "Operation *LITTLE SWITCH*," takes place at Panmunjom, under direction of Mun-san-ni Provisional Command.
- 26 Apr Truce talks resumed at Panmunjom.
- 5 May 1stMarDiv relieved by U.S. 25thInfDiv; 1st Division assigned mission of I Corps Reserve.
- 7 May Communists accept UN proposal that prisoners unwilling to be repatriated be kept in neutral custody within Korea, rather than be removed elsewhere to a neutral nation.
- 28-30 May Savage fighting while truce details worked out by negotiators. CCF launches regimental-strength attack against I Corps sector. Heavy action in Nevada Cities and Hook area outposts. Marine tanks and artillery in support of defending 25thInfDiv line units.
- 6 Jun ROK national Assembly demands freedom for anti-Communist North Koreans held in South Korean POW camps. Civilian demonstrations break out in various EUSAK and I Corps localities.
- 8 Jun Agreement reached on POW question. POW nonrepatriates to be turned over to five-member neutral commission to decide disposition of POW cases. Pres Rhee declares armistice terms unacceptable to South Korea.
- 9 Jun ROK National Assembly unanimously rejects truce terms.
- 10-17 Jun Communists launch heaviest offensive in two years against ROK II Corps sector in Kumsong area. Heavy penetrations, with ROK II Corps pushed 4000 yards south to new MLR.
- 18 Jun Breakout of 25,000 North Korean anti-Communist prisoners from South Korean POW camps, assisted by ROK guards.

- Release ordered by Pres Rhee as protest against proposed armistice.
- 18-20 Jun Communists accuse UNC of complicity in freeing prisoners; truce talks suspended.
- 23-25 Jun Pres Rhee continues opposition to truce terms. Walter Robinson, U.S. Asst. Sec. of State for Far East and Gen Mark Clark start confidential talks with Rhee.
- 7-8 Jul COPs Berlin-East Berlin (7th Marines right regimental sector) under attack during Marine relief of 25thInfDiv.
- 8 Jul 1stMarDiv assumes operational control of its former MLR sector, relieving 25thInfDiv.
- 8 Jul Communists agree to resume armistice negotiations; talks reconvened 10 July.
- 11 Jul Robertson announces that Pres Rhee will no longer oppose truce terms.
- 11 Jul Maj John F. Bolt, VMF-115, becomes first Marine jet ace with kill of his fifth and sixth MIGs.
- 13-20 Jul CCF launches even larger offensive than June attack along central Korean front. IX and ROK II Corps MLR reestablished south of Kumsong River.
- 19 Jul Negotiators at Panmunjom reach agreement on truce.
- 19 Jul Marine outposts Berlin-East Berlin overrun; I Corps decrees positions should not be retaken.
- 24-27 Jul Heavy enemy attack in Berlin Complex ("Boulder City") area held by 7th and 1st Marines.
- 27 Jul Cease-fire agreement signed at Panmunjom at 1000. Fighting ends. Armistice effective at 2200.
- 5 Aug-6 Sep Final exchange of prisoners in Operation BIG SWITCH, at Panmunjom.

APPENDIX C

Command and Staff List

1ST MARINE DIVISION (REINFORCED)

AND

1ST MARINE AIRCRAFT WING

MARCH 1952—JULY 1953

1st Marine Division

Commanding General	MajGen John T. Selden (to 28 Aug 1952) MajGen Edwin A. Pollock (from 29 Aug) MajGen Randolph McC. Pate (from 16 Jun 1953)
Asst Division Commander..	BGen William J. Whaling (to 23 Mar 1952) BGen Merrill B. Twining (from 24 Mar) BGen Robert O. Bare (from 13 Jun) BGen Joseph C. Burger (from 31 Mar 1953)
Chief of Staff	Col Austin R. Brunelli (to 10 Oct 1952) Col Henry W. Buse, Jr. (from 11 Oct) Col Lewis W. Walt (from 15 Jun 1953)
G-1	Col Walter N. Flournoy (to 31 Mar 1952) Col John F. Dunlap (from 1 Apr) Col Sidney M. Kelly (from 11 Sep) Col Albert F. Metze (from 1 Jun 1953) Col Wendell H. Duplantis (from 20 Jul)
G-2	LtCol James H. Tinsley (to 9 Apr 1952) Col Sidney S. Wade (from 10 Apr) LtCol William R. Watson, Jr. (from 24 Apr) Col Clarence A. Barninger, Jr. (from 11 Oct) Col William F. Prickett (from 20 Dec) Col Loren E. Haffner (from 1 Apr 1953) Col James E. Mills (from 10 Jul)
G-3	LtCol Gordon D. Gayle (to 22 Apr 1952) LtCol James H. Tinsley (from 24 Apr) Col Russell E. Honsowetz (from 15 Jun) Col Eustace R. Smoak (from 16 Dec) Col Lewis W. Walt (from 18 Apr 1953) LtCol Jess P. Ferrill, Jr. (from 15 Jun)
G-4	Col Robert A. McGill (to 27 Aug 1952) Col Thomas A. Culhane (from 28 Aug) Col Kenneth A. King (from 12 Nov) Col Richard H. Crockett (from 15 Dec) Col Thomas S. Ivey (from 15 May 1953)

Special Staff

Adjutant	Maj James K. Young (to 5 May 1952) Maj Charles T. Lamb (from 6 May) Maj Clyde W. Shealy (from 24 Feb 1953) Maj George K. Acker (from 1 Jun)
Air Officer	LtCol Edward V. Finn (to 14 Mar 1952) LtCol Walter F. Cornnell (from 15 Mar) LtCol William E. Abblitt (from 12 Feb 1953)
Anti-Tank Officer	Maj Harold C. Howard (to 4 Aug 1952) Maj Herbert E. L. Zastrow (from 5 Aug) LtCol Earl W. Gardner (from 18 Nov) Maj Marshall Salvaggio (from 10 Jan 1953) Capt William F. Doehler (from 6 Apr)
Amphibian Tractor Officer..	LtCol Michiel Dobervich (to 1 Aug 1952) LtCol Edwin B. Wheeler (from 2 Aug) LtCol George S. Saussy, Jr. (from 7 Nov) LtCol Frank R. Wilkinson, Jr. (from 16 Mar 1953) Maj John McN. Rosebush (from 16 Jun)
Armored Amphibian Officer.	LtCol John T. O'Neill (to 5 Aug 1952) Maj James L. Jones (from 6 Aug) LtCol Henry G. Lawrence, Jr. (from 12 Aug) LtCol Fenlon A. Durand (from 4 Dec) Maj Ralph J. Parker, Jr. (from 16 May 1953) LtCol Maurice C. Goodpasture (from 15 Jul)
Artillery Officer	Col Frederick P. Henderson (to 20 Sep 1952) Col Harry N. Shea (from 21 Sep) Col James E. Mills (from 22 Feb 1953) Col Manley L. Curry (from 5 Jul)
Chaplain	Cdr Walter S. Peck, Jr., USN (to 16 Apr 1952) Cdr Edward A. Slattery, USN (from 17 Apr) Cdr Lonnie W. Meachum, USN (from 28 Dec)
Chemical Warfare and Radiological Defense Officer	Maj Harold C. Howard (to 4 Aug 1952) Maj Herbert E. L. Zastrow (from 5 Aug) LtCol Earl W. Gardner (from 18 Nov) Maj Marshall Salvaggio (from 10 Jan 1953) Capt Gerald W. Gibson (from 30 Jan)
Dental Officer	Capt Francis C. Snyder, USN (to 26 Apr 1952) Cdr Clifford H. Rice, USN (from 27 Apr) Capt William M. Fowler, USN (from 26 May) Capt James R. Justice, USN (from 12 Mar 1953)

- Embarkation Officer LtCol John H. Papurca (to 1 Mar 1952)
 LtCol James F. Coady (from 2 Mar)
 LtCol Richard S. Johnson (from 5 Sep)
 Maj Edwin J. St. Peter (from 6 Nov)
 LtCol John N. Rentz (from 24 Nov)
 LtCol Sidney F. Jenkins (from 12 May 1953)
- Engineer Officer Col August L. Vogt (to 5 Jul 1952)
 (None listed for 6-16 July)
 Col Robert E. Fojt (from 17 Jul)
 LtCol Harry D. Clarke (from 1 Feb 1953)
 Col Walter R. Lytz (from 1 Apr)
- Exchange Officer Capt Benjamin Reed (to 28 Nov 1952)
 Capt John H. Thomas (from 29 Nov)
- Food Director 1stLt Herbert E. McNabb (to 15 Jun 1952)
 Maj Louis P. Penny (from 16 Jun)
 Maj Francis K. Bernardini (from 23 Apr 1953)
- Historical Officer 2dLt Francis X. Goss (to 22 Mar 1952)
 Capt Robert F. Seward (from 23 Mar)
 Capt William R. Smith (from 16 Jul)
 1stLt Virgil S. Price (from 8 Nov)
 2dLt John J. Creamer, Jr. (from 7 Dec)
 Capt Verle E. Ludwig (from 6 Apr 1953)
 2dLt Thomas A. MacCalla (from 22 Jul)
- Inspector Col William K. Davenport, Jr. (to 17 Mar 1952)
 Col Thomas C. Moore (from 18 Mar)
 Col Eustace R. Smoak (from 18 Jul)
 Col Clayton O. Totman (from 9 Aug)
 Col Wallace M. Nelson (from 5 Dec)
 Col Albert F. Metze (from 29 Apr 1953)
 Col Manley L. Curry (from 1 Jun)
 Col Edwin C. Ferguson (from 13 Jul)
- Legal Officer LCdr Arnold W. Eggen, USN (to 12 Jan 1953)
 Cdr Earl C. Collins, USN (from 13 Jan)
 LtCol Raymond G. Coyne (from 8 Jul)
- Motor Transport Officer . . . Maj Walter R. O Quinn (to 14 May 1952)
 LtCol Kenneth E. Martin (from 15 May)
 LtCol Hugh J. Chapman (from 12 Mar 1953)
 LtCol Jack F. McCollum (from 29 Jun)
- Naval Gunfire Officer Maj John V. Downs (to 5 Aug 1952)
 LtCol William P. Pala (from 6 Aug)
 LtCol Robert D. Shaffer (from 16 Sep)
 LtCol Henry H. Reichner, Jr. (from 20 Dec)
 LtCol Robert D. Shaffer (from 26 Apr 1953)
 Capt Robert J. Daeschler (from 15 Jul)

Ordnance Officer	Maj Harold C. Borth (to 5 May 1952) LtCol William F. Pulver (from 6 May) Maj Joseph O. Weist (from 4 Jun) Maj Stanley Tesko (from 21 Oct) LtCol Marshall R. Pilcher (from 1 Apr 1953) LtCol Samuel L. Grigsby (from 1 Jun)
Postal Officer	CWO George C. Hunter (to 25 Jun 1952) 2dLt Frederick T. McNamara, Jr. (from 26 Jun) 2dLt Rudolph R. Hendrick (from 18 May 1953) CWO Emerson R. Murrell (from 2 Jun)
Provost Marshal	LtCol William F. Pulver (to 31 Mar 1952) LtCol Sidney J. Altman (from 1 Apr) LtCol Frederick R. Findtner (from 15 Aug) LtCol Jess P. Ferrill (from 12 Jan 1953) LtCol Harold R. Warner, Jr. (from 18 Apr) Maj Walter L. Williams (from 23 Jul)
Public Information Officer ..	1stLt Robert S. Gray (to 5 May 1952) 1stLt Robert F. Coll (from 6 May) Maj Charles F. McKiever (from 5 Jul) Capt Bem Price (from 7 Nov) Capt Verle E. Ludwig (from 21 Jul 1953)
Shore Party Officer.....	LtCol Warren S. Sivertsen (to 26 Jul 1952) Col William G. Robb (from 27 Jul) LtCol Russell Duncan (from 2 Oct) Col Glenn C. Funk (from 3 Dec) Col William H. Barba (from 21 Mar 1953)
Signal Officer	LtCol Jino J. D'Allessandro (to 5 Apr 1952) LtCol John E. Morris (from 6 Apr) LtCol Eugene A. Dueber (from 18 Aug) LtCol Ralph M. Wismer (from 14 Nov) LtCol Frank G. Casserly (from 27 Jul 1953)
Supply Officer	Col Chester R. Allen (to 27 Apr 1952) Col Hawley C. Waterman (from 28 Apr) Col LeRoy Hauser (from 1 Feb 1953)
Special Services Officer.....	LtCol John E. Gorman (to 23 Jul 1952) Maj Alfred A. Tillmann (from 24 Jul) Maj William J. Kohler (from 8 Nov) Capt Don H. Blanchard (from 20 Apr 1953)
Surgeon	Capt Louis P. Kirkpatrick, USN (to 18 Jun 1952) Capt Lawrence E. Bach, USN (from 19 Jun) Capt Walter R. Miller, USN (from 25 Apr 1953)
Tank Officer	Maj Walter E. Reynolds, Jr. (to 20 May 1952) LtCol John I. Williamson, Jr. (from 21 May) LtCol Charles W. McCoy (from 16 Apr 1953)

Headquarters Battalion

- Commanding Officer Col Robert T. Stivers, Jr. (to 5 Jul 1952)
 Maj Anthony R. Frankiewicz (from 6 Jul)
 LtCol Oscar F. Peatross (from 12 Jul)
 LtCol John F. Corbett (from 11 Sep)
 Col Alexander W. Gentlemen (from 21 Nov)
 LtCol John C. Landrun (from 16 May 1953)
- Executive Officer Maj Corbin L. West (to 16 Mar 1952)
 Maj Anthony R. Frankiewicz (from 17 Mar)
 Maj Charles F. McKiever (from 10 Nov)
 Maj John K. Hogan (from 31 Jan 1953)
 (None listed for 29Feb-14May)
 Capt Joseph Hornstein (from 15 May)
- Commanding Officer,
 Headquarters Company Capt "J" E. Hancey (to 9 Mar 1952)
 Capt Robert J. McKay (from 10 Mar)
 1stLt George C. Schatteman (from 6 May)
 Maj Louis A. Cortright (from 1 Jul)
 2dLt Neil O. Snett (from 17 Jul)
 Maj Val Price, Jr. (from 29 Aug)
 Capt Joseph Hornstein (from 15 Jan 1953)
 Capt Robert A. Hohmann (from 15 May)
 Capt Martin S. Hauge (from 28 May)
- Commanding Officer,
 Military Police Company. LtCol William F. Pulver (to 31 Mar 1952)
 LtCol Sidney J. Altman (from 1 Apr)
 LtCol Frederick R. Findtner (from 15 Aug)
 LtCol Jess P. Ferrill, Jr. (from 12 Jan 1953)
 LtCol Harold B. Warner, Jr. (from 18 Apr)
 Maj Walter L. Williams (from 23 Jul)
- Commanding Officer,
 Reconnaissance Company. Maj Ephraim Kirby-Smith (to 10 Jun 1952)
 Capt James O. Webb (from 11 Jun)
 Capt James H. A. Flood (from 11 Sep)
 Maj Dermott H. MacDonnell (from 3 Dec)
 Maj Marvin D. Perskie (from 21 Jun 1953)

1st Marines

- Commanding Officer Col Sidney S. Wade (to 9 Apr 1952)
 Col Walter N. Flournoy (from 10 Apr)
 Col Walter F. Layer (from 25 Jul)
 Col Hewitt D. Adams (from 21 Nov)
 Col Wallace M. Nelson (from 1 May 1953)

Executive Officer LtCol Clifford F. Quilici (to 26 Mar 1952)
 Col Clarence A. Barninger, Jr. (from 27 Mar)
 LtCol Carlo A. Rovetta (from 2 May)
 LtCol Glenn R. Long (from 16 Sep)
 LtCol Sidney F. Jenkins (from 4 Feb 1953)
 LtCol Lowell E. English (from 8 May)
 LtCol Harold C. Boehm (from 2 Jul)

1st Battalion, 1st Marines

Commanding Officer LtCol John H. Papurca (to 2 Aug 1952)
 LtCol Louis N. King (from 3 Aug)
 LtCol Max H. LaGrone (from 13 Sep)
 Col Frederick R. Findtner (from 14 Jan 1953)
 LtCol Stanley M. Adams (from 5 Jun)
 Executive Officer Maj Ralph "C" Rosacker (to 5 Apr 1952)
 Maj Leo V. Gross (from 6 Apr)
 Maj John K. Logan (from 14 Jul)
 Maj William C. Chip (from 20 Aug)
 Maj John K. Hogan (from 30 Dec)
 Maj Marvin D. Perskie (from 4 Feb 1953)
 Maj Roger D. Peterson (from 19 Jun)

2d Battalion, 1st Marines

Commanding Officer LtCol Thell H. Fisher (to 1 Apr 1952)
 LtCol Clifford F. Quilici (from 2 Apr)
 LtCol Roy J. Batterton, Jr. (from 23 Jun)
 LtCol Charles E. Warren (from 18 Oct)
 LtCol George A. Gililand (from 9 Feb 1953)
 LtCol Frank A. Long (from 1 Jul)
 Executive Officer Maj Frank J. Harte (to 5 May 1952)
 Maj Fletcher R. Wycoff (from 6 May)
 Maj John N. Rentz (from 29 Jul)
 Maj John P. McNeill (from 21 Aug)
 Maj Horace C. Reifel (from 9 Mar 1953)
 Maj John B. Bristow (from 20 Apr)
 Maj Albert S. Dooley, Jr. (from 1 Jul)

3d Battalion, 1st Marines

Commanding Officer LtCol Spencer H. Pratt (to 11 Apr 1952)
 LtCol Carlo A. Rovetta (from 12 Apr)
 LtCol Gerard T. Armitage (from 2 May)
 LtCol Sidney J. Altman (from 20 Aug)
 LtCol Ernest G. Atkin, Jr. (from 6 Dec)
 LtCol Lowell E. English (from 1 Apr 1953)
 LtCol Roy D. Miller (from 6 May)

Executive Officer Maj Robert V. Perkins (to 2 Jul 1952)
 Maj Wesley R. Christie (from 3 Jul)
 Maj Charles S. Robertson (from 27 Oct)
 Maj Norman C. Smyle (from 3 Jan 1953)
 Maj Robert D. Thurston (from 26 Mar)
 Maj Walter L. Williams (from 20 May)
 Maj John T. Quinn (from 2 Jul)

5th Marines

Commanding Officer Col Thomas A. Culhane, Jr. (to 15 Aug 1952)
 Col Eustace R. Smoak (from 16 Aug)
 Col Lewis W. Walt (from 10 Dec)
 Col Harvey C. Tschirgi (from 14 Apr 1953)
 Executive Officer LtCol John A. Saxten (to 1 Jun 1952)
 LtCol Franklin B. Nihart (from 2 Jun)
 LtCol William S. McLaughlin (from 20 Jul)
 LtCol Jess P. Ferrill, Jr. (from 21 Aug)
 LtCol Edwin B. Wheeler (from 2 Jan 1953)
 LtCol James H. Finch (from 23 May)
 LtCol James Taul (from 18 Jul)

1st Battalion, 5th Marines

Commanding Officer LtCol Franklin B. Nihart (to 24 May 1952)
 Maj Paul H. Bratten, Jr. (from 25 May)
 LtCol Alexander W. Gentleman (from 15 Jul)
 LtCol Edwin B. Wheeler (from 11 Nov)
 LtCol Jonas M. Platt (from 26 Dec)
 LtCol Jackson B. Butterfield (from 29 Apr 1953)
 Executive Officer Maj Hildeburn R. Martin (to 4 May 1952)
 Maj Lyle K. London (from 5 May)
 Maj Robert H. Twisdale (from 29 Aug)
 Maj William C. Doty, Jr. (from 25 Jan 1953)
 Maj Thomas W. Pearson (from 2 Apr)
 Maj George R. Burke (from 11 Jun)
 Maj Charles E. McPartlin, Jr. (from 22 Jun)

2d Battalion, 5th Marines

Commanding Officer LtCol William H. Cushing (to 10 Jun 1952)
 LtCol Thomas J. Cross (from 11 Jun)
 LtCol William S. McLaughlin (from 20 Aug)
 LtCol Oscar F. Peatross (from 11 Sep)
 LtCol James H. Finch (from 27 Feb 1953)
 LtCol Andrew C. Geer (from 14 May)

Executive Officer Maj Robert S. Hudson (to 10 Jun 1952)
 Maj John C. Lundrigan (from 11 Jun)
 Maj Philip H. McArdle (from 16 Jul)
 Maj Paul C. Scofield (from 19 Dec)
 Maj Thomas M. Fields (from 26 Jun 1953)

3d Battalion, 5th Marines

Commanding Officer LtCol William S. McLaughlin (to 15 Jul 1952)
 LtCol Oscar T. Jensen, Jr. (from 16 Jul)
 LtCol Robert J. Oddy (from 16 Nov)
 LtCol John T. Hill (from 11 Apr 1953)
 Executive Officer Maj Paul H. Bratten, Jr. (to 22 May 1952)
 Maj Clifford J. Robichaud, Jr. (from 23 May)
 Maj Joseph A. Bruder, Jr. (from 7 Jul)
 Maj Vernon Burtman (from 1 Nov)
 Maj Joseph S. Buntin (from 7 Feb 1953)

7th Marines

Commanding Officer Col Russell E. Honsowetz (to 10 Jun 1952)
 Col Thomas C. Moore, Jr. (from 11 Jun)
 Col Loren E. Haffner (from 5 Nov)
 Col Glenn C. Funk (from 27 Mar 1953)
 Executive Officer LtCol John D. Wiggins (to 17 Jul 1952)
 LtCol Fenlon A. Durand (from 18 Jul)
 LtCol Richard D. Strickler (from 24 Nov)
 LtCol Robert S. Howell (from 22 Mar 1953)
 LtCol Russell Duncan (from 26 May)
 LtCol Stanley J. Nelson (from 31 Jul)

1st Battalion, 7th Marines

Commanding Officer LtCol George W. E. Daughtry (to 2 Aug 1952)
 LtCol Leo J. Dulacki (from 3 Aug)
 LtCol James C. Short (from 22 Nov)
 LtCol Henry G. Lawrence, Jr. (from 28 Dec)
 LtCol Harry A. Hadd (from 18 May 1953)
 Executive Officer Maj Henry V. Joslin (to 14 Jul 1952)
 Maj Theodore R. Cathey (from 15 Jul)
 Maj James C. Short (from 23 Jul)
 Maj Floyd M. Johnson, Jr. (from 2 Aug)
 Maj Roy H. Thompson (from 1 Dec)
 Maj Glenn E. Ferguson (from 3 Jun 1953)
 Maj Joseph R. Motelewski (from 25 Jun)

2d Battalion, 7th Marines

Commanding Officer LtCol Noel C. Gregory (to 18 Jul 1952)
 LtCol Anthony Caputo (from 19 Jul)
 LtCol Richard S. Johnson (from 12 Nov)
 LtCol Alexander D. Cereghino (from 19 Mar 1953)
 LtCol Joseph C. Missar (from 21 Jul)

Executive Officer Maj Erwin Madsen (to 19 Apr 1952)
 Maj William J. Zaro (from 20 Apr)
 Maj James C. Feters (from 8 Jun)
 Maj Richard H. Mickle (from 24 Oct)
 Maj Littleton K. Smith (from 16 Apr 1953)
 Maj Ralph E. June (from 17 Jun)
 Maj Don P. Wyckoff (from 17 Jul)

3d Battalion, 7th Marines

Commanding Officer LtCol Houston Stiff (to 26 Apr 1952)
 Maj Franklin C. Bacon (from 27 Apr)
 LtCol Gerald F. Russell (from 17 Jun)
 LtCol Charles D. Barrett, Jr. (from 13 Oct)
 LtCol Russell Duncan (from 14 Mar 1953)
 LtCol Paul M. Jones (from 26 May)

Executive Officer Maj Franklin C. Bacon (to 26 Apr 1952)
 Maj Richard M. Remington (from 27 Apr)
 Maj Harold T. Clemens (from 28 Aug)
 Maj Guy L. Wade (from 13 Oct)
 Maj Alfred A. Tillman (from 23 Oct)
 Maj John Mesko (from 25 May 1953)

11th Marines

Commanding Officer Col Frederick P. Henderson (to 20 Sep 1952)
 Col Harry N. Shea (from 21 Sep)
 Col James E. Mills (from 22 Feb 1953)
 Col Manly L. Curry (from 5 Jul)

Executive Officer LtCol Lewis A. Jones (to 4 Jun 1952)
 LtCol Robert F. Steidtmann (from 5 Jun)
 LtCol Earl W. Gardner (from 16 Jan 1953)
 LtCol Robert D. Heinl, Jr. (from 6 May)
 Maj Joseph E. Fogg (from 6 Jul)
 LtCol Wade H. Hitt (from 9 Jul)

1st Battalion, 11th Marines

Commanding Officer LtCol James R. Haynes (to 24 Jun 1952)
 LtCol David S. Randall (from 25 Jun)
 LtCol Olin W. Jones, Jr. (from 2 Nov)
 LtCol Earl W. Gardner (from 8 May 1953)

Executive Officer Maj Harold E. Nelson (to 21 Jun 1952)
 Maj Herbert E. L. Zastrow (from 22 Jun)
 Maj Lee P. Vance (from 26 Jul)
 Maj Harry L. Sherwood, Jr. (from 14 Nov)
 Maj Thomas L. Randall (from 17 Dec)
 Maj John J. Jarvis, Jr. (from 25 Mar 1953)

2d Battalion, 11th Marines

Commanding Officer LtCol George B. Thomas (to 2 May 1952)
 LtCol William P. Pala (from 3 May)
 LtCol Bert Davis, Jr. (from 6 Aug)
 LtCol Arthur J. Bachhuber (from 17 Nov)
 LtCol William H. Atkinson (from 10 Feb 1953)
 Maj Max Berueffy, Jr. (from 21 May)
 LtCol Gordon H. West (from 18 Jul)

Executive Officer Maj Morris R. Snead (to 10 Jun 1952)
 Maj Edward L. Fossum (from 11 Jun)
 LtCol Bert Davis, Jr. (from 1 Jul)
 Maj Roy E. Moffett (from 10 Aug)
 Maj Max Berueffy, Jr. (from 2 Sep)
 Maj Joseph F. Donahoe, Jr. (from 24 May 1953)
 Maj Herman Poggemeyer, Jr. (from 13 Jul)

3d Battalion, 11th Marines

Commanding Officer LtCol Henry E. W. Barnes (to 13 Jul 1952)
 LtCol Charles O. Rogers (from 14 Jul)
 LtCol Daniel S. Pregnall (from 27 Nov)
 LtCol Alfred L. Owens (from 25 Mar 1953)
 Maj Dale D. Meyers (from 28 Jul)

Executive Officer LtCol Charles A. Lipot (to 5 Jul 1952)
 Maj Joseph S. Gardner (from 6 Jul)
 Maj William J. Kohler (from 27 Jul)
 Maj Lawrence L. Graham (from 17 Nov)
 Maj Robert M. Jenkins (from 15 Dec)
 Maj Adolph J. Honeycutt (from 28 Mar 1953)
 Maj Robert C. Hilliard (from 7 May)
 Maj Leslie L. Page (from 12 Jun to 26 Jul)

4th Battalion, 11th Marines

Commanding Officer LtCol William M. Gilliam (to 11 Apr 1952)
 LtCol Bruce F. Hillam (from 12 Apr)
 Maj Carl A. Nielsen (from 16 Jun)
 LtCol Raymond D. Wright (from 16 Jul)
 Maj William J. Sullivan (from 18 Dec)

Executive Officer LtCol Robert D. Shaffer (from 20 Dec)
 Maj David L. Moberly (from 23 Apr 1953)
 LtCol Henry H. Reichner, Jr. (from 27 Apr)
 LtCol Bruce F. Hillam (to 16 Apr 1952)
 Maj Richard H. Jeschke, Jr. (from 17 Apr)
 Maj Carl A. Nielsen (from 11 Jun)
 Maj Edward E. Davis (from 16 Jun)
 Maj William J. Sullivan (from 17 Oct)
 Maj David L. Moberly (from 22 Feb 1953)
 Maj Johnny Jennings (from 2 May)
 Maj George W. Carrington, Jr. (from 13 Jun)

7th Motor Transport Battalion

Commanding Officer Maj Herbert E. Pierce (to 1 Jul 1952)
 LtCol Robert B. McBroom (from 2 Jul)
 Maj John H. Faggart (from 27 Jul)
 Maj Robert S. Anderson (from 16 Jun 1953)
 Executive Officer Maj Ben Sutts (to 15 Aug 1952)
 Maj John J. Howe (from 16 Aug)
 Maj Joseph P. Cushing (from 20 Nov)
 Maj Alfred G. McCormick (from 26 Apr 1953)

1st Ordnance Battalion

Commanding Officer Maj Harold C. Borth (to 5 May 1952)
 LtCol William F. Pulver (from 6 May)
 Maj Marshall R. Pilcher (from 26 Aug)
 Maj Maurice C. Pulliam (from 25 Mar 1953)
 Executive Officer Capt Frederick V. Osborn (to 5 May 1952)
 Maj Harold C. Borth (from 6 May)
 Maj Marshall R. Pilcher (from 16 Jul)
 Maj Frederick V. Osborn (from 26 Aug)
 Maj Allen F. Stockdale (from 1 Sep)
 Maj Frederick V. Osborn (from 15 Sep)
 Maj Stanley P. Bulkowski (from 4 Nov)
 Maj Maurice C. Pullian (from 21 Dec)
 Maj Stanley P. Bulkowski (from 25 Mar 1953)
 Maj Jack G. Fitzgerald (from 4 Jul)

1st Service Battalion

Commanding Officer LtCol Bernard W. McLean (to 18 May 1952)
 LtCol Charles E. Warren (from 19 May)
 LtCol Edwin A. Law (from 1 Oct)
 LtCol Hugh J. Chapman (from 5 Jul 1953)
 Executive Officer Maj George E. Allison (to 27 Oct 1952)
 Maj James C. Feters (from 28 Oct)
 Maj Robert "J" Vroegindewey (from 19 Mar 1953)

1st Tank Battalion

Commanding Officer Maj Walter E. Reynolds, Jr. (to 20 May 1952)
 LtCol John I. Williamson (from 21 May)
 LtCol Charles W. McCoy (from 16 Apr 1953)
 Executive Officer Maj Edward C. Nelson, Jr. (to 15 Jun 1952)
 Maj Robert B. Jeter (from 16 Jun)
 Maj William W. Day (from 21 Feb 1953)
 Maj Francis C. Hogan (from 6 May)

1st Armored Amphibian Battalion

Commanding Officer LtCol John T. O'Neill (to 5 Aug 1952)
 Maj James L. Jones (from 6 Aug)
 LtCol Henry G. Lawrence, Jr. (from 12 Aug)
 LtCol Fenlon A. Durand (from 4 Dec)
 Maj Ralph J. Parker, Jr. (from 16 May 1953)
 LtCol Maurice C. Goodpasture (from 15 Jul)
 Executive Officer Maj James L. Jones (to 5 Aug 1952)
 Maj David Young (from 6 Aug)
 Maj James L. Jones (from 12 Aug)
 Maj Ralph J. Parker, Jr. (from 21 Nov)
 Maj Robert S. Wilson (from 16 May 1953)

1st Motor Transport Battalion

Commanding Officer LtCol Howard E. Wertman (to 15 May 1952)
 Maj Walter R. O'Quinn (from 16 May)
 LtCol Robert B. McBroom (from 27 Jul)
 LtCol Robert E. McCook (from 24 Mar 1953)
 Executive Officer Maj Raymond L. Luckel (to 2 Aug 1952)
 Maj Marvin D. Grush (from 3 Aug)
 Maj Joseph P. Cushing (from 6 Sep)
 Maj Gobe Smith, Jr. (from 4 Oct)
 Maj Robert C. McNab, Jr. (from 17 Feb 1953)

1st Combat Service Group

Commanding Officer Col Russell N. Jordahl (to 29 Jun 1952)
 Col Kenneth A. King (from 30 Jun)
 LtCol Sidney F. Jenkins (from 8 Nov)
 Col James T. Wilbur (from 8 Dec)
 Col Edwin C. Ferguson (from 8 Feb 1953)
 Col James A. Moreau (from 8 Jul)
 Executive Officer LtCol James G. Kelly (to 20 May 1952)
 Col Frank M. Reinecke (from 21 May)
 LtCol William H. Cushing (from 11 Jun)
 LtCol Sidney F. Jenkins (from 8 Dec)

LtCol Max H. LaGrone (from 28 Jan 1953)
 LtCol Tillman N. Peters (from 15 Mar)
 Maj Harvey B. Atkins (from 11 May)

1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion

Commanding Officer LtCol Michiel Dobervich (to 1 Aug 1952)
 LtCol Edwin B. Wheeler (from 2 Aug)
 LtCol George S. Saussy, Jr. (from 7 Nov)
 LtCol Frank R. Wilkinson, Jr. (from 16 Mar 1953)
 Maj John McN. Rosebush (from 16 Jun)
 Executive Officer Maj William L. Eubank (to 3 Jun 1952)
 Maj George S. Saussy, Jr. (from 4 Jun)
 Maj William E. Lunn (from 7 Nov)
 Maj John McN. Rosebush (from 24 Mar 1953)
 Maj John J. DePalma (from 20 Jun)

1st Shore Party Battalion

Commanding Officer LtCol Warren S. Sivertsen (to 26 Jul 1952)
 Col William G. Robb (from 27 Jul)
 LtCol Russell Duncan (from 2 Oct)
 Col Glenn C. Funk (from 3 Dec)
 Col William H. Barba (from 21 Mar 1953)
 Executive Officer Maj Frederick F. Draper (to 3 Jun 1952)
 Maj William E. Buron (from 4 Jun)
 LtCol Clyde P. Ford (from 12 Aug)
 LtCol Francis X. Witt, Jr. (from 3 Mar 1953)
 LtCol Eugene A. Dueber, Jr. (from 18 Apr)
 LtCol James M. Joyner (from 8 Jul)

1st Engineer Battalion

Commanding Officer LtCol John V. Kelsey (to 5 May 1952)
 LtCol Harry D. Clarke (from 6 May)
 LtCol Francis W. Augustine (from 1 Dec)
 LtCol Francis X. Witt, Jr. (from 20 Apr 1953)
 Executive Officer Maj Grover C. Williams, Jr. (to 5 Jun 1952)
 Maj Francis W. Augustine (from 6 Jun)
 Maj George W. Torbert (from 1 Dec)
 Maj Donald V. Nahrgang (from 26 Jun 1953)

1st Medical Battalion

Commanding Officer Cdr Richard Lawrence, Jr., USN (to 31 Aug 1952)
 Cdr William W. Ayres, USN (from 1 Sep)

Executive Officer Cdr James C. Luce, USN (to 12 May 1952)
 (none listed from 13 May to 8 Jun)
 LCDr James A. McLaughlin, USN (from 9 Jun)
 Cdr Roald N. Grant, USN (from 24 Aug to 21
 Sep)
 (none listed from 22 Sep to 25 Apr 1953)
 Lt Roger D. Williams, USN (from 26 Apr)

1st Signal Battalion

Commanding Officer LtCol John E. Morris (to 3 Apr 1952)
 LtCol Alton L. Hicks (from 4 Apr)
 LtCol Jacob E. Glick (from 3 Aug)
 LtCol Eugene A. Dueber, Jr. (from 16 Feb 1953
 to 22 Apr 1953)
 Executive Officer Maj Ernest C. Bennett (to 4 Apr 1952)
 Maj Bolish J. Kozak (from 5 Apr)
 Maj Mauro J. Padalino (from 12 Jul)
 Maj Frederick J. Cramer (from 30 Dec)
 Maj John J. Reber (from 8 Feb 1953 to 22 Apr
 1953)

(This battalion was disbanded on 22 Apr 1953.)

1st Marine Aircraft Wing (1st MAW)

Commanding General MajGen Christian F. Schilt (to 11 Apr 1952)
 MajGen Clayton C. Jerome (from 12 Apr 1952)
 MajGen Vernon E. Megee (from 9 Jan 1953)
 Asst Commanding General . . BGen Frank H. Lamson-Scribner (to 30 Aug
 1952)
 BGen Alexander W. Kreiser, Jr. (from 31 Aug)
 Chief of Staff Col Arthur F. Binney (to 30 Apr 1952)
 Col Frank H. Schwable (from 1 May)
 Col John Wehle (from 9 Jul)
 Col Samuel S. Jack (from 8 Sep)
 Col John C. Munn (from 8 May 1953)
 Asst Chief of Staff, G-1 Col Robert O. Bisson (to 7 Sep 1952)
 Col Lewis H. Delano, Jr. (from 8 Sep)
 LtCol William M. Frash (from 11 May 1953)
 Col Lawrence B. Clark (from 29 May)
 Asst Chief of Staff, G-2 Col John W. Stage (to 14 May 1952)
 LtCol Chester A. Henry, Sr. (from 15 May)
 Maj Donald E. Kramer (from 22 Jul)
 LtCol Harold Granger (from 16 Sep)
 Col Arthur R. Stacy (from 25 Jul 1953)
 Asst Chief of Staff, G-3 Col Stanley W. Trachta (to 8 Apr 1952)
 Col William R. Wendt (from 9 Apr)
 Col Louis B. Robertshaw (from 2 Sep)

Col Charles H. Hayes (from 29 Sep)
 Col William D. Roberson (from 30 May 1953)
 Col Frank H. Wirsig (from 5 Jul)
 Asst Chief of Staff, G-4 Col Elmer T. Dorsey (to 24 Mar 1952)
 Col Robert E. Galer (from 25 Mar)
 Col Robert W. Clark (from 24 May)
 Col Richard D. Hughes (from 11 Feb 1953)
 Col Richard M. Baker (from 4 Jul)

Headquarters Squadron, 1st MAW

Commanding Officer Maj Earl C. Miles (to 29 May 1952)
 Maj David R. Moak (from 30 May)
 Maj Charles H. Woodley (from 1 Sep)
 Maj Lionel D. Hastings (from 26 Sep)
 Maj Charles W. Boggs, Jr. (from 1 Mar 1953)
 Maj Fred J. Gilhuly (from 1 Jul)

Marine Wing Service Squadron 1 (MWSS-1)

(Decommissioned 1 Jul 1953)

and

Marine Wing Service Group 17 (MWSG-17)

(Commissioned 1 Jul 1953)

Commanding Officer Col John Wehle (to 8 Apr 1952)
 LtCol Birney B. Truitt (from 9 Apr)
 LtCol Donald D. Blue (from 17 Jul)
 Col Lyle H. Meyer (from 21 Sep)
 LtCol Francis K. Coss (from 11 May 1953)
 Col Robert J. Johnson (from 30 Jun)
 Executive Officer LtCol Birney B. Truitt (to 8 Apr 1952)
 Maj William L. Woodruff (from 9 Apr)
 Maj Edward L. Schnettler (from 4 Jun)
 Maj Franklin L. Kemper (from 26 Aug)
 LtCol William G. Voss (from 20 Dec)
 LtCol Francis K. Coss (from 21 Apr 1953)
 Maj Elswin P. Dunn (from 11 May)
 LtCol Charles J. Prall (from 6 Jul)

Headquarters Squadron, MWSG-17

(Commissioned 1 Jul 1953)

Commanding Officer Capt James D. Ireland (from 1 Jul 1953)

Marine Air Base Squadron 17 (MABS-17)

(Activated 1 Jul 1953)

Commanding Officer Maj Bryce Howerton (from 1 Jul 1953)

Marine Aircraft Repair Squadron 17 (MARS-17)
(Activated 1 Jul 1953)

Commanding Officer Maj Vincent Franano (from 1 Jul 1953)
Maj James G. Fox (from 29 Jul)

Marine Air Control Group 2 (MACG-2)

Commanding Officer Col Frederick R. Payne (to 18 May 1952)
Col John W. Stage (from 19 May)
Col Jack R. Cram (from 11 Jul)
Col Kenneth D. Kerby (from 16 Feb 1953)
Executive Officer LtCol Russell D. Rupp (to 1 May 1952)
LtCol Philip "L" Crawford (from 2 May)
LtCol William A. Houston, Jr. (from 20 Jun)
LtCol Harold L. Lantz (from 11 Aug)
LtCol Lawrence F. Fox (from 24 Feb 1953)
LtCol Randolph C. Berkeley, Jr. (from 23 May)
LtCol John S. Flickinger (from 10 Jun)
LtCol Morris E. Flater (from 21 Jun)

Marine Tactical Air Control Squadron 2 (MTACS-2)

Commanding Officer LtCol Hensley Williams (to 2 Jun 1952)
Maj Clinton E. Jones (from 3 Jun)
LtCol William H. Whitaker, Jr. (from 1 Aug)
LtCol Frederick M. Rauschenbach (from 21 Aug)
LtCol Arthur C. Lowell (from 28 Jan 1953)
Col Joseph A. Gerath, Jr. (from 20 Feb)
LtCol Randolph C. Berkeley, Jr. (from 11 Jun)
Executive Officer Maj Clinton E. Jones (to 2 Jun 1952)
Capt John F. Driftmier (from 3 Jun)
Maj George C. Henshaw (from 28 Aug)
Maj Thomas H. Hughes, Jr. (from 25 Sep)
LtCol Arthur C. Lowell (from 20 Feb 1953)
(none listed from 15 Mar to 9 Jul)
Capt Robert L. Dietrichson (from 10 Jul)

Marine Ground Control Intercept Squadron 1 (MGCIS-1)

Commanding Officer Maj Fred A. Steele (to 15 Aug 1952)
Maj Henry W. Hise (from 16 Aug)
Maj Wallace G. Wethe (from 16 Oct)
Lt Col Joseph F. Wagner, Jr. (from 3 Feb 1953)
Maj Randal A. Yarberry (from 1 Jun)
LtCol Harold F. Brown (from 23 Jun)

Executive Officer Maj Marvin R. Bridges, Jr (to 11 Apr 1952)
 Capt William J. Wachsler (from 12 Apr)
 Capt Francis K. McManus (from 22 May)
 Maj William Sloane (from 1 Aug)
 Maj Romeo F. Bordigon (from 4 Oct)
 Maj Tolbert T. Gentry (from 2 Nov)
 Maj Francis F. Rotter (from 8 Jan 1953)
 Capt John E. Dixon (from 31 May)
 Maj Randal A. Yarberry (from 23 Jun)

Marine Ground Control Intercept Squadron 3 (MGCIS-3)

Commanding Officer LtCol Owen M. Hines (to 20 May 1952)
 Maj James H. Foster (from 21 May)
 LtCol Robert J. Hoey (from 14 Jun)
 LtCol Kenneth D. Frazier (from 16 Aug)
 Lt Col John B. Maas, Jr. (from 3 Feb 1953)
 Maj Nathan B. Peevey, Jr. (from 19 May)
 Maj James E. Lovin, Jr. (from 1 Jul)
 LtCol Lowell D. Grow (from 27 Jul)
 Executive Officer Maj James H. Foster (to 1 Jun 1952)
 Capt Lee B. Swindall (from 2 Jun)
 Maj Roy A. Thorson (from 21 Jun)
 Maj Raleigh E. Fletcher (from 5 Sep)
 Maj Francis E. Lee, Jr. (from 29 Oct)
 Maj Nathan B. Peevey, Jr. (from 4 Feb 1953)
 Capt William K. Lebo (from 19 May)
 Maj Thomas E. Archer (from 20 Jun)
 Maj James E. Lovin, Jr. (from 27 Jul)

Marine Composite Squadron 1 (VMC-1)
 (Activated 15 Sep 1952)

Commanding Officer LtCol Lawrence F. Fox (to 24 Jan 1953)
 LtCol Ernest C. Fusan (from 25 Jan)
 LtCol Thomas "H" Mann, Jr. (from 16 Mar)
 Maj George H. Linnemeier (from 6 Apr)
 LtCol Wilbur A. Free (from 1 Jun)

Marine Aircraft Group 12 (MAG-12)

Commanding Officer Col Elmer T. Dorsey (to 24 May 1952)
 Col Robert E. Galer (from 25 May)
 Col John P. Condon (from 10 Aug)
 Col George S. Bowman, Jr. (from 13 Jan 1953)
 Col Edward B. Carney (from 1 Apr)

Executive Officer Lt Col Robert J. Hoey (to 5 Jun 1952)
 Lt Col Joseph A. Gray (from 6 Jun)
 Col George S. Bowman, Jr. (from 17 Aug)
 Lt Col Barnette Robinson (from 20 Feb 1953)
 Col Robert J. Johnson (from 19 Mar)
 Col William F. Hausman (from 30 Jun)

Headquarters Squadron, MAG-12

Commanding Officer Capt George Byers, Jr. (to 22 Apr 1952)
 1stLt Daniel F. McConnell (from 24 Apr)
 Maj Godfrey Muller (from 1 Jul)
 Capt William M. Crooks (from 18 Sep)
 Capt Edgar F. Remington (from 21 Dec)
 Capt Bradford N. Slenning (from 15 May 1953)

Marine Air Base Squadron 12 (MABS-12)

Commanding Officer LtCol Carl M. Longley (to 31 Mar 1952)
 Maj Sumner H. Whitten (from 1 Apr)
 LtCol Graham H. Benson (from 25 Aug)
 LtCol Barnette Robinson (from 11 Oct)
 LtCol Eystein J. Nelson (from 1 Jan 1953)
 LtCol Richard M. Huizenga (from 1 Mar)
 LtCol Rufus D. Sams (from 1 Jul)

Executive Officer Maj Robert A. Collett (to 31 Mar 1952)
 Maj LeRoy T. Frey (from 1 Apr)
 Maj Oscar C. Hauge, Jr. (from 26 May)
 Maj Sumner H. Whitten (from 18 Aug)
 LtCol Barnette Robinson (from 18 Sep)
 Maj Frank Hick (from 11 Oct)
 Maj Harry J. Anderson (from 20 Jan 1953)
 LtCol Rufus D. Sams (from 14 Apr)
 Maj Donald A. McMillan (from 11 Jul)

Marine Aircraft Maintenance Squadron 12 (MAMS-12)

Commanding Officer LtCol Joseph A. Gray (to 31 May 1952)
 Maj James G. G. Taylor (from 1 Jun)
 Maj William M. Johnston, Jr. (from 19 Aug)
 Maj Leonard I. Beatty (from 29 Dec)
 LtCol Walter E. Gregory (from 20 Feb 1953)
 LtCol Clarence H. Moore (from 27 Jun)
 Maj Mervin L. Taylor (from 18 Jul)

Executive Officer Maj Robert E. Will (to 26 Apr 1952)
 Maj James G. G. Taylor (from 27 Apr)
 Capt Robert T. Kinsey (from 1 Jun)
 Maj James G. G. Taylor (from 19 Aug)
 Maj Warren L. MacQuarrie (from 1 Sep)
 Maj John R. Hyneman (from 15 Dec)
 Maj Leonard I. Beatty (from 20 Feb 1953)
 Maj Alexander Gagy (from 15 Apr)
 Maj Mervin L. Taylor (from 12 Jul)

Marine Attack Squadron 121 (VMA-121)

Commanding Officer LtCol William Q. Houston, Jr. (to 19 Jun 1952)
 LtCol Philip "L" Crawford (from 20 Jun)
 LtCol Wayne M. Cargill (from 11 Sep)
 LtCol Richard M. Huizenga (from 7 Dec)
 LtCol John E. Hughes (from 1 Mar 1953)
 Maj Richard L. Braun (from 21 Apr)
 LtCol Harold B. Penne (from 16 Jul)

Executive Officer Maj Henry W. Horst (to 31 May 1952)
 Maj Robert H. Brumley (from 1 Jun)
 Maj Julius B. Griffin (from 30 Jul)
 LtCol Donald D. Blue (from 2 Nov)
 LtCol Roy R. Hewitt (from 11 Dec)
 LtCol John E. Hughes (from 17 Jan 1953)
 Maj Mervin L. Taylor (from 1 Mar)
 Maj Robert C. Woten (from 16 Jul)

Marine Fighter Squadron 212 (VMF-212)
 redesignated

Marine Attack Squadron 212 (VMA-212)
 on 10 Jun 1952

Commanding Officer LtCol Robert L. Bryson (to 9 Jun 1952)
 LtCol Graham H. Benson (from 10 Jun)
 LtCol Maurice W. Fletcher (from 5 Sep)
 LtCol Charles E. Dobson, Jr. (from 25 Oct)
 LtCol Barnette Robinson (from 1 Jan 1953)
 LtCol Louis R. Smunk (from 20 Feb)
 Maj Edward C. Kicklighter (from 1 Jun)
 LtCol James R. Wallace (from 19 Jun)

Executive Officer Maj Richard B. Elliott (to 29 Feb 1952)
 Maj Roy A. Thorson (from 8 Mar)
 Maj Leslie C. Reed (from 10 Jun)

LtCol Walter E. Gregory (from 25 Oct)
 Maj Norman O'Bryan (from 20 Feb 1953)
 Maj Edward C. Kicklighter (from 7 Mar)
 Maj Donald A. McMillan (from 1 Jun)
 Maj Edward C. Kicklighter (from 19 Jun)
 Maj Boris J. Frankovic (from 20 Jul)

Marine Fighter Squadron 323 (VMF-323)
 redesignated

Marine Attack Squadron 323 (VMA-323)
 on 30 Jun 1952)

(Transferred from operational control of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing
 on 7 Jul 1953)

Commanding Officer LtCol Richard L. Blume (to 25 Apr 1952)
 Maj William A. Weir (from 26 Apr)
 LtCol Henry S. Miller (from 1 Jun)
 LtCol Kenneth R. Chamberlain (from 1 Sep)
 LtCol Williard C. Lemke (from 20 Nov)
 LtCol William M. Frash (from 13 Jan 1953)
 LtCol Clarence H. Moore (from 11 Apr to 26 Jun)
 Executive Officer Maj William A. Weir (to 8 Jun 1952)
 Maj Richard E. Pryor (from 9 Jun)
 Maj Eystein J. Nelson (from 1 Sep)
 Maj Thomas M. Forsyth, Jr. (from 20 Nov)
 LtCol Clarence H. Moore (from 2 Jan 1953)
 Lt Col Frederick M. Rauschenbach (from 29 Jan)
 Maj Robert C. Woten (from 3 May to 26 Jun)

Marine Attack Squadron 332 (VMA-332)

(Came under the operational control of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing
 on 29 May 1953)

Commanding Officer LtCol John B. Berteling (from 29 May 1953)
 Executive Officer Maj Gordon L. Allen (from 29 May 1953)

Marine Attack Squadron (VMA-251)
 attached to

1st Marine Aircraft Wing
 on 9 Jun 1953

Commanding Officer LtCol Harold A. Harwood (from 9 Jun 1953)
 Executive Officer Maj James W. Merritt (from 9 Jun 1953)

Marine Night-Fighter Squadron 513 (VMF(N)-513)

Commanding Officer	LtCol John R. Burnett (to 11 Jun 1952) Col Peter D. Lambrecht (from 12 Jun) LtCol Jack C. Scott (from 19 Jun) LtCol Homer G. Hutchinson, Jr. (from 9 Sep) LtCol Robert F. Conley (from 20 Jan 1953) LtCol Ross S. Mickey (from 6 May) LtCol Robert L. Conrad (from 10 Jul)
Executive Officer	Maj Frank H. Simonds (to 19 Apr 1952) Maj William D. Patterson, Jr. (from 23 Apr) Lt Col Jack C. Scott (from 15 Aug) Maj Gordon E. Gray (from 20 Aug) LtCol Jack C. Scott (from 8 Sep) LtCol Jack B. Winters (from 14 Sep) Maj Dave E. Severance (from 20 Jan 1953) Maj Richard M. Hunt (from 9 Jun) LtCol Robert L. Conrad (from 24 Jun) Maj Richard M. Hunt (from 10 Jul)

Marine Aircraft Group 33 (MAG-33)

Commanding Officer	Col Martin A. Severson (to 23 May 1952) Col John P. Condon (from 24 May) Col Herbert H. Williamson (from 11 Aug) Col Louis B. Robertshaw (from 22 Oct) Col Arthur R. Stacy (from 10 May 1953) Col John L. Smith (from 24 Jul)
Executive Officer	LtCol Vernon O. Ullman (to 13 May 1952) LtCol Graham H. Benson (from 14 May) Col Herbert H. Williamson (from 26 Jul) LtCol Darrell D. Irwin (from 11 Aug) Col John P. Coursey (from 17 Aug) Col Arthur R. Stacy (from 25 Mar 1953) LtCol James K. Dill (from 11 May) LtCol Thomas V. Murto, Jr. (from 26 Jul)

Headquarters Squadron, MAG-33

Commanding Officer	Capt Allen R. Schutter (to 30 May 1952) Maj Guy M. Cloud (from 1 Jun) Maj Richard J. Collins (from 21 Jul) Maj Reuel H. Pietz (from 1 Nov) Maj Thomas J. Cushman, Jr. (from 14 Apr 1953) Capt Jerry N. Hendershot (from 26 May)
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Marine Air Base Squadron 33 (MABS-33)

Commanding Officer	Maj Frank P. Barker, Jr. (to 9 Jun 1952)
	Maj John W. Zuber (from 10 Jun)
	Maj William D. Patterson, Jr. (from 6 Aug)
	Maj Kenneth B. Nelson (from 9 Dec)
	Lt Col Bernard McShane (from 21 Apr 1953)
	LtCol Arthur M. Moran (from 1 Jun)
	LtCol Jack Cosley (from 26 Jul)
Executive Officer	Maj George K. Harshberger (to 1 May 1952)
	Maj Summerfield M. Taylor, Jr. (from 2 May)
	Capt Frederic T. Watts, Jr. (from 11 Aug)
	Maj Harold N. McLaffey (from 2 Oct)
	Maj Darwin P. Glaese (from 23 Dec)
	Capt George J. Collins (from 22 May 1953)

Marine Aircraft Maintenance Squadron 33 (MAMS-33)

Commanding Officer	Maj Zadik Collier (to 1 Sep 1952)
	Maj William N. Case (from 2 Sep)
	Maj Patrick Harrison (from 5 Feb 1953)
	Maj Julian P. Craigmiles (from 29 Jun)
Executive Officer	Maj Alton C. Bennett (from 1 Aug 1952)
	Maj John L. Herndon (from 12 Aug)
	Maj James Aldworth (from 2 Dec)
	Capt Marshall S. Austin (from 22 April 1953)

Marine Fighter Squadron 115 (VMF-115)

Commanding Officer	LtCol Thomas M. Coles (to 20 May 1952)
	Maj John W. Zuber (from 21 May)
	LtCol Robert C. Armstead (from 5 Jun)
	Maj Wallace G. Wethe (from 17 Jul)
	LtCol Royce W. Coln (from 18 Aug)
	LtCol John B. Maas, Jr. (from 29 Sep)
	LtCol Stoddard G. Cortelyou (from 1 Feb 1953)
	LtCol Joe L. Warren (from 31 Mar)
Executive Officer	LtCol Lynn H. Stewart (from 5 Jun)
	Maj Conrad G. Winter (to 26 Apr 1952)
	Maj John W. Zuber (from 27 Apr)
	Maj Griffith B. Doyle (from 21 May)
	Maj Wallace G. Wethe (from 10 Jun)
	Maj Arthur N. Nehf, Jr. (from 5 Aug)
	LtCol Joseph F. Wagner, Jr. (from 19 Nov)
	Lt Col Joe L. Warren (from 2 Feb 1953)
	Maj Carol Bernard (from 31 Mar)
	Maj James H. Phillips (from 25 Jun)

Marine Fighter Squadron 311 (WFMF-311)

- Commanding Officer LtCol Darrell D. Irwin (to 2 Jun 1952)
 Maj Henry W. Hise (from 3 Jun)
 Maj Kenneth D. Frazier (from 10 Jun)
 Maj William J. Sims (from 26 Jun)
 LtCol Arthur H. Adams (from 1 Oct)
 LtCol Francis K. Coss (from 1 Feb 1953)
 LtCol Arthur M. Moran (from 21 Apr)
 LtCol Bernard McShane (from 1 Jun)
- Executive Officer Maj Jay E. McDonald (to 27 Mar 1952)
 Maj Henry W. Hise (from 28 Mar)
 Maj Kenneth D. Frazier (from 26 Jun)
 Maj Harold A. Langstaff, Jr. (from 22 Aug)
 Maj Williams J. Sims (from 1 Oct)
 LtCol Walter R. Bartosh (from 12 Oct)
 LtCol Arthur M. Moran (from 20 Jan 1953)
 Maj John Skinner, Jr. (from 21 Apr)
 Maj William D. Heier (from 3 Jul)

Marine Attack Squadron (VMA-312)

(On 16 Jun 1953, this squadron was reassigned to the 3d Marine Aircraft Wing.)

- Commanding Officer LtCol Joe H. McGlothlin, Jr. (to 8 Apr 1952)
 LtCol Robert E. Smith, Jr. (from 9 Apr)
 LtCol George C. Axtell, Jr. (from 11 Jul)
 LtCol Robert E. Cameron (from 4 Oct)
 LtCol Winston E. Jewson (from 25 Jan to
 15 Jun 1953)
- Executive Officer Maj Alexander S. Walker, Jr. (to 7 Apr 1952)
 Maj Edmond P. Hartsock (from 9 Apr)
 Maj Walter D. Persons (from 11 Jul)
 Maj Marshall C. Gregory (from 1 Sep)
 Maj James W. Baker (from 13 Jan 1953)
 Maj Grover R. Betzer (from 2 Feb)
 Maj James L. Cooper (from 4 May to 10 Jun)

Marine Photographic Squadron 1 (VMJ-1)

- Commanding Officer Maj Robert R. Read (to 13 May 1952)
 LtCol Vernon O. Ullman (from 14 May)
 LtCol William H. Whitaker (from 11 Sep)
 LtCol Howard L. Walter (from 1 Nov)
 LtCol William M. Ritchey (from 16 Feb 1953)
 LtCol Leslie T. Bryan, Jr. (from 15 May)

Executive Officer Maj Albert E. James (to 3 Jun 1952)
 Maj Marion B. Bowers (from 4 Jun)
 Maj Grant W. McCombs (from 18 Jul)
 LtCol William H. Whitaker (from 28 Aug)
 Maj Grant W. McCombs (from 11 Sep)
 Maj Howard L. Walter (from 2 Oct)
 Maj Louis Conti (from 6 Nov)
 LtCol Grant W. McCombs (from 14 Dec)
 Maj Louis Conti (from 5 Feb 1953)
 Maj John E. Worlund (from 1 Apr)

Marine Helicopter Transport Squadron 161 (HMR-161)

Commanding Officer Col Keith B. McCutcheon (to 7 Aug 1952)
 LtCol John F. Carey (from 8 Aug)
 Col Owen A. Chambers (from 15 Mar 1953)
 Executive Officer Maj James R. Dyer (to 10 May 1952)
 Maj Zigmund J. Radolinski (from 11 May)
 LtCol David M. Danser (from 28 May)
 LtCol Russel R. Riley (from 1 Sep)
 Maj Gilbert Percy (from 3 Jun 1953)
 Lt Col John H. King, Jr. (from 1 Jul)

Marine Observation Squadron 6 (VMO-6)

Commanding Officer LtCol William H. Herring (to 10 May 1952)
 Maj Wallace J. Slappey, Jr. (from 11 May)
 LtCol Elkin S. Dew (from 11 Sep)
 LtCol William A. Cloman, Jr. (from 2 Feb 1953)
 LtCol Earl E. Anderson (from 1 Jul)
 Executive Officer Maj William G. MacLean, Jr. (to 25 Jun 1952)
 Maj Lynn E. Midkiff (from 26 Jun)
 Maj Alton W. McCully (from 5 Feb 1953)
 Maj John A. Hood (from 15 May)

1st 90mm AAA Gun Battalion

Battalion Commander Col Max C. Chapman (to 22 Nov 1952)
 Col Edgar O. Price (from 23 Nov)
 LtCol Henry S. Massie (from 7 Apr 1953)
 Executive Officer LtCol Kenneth P. Dunkle (to 30 Apr 1952)
 Maj Thomas J. Matthews (from 1 May)
 Maj Robert H. Twisdale (from 15 Mar 1953)
 Maj Henry V. Leasure (from 9 Jun)

APPENDIX D

Effective Strength

1ST MARINE DIVISION AND 1ST MARINE AIRCRAFT WING¹

Listed below are selected dates and figures which represent the effective strength of 1stMarDiv and 1st MAW throughout the 1952-1953 period.

Date	Officers	Enlisted	Total
31 Mar 52	2,238	30,790	33,028
	ground (1,412)	(24,811)	(26,223)
	aviation (826)	(5,979)	(6,805)
30 June 52	2,560	34,509	37,069
	ground (1,684)	(28,549)	(30,233)
	aviation (876)	(5,960)	(6,836)
31 Oct 52	2,403	33,726	36,129
	ground (1,423)	(26,795)	(28,218)
	aviation (980)	(6,931)	(7,911)
31 Jan 53	2,329	32,976	35,305
	ground (1,352)	(26,766)	(28,118)
	aviation (977)	(6,210)	(7,187)
30 Apr 53	2,307	33,995	36,302
	ground (1,370)	(28,172)	(29,542)
	aviation (937)	(5,823)	(6,760)
31 Jul 53	2,335	31,881	34,216 ²
	ground (1,412)	(25,299)	(26,711)
	aviation (923)	(6,582)	(7,505)

¹ Personnel figures file, Statistics Br., HQMC, 31 May 1950-31 Jan 1955.

² In addition, the 1stMarDiv was reinforced throughout this period by other indigenous military and civilian personnel.

APPENDIX E

Marine Corps Casualties

(Ground and Air)

KOREAN WAR 1950-1953¹

Date	KIA ²	Killed non- Battle	WIA	Cumula- tive Total
Aug-Dec 1950	1,526	30	6,229	7,785
Jan-Dec 1951	960	82	7,924	8,966
Jan-Mar 1952	87	19	600	706
Aug 1950-Mar 1952	2,573	131	14,753	17,457
Apr-Dec 1952	960	66	6,815	7,841
Jan-Jul 1953	729	47	4,470	5,246
Apr 1952-Jul 1953	1,689	113	11,285	13,087
TOTAL:				
Aug 1950 to Jul 1953	4,262	244	26,038	30,544

¹ Abstracted from U. S. Marine Corps Strength in Korea vs Korean Casualties by Month, 25 Jun 1950-27 Jul 1953, based on Korean Operation Report, Statistics Br., HQMC and Log Sheet, dtd 21 Aug 1967.

² KIA includes DOW, Captured and Died, and Missing In Action, Presumed Dead.

APPENDIX F

Marine Pilots and Enemy Aircraft Downed in Korean War

21Apr51	1stLt Harold D. Daigh (VMF-312, F4U-4, USS <i>Bataan</i>)	1 YAK
21Apr51	Capt Phillip C. DeLong (VMF-312, F4U-4, USS <i>Bataan</i>)	2 YAKs
30Jun51	†Capt Edwin B. Long (VMF(N)-513, F7F-3N)	1 PO-2
12Jul51	Capt Donald L. Fenton (VMF(N)-513, F4U-5NL)	1 PO-2
23Sep51	Maj Eugene A. Van Gundy (VMF(N)-513, F7F-3N)	1 PO-2
4Nov51	*Maj William F. Guss (VMF-311)	1 MIG
5Mar52	*Capt Vincent J. Marzello (VMF-311)	1 MIG
16Mar52	*LtCol John S. Payne (1st MAW)	1 MIG
7June52	1stLt John W. Andre (VMF(N)-513, F4U-5NL)	1 YAK-9
10Sep52	Capt Jesse G. Folmar (VMA-312, F4U, USS <i>Sicily</i>)	1 MIG
15Sep52	*Maj Alexander J. Gillis (VMF-311)	1 MIG
28Sep52	*Maj Alexander J. Gillis (VMF-311)	2 MIGs
3Nov52	†Maj William T. Stratton, Jr. (VMF(N)-513, F3D-2)	1 YAK-15
8Nov52	Capt Oliver R. Davis (VMF(N)-513, F3D-2)	1 MIG
10Dec52	§1stLt Joseph A. Corvi (VMF(N)-513, F3D-2)	1 PO-2

12Jan53	Maj Elswin P. Dunn (VMF(N)-513, F3D-2)	1 MIG
20Jan53	*Capt Robert Wade (MAG-33)	1 MIG
28Jan53	Capt James R. Weaver (VMF(N)-513, F3D-2)	1 MIG
31Jan53	LtCol Robert F. Conley (VMF(N)-513, F3D-2)	1 MIG
7Apr53	*Maj Roy L. Reed (VMF-115)	1 MIG
12Apr53	*Maj Roy L. Reed (VMF-115)	1 MIG
16May53	*Maj John F. Bolt (VMF-115)	1 MIG
18May53	*Capt Harvey L. Jensen (VMF-115)	1 MIG
22Jun53	*Maj John F. Bolt (VMF-115)	1 MIG
24Jun53	*Maj John F. Bolt (VMF-115)	1 MIG
30Jun53	*Maj John F. Bolt (VMF-115)	1 MIG
11Jul53	*Maj John F. Bolt (VMF-115)	2 MIGs
12Jul53	*Maj John H. Glenn (VMF-311)	1 MIG
19Jul53	*Maj John H. Glenn (VMF-311)	1 MIG
20Jul53	*Maj Thomas M. Sellers (VMF-115)	2 MIGs
22Jul53	*Maj John H. Glenn (VMF-311)	1 MIG

* Marines on temporary exchange duty with Fifth Air Force.

† First enemy aircraft destroyed at night by UNC.

‡ First enemy jet aircraft destroyed through use of airborne intercept radar equipped fighter.

§ First enemy aircraft destroyed by means of lock-on radar gear.

APPENDIX G

Unit Citations¹

PRESIDENTIAL UNIT CITATION

*The President of the Republic of Korea takes profound pleasure
in citing*

*for outstanding and superior performance of duty during the
period 26 October 1950 to 27 July 1953²*

THE FIRST UNITED STATES MARINE DIVISION (REINFORCED)

for the award of

PRESIDENTIAL UNIT CITATION

Landing at Wonsan on 26 October 1950 the First United States Marine Division (Reinforced) advanced to Yudam-ni where they engaged the Chinese Communist Forces. The heroic and courageous fighting of the First United States Marine Division (Reinforced), which was outnumbered but never out-fought by the Chinese Communist Forces; coupled with its fight against the terrible winter weather in this return to Hungnam, has added another glorious page to the brilliant history of the United States Marines. After regrouping and retraining, the First United States Marine Division (Reinforced) rejoined the United Nations Forces and began the attack to the north which drove the aggressors relentlessly before them. The enemy spring offensive during April 1951 which threatened to nullify the recent United Nations gains was successfully repulsed by the First Marine Division (Reinforced) and when other Republic of Korea Forces were heavily pressed and fighting for survival the timely offensive by this Division gave heart to the peoples of Korea. In March 1952 the First Marine Division (Reinforced) assumed responsibility of defending the western flank of the Eighth Army. In carrying out the responsibilities of this assignment the Marines won everlasting glory at Bunker Hill. Continuing active operations against the Communist enemy until the Armistice, the First Marine Division (Reinforced) inflicted heavy losses upon the aggressors and successfully repulsed their assaults upon strong point Vegas and Reno during March 1953, and during July 1953, just prior to the signing of the Armistice, again threw back the enemy in several days of severe fighting at strong points Berlin and East Berlin. Although suffering heavy losses during

¹ For text of previous awards to 1stMarDiv, 1st MAW, and 1st ProvMarBrig, see earlier volumes of this series.

² The Korean PUC, for the period 26 Oct 50 to 15 Feb 53, was presented to the 1stMarDiv in March 1953. Later, President Syngman Rhee furnished a second citation extending the period to include 16 Feb-27 Jul 53. The division was thus cited for the overall period 26 Oct 50 to 27 Jul 53, and the entire period is considered one award. Decorations & Medals Br., HQMC.

these engagements the First Marine Division (Reinforced) was at all times successful in maintaining the integrity of the United Nations' positions within their assigned sector. The First United States Marine Division (Reinforced), by its unparalleled fighting courage and steadfast devotion to duty, has won the undying affection and gratitude of the Korean people. During its entire campaign the First United States Marine Division (Reinforced) remained true to its motto of "Semper Fidelis". In keeping faith with the highest traditions of its own country the First United States Marine Division (Reinforced) kindled new hope in the breasts of all free men and women in the Republic of Korea. This Citation carries with it the right to wear the Presidential Unit Citation Ribbon by each individual member of the First United States Marine Division (Reinforced) who served in Korea during the stated period.

/S/ SYNGMAN RHEE
President

PRESIDENTIAL UNIT CITATION

*The President of the Republic of Korea takes profound pleasure
in citing*

for outstanding and superior performance of duty

THE FIRST MARINE AIRCRAFT WING

UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

The First Marine Aircraft Wing has distinguished itself in support of United Nations Forces in Korea from 27 February 1951 to 11 June 1953. During this period, Marine Aircraft flew over 80,000 combat sorties braving intense opposition to strike enemy fortifications, weapons and logistical installations throughout North Korea. These extensive combat operations, often conducted in hazardous weather, have provided United Nations' ground forces with unparalleled close air support and have inflicted heavy casualties and tremendous damage on enemy forces. Flying from forward Korean bases and from naval aircraft carriers, Marine aircraft have continually harassed enemy communication and transportation systems, successfully curtailing the resupply of hostile front line troops. The exceptional achievements of the officers and men of the First Marine Aircraft Wing have materially assisted the Republic of Korea in its fight for freedom. Their outstanding performance of duty reflects great credit upon themselves and is in accord with the highest traditions of military service.

The citation carries with it the right to wear the Presidential Unit Citation Ribbon by each individual member of the First Marine Aircraft Wing who served in Korea during the stated period.

/S/ SYNGMAN RHEE
President

PRESIDENTIAL UNIT CITATION
*The President of the Republic of Korea
takes pleasure in citing*

THE UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS ADVISORY COMPONENT
United States Naval Advisory Group

for outstanding service to the people of Korea and for aid in the development of the Korean Marine Corps during the period February 1953 to 27 July 1954.

While attached to the Republic of Korea Marine Corps the United States Marine Advisory Component performed commendable service by giving valuable advice and guidance thus enabling the Korean Marine Corps to attain a ready status for any emergency.

By their initiative and constant attention the officers and men have contributed materially to the effective operation of all offices and departments of the Korean Marine Corps. Their thorough knowledge of techniques and military matters has helped in the practical routine training and in the fitting of the Korean Marine Corps for effective combat duty.

By exemplary conduct and indomitable spirit the United States Marine Corps Advisory Component has left a permanent imprint on the Korean Marine Corps which will assist in the accomplishment of the missions assigned to it in the future.

The outstanding service of the officers and men of the United States Marine Corps Advisory Component is in the best tradition of the United States Naval Service and this Presidential Unit Citation is given in recognition of their significant contribution to the welfare of the Republic of Korea.

/S/ SYNGMAN RHEE
President

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

WASHINGTON

The Secretary of the Navy takes pleasure in commending the

FIRST MARINE DIVISION, REINFORCED

for service as set forth in the following CITATION:

"For exceptionally meritorious service during operations against enemy aggressor forces in Korea from 11 August 1952 to 5 May 1953 and from 7 to 27 July 1953. During these periods the First Marine Division, Reinforced, maintained the integrity of over thirty-five miles of defense line in Pan-

munjom Truce Area against the constant aggressions of the enemy. During the time the Division was in the lines, it was under fire and attack by a resolute, well-equipped and fanatical hostile force. The Division maintained an aggressive defense and constantly kept the enemy off balance by continuously patrolling, probing and raiding enemy positions, accompanied by the full weight of artillery and air support. Commencing in August 1952, and frequently thereafter, during the months of October 1952, March 1953, and July 1953, the enemy launched a series of large scale attacks to capture certain terrain features critical to the defense of friendly lines. The outposts and main defensive positions called Bunker Hill, The Hook, Reno, Carson, Vegas, Berlin and East Berlin, along with certain smaller outposts, gave title to battles of unsurpassed ferocity in which the full effort of the Marine Division was required to hurl back the attackers at heavy cost to both the Division and the enemy. That the lines in the Division sector remained firm and unbreached at the cessation of hostilities on 27 July 1953 gave eloquent tribute to the resourcefulness, courage, professional acumen and stamina of the members of the First Marine Division, Reinforced. Their inspiring and unyielding devotion to the fulfillment of their vital mission reflects the highest credit upon themselves and the United States Naval Service."

All personnel attached to and serving with the First Marine Division, Reinforced, during the periods 11 August 1952 to 5 May 1953 and 7 to 27 July 1953, or any part thereof, are hereby authorized to wear the NAVY UNIT COMMENDATION RIBBON. This includes all organic units of the Division and the following reinforcing units:

FLEET MARINE FORCE UNITS AND DETACHMENTS: 1st 4.5 Rocket Battery; 1st Combat Service Group; 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion; 7th Motor Transport Battalion; 1st Armored Amphibian Battalion; 1st Amphibian Truck Company; Team #1, 1st Provisional Historical Platoon; 1st Fumigation and Bath Platoon; 1st Air Delivery Platoon; Radio Relay Team, 1st Signal Operations Company; Detachment, 1st Explosive Ordnance Disposal Company; 2nd Platoon, Auto Field Maintenance Company; 1st Provisional Truck Company; Detachment, 1st Air Naval Gunfire Liaison Company.

UNITED STATES ARMY UNITS: (For such periods not included in Army Unit Awards) 1st Bn, 32nd Regt, 7th Inf Div; 7th Inf Div; 74th Truck Co.; 513th Truck Co.; 3rd Plt, 86th Engr Searchlight Co (passed to operational control of 11th Marines); 558th Trans Truck Co (Amphibious, was attached to 7th MT Bn, FMF); 196th Field Arty Bn; 92nd Army Engr Searchlight Plt; 181st CIC Det USA; 163rd MIS Det USA (Unit redesignated 1 Sep 1952 to MIS Plt); TLO Det USA; UNMACK Civil Affairs Team USA; 61st Engr Co; 159th Field Arty Bn (155 Howitzer); 623rd Field Arty Bn; 17th Field Arty Bn "C" Btry; 204th Field Arty Bn "B" Btry; 84th Engr Construction Bn; 1st Bn, 15th US Inf Regt; 1st Bn, 65th US Inf Regt; 1st Bn, 9th Regt, 2nd US Div (attached to KPR); Recon Co, 7th US Inf Div; 461st Inf Bn; Heavy Mortars, 7th Inf Div; 204th Field Arty Bn "A" Btry; 69th Field Arty Bn; 64th Field Arty Bn; 8th Field Arty Bn; 90th Field Arty Bn; 21st AAA-AW Bn; 89th Tank Bn; 441st CIC Det, USA; Prov Bn, USA (Dets

31st and 32nd RCTS); Co D, 10th Engr (C) Bn, USA; Tank Co, 31st Inf, USA; Hqr Co, 31st Inf, USA; 2nd Bn, 31st Inf, USA (less Co E); 185th Engr (C) Bn, USA (less Co A); Co B, 1st Bn, 31st Inf, USA.

CHARLES S. THOMAS
Secretary of the Navy

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

WASHINGTON

The Secretary of the Navy takes pleasure in commending the

FIRST MARINE AIRCRAFT WING, REINFORCED

for service as set forth in the following CITATION:

"For exceptionally meritorious service during operations against enemy aggressor forces in Korea from 1 August 1952 to 27 July 1953. Flying more than 45,000 combat sorties against determined opposition during this period, the First Marine Aircraft Wing, Reinforced, struck repeatedly and effectively at enemy troops, fortifications, logistical installations and lines of communication throughout North Korea. These extensive combat operations provided friendly ground forces with decisive close air support during such battles as Bunker Hill, The Hook, Reno, Carson, Vegas, Berlin and East Berlin, and inflicted heavy casualties and tremendous damage upon the enemy. Operating from naval aircraft carriers and from forward Korean bases, Marine aircraft continually harassed enemy communication and transportation systems, curtailing the movement of hostile troops to the front lines, and provided the air defense of South Korea. The notable record achieved by the First Marine Aircraft Wing, Reinforced, is an eloquent tribute to the resourcefulness, courage and stamina of all her gallant officers and men. Their inspiring and unyielding devotion to duty in the fulfillment of these vital tasks reflect the highest credit upon themselves and the United States Naval Service."

All personnel attached to and serving with the First Marine Aircraft Wing, Reinforced, during the above period, or any part thereof, are hereby authorized to wear the NAVY UNIT COMMENDATION RIBBON. This includes all organic units and the following reinforcing units: Construction Battalion Maintenance Unit 1; 1st 90mm Anti-Aircraft Artillery Gun Battalion; and Ground Control Approach Unit 41M.

CHARLES S. THOMAS
Secretary of the Navy

EXTRACT

GENERAL ORDERS No. 16

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

Washington 25, D.C., 3 March 1954

DISTINGUISHED UNIT CITATION—Citation of Unit—Section 1

1—DISTINGUISHED UNIT CITATION.—As authorized by Executive Order 9396 (sec. I, WD Bul, 22, 1943), superseding Executive Order 9075 (sec. III, WD Bul 11, 1942), the following unit is cited under AR 220-315 in the name of the President of the United States as public evidence of deserved honor and distinction. The citation reads as follows:

1. The Third Turkish Brigade, Turkish Armed Forces Command, and the following attached units: The Turkish Liaison Detachment, 8215th Army Unit; Company B, 1st Marine Tank Battalion, 1st Marine Division; and Company C, 1st Marine Tank Battalion, 1st Marine Division, are cited for outstanding performance of duty and extraordinary heroism in action against the enemy near Munsan-ni, Korea, during the period 28 to 29 May 1953. On the night of 28 May, an assault, supported by a heavy barrage, was launched by a powerful enemy force, determined to wrest outposts "Elko," "Carson," and "Vegas" from friendly hands. The valiant troops occupying these positions were soon surrounded and hand-to-hand combat ensued. With great tenacity and courage, the friendly troops fought on until, with only three of them still standing on outpost "Carson," the first position fell. Despite the tremendous number of casualties they had suffered, the foe intensified the attack on the two remaining terrain features, rushing repeatedly up the slopes only to be hurled back by the gallant defenders. Friendly reinforcements arrived together with concentrated artillery support. All fire power was brought to bear on the charging enemy, as the defending troops fought desperately to hold. The foe came on in seemingly endless numbers and friendly tanks moved into highly vulnerable positions to fire at close range. Friendly casualties were heavy, but the toll of enemy dead was enormous. The determined foe paid apparently no attention to their thousands of casualties and appeared prepared to sacrifice thousands more to gain their objectives. Realizing that these friendly outposts could not hope to stand in the face of the endless waves of hostile troops, the friendly command ordered the outpost defenders to withdraw to the main line of resistance. The extraordinary heroism, singleness of purpose, and magnificent fighting spirit exhibited by the members of the Third Turkish Brigade, Turkish Armed Forces Command, and attached units throughout this crucial battle, resulted in the frustration of enemy plans to breach the main line of resistance, thus reflecting the greatest credit on themselves and the military profession.

By order of the Secretary of the Army:

OFFICIAL:

WM. E. BERGIN
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

M. B. RIDGWAY
General, United States Army
Chief of Staff

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

WASHINGTON

The President of the United States takes pleasure in presenting the PRESIDENTIAL UNIT CITATION to

MARINE OBSERVATION SQUADRON SIX

for service as set forth in the following CITATION:

"For extraordinary heroism in action against enemy aggressor forces in Korea from August 1950 to 27 July 1953. Pioneering in the development of front-line helicopter evacuation of casualties, Marine Observation Squadron Six skillfully carried out unprecedented low-altitude evacuation flights during all hours of the day and night over rugged mountainous terrain in the face of enemy fire and extremely adverse weather, thereby saving untold lives and lessening the suffering of wounded marines. In addition, this valiant squadron completed thousands of day and night artillery spotting, reconnaissance and tactical air control missions, contributing materially to the extensive damage inflicted upon enemy positions, supply lines and troop concentrations. The splendid record achieved by Marine Observation Squadron Six attests to the courage, determination and esprit de corps of the officers and men of this unit and was in keeping with the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service."

For the President,
CHARLES S. THOMAS
Secretary of the Navy

APPENDIX H

Armistice Agreement

Volume I

TEXT OF AGREEMENT

Agreement between the Commander in Chief, United Nations Command, on the one hand, and the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers, on the other hand, concerning a military armistice in Korea.

PREAMBLE

The undersigned, the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, on the one hand, and the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers, on the other hand, in the interest of stopping the Korean conflict, with its great toll of suffering and bloodshed on both sides, and with the objective of establishing an armistice which will insure a complete cessation of hostilities and of all acts of armed force in Korea until a final peaceful settlement is achieved, do individually, collectively, and mutually agree to accept and to be bound and governed by the conditions and terms of armistice set forth in the following Articles and Paragraphs, which said conditions and terms are intended to be purely military in character and to pertain solely to the belligerents in Korea.

Article I

MILITARY DEMARCATION LINE AND DEMILITARIZED ZONE

1. A Military Demarcation Line shall be fixed and both sides shall withdraw two (2) kilometers from this line so as to establish a Demilitarized Zone between the opposing forces. A Demilitarized Zone shall be established as a buffer zone to prevent the occurrence of incidents which might lead to a resumption of hostilities.

2. The Military Demarcation Line is located as indicated on the attached map.

3. The Demilitarized Zone is defined by a northern and a southern boundary as indicated on the attached map.

4. The Military Demarcation Line shall be plainly marked as directed by the Military Armistice Commission hereinafter established. The Commanders of the opposing sides shall have suitable markers erected along the boundary between the Demilitarized Zone and their respective areas. The Military

Armistice Commission shall supervise the erection of all markers placed along the Military Demarcation Line and along the boundaries of the Demilitarized Zone.

5. The waters of the Han River Estuary shall be open to civil shipping of both sides wherever one bank is controlled by one side and the other bank is controlled by the other side. The Military Armistice Commission shall prescribe rules for the shipping in that part of the Han River Estuary indicated on the attached map. Civil shipping of each side shall have unrestricted access to the land under the military control of that side.

6. Neither side shall execute any hostile act within, from, or against the Demilitarized Zone.

7. No person, military or civilian, shall be permitted to cross the Military Demarcation Line unless specifically authorized to do so by the Military Armistice Commission.

8. No person, military or civilian, in the Demilitarized Zone shall be permitted to enter the territory under the military control of either side unless specifically authorized to do so by the Commander into whose territory entry is sought.

9. No person, military or civilian shall be permitted to enter the Demilitarized Zone except persons concerned with the conduct of civil administration and relief and persons specifically authorized to enter by the Military Armistice Commission.

10. Civil administration and relief in that part of the Demilitarized Zone which is south of the Military Demarcation Line shall be the responsibility of the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command; and civil administration and relief in that part of the Demilitarized Zone which is north of the Military Demarcation Line shall be the joint responsibility of the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers. The number of persons, military or civilian, from each side who are permitted to enter the Demilitarized Zone for the conduct of civil administration and relief shall be as determined by the respective Commanders, but in no case shall the total number authorized by either side exceed one thousand (1,000) persons at any one time. The number of civil police and the arms to be carried by them shall be as prescribed by the Military Armistice Commission. Other personnel shall not carry arms unless specifically authorized to do so by the Military Armistice Commission.

11. Nothing contained in this Article shall be construed to prevent the complete freedom of movement to, from, and within the Demilitarized Zone by the Military Armistice Commission, its assistants, its Joint Observer Teams with their assistants, the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission hereinafter established, its assistants, its Neutral Nations Inspection Teams with their assistants, and of any other persons, materials, and equipment specifically authorized to enter the Demilitarized Zone by the Military Armistice Commission. Convenience of movement shall be permitted through the territory under the military control of either side over any route necessary to move between points within the Demilitarized Zone where such points are not connected by roads lying completely within the Demilitarized Zone.

*Article II*CONCRETE ARRANGEMENTS FOR CEASE-FIRE
AND ARMISTICE*A. General*

12. The Commanders of the opposing sides shall order and enforce a complete cessation of all hostilities in Korea by all armed forces under their control, including all units and personnel of the ground, naval, and air forces, effective twelve (12) hours after this Armistice Agreement is signed. (See Paragraph 63 hereof for effective date and hour of the remaining provisions of this Armistice Agreement.)

13. In order to insure the stability of the Military Armistice so as to facilitate the attainment of a peaceful settlement through the holding by both sides of a political conference of a higher level, the Commanders of the opposing sides shall:

a. Within seventy-two (72) hours after this Armistice becomes effective, withdraw all of their military forces, supplies, and equipment from the Demilitarized Zone except as otherwise provided herein. All demolitions, mine-fields, wire entanglements, and other hazards to the safe movement of personnel of the Military Armistice Commission or its Joint Observer Teams, known to exist within the Demilitarized Zone after the withdrawal of military forces therefrom, together with lanes known to be free of all hazards, shall be reported to the Military Armistice Commission by the Commander of the side whose forces emplaced such hazards. Subsequently, additional safe lanes shall be cleared; and eventually, within forty-five (45) days after the termination of the seventy-two (72) hour period, all such hazards shall be removed from the Demilitarized Zone as directed by and under the supervision of the Military Armistice Commission. At the termination of the seventy-two (72) hour period, except for unarmed troops authorized a forty-five (45) day period to complete salvage operations under Military Armistice Commission supervision, such units of a police nature as may be specifically requested by the Military Armistice Commission and agreed to by the Commanders of the opposing sides, and personnel authorized under Paragraphs 10 and 11 hereof, no personnel of either side shall be permitted to enter the Demilitarized Zone.

b. Within ten (10) days after this Armistice Agreement becomes effective, withdraw all of their military forces, supplies and equipment from the rear and the coastal islands and waters of Korea of the other side. If such military forces are not withdrawn within the stated time limit, and there is no mutually agreed and valid reason for the delay, the other side shall have the right to take any action which it deems necessary for the maintenance of security and order. The term "coastal islands," as used above, refers to those islands which, though occupied by one side at the time when this Armistice Agreement becomes effective, were controlled by the other side on 24 June 1950; provided, however, that all the islands lying to the north and west of the provincial boundary line between HWANGHAE-DO and KYONGGI-DO shall be under the military control of the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers

except the island groups of PAENGYONG-DO (37°58'N, 124°40'E), TAECHONG-DO (37°50'N, 124°42'E), SOCHONG-DO (37°46'N, 124°46'E), YONPYONG-DO (37°38'N, 125°40'E), and U-DO (37°36'N, 125°58'E), which shall remain under the military control of the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command. All the islands on the west coast of Korea lying south of the above-mentioned boundary line shall remain under the military control of the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command.

c. Cease the introduction into Korea of reinforcing military personnel; provided, however, that the rotation of units and personnel, the arrival in Korea of personnel on a temporary duty basis, and the return to Korea of personnel after short periods of leave or temporary duty outside of Korea shall be permitted within the scope prescribed below. "Rotation" is defined as the replacement of units or personnel by other units or personnel who are commencing a tour of duty in Korea. Rotation personnel shall be introduced into and evacuated from Korea only through the ports of entry enumerated in Paragraph 43 hereof. Rotation shall be conducted on a man-for-man basis; provided, however, that no more than thirty-five thousand (35,000) persons in the military service shall be admitted into Korea by either side in any calendar month under the rotation policy. No military personnel of either side shall be introduced into Korea if the introduction of such personnel will cause the aggregate of the military personnel of that side admitted into Korea since the effective date of this Armistice Agreement to exceed the cumulative total of the military personnel of that side who have departed from Korea since that date. Reports concerning arrivals in and departures from Korea of military personnel shall be made daily to the Military Armistice Commission and the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, such reports shall include places of arrival and departure and the number of persons arriving at or departing from each such place. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, through its Neutral Nations Inspection Teams, shall conduct supervision and inspection of the rotation of units and personnel authorized above, at the ports of entry enumerated in Paragraph 43 hereof.

d. Cease the introduction into Korea of reinforcing combat aircraft, armored vehicles, weapons, and ammunition; provided, however, that combat aircraft, armored vehicles, weapons, and ammunition which are destroyed, damaged worn out, or used up during the period of the armistice may be replaced on the basis of piece-for-piece of the same effectiveness and the same type. Such combat aircraft, armored vehicles, weapons, and ammunition shall be introduced into Korea only through the ports of entry enumerated in Paragraph 43 hereof. In order to justify the requirement for combat aircraft, armored vehicles, weapons, and ammunition to be introduced into Korea for replacement purposes, reports concerning every incoming shipment of these items shall be made to the Military Armistice Commission and the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission; such reports shall include statements regarding the disposition of the items being replaced. Items to be replaced which are removed from Korea shall be removed only through the ports of entry enumerated in Paragraph 43 hereof. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, through its Neutral Nations Inspection Teams shall conduct supervision and

inspection of the replacement of combat aircraft, armored vehicles, weapons, and ammunition authorized above, at the ports of entry enumerated in Paragraph 43 hereof.

e. Insure that personnel of their respective commands who violate any of the provisions of this Armistice Agreement are adequately punished.

f. In those cases where places of burial are a matter of record and graves are actually found to exist, permit graves registration personnel of the other side to enter, within a definite time limit after this Armistice Agreement becomes effective, the territory of Korea under their Military control, for the purpose of proceeding to such graves to recover and evacuate the bodies of the deceased military personnel of that side, including deceased prisoners of war. The specific procedures and the time limit for the performance of the above task shall be determined by the Military Armistice Commission. The Commanders of the opposing sides shall furnish to the other side all available information pertaining to the places of burial of the deceased military personnel of the other side.

g. Afford full protection and all possible assistance and cooperation to the Military Armistice Commission, its Joint Observer Teams, the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, and its Neutral Nations Inspection Teams, in the carrying out of their functions and responsibilities hereinafter assigned; and accord to the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, and to its Neutral Nations Inspection Teams, full convenience of movement between the headquarters of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission and the ports of entry enumerated in Paragraph 43 hereof over main lines of communication agreed upon by both sides, and between the headquarters of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission and the places where violations of this Armistice Agreement have been reported to have occurred. In order to prevent unnecessary delays, the use of alternate routes and means of transportation will be permitted whenever the main lines of communication are closed or impassable.

h. Provide such logistic support, including communications and transportation facilities, as may be required by the Military Armistice Commission and the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission and their Teams.

i. Each construct, operate, and maintain a suitable airfield in their respective ports of the Demilitarized Zone in the vicinity of the headquarters of the Military Armistice Commission, for such uses as the Commission may determine.

j. Insure that all members and other personnel of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission and of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission hereinafter established shall enjoy the freedom and facilities necessary for the proper exercise of their function, including privileges, treatment, and immunities equivalent to those ordinarily enjoyed by accredited diplomatic personnel under international usage.

14. This Armistice Agreement shall apply to all opposing ground forces under the military control of either side, which ground forces shall respect the Demilitarized Zone and the area of Korea under the military control of the opposing side.

15. This Armistice Agreement shall apply to all opposing naval forces,

which naval forces shall respect the waters contiguous to the Demilitarized Zone and to the land area of Korea under the military control of the opposing side, and shall not engage in blockade of any kind of Korea.

16. This Armistice Agreement shall apply to all opposing air forces, which air forces shall respect the air space over the Demilitarized Zone and over the area of Korea under the military control of the opposing side, and over the waters contiguous to both.

17. Responsibility for compliance with and enforcement of the terms and provisions of this Armistice Agreement is that of the signatories hereto and their successors in command. The Commanders of the opposing sides shall establish within their respective commands all measures and procedures necessary to insure complete compliance with all of the provisions hereof by all elements of their commands. They shall actively cooperate with one another and with the Military Armistice Commission and the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission in requiring observance of both the letter and the spirit of all of the provisions of this Armistice Agreement.

18. The costs of the operations of the Military Armistice Commission and of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission and of their Teams shall be shared equally by the two opposing sides.

B. Military Armistice Commission

1. Composition

19. A Military Armistice Commission is hereby established.

20. The Military Armistice Commission shall be composed of ten (10) senior officers, five (5) of whom shall be appointed by the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, and five (5) of whom shall be appointed jointly by the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers. Of the ten members, three (3) from each side shall be of general or flag rank. The two (2) remaining members on each side may be major generals, brigadier generals, colonels, or their equivalents.

21. Members of the Military Armistice Commission shall be permitted to use staff assistants as required.

22. The Military Armistice Commission shall be provided with the necessary administrative personnel to establish a Secretariat charged with assisting the Commission by performing record-keeping, secretarial, interpreting, and such other functions as the Commission may assign to it. Each side shall appoint to the Secretariat a Secretary and an Assistant Secretary and such clerical and specialized personnel as required by the Secretariat. Records shall be kept in English, Korean, and Chinese, all of which shall be equally authentic.

23. a. The Military Armistice Commission shall be initially provided with and assisted by ten (10) Joint Observer Teams, which number may be reduced by agreement of the senior members of both sides on the Military Armistice Commission.

b. Each Joint Observer Team shall be composed of not less than four

(4) nor more than six (6) officers of field grade, half of whom shall be appointed by the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, and half of whom shall be appointed jointly by the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers. Additional personnel such as drivers, clerks, and interpreters shall be furnished by each side as required for the functioning of the Joint Observer Teams.

2. Functions and Authority

24. The general mission of the Military Armistice Commission shall be to supervise the implementation of this Armistice Agreement and to settle through negotiations any violations of this Armistice Agreement.

25. The Military Armistice Commission shall:

a. Locate its headquarters in the vicinity of PANMUNJOM (37°57'29" N, 126°40'00" E). The Military Armistice Commission may relocate its headquarters at another point within the Demilitarized Zone by agreement of the senior members of both sides on the Commission.

b. Operate as a joint organization without a chairman.

c. Adopt such rules of procedure as it may, from time to time, deem necessary.

d. Supervise the carrying out of the provisions of this Armistice Agreement pertaining to the Demilitarized Zone and to the Han River Estuary.

e. Direct the operations of the Joint Observer Teams.

f. Settle through negotiations any violations of this Armistice Agreement.

g. Transmit immediately to the Commanders of the opposing sides all reports of investigations of violations of this Armistice Agreement and all other reports and records of proceedings received from the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission.

h. Give general supervision and direction to the Committee for Repatriation of Prisoners of War and the Committee for Assisting the Return of Displaced Civilians, hereinafter established.

i. Act as an intermediary in transmitting communications between the Commanders of the opposing sides; provided however, that the foregoing shall not be construed to preclude the Commanders of both sides from communicating with each other by any other means which they may desire to employ.

j. Provide credentials and distinctive insignia for its staff and its Joint Observer Teams, and a distinctive marking for all vehicles, aircraft, and vessels, used in the performance of its mission.

26. The mission of the Joint Observer Teams shall be to assist the Military Armistice Commission in supervising the carrying out of the provisions of this Armistice Agreement to the Demilitarized Zone and to the Han River Estuary.

27. The Military Armistice Commission, or the senior member of either side thereof, is authorized to dispatch Joint Observer Teams to investigate violations of this Armistice Agreement reported to have occurred in the Demilitarized Zone or in the Han River Estuary; provided, however, that not more than one half of the Joint Observer Teams which have not been dis-

patched by the Military Armistice Commission may be dispatched at any one time by the senior member of either side on the Commission.

28. The Military Armistice Commission, or the senior member of either side thereof, is authorized to request the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission to conduct special observations and inspections at places outside the Demilitarized Zone where violations of this Armistice Agreement have been reported to have occurred.

29. When the Military Armistice Commission determines that a violation of this Armistice Agreement has occurred, it shall immediately report such violation to the Commanders of the opposing sides.

30. When the Military Armistice Commission determines that a violation of this Armistice Agreement has been corrected to its satisfaction, it shall so report to the Commanders of the opposing sides.

3. General

31. The Military Armistice Commission shall meet daily. Recesses of not to exceed seven (7) days may be agreed upon by the senior members of both sides; provided, that such recesses may be terminated on twenty-four (24) hour notice by the senior member of either side.

32. Copies of the record of the proceedings of all meetings of the Military Armistice Commission shall be forwarded to the Commanders of the opposing sides as soon as possible after each meeting.

33. The Joint Observer Teams shall make periodic reports to the Military Armistice Commission as required by the Commission and, in addition, shall make such special reports as may be deemed necessary by them, or as may be required by the Commission.

34. The Military Armistice Commission shall maintain duplicate files of the reports and records of proceedings required by this Armistice Agreement. The Commission is authorized to maintain duplicate files of such other reports, records, etc., as may be necessary in the conduct of its business. Upon eventual dissolution of the Commission, one set of the above files shall be turned over to each side.

35. The Military Armistice Commission may make recommendations to the Commanders of the opposing sides with respect to amendments or additions to this Armistice Agreement. Such recommended changes should generally be those designed to insure a more effective armistice.

C. Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission

1. Composition

36. A Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission is hereby established.

37. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission shall be composed of four (4) senior officers, two (2) of whom shall be appointed by neutral nations nominated by the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, namely, SWEDEN and SWITZERLAND, and two (2) of whom shall be appointed by neutral nations nominated jointly by the Supreme Commander of

the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers, namely, POLAND and CZECHOSLOVAKIA. The term "neutral nations" as herein used is defined as those nations whose combatant forces have not participated in the hostilities in Korea. Members appointed to the Commission may be from the armed forces of the appointing nations. Each member shall designate an alternate member to attend those meetings which for any reason the principal member is unable to attend. Such alternate members shall be of the same nationality as their principals. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission may take action whenever the number of members present from the neutral nations nominated by one side is equal to the number of members present from the neutral nations nominated by the other side.

38. Members of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission shall be permitted to use staff assistants furnished by the neutral nations as required. These staff assistants may be appointed as alternate members of the Commission.

39. The neutral nations shall be requested to furnish the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission with the necessary administrative personnel to establish a Secretariat charged with assisting the Commission by performing necessary record-keeping, secretarial, interpreting, and such other functions as the Commission may assign to it.

40. a. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission shall be initially provided with, and assisted by, twenty (20) Neutral Nations Inspection Teams, which number may be reduced by agreement of the senior members of both sides on the Military Armistice Commission. The Neutral Nations Inspection Teams shall be responsible to, shall report to, and shall be subject to the direction of, the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission only.

b. Each Neutral Nations Inspection Team shall be composed of not less than four (4) officers, preferably of field grade, half of whom shall be from the neutral nations nominated by the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, and half of whom shall be from the neutral nations nominated jointly by the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers. Members appointed to the Neutral Nations Inspection Teams may be from the armed forces of the appointing nations. In order to facilitate the functioning of the Teams, sub-teams composed of not less than two (2) members, one of whom shall be from a neutral nation nominated by the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, and one of whom shall be from a neutral nation nominated by the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers, may be formed as circumstances require. Additional personnel such as drivers, clerks, interpreters, and communications personnel, and such equipment as may be required by the Teams to perform their missions, shall be furnished by the Commander of each side, as required, in the Demilitarized Zone and in the territory under his military control. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission may provide itself and the Neutral Nations Inspection Teams with such of the above personnel and equipment of its own as it may desire; provided, however, that such personnel shall be personnel of the same neutral nations of which the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission is composed.

2. Functions and Authority

41. The mission of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission shall be to carry out the functions of supervision, observation, inspection, and investigation, as stipulated in Subparagraphs 13c and 13d and Paragraph 28 hereof, and to report the results of such supervision, observation, inspection, and investigation to the Military Armistice Commission.

42. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission shall:

a. Locate its headquarters in proximity to the headquarters of the Military Armistice Commission.

b. Adopt such rules of procedure as it may, from time to time, deem necessary.

c. Conduct, through its members and its Neutral Nations Inspection Teams, the supervision and inspection provided for in Sub-paragraphs 13c and 13d of this Armistice Agreement at the ports of entry enumerated in Paragraph 43 hereof, and the special observations and inspections provided for in Paragraph 28 hereof at those places where violations of this Armistice Agreement have been reported to have occurred. The inspection of combat aircraft, armored vehicles, weapons, and ammunition by the Neutral Nations Inspection Teams shall be such as to enable them to properly insure that reinforcing combat aircraft, armored vehicles, weapons, and ammunition are not being introduced into Korea; but this shall not be construed as authorizing inspections or examinations of any secret designs or characteristics of any combat aircraft, armored vehicle, weapon, or ammunition.

d. Direct and supervise the operations of the Neutral Nations Inspection Teams.

e. Station five (5) Neutral Nations Inspection Teams at the ports of entry enumerated in Paragraph 43 hereof located in the territory under the military control of the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command; and five (5) Neutral Nations Inspection Teams at the ports of entry enumerated in Paragraph 43 hereof located in the territory under the military control of the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers; and establish initially ten (10) mobile neutral Nations Inspection Teams in reserve, stationed in the general vicinity of the headquarters of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, which number may be reduced by agreement of the senior members of both sides on the Military Armistice Commission. Not more than half of the mobile Neutral Nations Inspection Teams shall be dispatched at any one time in accordance with requests of the senior member of either side on the Military Armistice Commission.

f. Subject to the provisions of the preceding Sub-paragraph, conduct without delay investigations of reported violations of this Armistice Agreement, including such investigations of reported violations of this Armistice Agreement as may be requested by the Military Armistice Commission or by the senior member of either side on the Commission.

g. Provide credentials and distinctive insignia for its staff and its Neutral Nations Inspection Teams, and a distinctive marking for all vehicles, aircraft, and vessels, used in the performance of its mission.

43. Neutral Nations Inspection Teams shall be stationed at the following ports of entry:

Territory under the military control of the United Nations command

INCHON (37°28'N, 126°38'E)
 TAEGU (35°52'N, 128°36'E)
 PUSAN (35°06'N, 129°02'E)
 KANGNUNG (37°45'N, 128°54'E)
 KUNSAN (35°59'N, 126°43'E)

Territory under the military control of the Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers

SINUIJU (40°N, 124°24'E)
 CHONGJIN (41°46'N, 129°49'E)
 HUNGNAM (39°50'N, 127°37'E)
 MANPO (41°09'N, 126°18'E)
 SINANJU (39°36'N, 125°36'E)

These Neutral Nations Inspection Teams shall be accorded full convenience of movement within the areas and over the routes of communication set forth on the attached map.

3. General

44. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission shall meet daily. Recesses of not to exceed seven (7) days may be agreed upon by the members of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission; provided, that such recesses may be terminated on twenty-four (24) hour notice by any member.

45. Copies of the record of the proceedings of all meetings of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission shall be forwarded to the Military Armistice Commission as soon as possible after each meeting. Records shall be kept in English, Korean, and Chinese.

46. The Neutral Nations Inspection Teams shall make periodic reports concerning the results of their supervision, observations, inspections, and investigations to the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission as required by the Commission and, in addition, shall make such special reports as may be deemed necessary by them, or may be required by the Commission. Reports shall be submitted by a Team as a whole, but may also be submitted by one or more individual members thereof; provided, that the reports submitted by one or more individual members thereof shall be considered as informational only.

47. Copies of the reports made by the Neutral Nations Inspection Teams shall be forwarded to the Military Armistice Commission by the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission without delay and in the language in which received. They shall not be delayed by the process of translation or evaluation. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission shall evaluate such reports at the earliest practicable time and shall forward their findings to the Military Armistice Commission as a matter of priority. The Military Armistice Commission shall not take final action with regard to any such report until the evaluation thereof has been received from the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission. Members of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission and of its Teams shall be subject to appearance before the Military Armistice Commission, at the request of the senior member of either side on the Military Armistice Commission, for clarification of any report submitted.

48. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission shall maintain duplicate files of the reports and records of proceedings required by this Armistice

Agreement. The Commission is authorized to maintain duplicate files of such other reports, records, etc., as may be necessary in the conduct of its business. Upon eventual dissolution of the Commission, one set of the above files shall be turned over to each side.

49. The Neutral Supervisory Commission may make recommendations to the Military Armistice Commission with respect to amendments or additions to this Armistice Agreement. Such recommended changes should generally be those designed to insure a more effective armistice.

50. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, or any member thereof, shall be authorized to communicate with any member of the Military Armistice Commission.

Article III

ARRANGEMENTS RELATING TO PRISONERS OF WAR

51. The release and repatriation of all prisoners of war held in the custody of each side at the time this Armistice Agreement becomes effective shall be effected in conformity with the following provisions agreed upon by both sides prior to the signing of this Armistice Agreement.

a. Within sixty (60) days after this Armistice Agreement becomes effective, each side shall, without offering any hindrance, directly repatriate and hand over in groups all those prisoners of war in its custody who insist on repatriation to the side to which they belonged at the time of capture. Repatriation shall be accomplished in accordance with the related provisions of this Article. In order to expedite the repatriation process of such personnel, each side shall, prior to the signing of the Armistice Agreement, exchange the total numbers, by nationalities, of personnel to be directly repatriated. Each group of prisoners of war delivered to the other side shall be accompanied by rosters, prepared by nationality, to include name, rank (if any) and internment or military serial number.

b. Each side shall release all those remaining prisoners of war, who are not directly repatriated, from its military control and from its custody and hand them over to the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission for disposition in accordance with the provisions in the Annex hereto: "Terms of Reference for Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission."

c. So that there may be no misunderstanding owing to the equal use of three languages, the act of delivery of a prisoner of war by one side to the other side shall, for the purposes of this Armistice Agreement, be called "repatriation" in English, "song hwan" in Korean, and "ch'ien fan" in Chinese, notwithstanding the nationality or place of residence of such prisoner of war.

52. Each side insures that it will not employ in acts of war in the Korean conflict any prisoner of war released and repatriated incident to the coming into effect of this Armistice Agreement.

53. All the sick and injured prisoners of war who insist upon repatriation shall be repatriated with priority. Insofar as possible, there shall be captured medical personnel repatriated concurrently with the sick and injured prisoners of war, so as to provide medical care and attendance en route.

54. The repatriation of all the prisoners of war required by Sub-paragraph 51a hereof shall be completed within a time limit of sixty (60) days after this Armistice Agreement becomes effective. Within this time limit each side undertakes to complete the repatriation of the above-mentioned prisoners of war in its custody at the earliest practicable time.

55. PANMUNJOM is designated as the place where prisoners of war will be delivered and received by both sides. Additional place(s) of delivery and reception of prisoners of war in the Demilitarized Zone may be designated, if necessary, by the Committee for Repatriation of Prisoners of War.

56. a. A Committee for Repatriation of Prisoners of War is hereby established. It shall be composed of six (6) officers of field grade, three (3) of whom shall be appointed by the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, and three (3) of whom shall be appointed jointly by the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers. This Committee shall, under the general supervision and direction of the Military Armistice Commission, be responsible for coordinating the specific plans of both sides for the repatriation of prisoners of war and for supervising the execution by both sides of all of the provisions of this Armistice Agreement relating to the repatriation of prisoners of war. It shall be the duty of this Committee to coordinate the timing of the arrival of prisoners of war at the place(s) of delivery and reception of prisoners of war from the prisoner of war camps of both sides; to make, when necessary, such special arrangements as may be required with regard to the transportation and welfare of sick and injured prisoners of war; to coordinate the work of the joint Red Cross teams, established in Paragraph 57 hereof, in assisting in the repatriation of prisoners of war; to supervise the implementation of the arrangements for the actual repatriation of prisoners of war stipulated in Paragraphs 53 and 54 hereof; to select, when necessary, additional place(s) of delivery and reception of prisoners of war, and to carry out such other related functions as are required for the repatriation of prisoners of war.

b. When unable to reach agreement on any matter relating to its responsibilities, the Committee for Repatriation of Prisoners of War shall immediately refer such matter to the Military Armistice Commission for decision. The Commission for Repatriation of Prisoners of War shall maintain its headquarters in proximity to the headquarters of the Military Armistice Commission.

c. The Committee for Repatriation of Prisoners of War shall be dissolved by the Military Armistice Commission upon completion of the program of repatriation of prisoners of war.

57. a. Immediately after this Armistice Agreement becomes effective, joint Red Cross teams composed of representatives of the national Red Cross Societies of the countries contributing forces to the United Nations Command on the one hand, and representatives of the Red Cross Society of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and representatives of the Red Cross Society of the People's Republic of China on the other hand, shall be established. The joint Red Cross teams shall assist in the execution by both sides of those provisions of this Armistice Agreement relating to the repatriation of all the prisoners of war specified in Sub-paragraph 51a hereof, who insist upon repatriation, by the performance of such humanitarian services as are neces-

sary and desirable for the welfare of the prisoners of war. To accomplish this task, the joint Red Cross teams shall provide assistance in the delivering and receiving of prisoners of war by both sides at the place(s) of delivery and reception of prisoners of war, and shall visit the prisoner of war camps of both sides to comfort the prisoners of war and to bring in and distribute gift articles for the comfort and welfare of the prisoners of war. The joint Red Cross teams may provide services to prisoners of war while en route from prisoner of war camps to the place(s) of delivery and reception of prisoners of war.

b. The Joint Red Cross teams shall be organized as set forth below:

(1) One team shall be composed of twenty (20) members, namely, ten (10) representatives from the national Red Cross Societies of each side, to assist in the delivering and receiving of prisoners of war by both sides at the place(s) of delivery and reception of prisoners of war. The chairmanship of this team shall alternate daily between representatives from the Red Cross Societies of the two sides. The work and services of this team shall be coordinated by the Committee for Repatriation of Prisoners of War.

(2) One team shall be composed of sixty (60) members, namely, thirty (30) representatives from the national Red Cross Societies of each side, to visit the prisoners of war camps under the administration of the Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers. This team may provide services to prisoners of war while en route from the prisoner of war camps to the place(s) of delivery and reception of prisoners of war. A representative of the Red Cross Society of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea or of the Red Cross Society of the People's Republic of China shall serve as chairman of this team.

(3) One team shall be composed of sixty (60) members, namely, thirty (30) representatives from the national Red Cross Societies of each side, to visit the prisoner of war camps under the administration of the United Nations Command. This team may provide services to prisoners of war while en route from the prisoner of war camps to the place(s) of delivery and reception of prisoners of war. A representative of a Red Cross Society of a nation contributing forces to the United Nations Command shall serve as chairman of this team.

(4) In order to facilitate the functioning of each joint Red Cross team, sub-teams composed of not less than two (2) members from the team, with an equal number of representatives from each side, may be formed as circumstances require.

(5) Additional personnel such as drivers, clerks, and interpreters, and such equipment as may be required by the joint Red Cross teams to perform their missions, shall be furnished by the Commander of each side to the team operating in the territory under his military control.

(6) Whenever jointly agreed upon by the representatives of both sides or any joint Red Cross team, the size of such team may be increased or decreased, subject to confirmation by the Committee for Repatriation of Prisoners of War.

c. The Commander of each side shall cooperate fully with the joint Red

Cross teams in the performance of their functions, and undertakes to insure the security of the personnel of the joint Red Cross team in the area under his military control. The Commander of each side shall provide such logistic, administrative, and communications facilities as may be required by the team operating in the territory under his military control.

d. The joint Red Cross teams shall be dissolved upon completion of the program of repatriation of all the prisoners of war specified in Sub-paragraph 51a hereof, who insist upon repatriation.

58. a. The Commander of each side shall furnish to the Commander of the other side as soon as practicable, but not later than ten (10) days after this Armistice Agreement becomes effective, the following information concerning prisoners of war:

(1) Complete data pertaining to the prisoners of war who escaped since the effective date of the data last exchanged.

(2) Insofar as practicable, information regarding name, nationality, rank, and other identification data, date and cause of death, and place of burial, of those prisoners of war who died while in his custody.

b. If any prisoners of war escape or die after the effective date of the supplementary information specified above, the detaining side shall furnish to the other side, through the Committee for Repatriation of Prisoners of War, the data pertaining thereto in accordance with the provisions of Sub-paragraph 58a hereof. Such data shall be furnished at ten-day intervals until the completion of the program of delivery and reception of prisoners of war.

c. Any escaped prisoner of war who returns to the custody of the detaining side after the completion of the program of delivery and reception of prisoners of war shall be delivered to the Military Armistice Commission for disposition.

59. a. All civilians who, at the time this Armistice Agreement becomes effective, are in territory under the military control of the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, and who, on 24 June 1950, resided north of the Military Demarcation Line established in this Armistice Agreement shall, if they desire to return home, be permitted and assisted by the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, to return to the area north of the Military Demarcation Line; and all civilians, who, at the time this Armistice Agreement becomes effective, are in territory under the military control of the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers, and who, on 24 June 1950, resided south of the Military Demarcation Line established in this Armistice Agreement shall, if they desire to return home, be permitted and assisted by the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers to return to the area south of the Military Demarcation Line. The Commander of each side shall be responsible for publicizing widely throughout territory under his military control the contents of the provisions of this Sub-paragraph, and for calling upon the appropriate civil authorities to give necessary guidance and assistance to all such civilians who desire to return home.

b. All civilians of foreign nationality who, at the time this Armistice

Agreement becomes effective, are in territory under the military control of the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers shall, if they desire to proceed to territory under the military control of the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, be permitted and assisted to do so; all civilians of foreign nationality who, at the time this Armistice Agreement becomes effective, are in territory under the military control of the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, shall, if they desire to proceed to territory under the military control of the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers, be permitted and assisted to do so. The Commander of each side shall be responsible for publicizing widely throughout the territory under his military control the contents of the provisions of this Sub-paragraph, and for calling upon the appropriate civil authorities to give necessary guidance and assistance to all such civilians of foreign nationality who desire to proceed to territory under the military control of the Commander of the other side.

c. Measures to assist in the return of civilians provided for in Sub-paragraph 59a hereof and the movement of civilians provided for in Sub-paragraph 59b hereof shall be commenced by both sides as soon as possible after this Armistice Agreement becomes effective.

d. (1) A Committee for Assisting the Return of Displaced Civilians is hereby established. It shall be composed of four (4) officers of field grade, two (2) of whom shall be appointed by the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, and two (2) of whom shall be appointed jointly by the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers. This Committee shall, under the general supervision and direction of the Military Armistice Commission, be responsible for coordinating the specific plans of both sides for assistance to the return of the above-mentioned civilians, and for supervising the execution of both sides of all of the provisions of this Armistice Agreement relating to the return of the above-mentioned civilians. It shall be the duty of this Committee to make necessary arrangements, including those of transportation, for expediting and coordinating the movement of the above-mentioned civilians; to select the crossing point(s) through which the above-mentioned civilians will cross the Military Demarcation Line; to arrange for security at the crossing points; and to carry out such other functions as are required to accomplish the return of the above-mentioned civilians.

(2) When unable to reach agreement on any matter relating to its responsibilities, the Committee for Assisting the Return of Displaced Civilians shall immediately refer such matter to the Military Armistice Commission for decision. The Committee for Assisting the Return of Displaced Civilians shall maintain its headquarters in proximity to the headquarters of the Military Armistice Commission.

(3) The Committee for Assisting the Return of Displaced Civilians shall be dissolved by the Military Armistice Commission upon fulfillment of its mission.

*Article IV*RECOMMENDATION TO THE GOVERNMENTS
CONCERNED ON BOTH SIDES

60. In order to insure the peaceful settlement of the Korean question, the military Commanders of both sides hereby recommend to the governments of the countries concerned on both sides that, within three (3) months after the Armistice Agreement is signed and becomes effective, a political conference of a higher level of both sides be held by representatives appointed respectively to settle through negotiation the questions of the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea, the peaceful settlement of the Korean question, etc.

Article V

MISCELLANEOUS

61. Amendments and additions to this Armistice Agreement must be mutually agreed to by the Commanders of the opposing sides.

62. The Articles and Paragraphs of this Armistice Agreement shall remain in effect until expressly superseded either by mutually acceptable amendments and additions or by provision in an appropriate agreement for a peaceful settlement at a political level between both sides.

63. All of the provisions of this Armistice Agreement, other than Paragraph 12, shall become effective at 2200 hours on 27 July 1953.

Done at Panmunjom, Korea, at 1000 hours on the 27th day of July 1953, in English, Korean, and Chinese, all texts being equally authentic.

KIM IL SUNG
Marshall, Democratic
People's Republic
of Korea
Supreme Commander,
Korean People's Army

PENG TEH-HUAI
Commander, Chinese
People's
Volunteers

MARK W. CLARK
General, United States
Army
Commander-in-Chief
United Nations
Command

PRESENT

NAM IL
General, Korean People's Army
Senior Delegate,
Delegation of the Korean People's
Army and the Chinese People's
Volunteers

WILLIAM K. HARRISON, JR.
Lieutenant General,
United States Army
Senior Delegate,
United Nations Command
Delegation

ANNEX

TERMS OF REFERENCE
FOR
NEUTRAL NATIONS REPATRIATION
COMMISSION
(See Sub-paragraph 51b)

1. In order to ensure that all prisoners of war have the opportunity to exercise their right to be repatriated following an armistice, Sweden, Switzer-

land, Poland, Czechoslovakia and India shall each be requested by both sides to appoint a member to a Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission which shall be established to take custody in Korea of those prisoners of war who, while in the custody of the detaining powers, have not exercised their right to be repatriated. The Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission shall establish its headquarters within the Demilitarized Zone in the vicinity of Panmunjom, and shall station subordinate bodies of the same composition as the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission at those locations at which the Repatriation Commission assumes custody of prisoners of war. Representatives of both sides shall be permitted to observe the operations of the Repatriation Commission and its subordinate bodies to include explanations and interviews.

2. Sufficient armed forces and any other operating personnel required to assist the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission in carrying out its functions and responsibilities shall be provided exclusively by India, whose representative shall be the umpire in accordance with the provisions of Article 132 of the Geneva Convention and shall also be chairman and executive agent of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission. Representatives from each of the other four powers shall be allowed staff assistants in equal number not to exceed fifty (50) each. When any of the representatives of the neutral nations is absent for some reason, that representative shall designate an alternate representative of his own nationality to exercise his functions and authority. The arms of all personnel provided for in this Paragraph shall be limited to military police type small arms.

3. No force or threat of force shall be used against the prisoners of war specified in Paragraph 1 above to prevent or effect their repatriation, and no violence to their persons or affront to their dignity or self-respect shall be permitted in any manner for any purpose whatsoever (but see Paragraph 7 below). This duty is enjoined on and entrusted to the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission. This Commission shall ensure that prisoners of war shall at all times be treated humanely in accordance with the specific provisions of the Geneva Convention, and with the general spirit of that Convention.

II

CUSTODY OF PRISONERS OF WAR

4. All prisoners of war who have not exercised their right of repatriation following the effective date of the Armistice Agreement shall be released from the military control and from the custody of the detaining side as soon as practicable, and, in all cases, within sixty (60) days subsequent to the effective date of the Armistice Agreement to the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission at locations in Korea to be designated by the detaining side.

5. At the time the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission assumes control of the prisoner of war installations, the military forces of the detaining side shall be withdrawn therefrom, so that the locations specified in the preceding Paragraph shall be taken over completely by the armed forces of India.

6. Notwithstanding the provisions of Paragraph 5 above, the detaining side shall have the responsibility for maintaining and ensuring security and order in the areas around the locations where the prisoners of war are in custody and for preventing and restraining any armed forces (including irregular armed forces) in the area under its control from any acts of disturbance and intrusion against the locations where the prisoners of war are in custody.

7. Notwithstanding the provisions of Paragraph 3 above, nothing in this agreement shall be construed as derogating from the authority of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission to exercise its legitimate functions and responsibilities for the control of the prisoners of war under its temporary jurisdiction.

III

EXPLANATION

8. The Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, after having received and taken into custody all those prisoners of war who have not exercised their right to be repatriated, shall immediately make arrangements so that within ninety (90) days after the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission takes over the custody, the nations to which the prisoners of war belong shall have freedom and facilities to send representatives to locations where such prisoners of war are in custody to explain to all the prisoners of war depending upon these nations their rights and to inform them of any matters relating to their return to their homelands, particularly of their full freedom to return home to lead a peaceful life, under the following provisions:

a. The number of such explaining representatives shall not exceed seven (7) per thousand prisoners of war held in custody by the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission; and the minimum authorized shall not be less than a total of five (5);

b. The hours during which the explaining representatives shall have access to the prisoners shall be as determined by the Neutral Repatriation Commission, and generally in accord with Article 53 of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War;

c. All explanations and interviews shall be conducted in the presence of a representative of each member nation of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission and a representative from the detaining side;

d. Additional provisions governing the explanation work shall be prescribed by the Neutral Repatriation Commission, and will be designed to employ the principles enumerated in Paragraph 3 above and in this Paragraph;

e. The explaining representatives, while engaging in their work, shall be allowed to bring with them necessary facilities and personnel for wireless communications. The number of communications personnel shall be limited to one team per location at which explaining representatives are in residence, except in the event all prisoners of war are concentrated in one location, in which case, two (2) teams shall be permitted. Each team shall consist of not more than six (6) communications personnel.

9. Prisoners of war in its custody shall have freedom and facilities to make representations and communications to the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission and to representatives and subordinate bodies of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission and to inform them of their desires on any matter concerning the prisoners of war themselves, in accordance with arrangements made for the purpose by the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission.

IV

DISPOSITION OF PRISONERS OF WAR

10. Any prisoner of war who, while in the custody of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, decides to exercise the right of repatriation, shall make an application requesting repatriation to a body consisting of a representative of each member nation of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission. Once such an application is made, it shall be considered immediately by majority vote the validity of such application. Once such an application is made to and validated by the Commission or one of its subordinate bodies, the prisoner of war concerned shall immediately be transferred to and accommodated in the tents set up for those who are ready to be repatriated. Thereafter, he shall, while still in the custody of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, be delivered forthwith to the prisoner of war exchange point at Panmunjom for repatriation under the procedure prescribed in the Armistice Agreement.

11. At the expiration of ninety (90) days after the transfer of custody of the prisoners of war to the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, access of representatives to captured personnel as provided for in Paragraph 8 above, shall terminate, and the question of disposition of the prisoners of war who have not exercised their right to be repatriated shall be submitted to the Political Conference recommended to be convened in Paragraph 60, Draft Armistice Agreement, which shall endeavor to settle this question within thirty (30) days, during which period the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission shall continue to retain custody of those prisoners of war. The Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission shall declare the relief from the prisoners of war status to civilian status of any prisoners of war who have not exercised their right to be repatriated and for whom no other disposition has been agreed to by the Political Conference within one hundred and twenty (120) days after the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission has assumed their custody. Thereafter, according to the application of each individual, and those who choose to go to neutral nations shall be assisted by the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission and the Red Cross Society of India. This operation shall be completed within thirty (30) days, and upon its completion, the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission shall immediately cease its functions and declare its dissolution. After the dissolution of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, whenever and wherever any of those above-mentioned civilians who have been relieved from the prisoner of war status desire to return to their fatherlands, the authorities of the localities where they are shall be responsible for assisting them in returning to their fatherlands.

V

RED CROSS VISITATION

12. Essential Red Cross service for prisoners of war in custody of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission shall be provided by India in accordance with regulations issued by the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission.

VI

PRESS COVERAGE

13. The Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission shall insure freedom of the press and other news media in observing the entire operation as enumerated herein, in accordance with procedures to be established by the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission.

VII

LOGISTICAL SUPPORT FOR PRISONERS OF WAR

14. Each side shall provide logistical support for the prisoners of war in the area under its military control, delivering required support to the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission at an agreed delivery point in the vicinity of each prisoner of war installation.

15. The cost of repatriating prisoners to the exchange point at Panmunjom shall be borne by the detaining side and the cost from the exchange point by the side on which said prisoners depend in accordance with Article 118 of the Geneva Convention.

16. The Red Cross Society of India shall be responsible for providing such general service personnel in the prisoner of war installations as required by the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission.

17. The Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission shall provide medical support for the prisoners of war as may be practicable. The detaining side shall provide medical support as practicable upon the request of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission and specifically for those cases requiring extensive treatment or hospitalization. The Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission shall maintain custody of prisoners of war during such hospitalization. The detaining side shall facilitate such custody. Upon completion of treatment, prisoners of war shall be returned to a prisoners of war installation as specified in Paragraph 4 above.

18. The Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission is entitled to obtain from both sides such legitimate assistance as it may require in carrying out its duties and tasks, but both sides shall not under any name and in any form interfere or exert influence.

VIII

LOGISTICAL SUPPORT FOR THE NEUTRAL NATIONS
REPATRIATION COMMISSION

19. Each side shall be responsible for providing logistical support for the personnel of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission stationed in the area under its military control, and both sides shall contribute on an equal basis to such support within the Demilitarized Zone. The precise arrangements shall be subject to determination between the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission and the detaining side in each case.

20. Each of the detaining sides shall be responsible for protecting the explaining representatives from the other side while in transit over lines of communication within its area, as set forth in Paragraph 23 for the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, to a place of residence and while in residence in the vicinity of but not within each of the locations where the prisoners of war are in custody. The Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission shall be responsible for the security of such representatives within the actual limits of the locations where the prisoners of war are in custody.

21. Each of the detaining sides shall provide transportation, housing, communication, and other agreed logistical support to the explaining representatives of the other side while they are in the area under its military control. Such services shall be provided on a reimbursable basis.

IX

PUBLICATION

22. After the Armistice Agreement becomes effective, the terms of this agreement shall be made known to all prisoners of war who, while in the custody of the detaining side, have not exercised their right to be repatriated.

X

MOVEMENT

23. The movement of the personnel of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission and repatriated prisoners of war shall be over lines of communication, as determined by the command(s) of the opposing side and the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission. A map showing these lines of communication shall be furnished the command of the opposing side and the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission. Movement of such personnel, except within locations as designated in Paragraph 4 above, shall be under the control of, and escorted by, personnel of the side in whose area the travel is being undertaken; however, such movement shall not be subject to any obstruction and coercion.

XI**PROCEDURAL MATTERS**

24. The interpretation of this agreement shall rest with the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission. The Neutral Repatriation Commission, and/or any subordinate bodies to which functions are designed or assigned by the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, shall operate on the basis of majority vote.

25. The Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission shall submit a weekly report to the opposing Commanders on the status of prisoners of war in its custody, indicating the numbers repatriated and remaining at the end of each week.

26. When this agreement has been acceded to by both sides and by the five powers named herein, it shall become effective upon the date the Armistice becomes effective.

Done at Panmunjom, Korea, at 1400 hours on the 8th day of June 1953, in English, Korean, and Chinese, all texts being equally authentic.

NAM IL
General, Korean People's Army
Senior Delegate,
Delegation of the Korean People's
Army and the Chinese People's
Volunteers

WILLIAM K. HARRISON, JR.
Lieutenant General,
United States Army
Senior Delegate,
United Nations Command
Delegation

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THE FAR EAST



MANCHURIA

U.S.S.R.

HOKKAIDO

JAPAN

Sea of Japan

● PEIPING
(Peking)

● PYONGWANG

● SEOUL
Incheon

Yellow Sea

CHINA

Nanking ●

Shanghai ●

Pohang ●
Taishan ●
Tientsin ●
Chungking ●

Sea of Korea

● Sasebo

SHIKOKU


KYUSHU

HONSHU

● TOKYO
● Yokohama
● Atsugi
● Nagoya
● Gifu
● Kyoto
● Osaka
● Kobe
● Hiroshima
● Fukuoka
● Naha

Okinawa

U.S. MARINE GROUND OPERATIONS KOREAN WAR 1950-1953



ZONES OF ACTION

- | | |
|-------------------------|-----------------------------|
| A. Pusan Perimeter | D. Pohang Operations |
| B. Inchon - Seoul | E. Spring Counteroffensives |
| C. Chosin Reservoir | F. East Central Front |
| G. Western Korean Front | |